Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

Yes, it is extremely ridiculous, and also very obviously ridiculous. It's a good example of the Russian ineptness at handling information... who reads Interfax material anyway, and how many people are really going to believe it? The threat of an information campaign is measured not by its extent, but by its quality and its impact, areas where the Russians go badly wrong. Shoveling hotter fresher BS on top of old stale BS does not convince people. Eventually it just ends up discrediting the source.

Putin did of course get a patriotic bounce in popularity after Crimea, but how long will that last? Isn't there a deep-rooted cynicism and distrust toward official information in Russia? How long will it be before that takes over and the crude propaganda campaign starts shooting itself in the foot?

Outside of Russia Putin has a few admirers on the conspiracy theory fringe, largely among those who imagine him as a challenger to some imaginary "New World Order" construct and those who admire his strutting homophobic machismo. That's a fringe of a fringe, though, and one without influence. Of course those who really loathe the US will side with Russia by reflex, but that would be the case no matter what information goes around.

I really don't see Russian information operations as much of a threat. Extensive, yes... but effective? Are they selling the product? To who?



Yes, many people have been saying this since long before the Ukraine events.

Dayuahn--then you do not understand how they have been controlling the global news cyles and how the lancing works.

You evidently do not understand the target populations as well---the Russian population, the Crimea and eastern Ukrainians, and the Europeans. The US population was to a degree influenced by the US RT which actually has a large following and a number of US organizations and politicans.

I posted back a really long time ago in this thread---a chart depicting the depth of the information war.

It was working extremely well until the airliner crash and then crashed their information war with the plane.

See if you had understood the cycle then you would have noticed the first lance was Interfax, then followed by about 4-5 hrs later an extended article from RIA that set the tone to be picked up by the Global press as the press Googles as well looking for short article to pass on and act as filler.

Here in Berlin is a 100% Russian owned media company that is one of the worlds largest providers of video/video articles, film, and photo materials to the global news agencies, TV stations, and print media. So guess whose view point is being passed daily?

That is just the two news agencies---then look at the world wide web of news stations, TV stations and foreign reporters in the various countries that continued the drum beats---one story I tracked for six complete global news cycles.

By the way even CNN got caught carrying a complete fake report funneled to them by the information war. Yesterday a Brit TV reporter for RT UK can captured by the UA held of awhile and then deported--and he is not a friend of the Ukraine and reports in the UK.

The Maidan was the trigger for the Crimea and the eastern Ukraine---not the cause.

If you have been following Putin's comments since the Crimea you would have caught one video where he gave instructions to his NSC to analyze the entire range of colored revolts and the Arab Springs to see what Russia must do to protect itself. This comment was carried in clear text and in front of TVs---the world just raced over it.

Then over the last ten days a whole series of laws to do just that have been passed.

So explain to me again just how did the world know before the Maidan that Putin was "threatened" by the colored revolts when he himself did not voice that until three months ago?

[Firn]

I think many in the West mistake themselves as the target audience for Russia's information operations through its mainstream media. How many Americans actually read/watch Russia Today, Interfax, and so on? I don't think the Russians are so incompetent as to not recognize that. During the Cold War, the Russians were more subtle by penetrating Western media outlets that they knew were well received by Western audiences; influencing reporters, sending in opinion pieces, and so on. Why would that strategy have changed now? The conspiracy theories spun by Russian-originated media IMO is aimed at the Russian audience.

Maybe this is not the best place to discuss it, but obviously the Kremlin's strategy is to tailor it's message to the audience. The Western world gets targeted by various means, be it think thanks, news stations, blogs, social media, online comments or so forth. We have the thread about it's links with European right (and a least one Italian Mafioso) and the cyber and info ops one.

A considerable problem of the Kremlin is of course that propaganda intended for Russian consumption, which is far to wild and crazy for almost all Western audience, still reaches across borders. In the case of MH17 it certainly hit the national news in Italy and Germany. In short the strategy is clear but the execution difficult and sometimes sloppy.

[davidbfpo]

This article's theme is President Putin -v- Stelkov, but IMHO this admission is more important:

In Strelkov’s recent video posted online, he said he “could never have imagined” that of the more than 4.6 million people living in the Donetsk region, only about 1,000 volunteers were willing to join his rebel army to defend Novorossiya: “We can see anything but crowds of volunteers outside our gate,” admitted Strelkov, whose nom de guerre means “gunman” and whose real surname is Girkin.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...le-defeat.html

[OUTLAW 09]

From JCoS General Dempsey:

“You’ve got a Russian government that has made a conscious decision to use its military force inside another sovereign nation to achieve its objectives,” he said. “They clearly are on a path to assert themselves differently not just in Eastern Europe, but Europe in the main, and towards the United States.”

[Dayuhan]

Dayuahn--then you do not understand how they have been controlling the global news cyles and how the lancing works.

You evidently do not understand the target populations as well---the Russian population, the Crimea and eastern Ukrainians, and the Europeans. The US population was to a degree influenced by the US RT which actually has a large following and a number of US organizations and politicans.

I posted back a really long time ago in this thread---a chart depicting the depth of the information war.

Yes, we all know it's deep, it's wide, it's extensive in all dimensions. This is completely irrelevant to the core questions: is it effective? Is it actually selling the product? To answer that you need opinion polls and other indicators of public opinion, not charts depicting the structure of the information campaign.

For all it's depth and breadth, the Russian propaganda campaign is anything but sophisticated. The content is crude, often to the point of absurdity, as you regularly point out. Bombarding people with ridiculous claims and wild accusations does not convince, and it can very easily bounce back on the source.

I wonder if the Russians have examined the lessons of the US domestic propaganda campaign supporting war on Iraq. That campaign was effective... at first. Americans were all too willing to believe that Saddam was a saber-toothed threat, an AQ-supporting, WMD-armed monster who had to be removed. They were willing to support the war, as long as it went well. How long did that last?

Obviously it's difficult to know whether Russians really believe everything the government throws at them, but given their quite extended experience with managed information and state propaganda, it seems likely that there's a lot of doubt and a lot of cynicism about the official line, especially in urban areas with better access to outside news sources. Patriotic groundswells are transient phenomena, and when they're done crudely managed propaganda becomes more liability than asset.

Again, the extent, depth and breadth of an information campaign don't mean a thing if the content is crap. The question is not "who where does it reach", but "who does it convince"... because unconvincing propaganda only undermines its source.

So explain to me again just how did the world know before the Maidan that Putin was "threatened" by the colored revolts when he himself did not voice that until three months ago?

Every authoritarian government is threatened by these events, especially when they start showing signs of being contagious. The semi-spontaneous urban insurrection has been high on the list of authoritarian nightmares since the storming of the Bastille (at least), and given the events that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union it is obviously going to be a concern of the Russian oligarchy. Controlling information has always been hard in urban environments, and today's information environment exacerbates that, so any time precedents start emerging, authoritarian governments are going to start worrying. The Arab Spring precedent was an obvious threat to corrupt and autocratic governments, and it was certainly a threat to people like Putin, Lukashenko, and Yanukovych, whether they publicly voiced that threat or not. You can bet your last peso that when the Ukrainians went to the streets there was a whole lot of nervous concern over domestic conditions in Moscow and Minsk, whether or not anything was publicly said.

The Chinese government doesn't talk about that threat: there's good reason not to, as talking about it would only encourage what they fear. That doesn't mean they don't feel threatened.

[BrentWilliams]

Rather interesting article in the Washington Post. Ukraine seems to be continuing the ground offensive.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...6ed_story.html

Government troops were engaged in a pitched battle with rebels on Saturday just outside the separatist bastion of Donetsk and plan to advance next into the city that has been at the heart of the pro-Russian insurgency.

If the army succeeds in retaking Horlivka, a city of almost 300,000 people where fighting was fierce Saturday, they will be within a few miles of Donetsk. Rebels have held sway there since the spring, ruling what they call the Donetsk People’s Republic. Cars created roadblocks out of town Saturday, and the railway station was packed with people desperate to board the next train out.

It is looking increasenly likely that the Ukraine will succeed unless Russia directly intervenes on the ground. If they do, Europe and the United States is almost certain to respond with economic sanction that will cripple the Russian economy. The current outline of sanctions outlined after the Malaysian airlines flight would be vastly expanded. One would also think aid in weapons and training would be on the table. If Russia doesn't directly intervene, what is to stop the Ukraine from turing their attention to Crimea next?

[kaur]

Two interesting interceptions by SBU in Russian. In first one DPR leader Borodai is getting some instructions from former Russian presidentianl administration and United Russia party official Chesnakov. It seems that Borodai arrived from Russia with suitcases full of money and he asks for more. Chesnakov gives to Borodai instructions with what message should give interview Girkin/Strelkov ( Putin is Russkii Mir leader and i'm his subordinate). It seems that Chesnakov is back in administration with Surkov covering Ukraine. During second intercept Borodai's deputy is complaining how stupidly Girkin is acting in Donetsk.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=GH-BdpHf7jg

[JMA]

Did he say what the US was going to do about it?

From JCoS General Dempsey:

“You’ve got a Russian government that has made a conscious decision to use its military force inside another sovereign nation to achieve its objectives,” he said. “They clearly are on a path to assert themselves differently not just in Eastern Europe, but Europe in the main, and towards the United States.”

[Shchors]

There have been few detailed descriptions in Western publications of the campaign by the Ukrainian Army to expel the Russian inspired separatists from East Ukraine. What first started in mid-April 2014 as a low level insurgency led by Russian GRU spetsnaz operatives that was centered in an urban bastion named Sloviansk, has since transformed into essentially a conventional war between 30,000 attacking Ukrainians against 10,000 defending Russians in an area 9,000 square miles in size, which encompasses numerous cities, one of them a one million plus metropolis - the City of Donetsk. From what I have been able to extrapolate from sketchy press releases from the Ukrainian armed forces and the more detailed but yet unverified situation reports from the Russian commanders, the Ukrainians, while tactically unsophisticated, have acquired enough combat experience to mount what, by all accounts is a rather elegant and nuanced campaign. The Ukrainians have initiated simultaneous battalion sized armored maneuvers on multiple fronts to spread out the defenders. The operation has also revealed attempts to control tempo and timing of sequential attacks. The Ukrainians also sent a brigade-sized mechanized column in a daring (and perhaps ill advised) flanking maneuver to try to seal off the Russian border. These troops are now trapped against the border for over two weeks but are still dug in and resupplied by parachute drop. (The Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff, General Muzychko, has decided to ignore the pleas of these troops for a relief offensive and has shifted reserves elsewhere) The Russians have proved to be the better infantry commanders (all are veterans of the Chechen Wars, Bosnia and Georgia) and have orchestrated a daring maneuver themselves when 1500 escaped from encirclement in Sloviansk at the very last moment. However, Ukrainian armor and artillery crews have gradually acquired competence and have buttressed their unreliable mech infantry with volunteer battalions, which make up for their lack of training with enthusiasm. (The mech infantry is comprised of recruits, while the specialists are contract soldiers) Throughout, the separatists have utilized state-of-the art MANPADS, with which they have downed some 10 attack helicopters and 6 attack warplanes. Despite the heavy losses, the small and outdated Ukrainian air force continues to fly 10-15 close air support sorties daily, with noticeable effect. Moreover, the Russians have used Kornet and Konkurs anti-tank missiles against Ukrainian tanks (upgraded old T-64s). The separatists have also acquired close to 100 T-64 and T-72 tanks themselves, with generous numbers of artillery and rockets, all smuggled over the border from Russia. As we all know, recently they even acquired BUK anti-air systems, with tragic results to passengers of Malaysian Airlines. Casualties so far amount to approximately 1,500 to 2,000 KIA and wounded on each side. As always, the big killer in the steppe is massed artillery. In fact, the Russians have fired artillery support from across the border. As of today, July 25, 2014, the Ukrainians appear to have turned the flank of a strong redoubt in Horlivka (which opens the way towards Donetsk from the north) and are close to seizing an important road junction at Debaltsevo, along a key supply line. All of these names would have been familiar to WWII era Red Army and Wehrmacht commanders, as bloody battles were fought to seize and to hold these locations in the Great Patriotic War. If Russia does not intervene directly or injects substantial irregular reinforcements soon (at least 5,000), the Ukrainians may have their first ever victorious campaign against Russia in history. (They won a few small battles in 1919 but never a war) One of the ironies of this entire struggle is that the people of Donetsk now realize that Putin never intended to liberate them and, to the contrary, has ruined their region economically for years to come. Ukraine looks like a better option and many are starting to see Kyiv as the lesser of two evils. Putin's adventures in Crimea and Donetsk have led to unintended consequences; (1) a Ukraine unified for the first time in its history, regardless of language (many of the Ukrainian fighters speak Russian; the orders in the Ukrainian army at the tactical level are issued in Russian);(2) the growth of national myths forged in a war with Russia that may develop into a true Ukrainian nationalism (and a break from Russia once and for all) and (3) disenchantment with Putin among nationalist voters in Russia proper (most of the blue collar population) which may threaten his hold on political power at the next election. There is some talk of Igor Strelkov, the Russian field commander in Donetsk, as a viable alternate candidate (unless Putin has him killed at the front). In any case, this war holds valuable lessons regarding the effectiveness of MANPADS against tactical air as well as the dynamics of a conventional war where neither side has air superiority. It offers a conflict involving urban warfare as well as broad mechanized maneuver and where artillery is still the king of battle.

[JMA]

Thanks Shchors, interesting perspective.

[AmericanPride]

BTW AP... are you running interference for Obama or the Russians or both? Seriously.

That's for you to find out.

[AmericanPride]

Wrong questions... what happens if Ukraine does not suppress the Russian aggression? What would Russia's next move be?

BTW - it is the right question. From the Russian foreign ministry today:

"The additional sanction list is direct evidence that the EU countries have set a course for fully phasing out cooperation with Russia over the issues of international and regional security. This includes the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, and other new challenges and dangers," a statement said.

Here's the problem: the U.S. is in retrenchment. One, it's exhausted from the War on Terrorism. Two, it's more or less paralyzed by bitter political infighting (and it doesn't look like the mid-term elections will ease that pressure). And this infighting is sharpened by the measurable decline in the U.S.' relative power. Three, demands for U.S. actions abroad have not declined. Ukraine. Iran. Iraq. Syria. Libya. The list goes on.

The U.S. is not a hegemon. It does not have the power to unilaterally enforce it demands on any state or combination of states. The last year's worth of events have made this painfully obvious. It's not a matter of mustering sufficient political will. That's an unrealistic expectation. Consequently, the U.S. now more than any time in its recent history must rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests. What outcome in Ukraine is in the best U.S. interest? What kind of relationship with Russia is in the U.S. interest? What are the linkages between the U.S.-Russian relationship and other U.S. interests around the world? These are questions you have failed to answer. Ukraine is not the only issue - or the most important one - facing the U.S.

So - we freeze out the Russians because of Ukraine. Fine. What next? Does the U.S. now commit itself to Ukraine's security for the foreseeable future? To what extent is that commitment elevated? NATO membership? What signal does increased U.S. commitment to Ukraine send to Moscow? Where does the cycle of escalation end? How will Moscow now act as a spoiler in the international arena on issues of U.S. interest?

[AmericanPride]

It is looking increasenly likely that the Ukraine will succeed unless Russia directly intervenes on the ground. If they do, Europe and the United States is almost certain to respond with economic sanction that will cripple the Russian economy. The current outline of sanctions outlined after the Malaysian airlines flight would be vastly expanded. One would also think aid in weapons and training would be on the table. If Russia doesn't directly intervene, what is to stop the Ukraine from turing their attention to Crimea next?

That appears to be the case at the moment. The Ukrainian advance has proceeded surprisingly well given their initial poor performance at the outset of the conflict. I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine. Russia's most notable military successes since 1991 have been rapid, decisive campaigns with clearly defined political objectives. I don't think there's a clear political outcome that could emerge from Russian intervention in the east - the first sign of that was Moscow's refusal to extend annexation after the Donetsk referendum though it accepted the Crimean one. The Russians do not want to be involved any more than they have to be.

I also don't think the Ukrainians will push into Crimea. That's already occupied territory and formally annexed by Russia. Attacking Crimea would compel the Russians to further escalate the conflict to protect its own credibility and would give the pretext for the 30,000 Russian soldiers on Ukraine's border to come streaming across.

The resignation of the Yatsenyuk government is a clear indicator that even with military victory, Kiev still faces many internal challenges. Defeating the insurgents militarily will alone not solve Ukraine's fundamental political problem. Yatsenyuk claimed that the coalition collapsed because his allies did not want to take part in the painful political process of imposing austerity measures on the Ukrainian economy (especially in a time of insecurity). That's not a surprise, since the origin of this crisis in the first place was Yanukovych's inability (or unwillingness) to resolve that problem too.

[OUTLAW 09]

Yes, we all know it's deep, it's wide, it's extensive in all dimensions. This is completely irrelevant to the core questions: is it effective? Is it actually selling the product? To answer that you need opinion polls and other indicators of public opinion, not charts depicting the structure of the information campaign.

For all it's depth and breadth, the Russian propaganda campaign is anything but sophisticated. The content is crude, often to the point of absurdity, as you regularly point out. Bombarding people with ridiculous claims and wild accusations does not convince, and it can very easily bounce back on the source.

I wonder if the Russians have examined the lessons of the US domestic propaganda campaign supporting war on Iraq. That campaign was effective... at first. Americans were all too willing to believe that Saddam was a saber-toothed threat, an AQ-supporting, WMD-armed monster who had to be removed. They were willing to support the war, as long as it went well. How long did that last?

Obviously it's difficult to know whether Russians really believe everything the government throws at them, but given their quite extended experience with managed information and state propaganda, it seems likely that there's a lot of doubt and a lot of cynicism about the official line, especially in urban areas with better access to outside news sources. Patriotic groundswells are transient phenomena, and when they're done crudely managed propaganda becomes more liability than asset.

Again, the extent, depth and breadth of an information campaign don't mean a thing if the content is crap. The question is not "who where does it reach", but "who does it convince"... because unconvincing propaganda only undermines its source.



Every authoritarian government is threatened by these events, especially when they start showing signs of being contagious. The semi-spontaneous urban insurrection has been high on the list of authoritarian nightmares since the storming of the Bastille (at least), and given the events that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union it is obviously going to be a concern of the Russian oligarchy. Controlling information has always been hard in urban environments, and today's information environment exacerbates that, so any time precedents start emerging, authoritarian governments are going to start worrying. The Arab Spring precedent was an obvious threat to corrupt and autocratic governments, and it was certainly a threat to people like Putin, Lukashenko, and Yanukovych, whether they publicly voiced that threat or not. You can bet your last peso that when the Ukrainians went to the streets there was a whole lot of nervous concern over domestic conditions in Moscow and Minsk, whether or not anything was publicly said.

The Chinese government doesn't talk about that threat: there's good reason not to, as talking about it would only encourage what they fear. That doesn't mean they don't feel threatened.

Actually Dayuhan then you quite do not understand the depth of it's pull here in Europe, the Ukraine where it is being used very effectively as well as in Russia where Putin's poll numbers are still off the charts.

Secondly, colored revolts threaten in fact every type of government why-it usually is about something that the population as a whole takes issues with---again it is all about the rule of law and good governance which in the case of say the Ukraine was using the EU image to voice it's displeasure with the government rit large.

Actually the Ukraine did something unnoticed from the world--it actually dissolved their Communist Party---one of the core reasons that in the eastern countries not members of the EU has been leading the way of these mini Russian revolts---notice it was forbidden even in Germany as a subversive organization which it still is.

[OUTLAW 09]

BTW - it is the right question. From the Russian foreign ministry today:



Here's the problem: the U.S. is in retrenchment. One, it's exhausted from the War on Terrorism. Two, it's more or less paralyzed by bitter political infighting (and it doesn't look like the mid-term elections will ease that pressure). And this infighting is sharpened by the measurable decline in the U.S.' relative power. Three, demands for U.S. actions abroad have not declined. Ukraine. Iran. Iraq. Syria. Libya. The list goes on.

The U.S. is not a hegemon. It does not have the power to unilaterally enforce it demands on any state or combination of states. The last year's worth of events have made this painfully obvious. It's not a matter of mustering sufficient political will. That's an unrealistic expectation. Consequently, the U.S. now more than any time in its recent history must rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests. What outcome in Ukraine is in the best U.S. interest? What kind of relationship with Russia is in the U.S. interest? What are the linkages between the U.S.-Russian relationship and other U.S. interests around the world? These are questions you have failed to answer. Ukraine is not the only issue - or the most important one - facing the U.S.

So - we freeze out the Russians because of Ukraine. Fine. What next? Does the U.S. now commit itself to Ukraine's security for the foreseeable future? To what extent is that commitment elevated? NATO membership? What signal does increased U.S. commitment to Ukraine send to Moscow? Where does the cycle of escalation end? How will Moscow now act as a spoiler in the international arena on issues of U.S. interest?

AP--this has been a battle of values and will be going forward much as the Cold War was about the battle of ideologies. By the way the US is an hegemon---via it's global economic power just check the current set of sanctions against Russia.

Why values---even when Dayuhan seems t think it is already known that the colored revolts and the Arab Springs are threats to governments --he failed to ask the follow on question ---why is that?

It is all about and again it seems to be a constant repeat---the rule of law and good governance---but here is the difference---determined by the effected populations and their definitions of those two concepts not ours, the EU or China for that matter.

Why does the Ukraine look towards Europe---it is this ideal that has stuck in their heads---at least the police function a little bit equally for all, the economic system does not close everyone out who is not a member of the oligarchs or ruling elite and the court system tends to generally be fair. Meaning it is really about jobs, security and personal development for a family and their children --it sounds hooky but it is their view of the world not ours as the the US lost that drive a long time ago if one looks at current US politics.

The Ukrainians are still in that Soviet era industrial age of counting of tons not quality---will it hurt to adjust to the EU yes it will but they are willing to try it---that is theiir decision not the US/EU or Russia's.

It seems that they are willing to fight and die for that set of values--once a ragtag group of individuals they are with the increasing fighting gaining experience from the day to day combat and this is the big key---they are fighting for their sovereignty and their flag not for the Red Flag or the EU flag--but theirs that actually they tried to do in 1945 but failed as the Red Army used an entire Corp to suppress it.

When the SU fell there was a massive sigh of relieve even in Moscow that it might be able to move forward economically, shake off the could corrupt legal/political/party system and somehow become like "Europe". Historically Russia has always tried to reach out to the West.

Putin has shoved that back under the rug---one just needs to talk to the young Russians here in Berlin that are in envy of the "German" model and their total dislike for Putin to fully understand why Putin fears the colored revolts. The young well educated-- the core of a country are leaving Russia in droves. Why? German/EU values.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--just a side comment---watch for small tidbits of reporting coming out of Moscow in the coming days of a massive internal inside the inner circle to Putin ongoing shouting match between the oligarchs and the hardliners on whether to continue or to pull back.

The oligarchs side says the economy being destroyed is not worth the puesdo ethnic nationalism that Putin has been pushing as at some point it will hit the population hard and which is actually now starting to happen. They also fear the formal isolation which will kill any chance of industrial development for the next 10 years thus pushing Russia even more backwards.

Thus the hardliners heavy push into law all the new "anti-color" laws. the hardliners are anti West united by their hatred of the West and the values the West represent to them and the decadence of the West.

We will see the outcome of that internal debate in the Ukraine in the coming days---more weapons and troops or less and throttling back of the separatists.

If the hardliners win out in the debate--then seriously to heart the words the Joint Chief of Staff General Dempsey released in his article yesterday.

Something interesting that came up in comments yesterday out of a Russian western think tank in Moscow.

Throughout the eastern Ukraine crisis, now in its fourth month, Putin and his officials have consistently portrayed the conflict as Ukraine's unprincipled assault on its own citizens, rather than as a move to take back a sizeable part of the country seized by heavily armed separatists.

The aim is to discredit the Kiev authorities without openly opposing them. Putin even spoke face-to-face in June with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who had just been elected following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych in the wake of months of mass protests. But on Tuesday, he stepped up the aspersions in a meeting with his security council.

"True, they held elections after the takeover," Putin said. "However, for some strange reason, power ended up again in the hands of those who either funded or carried out this takeover."

This is where the long game appears to take shape.

By aggressively suggesting that Ukraine's instability is a prelude to Western designs on Russia, Putin not only deflects attention away from the plane crash, but strikes a chord in the Russian psyche. Russia characteristically sees itself as both a vast and mighty world power and as forever beleaguered by devious and violent forces dating back to the Mongol hordes and later including Napoleonic France, Poland, Sweden and, finally, Nazi Germany.

Even as he expresses concern about Russia's vulnerability, Putin also declares that "the recipes used regarding weaker states fraught with internal conflict will not work with us."

Dayuhan--take notice of this comment concerning the Russian psyche---it is the target of the information war not the US.

[mirhond]

separatists have also acquired close to 100 T-64 and T-72 tanks themselves, with generous numbers of artillery and rockets, all smuggled over the border from Russia.

if this document
isn't a fake, your statement is far from truth

in short: Ukrarmy lost dosens of combat vehicles and other military pieces to separatists

(1) a Ukraine unified for the first time in its history, regardless of language (many of the Ukrainian fighters speak Russian; the orders in the Ukrainian army at the tactical level are issued in Russian);(2) the growth of national myths forged in a war with Russia that may develop into a true Ukrainian nationalism (and a break from Russia once and for all)

I believe you just did'nt bothered to read Wikipedia article about Ukraine, that's why your post shows lack of historical knowledge.
In short: Ukraine once already was an independent state, for a short time after Russian revolution. Ukrainian exclusive nationalism has a long and glorious story.

зы. К чему эта маскировка под невежду, товарищ Щорс, вы же украинский коммунист и прекрасно знаете историю своей Родины, а так же всю ту хуиту, что происходит сейчас на Юго-Востоке

[Dayuhan]

Actually Dayuhan then you quite do not understand the depth of it's pull here in Europe, the Ukraine where it is being used very effectively as well as in Russia where Putin's poll numbers are still off the charts.

Didn't you just post this piece suggesting that in some quarters at least there's a perception that Putin's popularity is sliding?

Strelkov’s mission in Ukraine, whoever gave it to him, has been bigger than just the defense of the DPR. Strelkov claims to be defending Putin’s reputation and power in Russia, too. In an interview with The Daily Beast on Thursday, Strelkov adviser Druzd spoke about the importance of Russians coming to Donbass in order to prevent a revolution like the Maidan in Kiev from spreading to Moscow.

“Putin’s popularity is fading away, since nobody has stopped the slaughter of Russians in Donbass," Druzd said. “The president’s approval rating is much lower in Moscow and St. Petersburg than in the provinces. As we know, revolutions—both French and October—were done in capitals; unfortunately, we cannot exclude attempts of the Maidan type of protests in Moscow,” Druzd explained. “For now Russia mostly sends us information and humanitarian help,” he said, when what the rebels need to defend Russian interests is “significant military support.”

Putin is increasingly between a rock and a hard place: nationalists will still give him credit for taking Crimea, but in politics you're only as good as your last show, and if he doesn't act in the Ukraine he will be accused of abandoning his proxies (an accusation with which Americans will feel some sympathy). If he does move, the oligarchs and the licit and illicit business community will accuse him of risking damage to both the Russian economy and to their individual economies. In short, he's moving into a situation where different sides of his support base have widely divergent interests and demands. Not a comfortable place to be.

Secondly, colored revolts threaten in fact every type of government why-it usually is about something that the population as a whole takes issues with---again it is all about the rule of law and good governance which in the case of say the Ukraine was using the EU image to voice it's displeasure with the government rit large.

Color revolutions specifically threaten governments where the populace does not feel that it has the ability to change the government, typically dictatorships and pseudo-dictatorships. Where the populace has confidence in the electoral system, they may take to the streets when they see lousy government, but they generally won't directly try to overthrow the government, because they know that in due time they can overthrow it legally with a lot less risk and trouble. I think you'll find that the key determinant that pushes public unrest to the color revolution level is less public perception of bad governance than the public's confidence in existing mechanisms for changing governance. Democratic governments need to be worried about being voted out if they don't deliver good governance, but they face much less threat from color revolutions than countries that are either non-democratic or where the public has little or no confidence in the nominally democratic mechanisms.

Dayuhan--take notice of this comment concerning the Russian psyche---it is the target of the information war not the US.

I suppose that's why they don't bother publishing RT in English, or hiring stooges to pack the comments sections of English-language publications...

Propaganda is advertising by another name. As with any type of advertising, the measure of success is not the structure of your campaign or the number of people it reaches. The only relevant measure of success is sales of the product. The Russian propaganda campaign is extensive and the structure of it is fairly sophisticated. The content remains extremely crude, and structure without content gets you nowhere. The question remains... who is being convinced, and where? That question can only be answered with actual evidence... market research as it were. Anecdotal evidence doesn't count.

[Firn]

I doubt Russia will intervene directly in the east - not out of fear of U.S. sanctions, but because of the uncertainty that lies in an open-ended conflict with Ukraine.

I actually agree mostly, but I want to ask: What is a direction Russian intervention in your opinion? What isn't open-ended to this war, with the Crimea occupied by Russia and Russian men and Russian weapons reinforcing Russias shadow armies lead by Russian veterans with it's limited local support while the Russian army shells Ukrainian forces from Russia proper?

I have a pretty hard time to draw a line...

@davidpfbo: There might also be considerable differences from city to city, area to area with the larger cities giving a better idea then the smaller ones in which extremes are more likely to be observed. All in all the local support for the shadowy Russian invasion isn't certainly as big as the Kremlin would have hoped. Weapons are certainly not the bottleneck.

@Shchors: Maybe you could open a new thread about the strictly military aspect of the conflict. This thread contains already so many strands. Thanks anyway.

[OUTLAW 09]

[QUOTE=mirhond;159172]if this document
isn't a fake, your statement is far from truth

in short: Ukrarmy lost dosens of combat vehicles and other military pieces to separatists



I believe you just did'nt bothered to read Wikipedia article about Ukraine, that's why your post shows lack of historical knowledge.
In short: Ukraine once already was an independent state, for a short time after Russian revolution. Ukrainian exclusive nationalism has a long and glorious story.


So comrade non knowing expert mirhond---just what about those T64s that you once claimed here in SWJ were stolen from the Ukrainians which turned out to be registered to the Russian Army complete with former Russian military base numbers that somehow made it across that from Putin lied about "enhanced security border" that the famous FSB knows nothing about.

come on comrade mirhond get with the progam.