Bob Woodward on 60 Min

[jkm_101_fso]

He was on CBS 60 Min last night talking about his new book. His article today in the Washington Post covers many things he talked about last night. A few interesting perspectives on why the "The Surge" worked, outside of the obvious (troop increase, Petraeus strategy).

Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just The Surge.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...l?hpid=topnews

By Bob Woodward, Washington Post

Throughout the summer of 2007, as the troop surge in Iraq reached full strength, Gen. David H. Petraeus kept waiting for the tide to turn. By summer's end, the U.S. commander in Iraq got his wish. The high of 1,550 attacks a week fell below 800 -- nearly a 50 percent reduction. It has continued to fall over the past year.

Why did the violence drop so dramatically?

On one level, the surge was beginning to have its intended effect. Doubling the U.S. forces in and around Baghdad from 17,000 to nearly 40,000, coupled with Petraeus's counterinsurgency game plan, had helped quell some of the sectarian and other violence that had defined the previous year and a half. About 30 joint security stations had been established around Baghdad; security along the borders with Iran and Syria had improved; and the Iraqi army was performing better.

In Washington, conventional wisdom translated these events into a simple view: The surge had worked. But the full story was more complicated. At least three other factors were as important as, or even more important than, the surge. These factors either have not been reported publicly or have received less attention than the influx of troops.

Beginning in the late spring of 2007, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies launched a series of top-secret operations that enabled them to locate, target and kill key individuals in groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni insurgency and renegade Shia militias, or so-called special groups. The operations incorporated some of the most highly classified techniques and information in the U.S. government.

Senior military officers and officials at the White House urged against publishing details or code names associated with the groundbreaking programs, arguing that publication of the names alone might harm the operations that have been so beneficial in Iraq. As a result, specific operational details have been omitted in this report and in "The War Within."

Woodward refused to eloborate last night on TV on this subject for obvious reasons:

But a number of authoritative sources say the covert activities had a far-reaching effect on the violence and were very possibly the biggest factor in reducing it. Several said that 85 to 90 percent of the successful operations and "actionable intelligence" had come from the new sources, methods and operations. Several others said that figure was exaggerated but acknowledged their significance.

Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) responsible for hunting al-Qaeda in Iraq, employed what he called "collaborative warfare," using every tool available simultaneously, from signal intercepts to human intelligence and other methods, that allowed lightning-quick and sometimes concurrent operations.

Asked in an interview about the intelligence breakthroughs in Iraq, President Bush offered a simple answer: "JSOC is awesome."

The other two reasons for success, according to Woodward:

A second important factor in the lessening of violence was the so-called Anbar Awakening, in which tens of thousands of Sunnis turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq and signed up with U.S. forces. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had made a strategic mistake in the province, overplaying its hand. Its members had performed forced marriages with women from local tribes, taken over hospitals, used mosques for beheading operations, mortared playgrounds and executed citizens, leaving headless bodies with signs that read, "Don't remove this body or the same thing will happen to you." The sheer brutality eroded much of the local support for al-Qaeda in Iraq.

A third significant break came Aug. 29, when militant Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his powerful Mahdi Army to suspend operations, including attacks against U.S. troops. Petraeus and others knew it was not an act of charity. The order followed a gunfight between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in the holy city of Karbala, during which more than 50 Shia pilgrims gathering for an annual festival had been killed and another 275 wounded. Sadr's order marked an unexpected stroke of good luck, another in a series for the Americans.

Woodward also mentioned that the U.S. spied on Iraqi PM Maliki and other Iraqi Government officials, noting: "We know everything he [Maliki] says". More HERE: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/06/wo...rssnyt&emc=rss

I've read the other three books in this series and look forward to his new one, "The War Within".

[weiss]

I agree this should be an interesting book. I can't wait until I get my hands on a copy. I am particularly interested in his recent reference for the covert operations and there likeness to the "Manhattan Project" of WWII. Though I would equate this likeness more to the ingenuity of it rather than overall potential it has on world affairs.

Good Post FSO!

[jonSlack]

WSJ - Generals Behaving Badly

When Abraham Lincoln famously sent word to Gen. George McClellan that he'd like to "borrow" the army if the general wasn't planning on using it, the commander of Union forces likely did not take it kindly. McClellan, after all, was a man whose letters home referred to Lincoln as an "idiot," "a well-meaning baboon" and other colorful language.

In the first few pages of "The War Within," Bob Woodward opens with another presidential remark that offended another wartime general. This time the recipient was the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. George Casey. During a videoconference with Baghdad, the president said, "George, we're not playing for a tie. I want to make sure we all understand this." Gen. Casey, Mr. Woodward writes, took this as "an affront to his dignity that he would long remember."

Whether or not Gen. Casey long remembered, "The War Within" makes clear his disdain for his commander in chief. If the views and remarks attributed to Gen. Casey are not accurate, Mr. Woodward has done him a grave injustice. If they are accurate, they come as further evidence of the obstacles President George W. Bush had to overcome to get his commanders to start winning in Iraq.

[Ken White]

he couldn't very well do what he and his Army had not been trained or equipped to do due to major error on the part of 25 years of US leader failures and US Army senior leader intransigence with respect to FID and COIN

In fairness to President Bush; we had just spent 18 months watching LTG Ric Sanchez and Co. dig a hole and keep shoveling. The buck stops with him and all that...

Have I ranted about DOPMA and the "everybody can do everything equally well" myth lately???

[jkm_101_fso]

Woodward followed up in the Washington Post today with "You're Not Accountable, Jack", citing how Retired Army GEN Jack Keane gained influence in the White House.

The War Within: The Shadow General

'You're Not Accountable, Jack'

How a Retired Officer Gained Influence at the White House and in Baghdad

By Bob Woodward, Washington Post Staff Writer

Retired Army Gen. Jack Keane came to the White House on Thursday, Sept. 13, 2007, to deliver a strong and sober message. The military chain of command, he told Vice President Cheney, wasn't on the same page as the current U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus. The tension threatened to undermine Petraeus's chances of continued success, Keane said.

Keane, a former vice chief of the Army, was 63, 6-foot-3 and 240 pounds, with a boxer's face framed by tightly cropped hair. As far as Cheney was concerned, Keane was outstanding -- an experienced soldier who had maintained great Pentagon contacts, had no ax to grind and had been a mentor to Petraeus. Keane was all meat and potatoes; he didn't inflate expectations or waste Cheney's time.

By the late summer of 2007, Keane had established an unusual back-channel relationship with the president and vice president, a kind of shadow general advising them on the Iraq war. This September visit was the fifth back-channel briefing that Keane had given the vice president that year.

As Keane was laying out his view, President Bush walked in.

"I know you're talking to Dave," Bush said to Keane. "I know that the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon have some concerns." The JCS had not favored the surge of 30,000 troops that Bush had decided was essential to quell the escalating violence in Iraq; the chiefs were deeply worried that the surge left no strategic reserve for an unexpected crisis elsewhere.

Keane repeated what he had just told Cheney: The JCS and Adm. William J. Fallon, Petraeus's boss at Central Command, were insisting on studies and reports to justify even the smallest request for more resources for Iraq. Their persistent pressure, pushing Petraeus for a faster drawdown, was taking its toll.

"There is very little preparation," Keane said, "for somebody who grows up in a military culture to have an unsupportive chain of command above you and still be succeeding. You normally get fired." The result, he said, is that Petraeus "starts to look for ways to get rid of this pressure, which means some kind of accommodation."

Bush said he wanted Keane to deliver a personal message to Petraeus from his commander-in-chief. After Bush laid out his thoughts, Keane went to the large West Wing lobby, sat among the couches and chairs and wrote out the president's words.

National security adviser Steven J. Hadley and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates did not know of the president's back-channel contact with Petraeus. When I asked the president in May 2008 about his message, Bush explained why he had felt a need to send it.

The senior military leadership in Washington, though unaware of the extent of Keane's role, was uncomfortable with his frequent visits to Iraq and his influence at the White House.

Gen. George W. Casey Jr. was one of them. After serving as Iraq commander for two years, he had handed over the job to Petraeus in early 2007. Casey was now Army chief of staff and a member of the Joint Chiefs. It was a promotion and a kind of soft landing, but he had left Iraq feeling he had lost Bush's confidence.

In the summer of 2007, Casey was at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Northwest Washington, waiting for a routine physical, when he spotted Keane standing in line at the radiology desk.

The two generals locked eyes for a moment, then Keane turned away, as if he hadn't recognized Casey.

"Hi Jack, how are you?" Casey said, extending his hand. He had been waiting for a moment like this. "Has the chairman called you yet?"

"No, why?" Keane asked.

"Because we feel -- the chiefs feel -- that you are way too out in front advocating a policy for which you're not accountable. We're accountable. You're not accountable, Jack. And that's a problem."

Keane said he had taken action as a member of the secretary of defense's policy board, whose members were supposed to offer their independent advice. All he was trying to do was help Petraeus, he said. "I supported this strategy for three years when a lot of other guys didn't," Keane said, referring to Casey's strategy to build up the Iraqi security forces in hopes of a speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops. "And at some point, I no longer could support it. I'm not operating as some kind of Lone Ranger."

"It's not appropriate for a retired general to be so far forward advocating a policy that he is not responsible or accountable for," Casey said again.

"I'll take your counsel," said Keane, but he didn't suggest he would act any differently.

Complete article here:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...802839_pf.html

[Ski]

Keane was the real driver of the "Surge" - him and one of the Kagans.

[Rank amateur]

Ken knew Abraham Lincoln. Abe was a friend of his. Bush is not Abraham Lincoln.

On a more serious note, - in my humble, and called it biased if you wish - opinion, this is simply "You're not doing a hell of a job Casey."

Setting the objectives is the commander's in chiefs job. The should be clear, well defined and obtainable. "Spreading democracy is arguably two of the three." Unfortunately, that's not good enough.

"Victory" in COIN is even worse. It's only one of the three.

RE: Woodward. Using the population to obtain intelligence on "insurgents" isn't revolutionary; that's how the Romans got Jesus. (Please notice the quotes. The Romans eventually changed their opinion on Jesus.)

[reed11b]

Regarding Gen Casey

he couldn't very well do what he and his Army had not been trained or equipped to do due to major error on the part of 25 years of US leader failures and US Army senior leader intransigence with respect to FID and COIN

During that time period, every time I asked the question "what is our strategy in Iraq?" the answer was "Improve Iraqi Security forces and fight AQI, Help build up the infrastructure and improve quality of life conditions for Iraqis." This I would always think to myself, sounds great, but those are goals, what is the actual plan to make this happen. The more I read, the more I think that even at the highest levels there never really was a plan, just a set of goals. Am I striking anywhere near the target on this?
Reed

[sullygoarmy]

Reed,
I think you are right on the mark. Up until mid 2006, I'd say we never had an endstate goal as to what we were striving for in Iraq. Once GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker signed and published their campaign plan, we at least had a document by the two most important U.S. agencies in Iraq (Military and State) indicating where we needed to go.