Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[Dayuhan]

But there are also other implications. First, it's clear that Washington's power relative to that of other states, specifically Russia, is waning.

The talk of waning US power misses, I think, an important point. The great powers of today, going back to the start of the nuclear age, prefer to avoid direct confrontation, for obvious reasons. That's why the Cold War was fought by proxy. When one great power sets up to intervene, the rival great powers can be counted on to denounce, oppose, issue vague threats, possibly throw in a symbolic act or two (boycotting Olympics or Summits), but they don't directly confront. It's easier and safer to sit back, watch, and hope the other guy steps in a mess and opens an opportunity for some proxy action. Given the complexities and nature of intervention, that very often happens.

This is less "waning US power" than business as usual: it's the way these things have been played out for the last 50+ years. It's the way the Russians and Chinese have responded to US intervention, and the way the US has responded to Russian and Chinese intervention. It's not a new development.

[carl]

American Pride:

Nope, Russia is a third rate economy. You don't just judge by the total product, you judge by the total product divided by the number of people. So Canada and Italy rate and Russia don't. Besides it is mostly an extractive economy. Not good. Canada by the way has 35 million people and its GDP is about 1.821. Russia has 143 million and its GDP is about 2.029. That doesn't compare too well.

Their military record isn't anything to brag about. If people are up in arms about that they aren't judging it correctly. I think they are up in arms because they invade other countries. They get by so mostly on bluff. You don't have to actually be strong if nobody requires a demo.

I will not explain to you why a demographic problem is important when judging a country's immediate military strength and future potential. You should know.

Sorry I was unclear when I said they do well against countries that are little and won't fight. I should have said they do well against countries that are little OR won't fight. The "or" is important. The big question now is if things get worse, will Ukraine fight? If they do, the Russian military will be better tested but their economy won't hold, in my opinion.

If Europe wants to hand the keys to Vlad, they won't do anything as to sanctions. If they don't they will. And the reason they would is because their economies are much much stronger than Russia's and the Russians would cry uncle long before the Euros. It would take some determination though. We'll see if they have it.

Well if you think we can't handle Russia by various means when we have double the population, eight times the GDP, lots and lots of reasonably good allies, don't have the demographic problem they have and are not plagued by an insurgency that won't go away-then I guess there is no alternative but give Vlad what he wants and hope he won't want more.

[AdamG]

SIMFEROPOL, Ukraine — The Russian military set an ultimatum Sunday for Ukrainian army and navy units “to surrender weapons and leave their bases” in the Crimean peninsula, Ukraine’s acting president, Olexandr Turchinov, said in televised remarks.

According to Turchinov, the ultimatum demanded that the troops abandon their bases by 5 a.m. Sunday. But as of late afternoon, the Ukrainian military was still occupying the bases, although they were kept effectively confined to them by Russian troops blocking access.

Turchinev said the ultimatum came from the Russian military’s North Caucasus division. He said his efforts to speak about it with leaders in Moscow had been futile.

http://www.latimes.com/world/worldno...#ixzz2us1KMRGo

Ukraine has fired its navy chief, and launched a treason case against him for "refusing to fight Russians, surrendering Sevastopol headquarters, the deputy Secretary of security council told Reuters.

http://www.itv.com/news/update/2014-...rrendering-hq/

[Dayuhan]

In 2008 they fell on little contiguous Georgia and just now they took Crimea where they had a preponderance of military force already in place. Neither one of those is anything to brag about. They have had an insurgency in their south for many years that they can't get a handle on. In my view they got mostly nerve with no economy to back it up. Plus that pesky demographic problem.

Plus that pesky nuclear arsenal, which makes a difference.

Below are a list of Outlaw's suggestions of things that can be done, Right Now, to pressure Russia. They are mostly economic steps and they seem quite doable and effective. They get their power from the fact that Russia's economy is weak and can be got to.

"Step 1:
HAS anyone ever seen on any given day the amount of Russian truck traffic on the German A10 highway coming out of the Russian economy via Poland that is so dependent on EU trading? Thousands per month---NOW stop the traffic-- in fact the Ukraine as well as Poland can stop the traffic and see what the reaction will be---immediate!

The Russian economy is spiraling downward, they need foreign investment and many foreign companies are in fact leaving, and the Rubel is sinking---Russia itself is struggling economically so use the economic weapons available.

Step 2: Stop the next G8 meeting and institute a removal of Russia as they had for years fought to get in---so make it now painful to continue in the "Club". Go to the WTO and file charges for manipulating their gas prices via Gazpom to gain undue economic advantages.

Step 3. Enforce a total economic freeze on all Russian oligarch accounts outside of Russia for the entire length of time Russian remains inside the Ukraine---in fact the recent actions to freeze accounts of proRussian Ukraine oligarchs in Eastern Ukraine by Austria and Switzerland and rumored the UK was a shock wave that is now causing some of them to turn "moderate" in their comments. Watch the reaction by the oligrachs-immediate! Institute travel/visa restrictions on all Russian citizens worldwide.

Step 4. Place every Russian naval vessel that leaves the Black Sea under nearby constant surveillance and start patrolling outside territorial limits for the length of the Russian stay in Ukrainian territory.

Step 5. Review of all Russian commercial flights into and out of the EU and the US/Canada---then reduce them for the length of time the Russians remain inside the Ukraine.

Step 6. A constant calling in and discussing the issue with the Russian ambassadors stationed in EU/NATO/US countries.

Step 7. Curtail the blossoming military to military meetings between the US Army and Russian Army.

Step 8. Call for the former Ukrainian President to be arrested for murder of civilians and the theft of over 70B from the Ukrainian people."

Yes, these things can be done, right now... if the US, Europe, and Canada cooperate fully and seamlessly. What do you figure the odds are on that? The US cannot simply dictate what the response should or will be, nor can it act effectively alone. I'd guess there's a great deal of talk going on right now aimed at figuring out what courses of action everyone can agree on, and I expect the outcome will be pretty limited.

There's a playbook of unilateral US options, but it's a pretty thin one. The playbook of multilateral options is a lot thicker and potentially a lot more effective, but none of the multilateral options are going to do much unless everybody's on board.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

Why by golly you're right! I hadn't thought that cooperative action amongst the US and its allies is impossible. Here I thought it was. Too bad for us. There is nothing at all we can do now except hope Vlad will be merciful to the world. I thought too that, as Outlaw 09 says, we have an arsenal of financial tools developed since 9-11 that can put a world of hurt on the Russian oligarchs thereby putting a world of hurt on Vlad. Too bad those won't have much effect either. Sigh , there is nothing to be done.

Their nukes do make a difference. Of course so do ours and the Brit's and France's and all the others and all tend to cancel each other out and all of which has nothing at all to do with Russia's conventional capabilities which are what is in play here.

[JMA]

There's a playbook of unilateral US options, but it's a pretty thin one. The playbook of multilateral options is a lot thicker and potentially a lot more effective, but none of the multilateral options are going to do much unless everybody's on board.

What are these options you allude to? Care to elaborate?

[Firn]

No time for much writing. This is of course from Euromaidens PR team so handle bit care but it pictures the Russian strategy well:



I know it is for the internal consumption, but please...

Young, very fit, masked Russian SF or so: You are doing it too professionally, fine trigger control and fire arcs and all.

Meanwhile those pictures seem to fit precious accusations that somebody is paying for having at least additional manpower to stage pro-Russian demostrations

[Firn]

I posted before about the deep economic links of the Crimea with the other Ukrainian regions and it's reliance on irrigation water, electricity, gas plus the many trade goods coming over the rail & roads from the North. I concluded that the Crimean economy will suffer very badly and that the Russians will have difficulties to avoid a big crisis and to supply it properly.

Now we hear this:

Laura Mills @lauraphylmills

Russian wires reporting that PM Dmitry Medvedev issued an order to build a bridge across the Kerch straights linking Russia and Crimea.

Perhaps part of the progaganda war, but if Russia will continue it's occupation in the long run in a half-away efficient manner a bridge sounds at first like a decent idea.

[Firn]

After having ticked off the financial impact and the economic troubles it is time to look at the behaviour of the Ukrainian forces.

Ukraine navy officers reject plea to defect to Russian-backed Crimea

The officers broke into applause as Haiduk read them an order from Kiev removing Berezovsky from his position, and told them that Berezovsky was facing treason charges. When Haiduk had finished his dry but compelling address, the officers spontaneously broke into the national anthem, and some were seen to cry. Berezovsky showed no visible sign of emotion.

"I know my men will stay loyal to their oaths," Haiduk said before the address. "What Berezovsky has done is a matter for him alone. When he brought intruders in here, we did not offer armed resistance as would have been our right, in order to avoid any provocations the other side would like."

Officers at the HQ said Berezovsky had committed treachery twice – the first time when he broke his oath, and the second time on Monday morning when he requested permission to enter the headquarters and let several Russian special forces officers slip in behind him.

I mentioned before that now after the confusion and surprise have ended it will be much harder to convince the remaining Ukrainian forces of the Crimea to defect by words alone.

Ukrainian BMP rolling east from the Odessa region.

Not everybody is understandably happy about those movements, there is also a considerable number of Russian speakers in the region. This doesn't mean that there were no Ukrainian speakers there to voice their opinion. Most of the peaceful protesters were old, note the red flag. The tiny barricade was removed within 5 minutes.

The young men jumping up and standing on the movers are clearly joining up. Note the blue armbinds.

[slapout9]

On another thread I said that the new flash points were likely to be Race,Religion and Language. This is a good example. Putin will protect the "Human Rights" of the Russian speaking people of the Ukraine along with protecting the major seaport for his Navy....the rest can go to the EU.

[jmm99]

for doing a bang up job on this story. Nice graphics, which often say more than thousands of words.

IMO (and broken crystal ball): If Georgia and Sudetenland I (Sudetenland II being when Adolf gobbled the rest of Cz) are the precedents, then Slap's post just above suggests the eventual diplomatic outcome: a secure Russian naval base in the Crimea, with an ethnic Russian buffer zone in southern and eastern Ukraine following the 2010 election results, leaving the rest of the Ukraine for the EU (at least for now).

JMA: Here's the US playbook on the Ukraine:



aka "All Options Are on the Table" John - doing what he does best: lofty rhetoric (Youtube now, and Youtube then).

Of course, the WH had to "refine" his statements (from Politico's "All Options Are on the Table" article):

Secretary of State John Kerry said Sunday that “all options” were “on the table” as Washington determines how to respond to the Crimea crisis, but a senior administration official later told reporters he was describing the American “menu” of non-military options.

“We are focused on political and economic and diplomatic and economic options,” the official said. “We do have a wide range of options to include isolation, potential sanctions, relationships between Russia [and other countries]. … Our goal is to uphold the territorial integrity and government of Ukraine, not to have a military escalation. I don’t think we’re focused right now on some sort of military intervention. I don’t think that would be an effective way to deescalate the situation.”

So, don't expect a lot out of NATO Art. 4 and Art. 5 - which is going to be Germany's call anyway.

Ashley Deeks (a reasonable sort) looks at the Russian Forces in Ukraine: A Sketch of the International Law Issues, and concludes (after going through the major points):

Russia’s invasion of Crimea provides the latest evidence of two recurrent themes in “use of force” law: That many of its concepts remain malleable on paper, and that certain forcible actions fall within the core understandings of those concepts, such that most credible observers would agree that those actions violate international law.

To which, I can only say - So What ? Recourse to Thucydides would seem a more fruitful employment of one's time and effort.

Regards

Mike

[AmericanPride]

I'd like to focus on the new Ukrainian government that has taken shape. The media has mostly ignored or downplayed the role of right-wing militants in the revolution. However, Svoboda, an openly racist neo-nazi party, holds four ministry posts in the new government: Vice Prime Minister, Defense, Agrarian Policy and Food, and Ecology and Natural Resources. It was quoted somewhere (I'll have to dig up the link) that members of this party view Ukraine's alliance with pro-West activists as not an end, but only a tactic to break the country's relationship with Russia. Given the ethnic and religious history of the region (specifically its experience in World War II; Svoboda leaders memoralize the Ukrainian SS division), I think this is a legitimate concern. Jewish groups in Ukraine certainly take it seriously. It doesn't help that when John McCain visited Ukraine several months ago, he openly embraced the party leader.This party isn't only anti-Russian, it's also anti-West in its ideology.

Now, let's assume that Ukraine turns firmly westward, and to avoid the pending economic crisis, accepts conditional IMF loans (as was offered during the EU negotiations that Yanukovych turned down). These loans are smaller than what was offered by Russia and they're also tied to austerity measures that have proven unpopular in the rest of Europe, and gave rise to far-right parties in those countries. Reactionary organizations frequently appear during times of economic duress. The politics of this situation are not promising, either from Washington or Moscow's perspective.

It was reported this morning that Moscow has demanded of Kiev to return to the unity government agreement of last month negotiated by the EU, but virtually ignored by the protesters who ousted Yanukovych that same day (and ignored by Washington after Yanukovych disappeared). This was followed by a rapid defection from Yanukovych's party in parliament and the consequent take over of the government by the opposition. And Berlin has already offered to Moscow a fact-finding mission to Crimea to help facilitate negotiations. I don't think Washington or Brussels is desirous of a return to the old agreement since their allies are already in power in Kiev.

However, Moscow does have the upper hand in this situation since it physically occupies Ukrainian territory and so far, Washington has only responded with a number of soft threats. Occupying Crimea provides Moscow with far more leverage in the coming negotiation period than the prospect of losing a G8 summit damages Russia's economic standing.

There are calls for secession votes in parts of Ukraine which are forthcoming later this month. So I think we're looking at a couple of scenarios:

(1) the Kiev government, facing collapse, calls new elections. This could mollify secessionist sentiment and keep Moscow honest about Ukraine's territorial integrity. But right now there's strong disincentives for this in Kiev and in Washington.

(2) the secessionist votes go forward. Given the reports of Russian agitation in this regions and the generally favorable view of Russia in the first place, it'll probably be successful. What does that mean for Ukraine and Russia? No idea. Could also lead to a shooting war or at the least widespread civil unrest.

Kiev has to make a decision soon with the pressure of its outstanding financial obligations coming due this month and the votes at the end of the month. The opposition alliance is likely to be strained as a result. With Svoboda in the Defense Minister post, that's also a concern to see what extent he pushes for mobilization and armed confrontation rather than negotiation.

EDIT: Early elections could also bolster the position of the new government internally since polls indicate that Svoboda has suffered in popularity since the last elections and was only bolstered by taking an active role in the protests. However they do have a more visible role in government now, so that could be offset. But new elections offers the opportunity to reduce the influence of this party as well as establish democratic legitimacy for the new government.

[AmericanPride]

Some more updates:

“Diplomacy is not a sign of weakness, but rather more necessary than ever,” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told reporters after an emergency EU meeting in Brussels today.

EU Seeks Dialogue Before Sanctions to Ease Russia-Ukraine

No surprise here. As I and others have remarked, the Europeans, particularly Berlin, will be in no hurry to impose economic sanctions destrucitive to their own economic relations with Moscow. Sure, the US can impose unilateral sanctions but that those will be more limited in scope. Importantly for Moscow, this provides an opening for negotiations after the requisite posturing by Europe, Russia, and the US. Paris came through in the Russian-Georgian conflict as a facilitator; my expectation is that it will likely be Berlin this time. I see four major open questions:

1) What will be the political status of Crimea?
2) What will be the political status of other Russian enclaves in Ukraine?
3) How will the Kiev government handle the financial situation?
4) What will be the political conditions for governance of the new Ukraine administration?

The March 6th deadline for Brussels and the end of month secession votes are forcing mechanisms for Moscow and Kiev, but not strong ones. I think the strongest one is the financial shortfall; how Kiev resolves that problem will determine the fate of the new government. In the way the situation is shaping up, I think holding elections is the only feasible way forward.

[Fuchs]

For many years people for whom I have little respect claimed that Germany could not make do without its nuclear powerplants (actually non-nuclear reliable electricity production capacity was larger than even German peak electricity consumption and import is always an option).
The Merkel did one of her sudden u-turns on long-held positions of her party and did practically shut down the nuclear powerplants overnight. Germany coped with it and is still an electricity net exporter.

I suppose this may have influenced Russian opinion about German 'dependence' on their gas (there's no dependence on their oil anyway). I criticized the belief in this dependence long ago on my blog; in my opinion it's a typical fear held by insecure, conservative, fearful people. Someone with good knowledge of history would understand that a loss of Russian gas supplies would merely be a major annoyance.

Putin's advisers may have understood this already, and this may bear fruits sooner or later. I've read comments about how the Putin crowd doesn't respect the other European countries all that much anyway, considering them as dependent on the U.S. (a novel and intriguing rumour, not the least in regard to Hollande's France).

[AmericanPride]

Back to Germany. Here's an article from the New Republic on why Germany is not keen on sanctions:

According to the Wall Street Journal, Phillip Missfelder, a senior member of the German legislative body, said, “Economic sanctions against Russia would damage Germany itself. Sanctions are always bad for Germany as an export-driven nation.” He later added that they “are currently not an option.” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also said on Sunday that the G7 countries should not kick Russia out of the G8, as the U.S. has threatened.

Currently Berlin is opposed to both punishing sanctions and to expelling Moscow from G8. There was another article discussing the suspension of negotiations regarding Russian visa access to the EU; that would be similar to the EU's response to the Georgian war, suspenion of trade negotiations. In the long-term, Moscow could potentially be economically weakened by sanctions or other reprisals from Brussels and Washington, but events on the ground are moving more quickly. Kiev will be out of cash in several weeks and there is pressure in parts of Ukraine for a secession vote this month.

So I think discussions about how the impact on Russia's economy will compel it to abandon its military operation overlooks several significant developments that not only demand immediate attention, but also will change the situation in such a way that the conditions of Russia's economy won't matter in the outcome.

[AmericanPride]

According to the Telegraph:

However, a document photographed in Downing Street suggested that Britain is concerned about the economic impact of any sanctions against Russia. The paper states that the “UK should not support, for now, trade sanctions … or close London’s financial centre to Russians”.

The document also stated that Britain would not support any Nato military preparations and said that the United Nations rather than the EU should take the lead in sending observers to Ukraine. It suggested that ministers were instead considering a more cautious approach including visa restrictions and travel bans on key Russian figures.

It appears like any resolution to this conflict will be led by Europe, not Washington. This has the advantage of allowing Europea to figure out an appropriate solution while enabling Washington to continue to posture without committment. The G7 stated that they are prepared to provide financial support to Kiev, but there are no details. That would stabilize Ukraine but won't dislodge Moscow from Crimea.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Poland has invoked Article 4 of Nato's founding treaty, under which consultations can be requested when an ally feels their security is threatened. Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski has said that while the Ukraine crisis is not a direct threat to Poland and that the country is safe, Poland wants to enlist Nato as a tool to work for stabilisation in Ukraine.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26413953

I am not even sure what we have left in EUCOM. I know we have no Tanks.

US Army last tanks depart from Germany

I find it interesting that, as the Army is arguing to maintain their numbers because we can never predict the future, they are not (yet) using this as an "I told you so" moment. Perhaps because there is little they can do in less than 90 days that is sustainable.

[Fuchs]

The U.S.Army would hardly arrive in time and in force if Russia actually attacked with what little it has nearby. The Ukrainian forces are poorly prepared and have the cohesion and reliability issues so typical for multi-ethnic countries with strong internal tensions.

The East Ukraine is simply too far away for anything but air-deployed forces. The Bulgarians, Hungarians and Romanians have little to no relevant forces capable of a long road march on short notice.
The Poles and Germans have hardly enough to react in tie for a Baltic crisis, and the Ukraine is much farther away. The Poles would also need to keep at least enough forces at home to cope with Russians at Kaliningrad and the forces of Belarus at least for a short time.

The USN is largely irrelevant because it's not going to go through the Bosporus afaik.

The USAF will find relatively few airbases in a fine condition anywhere near the East Ukraine: Some Cold War airbases and international airports in Romania and the also very distant NATO bases in Turkey.

The Greek forces are simply not in a good condition for obvious reasons (the Greek army was a huge paper tiger anyway) and the largely obsolete Turkish forces are rather far away, save for their air force and navy.


NATO never bothered to prepare for a very short-term crisis in Eastern Europe. Our Allies (Baltic, Poland) already bemoaned that during the years of Iraq occupation stupidity. Shinseki's "four day Stryker brigade deployment" fetish was at least reassuring on an improvised basis, but later on nobody seemed to take Eastern European crisis potential particularly serious in Western capitals. Reportedly NATO became only serious about planning for Baltic defence a year or two ago.


So a hot conflict would be more of an embarrassment to NATO than TF Hawk was to the U.S.Army. Then again, plenty other conflicts including Kosovo and Libya were also embarrassing, since NATO air power refused to set up forward airfields and instead worshipped the golden calf of aerial refuelling.

[carl]

I don't understand why Western conventional response would be a preferred option. There are lots of Ukrainians available to fight the Russians if it comes to that and they are already organized into an army and air force. All they would really need, at least in the beginning, is money, supplies and as much economic mischief (to include cyber ops) directed at the Russians as the West could manage. Those things would give the Russians a lot to handle, maybe more than they could handle.

If that didn't work and the Russians prevailed, what did they just win? They just won tens of millions of thoroughly ticked off Ukrainians who would be thrilled to receive help from the special services of a long list of countries who would love to see the Russians choke to death on their conquest. I imagine that would be right up the alley of guys like Outlaw 09 and Bill Moore. The bear may end up biting off a big chunk of meat that has a grenade inside.

[Fuchs]

Look at the map.
If the Crimea declares independence or joins Russia, no Ukrainian forces could fight their way through the tiny land bridge without extreme heavy weapons (artillery, bombs) support - and even shiploads of DPICM wouldn't do the trick.

The Ukrainian government needs an operational and loyal divisional equivalent on the Crimea ASAP if it wants to prevail in face of a determined Putin.