Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan----you are better sometimes and bad at others.

If one understands nationalism especially Russian nationalism whiuch goes back to the Czarist days and the nationalism tied to the glory of the Soviet Union as a "superpower" the two are in fact the same.

Review both forms and you will notice Putin is working both of them in his messaging to the world and to the Russian population.


The Russian are not pulling back and are still very much interested in matching into the Ukraine--the problem is that the initial reasons which they used for the Crimea are not working currently in the Ukraine as both the Ukraine/US/NATO/EU have worked hard in the last two weeks to eliminate the Russian arguments actually quite successfully.

So they are attempting to reestablish new arguments which if you and say wm would expand out the reading to "see and understand" the other view point say reading Interfax or TASS.

I have over the last three days pasted in the comments at least three new arguments the Russians are attempting to establish as a legal reason for moving.

[OUTLAW 09]

wm/Dayuhan---this is how one reads the world press and you can critique the quote if you like.

Thoroughly read the released verbiage by Kerry in any of the leading articles and watch his video and then compare it against this short Interfax PR and one notices just how the Russians spin---or you can go back to the linked article I posted on the Russian government directions for news reporting standards issued to the Russian TV---and yes it is the same concept.

Then dissect in your fashion what Kerry formally stated to the Interfax PR.

You will I hope notice two distinct worlds---look at how the Russians define "working with" vs say the position of NATO/US/EU when they use the term "working with".

03/31 09:09 RUSSIA, U.S. AGREE TO WORK WITH UKRAINIAN GOVT, PEOPLE ON CRISIS SETTLEMENT- LAVROV

[Dayuhan]

If one understands nationalism especially Russian nationalism whiuch goes back to the Czarist days and the nationalism tied to the glory of the Soviet Union as a "superpower" the two are in fact the same.

Review both forms and you will notice Putin is working both of them in his messaging to the world and to the Russian population.

We all understand nationalism. It is not some arcane and rarefied concept.

Apart from the rather peripheral fact that they share a place in the idyllic and distorted memory lane of past Russian greatness, the Czarist empire and the Soviet Union have virtually nothing in common. The Soviet Union was intended to be the core of a global communist movement that could (and to some extent did) challenge the West in every corner of the globe and could theoretically have become a venue for global domination... of course that failed because at the end of the day Communism sucked, but the intent was there.

The Czarist empire had no such ambition and posed no such threat. It was a real threat to weak and defenseless neighbors, a very remote threat to the major powers of Europe, and no threat art all to the US. The two are not the same thing, far from it.

The Russian are not pulling back and are still very much interested in matching into the Ukraine--the problem is that the initial reasons which they used for the Crimea are not working currently in the Ukraine as both the Ukraine/US/NATO/EU have worked hard in the last two weeks to eliminate the Russian arguments actually quite successfully.

Do you really think they are so concerned with arguments and reasons? Or are they assessing the consequences that might or might not be imposed, and/or trying to organize an incident that could be used as a pretext. I assume that Ukrainian authorities realize that it would not be smart to respond to a Russian nationalist rally by breaking heads, even if the participants richly deserve it.

So they are attempting to reestablish new arguments which if you and say wm would expand out the reading to "see and understand" the other view point say reading Interfax or TASS.

I have over the last three days pasted in the comments at least three new arguments the Russians are attempting to establish as a legal reason for moving.

Yes, we see this stuff. It's pretty crude. So what?

wm/Dayuhan---this is how one reads the world press and you can critique the quote if you like.

Thoroughly read the released verbiage by Kerry in any of the leading articles and watch his video and then compare it against this short Interfax PR and one notices just how the Russians spin---or you can go back to the linked article I posted on the Russian government directions for news reporting standards issued to the Russian TV---and yes it is the same concept.

Then dissect in your fashion what Kerry formally stated to the Interfax PR.

You will I hope notice two distinct worlds---look at how the Russians define "working with" vs say the position of NATO/US/EU when they use the term "working with".

03/31 09:09 RUSSIA, U.S. AGREE TO WORK WITH UKRAINIAN GOVT, PEOPLE ON CRISIS SETTLEMENT- LAVROV

Yes, we're all aware that Russia produces a large quantity of generally pretty unsophisticated propaganda. Again, what's the point?

[JMA]

Nit-pick, nit-pick, nit-pick... whatever floats your boat.

We all understand nationalism. It is not some arcane and rarefied concept.

snip

[JMA]

Russia playing the US the 'two steps forward, one step back' routine.

Promises of Diplomacy but No Advances in Ukraine Talks

Incredibly the US has rolled over and spread its legs over the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 'theft' of Ukrainian naval vessels, aircraft and anti-aircraft missile systems.

The once great US has been reduced to demanding - without result to date - that the Russians pull their military back from the Russian/Ukrainian border but not from Crimea nor reverse the annexation.

Now it appears Russia will be prepared to take 'one step back' but not without additional terms and conditions being extracted by Russia from an all but impotent US WH.

This is history in the making. Sad to see Russia humiliating the US with such ruthless cruelty... but it has been coming for some time now.

[JMA]

Out of curiosity, I looked at early posts (mid 2011) on the Syria threads. The opinion I expressed then was that while Syria was likely to devolve into a stellar mess, the US had no critical or even pressing interests at stake, US involvement was unlikely to make things better and could easily make them worse, and that the US should therefore STFO. I certainly don't think that was "100% wrong"; I retain the same opinion to this day. I am very happy that the US had the wisdom to avoid wading into that particular mess.

Oh dear.

Lets work through it then.

This is the thread:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=Syria

Consider this a test of your integrity.

[Stan]

Stan,

The dynamics of Nationalism in a individualistic democracy (Bush) and Ethnicity or Religion in a communal society (Putin) are different. Ethnic wars can go on for centuries but Democracies lose interest in Nationalistic fights in about 5-7 years. When I have more time I will provide references, but don't confuse the two, they are not the same.

Stan,

Yes, I’m well aware of the differences with 20 years in this country and 12 collective years in 7 African countries. But I can always be confused

While Putin and company certainly tried to rouse the ethnic Russians in Estonia, it required more than just fighting words and there was sufficient evidence of paying people to incite and organize violence. It would have been far simpler to drive into Estonia and take over the town of Narva, but yet, they didn’t. In this case, ethnicity wasn’t enough.

The Russian youth in the Baltic States have no desire to return to Russia, nor a return to deprivation. They are however just ignorant enough to take on a dare when feed alcohol and being paid to incite violence. They also know just how to push the Estonians into a brawl.

Regards, Stan

[davidbfpo]

There are a number of posts in this thread which detract from the discussion and do not help. So those responsible stop.

The Crimean crisis deserves nothing better than 'Stay calm, Carry on'.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---

Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
"We all understand nationalism. It is not some arcane and rarefied concept."


Based on this comment would you then say that there are two different forms of nationalism at work inside Russia?
1. one is what I call the "populist" version being driven by the Russian population (from Czarist days)
2. and one is "hegemonic" being driven by the Russian elite ie Putin and Co. (from Comrade Stalin's SU days)

While both interact and are driving each other each ---their themes and or messaging is quite different which is something one would not normally anticipate in the common usage of the term nationalism.

In addition to the various themes and messaging there is also at the Russian political level ie Putin the use of specific terms and words that mean one thing for the Russians and another for the West---intractably tied to both styles of nationalism .

Example---when Kerry states that the new form of government is to be determined by the Ukrainians the Russians say yes BUT this is what we want as a solution---a "federated"state ie a federated country definitely means something to the West but is it exactly the same as meant by Russia?---no it is not.

Does say an "military exercise" in Western terms equal that of say the Russians are saying---where parking 80K troops on one's immediate border is being defined as an "exercise", but internally it is being viewed by the Russians as a not so subtle signal to their neighbor by what they mean "federated".

Dayuhan it is all about the use of words and how those words are being used and believe me I am not so sure you understand just how "nationalism" is being used by the Russians.

If one does in fact fully understand the two types of Russian nationalism then it is really easy to go back and review their actions and statements for the last ten years ---then their entire thinking process is very easy to comprehend.

In the US diplomacy and I think Bill M will agree we have not been good at picking up the not so subtle signs of nationalism being expressed by the Arab springs and the "colored" revolts and now by the Russians.

One could in fact be writing a current Ph.D thesis on nationalism just by taking the various statements by the Russian elites and Putin and Co. and compare them to the words being used by Interfax, TASS, and Russian TV compare them to the various social media comments being sent by the individual Russian population against what is being said in the West.

That is why right now the US diplomacy seems to be struggling-which I think is where JMA is coming from--if I can see it then my next question is why are they the US not seeing it themselves?

Again your comment is correct;
"It is not some arcane and rarefied concept."

My response is yes while it is not some arcane and rarefied concept just when was the last time you read something along the lines of say Russian or Islamic nationalism written here in SWJ or for that matter any new political articles on the exact same topic in say the last ten years?

That is the core question.

[Dayuhan]

Based on this comment would you then say that there are two different forms of nationalism at work inside Russia?

1. one is what I call the "populist" version being driven by the Russian population (from Czarist days)
2. and one is "hegemonic" being driven by the Russian elite ie Putin and Co. (from Comrade Stalin's SU days)

That sounds less like two discrete nationalisms than like a fundamental nationalist impulse being expressed in different terms by different segments of the population, and being manipulated to serve elite agendas. This is neither surprising nor unique: elite manipulation of nationalist impulses is as old as nationalist impulses.

Of course different nations, and different groups within nations, express the nationalist impulse in terms and goals specific to their own circumstances... but I don't see how any of this supports the rather extreme threat assessments we sometimes see here.

My response is yes while it is not some arcane and rarefied concept just when was the last time you read something along the lines of say Russian or Islamic nationalism written here in SWJ or for that matter any new political articles on the exact same topic in say the last ten years?

Nationalism is a regular feature of discussions on East Asia. I recall bringing it up in a discussion of the "Asian Pivot" not so long ago, pointing out that people long immersed in conflict with non-state and trans-state actors were going to have to adjust to an environment dominate by traditional nation-states and strong nationalist sentiments.

"Islamic nationalism" is to me an oxymoron, but I am perhaps excessively rigorous with definitions.

Russian nationalism is discussed in pol sci journals, I suppose less so in the mainstream press. People write books about it:

http://books.google.com.ph/books/abo...EC&redir_esc=y

Certainly there is material out there. What's not clear to me, again, is how all this supports an elevated assessment of threat.

[Firn]

I think it is indeed important to point out that Putin's Russia is not a threat to the free World as the Soviet one was. The Soviet Union was, without going into Marxist hairsplitting, the most powerful state of an ideology, which it rappresented and supported to different degrees. It was attrative to many, including the wealthier West and this made it of course a lot easier to project power on a world wide stage.

Putin's Russia does to some extent use the ideas and memories of the 'good, old' days in the SU and not only for the propaganda value. This EurasianUnion and his older comments on the tragedy of the SU's fall indicated that some of those old ideas still play a considerable part in the political process in the Kremlin. The loss of an empire is usually hard to stomach. Nationalism is another motif driving the agenda as well as anti-Western feeling.

At least this is my take on it.

[Fuchs]

Regarding nationalism and Russians; which Russians?

http://images.nationmaster.com/image...thnic_1974.jpg
This USSR map shows of course a couple regions more than today's Russia, but it also omits a couple Tatar minority regions in Western Russia.

Still, you can see how Russia is hardly a nation state in European style. Russia and China had instead grown so very large and were assembled when illiteracy was still widespread. These multi-ethnic countries were probably for these reasons able to survive while others such as Austria-Hungary or later Yugoslavia did not.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---while you might argue that nationalism is just nationalism and there is really no difference as is argued by some historians/political science professors others might break nationalism into the following categories;

1 Ethnic nationalism
2 Civic nationalism
3 Expansionist nationalism (imperialism)
4 Romantic nationalism
5 Cultural nationalism
6 Post colonial nationalism
7 Liberation nationalism
8 Left-wing nationalism
9 Liberal nationalism
10 National conservatism
11 Schools of anarchism which acknowledge nationalism
12 Religious nationalism
13 Pan-nationalism
14 Diaspora nationalism

Russian foreign policy as defined by the Putin Duma speech could in fact be a Doctrine of sorts meaning I will if I feel it necessary take over any territory that has any size of "mistreated Russians"---he defines in the Duma speech then Russians being based on ethnicity, language and culture or what Interfax recently called "genetic fund". Or if one uses the nationalism list above points 1,2 and 5.

If one really analyzed Putin's speech you would see a tad bit if not a massive bit of what the Germans called prior to the Nazi's coming to power a movement in Germany called "Blut und Boden" (points 1, 4, and 5) which set the nationalism stage for the Nazi movement to succeed.

Even Germans picked up on the "Blut und Boden" bits in his speech but we somehow missed them.

I guess if you accept the list then my use of the term hegemonic nationalism equates with point 3 or expansionist/imperialist nationalism.

Russian nationalism has taken multiple different interacting forms since the 18th century ---then expanded under the last few Czars and really expanded using the Red Army boots on the ground during WW2 in a "communist" expansion nationalism.

If we look at this Interfax PR from today you will notice the subtle form of nationalism inside the PR using ethnicity, language and culture all specific forms of nationalism in a not to subtle expansionism threat as voiced by Putin in the Duma where he stated that he had the right to protect "mistreated Russian groups" regardless in what country.

What is interesting is that one could use the Putin Doctrine to argue say in San Antonia Texas that the Mexican government needs to establish an armed presence in San Antonio to "defend the Spanish speaking people" from having to learn English in American schools. See just how dangerous this doctrine can be if it is allowed to become political reality anywhere in the world.

There was released recently a list of over 365 hotspots in the world where one country could annex another's territory using the Putin Doctrine.

MOSCOW. March 31 (Interfax) - The Russian Foreign Ministry is concerned by the Latvian authorities' plans for the teaching process to fully switch into the Latvian language as of 2018, and calls on the human rights agencies of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) to exert due pressure on Riga in order to stop discrimination of its Russian-speaking population.
"These education initiatives are another instance of the ongoing discriminatory policy of the Latvian authorities, aimed at the forced assimilation of the Russian-speaking population and the building of a mono-ethnic society in Latvia," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement posted on its website on Monday.
"The letters call for due pressure to be exerted on the Latvian authorities with the aim to stop discrimination of the Russian-speaking population based on their ethnicity and language," the ministry said.
Dolgov sent the letters to senior human rights officials in the CoE, the OSCE, and the EU, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

So again Dyauhan just how one splits the coffee bean just means your banana might in fact be my apple depending on how one defines the specific piece of fruit one is looking at.

While others might not even agree that it is a piece of fruit but that it is a flower or even a bird.

Have never been one for defining things in a strict fashion as do many professors, historians, or even bloggers---have been more for attempting to define it based on the environment where it is occurring and how it is "seen".

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan ---this is the problem that Russia is now having with it's nationalism---following the motto I took over the Crimea to "defend those poorly mistreated Russians---and the West just doe not understand" using expansionist nationalism couple to ethnic and cultural nationalism to motivate my own population in support of my political moves.

This cam in over Interfax today and it is interesting that Russian lawmakers when being briefed by OCSE reps and Russian is a signatory of the OCSE "think" that the OCSE's interpretation of internal law is wrong.

Especially when now Russia has to use any and all opportunities just to validate the Crimea takeover as being internationally legal.

Part of the theoretical problem Russia is facing is that they continue to complain about Russian mistreatment and the need for a federated region politically representing the proRussian community---now with the Crimea gone there are 1.5M fewer voters that would or could vote for the proRussian Ukrainian Regions Party so after the elections will Russia argue the ethnic Russians are "politically underrepresented" thus the vote was "illegal"?

Letting nationalism out of the bottle to drive international decisions is hard to put back into the bottle when suddenly the one that released it is in a corner.

March 31, 2014 17:40 OSCE reps to discuss Crimea with Russian lawmakers


MOSCOW. March 31 (Interfax) - Russian lawmakers think experts from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will only be able to monitor the Ukrainian presidential elections in Crimea after the OSCE recognizes Crimea as Russia's constituent territory.

President of the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly Ranko Krivokapic told reporters in Moscow on Monday that the OSCE delegation plans to meet with State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin to discuss organizational aspects of the Ukrainian presidential elections. The OSCE mission will hopefully gain access to both sides of the border, he also said.

This issue will be discussed in talks with Naryshkin later on Monday, leader of the Russian permanent delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, State Duma Deputy Nikolai Kovlayov confirmed.

"If elections are to be held in Ukraine, polling stations must be opened in Crimea and in the rest of Russia in accordance with international law, to allow those who want to participate to cast their ballots," he said.

"But if this is to be done, Crimea must be recognized as Russia's constituent territory," Kovalyov said.

"We will honor all of our obligations in accordance with international agreements. The ball is in Ukraine's court now," he said.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---if we take this from the CEPA Report 35 and read through it would we find elements of Russian nationalism or in much of what I write about which is really Russian imperialism on two different levels one driven by the population the other driven by elites.

Who says nationalism is not alive and well in Russia?

The Russian seizure of Crimea poses a direct challenge to the post-Cold War security order in Europe. By forcibly altering the borders of a sovereign neighboring state, Russia has weakened the foundations of the post-Cold War territorial settlement and reintroduced geopolitics to Europe’s Eastern frontier.1 The Crimean incursion is a violation of three international agreements that have underpinned the stability of Eastern Europe and Ukraine (the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994
and the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997). The move marks the second time in five years that Vladimir Putin’s Russia has humiliated and dismembered an ex-Soviet state without encountering a strong reaction from the West. Compared with Russia’s brief but-bloody fight in the Caucasus during the 2008 Georgia War, the invasion of Crimea represents a significant escalation in Russian military ambition. Ukraine is the largest and most important country in Eastern Europe, with 45 million inhabitants and a strategically-vital
location straddling historic invasion routes and modern day energy transit links between Europe and Eurasia. With tens of thousands of Russian troops deployed in and around Ukraine, the crisis has profound implications for the military balance of power in the region and longer-term configuration of the former Soviet Union and neighboring Central and Eastern Europe.

[Stan]

This cam in over Interfax today and it is interesting that Russian lawmakers when being briefed by OCSE reps and Russian is a signatory of the OCSE "think" that the OCSE's interpretation of internal law is wrong.

Especially when now Russia has to use any and all opportunities just to validate the Crimea takeover as being internationally legal.

You're not keen on responding to me, so I'll make this as short as possible.

Attempting to find your interfax links is a PITA. If you really want us to read more on the posts, you need to step a bit further forward. It is after all just a copy and paste manoeuvre and then hit the globe with chain links at the top of the text box and voilà.

You probably already read about purported withdrawal of Russian forces and the guestimated numbers. We've gone from a SWAG of 80K down now to 10 K. Those Ruskkies must be a fast bunch . But just in case, here it is (please note the use of a quote box, as these are not my words, but the author's).

Russia is gradually reducing the number of troops stationed near its border with Ukraine, a Kiev official said on Monday.

... the Russian forces have been gradually withdrawing from the border," the spokesman for the Ukrainian defence ministry's general staff, Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskiy, told the AFP news agency in a telephone interview.

Dmytrashkivskiy said he could not confirm how many soldiers the drawdown involved or the number of troops still stationed at Russia's border with its former Soviet satellite.

But an analyst with Kiev's Centre for Military and Political Studies, Dmytro Tymchuk, said that his sources had told him that Russia had only 10,000 soldiers remaining near the border as of Monday morning.

[Stan]

Dayuhan---while you might argue that nationalism is just nationalism and there is really no difference as is argued by some historians/political science professors others might break nationalism into the following categories;

Sorry to cut your quoted text short. For those interested, it's also listed here.

Types of nationalism

I'm curious however, not regarding just how we did not second guess Putin, but, how Putin operates.

Not a land grab, just a swift kick in the Alpha and immediately gone. What a mistake, if his worst fears were further expansion of NATO and US Force presence on his back door.

Nothing nationalistic nor ethnic here. He blew it.

[TheCurmudgeon]

We all understand nationalism. It is not some arcane and rarefied concept.

It may not be an arcane or rarefied concept, but that does not mean it is understood.

In essense, there are two ways to be part of a nation. The first is by identity at birth, associated with ethnic or religious identity. This is the involuntary type. The second is by voluntary association, as in a country like the US where the nation was created through a common set of ideals and a struggle to achieve and maintain those ideals.

Classical nationalism is the political program that sees the creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a given ethno-national group (“people” or “nation”) as a primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from the assumption that the appropriate (or “natural”) unit of culture is an ethno-nation it claims that a primary duty of each member is to abide in cultural matters by one's recognizably ethno-national culture.

...versus...

Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations (for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective) from this ascribed value.

When it comes to how it affects a population there are two sides to it: the first is the irrational belief in a common "consciousness", and the second is an irrational distrust of outsiders.

Let us now turn to question (1c), the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being at least in some sense rational. Authors in the first camp, who see it as irrational, propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. Some say, critically, that nationalism is based on “false consciousness”. But where does such false consciousness come from? The most simplistic view is that it is a result of direct manipulation of “masses” by “elites”. On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism, Elie Kedourie (1960) sees this irrationality as being spontaneous. Liah Greenfeld has recently gone as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative (2005) article. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his (2002). Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. To mention one, the French structuralist Étienne Balibar sees it as a result of “production” of ideology effectuated by mechanisms which have nothing to do with spontaneous credulity of individuals, but with impersonal, structural social factors (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1992). (For an overview of Marxist approaches see Glenn 1997). Consider now the other camp, those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists (Hardin 1985). Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. First, identification and cohesion within the ethno-national group has to do with inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group. To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: common language, customs and expectations might help him a lot in finding his way in new surroundings. Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating, and ethnic sentiment does secure the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation. A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism. This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin (1998, summarized in 2001; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich 2004; see also Laitin 2007), who uses material from the former Soviet Union. The other side of the nationalist coin has to do with conflict between various ethno-nations. It concerns non-cooperation with the outsiders, which can go very far indeed. Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do it in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if you have no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable to take precautions against him. If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as being seriously inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps, to a situation of conflict. (Such negative development is often presented as a variant of the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma.) Now, it is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts. The line of thought just sketched is often called the “rational choice approach”. It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic theories of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to the explanation of ethno-nationalism.

That probably didn't help explain much, other than the common in-group/out-group distictions found in nationalist attitudes.

Sorry for the edits, trying to make it less bulky, more to the point. If I had more time I would have written a shorter post

[TheCurmudgeon]

Stan,

Yes, I’m well aware of the differences with 20 years in this country and 12 collective years in 7 African countries. But I can always be confused

My apologies, I did not intend to appear condescending.

While Putin and company certainly tried to rouse the ethnic Russians in Estonia, it required more than just fighting words and there was sufficient evidence of paying people to incite and organize violence. It would have been far simpler to drive into Estonia and take over the town of Narva, but yet, they didn’t. In this case, ethnicity wasn’t enough.

I agree, ethnic identity only creates a common bond. It does not create the intent to go to war on its own. Some other provocation is required.

[Stan]

My apologies, I did not intend to appear condescending.

I agree, ethnic identity only creates a common bond. It does not create the intent to go to war on its own. Some other provocation is required.

Stan,

Appreciate that and no offense taken.

I know I often sound like I could care less, or, even don’t fully appreciate the significance of ethnicity in low intensity conflicts.

Being 1 of a 3-man team during the Rwandan genocide meant no second guessing, or it would cost you your life. I appreciated and calculated the hatred against the French and the distance with the remainder of the West.

I didn’t have to fully understand it, but I did need to get it right with over 4,000 dying a day all around us, and an exiled army hiding in the bush.

So, I appreciate the academic descriptions but the reality is, our administration could care less and wants fast answers without the anthro spin on things. What we do however need is a smart decision based on knowing all this Sierra and turn it into an executive summary in 5 lines or less.