Hamas in Gaza (merged thread)

[Ron Humphrey]

Big difference is that one of them likes to spout off about blowing up everybody(and generally noone including his own put too much stock in what he says) vs the other who likes to be very singular in his approach as to who he wants blown up(and he not only talks but has groupies who act on it.)

Not sure ol KOH's really looking out for his own interests as well as he might think.

Who's to say?

[davidbfpo]

Someone has red-discovered an old Israeli article: http://entitledtoanopinion.wordpress...-about-israel/

and linked it via the Kings of War website, with a comment as being a guide to the current campaign in Gaza: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/

Not seen the data before and needs a lengthy read, probably in hard copy and undoubtedly controversial. I have placed this on the Suicide Bombing thread of old.

davidbfpo

[bourbon]

Exactly how sane is it though to let a nut be your face to the world?

I think it can be considered sane, and as Ken White has noted - it's worked so far.


"I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry -- and he has his hand on the nuclear button' -- and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." - President Richard Milhous Nixon

Big difference is that one of them likes to spout off about blowing up everybody(and generally noone including his own put too much stock in what he says) vs the other who likes to be very singular in his approach as to who he wants blown up(and he not only talks but has groupies who act on it.)

Woofing aside, he has no real power. I believe a solid look at Iran's actions reveal it to be a far more a rational player than a irrational fanatic. (Tom Odom has recently reviewed one such work)

[Ron Humphrey]

I think it can be considered sane, and as Ken White has noted - it's worked so far.

and just re-read the review again and I don't disagree with your assertion that they are not exactly irrational actors. That said there is a determination to made about any rational action as to exactly which rationale it reflects.

Much like many of the actions by actors such Hamas, or Hezbollah, or Iran, or the US and its counterparts are based in some form of rational consideration the baseline behind those is generally endstates. And as such I still hold that their ways won't meet the expected ends.

The US actions in both Iraq and Afghanistan might be described as efforts to free themselves from threats and those nations from non-representated lives. While the end is unlikely to be exactly as expected it is probably a pretty fair bet that those two can and will happen in some form or another.(This if for no other reason than they are states of existence which are compatible with the human condition.

Hamas and some others on the other hand regardless of the varied implied purposes exist mainly on a baseline that Israel must end as a state, something which I might suggest is not only nonviable but even more so unlikely due to an enormous number of other factors which have to do with many countries besides Israel. In that context exactly what rationale do the actions of Hamas represent with regard to their stated endstate?

As to Iran yes they are acting in ways which they percieve will gain them more "influence" within their neighborhood. The rationale however seems to break down if one considers that partly due to their own actions not only do they have neighbors who aren't extremely fond of them but several of them may very well have much more military capacity and capability then they in the not so distant future. So exactly what have their actions up till now accomplished.

1- They have had to maneuver politically and security ways which probably are not extremely comfortable.

2- They may have more military hardware but are looking at much higher costs should they use them

3- They have almost achieved nuclear status but,
a: As soon as they try to capitalize on that by sharing it with the world they automatically become prime target for all their neighbors as well as other international bodies for focused efforts to not only track anything and everything that comes in and out of there but all those promises for what type of recognition that would bring them (which is how they have sold it to the public) comes due. and exactly what are they gonna have to show for it.

b: Should they choose to share that capability with anyone (terrorists,criminals,etc) and anything happens anywhere there's not a big enough army anywhere to keep whats coming their way from coming

c:This all assumes someone doesn't call their bluff before they get there

"I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry -- and he has his hand on the nuclear button' -- and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." - President Richard Milhous Nixon


Woofing aside, he has no real power. I believe a solid look at Iran's actions reveal it to be a far more a rational player than a irrational fanatic. (Tom Odom has recently reviewed one such work)

See c: above

[ipopescu]

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...oes_it_end.pdf

Interesting commentary, touches on several issues debated on this thread, and also on the potential impact on the conflict on US interests in the region.

......One thing is certain. The fighting has already become a strategic liability for the US. There is no good answer to what level of force is “proportionate” in this kind of asymmetric warfare. There is no equation that can decide how many rocket firings and acts of terrorism justify a given level of air strikes or use of conventional ground forces. The fact that the weak suffer more than the strong in war is a grim reality, as is the fact that no power is going to accept terrorism because its best military options produce civilian casualties.

Nevertheless, the US has again been pushed into being Israel’s only defender in an international environment where it is far easier (and more lucrative) to take the Arab side than seek any form of balance. Arab and Islamic media and think tanks already portray the fighting as enabled by US support of Israel and actions in the UN, and this is the judgment of most media and think tanks in Europe and outside the US....

[Surferbeetle]

From Today's WSJ an opinion piece by Ruel Marc Gerecht

With Hamas, Iran has the opportunity to make amends. The mullahs have a chance of supplanting Saudi Arabia, the font of the most vicious anti-Shiite Sunni creed, as the most reliable backer of Palestinian fundamentalists. Even more than the Lebanese Hezbollah, which remains tied to and constrained by the complex matrix of Lebanese politics, Hamas seems willing to absorb enormous losses to continue its jihad against Israel. Where Saudi Arabia has been uneasy about the internecine strife among Palestinians -- it has bankrolled both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas -- Iran has put its money on the former.

Although Fatah, the ruling party within the Palestinian Authority, may get a second wind thanks to the excesses of Hamas and the Israelis' killing much of Hamas's brain power and muscle, it is difficult to envision Fatah reviving itself into an appealing political alternative for faithful Palestinians. Fatah is hopelessly corrupt, often brutal, and without an inspiring raison d'être: a Palestine of the West Bank and Gaza is, as Hamas correctly points out, boring, historically unappealing, and a noncontiguous geographic mess. Fatah only sounds impassioned when it gives vent to its anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic, profoundly Muslim roots. It's no accident that the religious allusions and suicide bombers of Fatah and Hamas after 2000 were hard to tell apart. If Hamas can withstand the current Israeli attack on its leadership and infrastructure, then the movement's aura will likely be impossible to match. Iran's influence among religious Palestinians could skyrocket.

[Ron Humphrey]

From Today's WSJ an opinion piece by Ruel Marc Gerecht

TOM, and Bourbon, got the Devil We Know today and also another by Nathan Gonzalez - Engaging Iran. Any thoughts on that one

[tpjkevin]

Broto Wardoyo writes in The Jakarta Post, Gaza assaults: Fighting fire with fire?

It is a mistake to call for the eradication of Israel since Israel has their right to exist. It is also a mistake to call for the destruction of Hamas since they also have the right to be recognized as part of the Palestinian people. Israel's right to exist, however, must not come at the expense of Hamas or Palestinians as a whole, and vice versa.

Israel has always had to be concerned about its existence. Rejected by its immediate neighbors since its independence in 1948, Israel faced another three major wars afterward. In 1956, out of the blue, Egypt decided to force the UN mission to abandon their post and started a military move eastward, occupying the whole Sinai Peninsula.

In 1973, Israel was hit with a surprise attack right on the Yom Kippur holiday, when observant Jews are forbidden to conduct normal business. A sense of insecurity lives on in their minds up to today.

Hamas, on the other hand, shared a similar experience. Created in 1988 during the first intifada, their existence was undercut by the dominant Palestinian Liberation Organization. Hamas' decision to choose the path of jihad, and to clearly calling for the destruction of Israel in their charter, signals their anti-peace stance. Hamas, then, is perceived by many, including elements among the Palestinians, as an obstacle to peace.

The choice of violence seems to be the only option now, both for Israeli and Hamas. It is their way of communicating with each other and to the other actors. The message behind Hamas' violence is clear. They are there and need to be included in the game. Israel's message behind its actions is also clear. They are there and must not be challenged.

[Rex Brynen]

In 1956, out of the blue, Egypt decided to force the UN mission to abandon their post and started a military move eastward, occupying the whole Sinai Peninsula.

The columnist might have a little more credibility if they knew their history and geography.

There was no Egyptian attack "out of the blue" in 1956. Rather, Israel attacked Egypt as part of a secret plan with the British and French to enable the latter's armed intervention against Nasser's Egypt.

Other than a very small contingent of UNTSO observers (who weren't forced by Egypt to abandon their positions), there was no UN force until after 1956.

Perhaps the author is thinking of 1967. However, in neither 1956 nor 1967 did Egypt "occupy" the Sinai--it was already Egyptian. It didn't fall under temporary Israeli control until after the June 1967 war.

Egypt did ask UNEF to leave in 1967. Equally, Israel refused to accept their redeployment to the Israeli side of the border.

[Tom Odom]

The columnist might have a little more credibility if they knew their history and geography.

There was no Egyptian attack "out of the blue" in 1956. Rather, Israel attacked Egypt as part of a secret plan with the British and French to enable the latter's armed intervention against Nasser's Egypt.

Other than a very small contingent of UNTSO observers (who weren't forced by Egypt to abandon their positions), there was no UN force until after 1956.

Perhaps the author is thinking of 1967. However, in neither 1956 nor 1967 did Egypt "occupy" the Sinai--it was already Egyptian. It didn't fall under temporary Israeli control until after the June 1967 war.

Egypt did ask UNEF to leave in 1967. Equally, Israel refused to accept their redeployment to the Israeli side of the border.

No kidding, Rex! I found the same to be true when teaching officers from either side at CGSC. It was rather fun to push them out of their comfort zone; most responded quite well after some initial hostility. Some did not.

Best

Tom

[Granite_State]

Colonel Pat Lang (SWJ friend?) has a long post on the IDF's lack of real NCOs:

I associated with and/or conducted liaison with The Israel Defense Force (IDF) for many years. This activity occurred as part of my regular duties as a US Army officer and later as a civilian executive of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since my retirement from US government service I have had many occasions to visit Israel and to watch the IDF in action against various groups of Palestinians all over the West Bank. I have many friends who are retired and/or reserve members of the IDF. My observations concerning the IDF are based on that experience.

I write here of the ground force. The air force and navy are unknown to me from personal experience except that I know some of their officers from their service in joint (inter-service) assignments like general staff intelligence.

IMO, the IDF is an army built to very specifically suit Israel's individual circumstances, needs, and philosophy. It is in some ways, a singular force. It actually more closely resembles the Swiss military establishment than it does a large standing force backed by reserve units in the way that the US Army is built.

The IDF ground force is essentially a reserve or militia army that keeps most of its forces in inactive status while maintaining a handful of units on active duty as a training base and a force in being to meet short term contingencies.

In this post I am writing of the "line" of the ground forces as represented by armor, infantry, paratroop and artillery units at brigade elvel and below, i.e., battalion and company.

The special operations forces are a small part of Israeli capabilities and are manned and maintained on a very different basis. In many ways they are more like a "SWAT" team than a military force.

To understand the IDF ground forces as an institution, there are certain things that must be understood in order to "see" clearly the actual capabilities of this army:

- Because of the heavy reliance on reserve units filled with older, part time soldiers, any mobilization of a large number of ground force units for considerable periods of time places a heavy burden on the Israeli national economy. Mobilized reservists are lost to their jobs. Israeli soldiers are among the strongest and most skilled members of their society. They are typically well employed in the civilian world. When they are gone in military service the economy suffers. This automatically limits the scale and duration of reserve mobilizations.

- Older reserve soldiers serve in units made up almost entirely of similar reservists. These units are hard to maintain at a high level of training and readiness. Only limited amounts of training time and money are available for this necessity. As a result units are often unready for deployment into combat in an emergency. On a number of occasions this problem has caused IDF troops to be committed to combat in a less than "ready" status. In other words, troops have gone into combat with equipment not properly maintained and with insufficient unit training. It must be said that they have typically been lucky in their enemies and that if they had faced more serious enemies, they would have had a much different experience than the ones they had. In the Golan Heights the Syrians gave them a very difficult time in 1973 and in the same war their victory against Egypt featured a renewal of offensive activity under the cover a cease fire which they had accepted.

- There are no career ground force sergeants except as technicians. Unless the system has changed very recently, the IDF ground forces typically do not have career NCOs in the LINE of the combat arms. This is a structural tradition that derives originally from the Russian tsar's army and which came to Palestine through Russian and Polish Zionist immigrants. Then this passed through the Haganah into the IDF. The IDF "line" conscripts what amount to yearly classes of recruits and selects from them more promising soldiers who are given NCO level command responsibilities as; infantry leaders, tank commanders, artillery gun captains, etc. The IDF does have career NCOs but they are typically found in jobs of a more technical nature rather than junior combat command at the squad or platoon (section) level. As a result, junior officers (company grade) are required to perform duties that in more traditionally organized armies would be performed by sergeants. Leading a small combat or reconnaissance patrol would be an example. As a result, a non-reserve infantry or tank company in the field consists of people who are all about the same age (19-22) and commanded by a captain in his mid 20s. What is missing in this scene is the voice of grown up counsel provided by sergeants in their 30s and 40s telling these young people what it is that would be wise to do based on real experience and mature judgment. In contrast a 22 year old American platoon leader would have a mature platoon sergeant as his assistant and counselor.

- As a result of this system of manning, the IDF's ground force is more unpredictable and volatile at the tactical (company) level than might be the case otherwise. The national government has a hard time knowing whether or not specific policies will be followed in the field. For example, the Israeli government's policy in the present action in the Gaza Strip has been to avoid civilian casualties whenever possible. Based on personal experience of the behavior of IDF conscripts toward Palestinian civilians, I would say that the Israeli government has little control over what individual groups of these young Israeli soldiers may do in incidents like the one yesterday in which mortar fire was directed toward UN controlled school buildings.

In Beit Suhur outside Bethlehem, I have seen IDF troops shoot at Palestinian Christian women hanging out laundry in their gardens. This was done with tank coaxial machine guns from within a bermed up dirt fort a couple of hundred yards away, and evidently just for the fun of it. In Bethlehem a lieutenant told me that he would have had his men shoot me in the street during a demonstration that I happened to get caught in, but that he had not because he thought I might not be a Palestinian and that if I were not the incident would have caused him some trouble. I have seen a lot of things like that. One might say that in war, s--t happens. That is true, but such behavior is indicative of an army that is not well disciplined and not a completely reliably instrument of state policy. In my travels in the west Bank in March of 2008, it was noticeable that the behavior towards Palestinian civilians of IDF troops at roadblocks was reminiscent of that of any group of post-adolescents given guns and allowed to bully the helpless in order to look tough for each other. I think the IDF would be well advised to grow some real sergeants.

All in all, I think the IDF ground forces can best be described as specialized tools that reflect 20th century Zionist socialist and nationalist ideals, and which have military traditions that are in no way reflective of those of the United States. They can also be justly said to have been been fortunate in their enemies. The Jordanians gave them a run for their money in 1948-49. Hizbullah delivered a hint of the inherent limits in such a socio-military system in 2006 and now we are seeing whatever it is that we will see at Gaza. pl

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_s...ound.html#more

[Tom Odom]

- As a result of this system of manning, the IDF's ground force is more unpredictable and volatile at the tactical (company) level than might be the case otherwise. The national government has a hard time knowing whether or not specific policies will be followed in the field. For example, the Israeli government's policy in the present action in the Gaza Strip has been to avoid civilian casualties whenever possible. Based on personal experience of the behavior of IDF conscripts toward Palestinian civilians, I would say that the Israeli government has little control over what individual groups of these young Israeli soldiers may do in incidents like the one yesterday in which mortar fire was directed toward UN controlled school buildings.

In Beit Suhur outside Bethlehem, I have seen IDF troops shoot at Palestinian Christian women hanging out laundry in their gardens. This was done with tank coaxial machine guns from within a bermed up dirt fort a couple of hundred yards away, and evidently just for the fun of it. In Bethlehem a lieutenant told me that he would have had his men shoot me in the street during a demonstration that I happened to get caught in, but that he had not because he thought I might not be a Palestinian and that if I were not the incident would have caused him some trouble. I have seen a lot of things like that. One might say that in war, s--t happens. That is true, but such behavior is indicative of an army that is not well disciplined and not a completely reliably instrument of state policy. In my travels in the west Bank in March of 2008, it was noticeable that the behavior towards Palestinian civilians of IDF troops at roadblocks was reminiscent of that of any group of post-adolescents given guns and allowed to bully the helpless in order to look tough for each other. I think the IDF would be well advised to grow some real sergeants.

Matches my personal experience in southern Lebanon.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

And now for the corrections...

The special operations forces are a small part of Israeli capabilities and are manned and maintained on a very different basis. In many ways they are more like a "SWAT" team than a military force.

Well that's a context free observation. There are 3 different levels of SF Capable units in the IDF covering 5 Services, and they are under constant evolution. At best that is a snap shot of 1 possible SF unit in the last 60 years and devoid of the actual record of SF units.

Unless the system has changed very recently, the IDF ground forces typically do not have career NCOs in the LINE of the combat arms. This is a structural tradition that derives originally from the Russian tsar's army and which came to Palestine through Russian and Polish Zionist immigrants.

Rubbish. Zionist?? It has nothing to do with the Tsarist Army. It is actually not possible to trace a clear line in the historical influences of the IDF. By far the biggest influence was the British, and the next was the Turkish (trained by the Germans). The structual form of the IDF was developed by the Palmach, not the Haganah.

Then this passed through the Haganah into the IDF. The IDF "line" conscripts what amount to yearly classes of recruits and selects from them more promising soldiers who are given NCO level command responsibilities as; infantry leaders, tank commanders, artillery gun captains, etc

Again, what he fails to mention is that all IDF officers are former NCOs, and the Kabbah system used in selection that creates officers of a pretty high standard even in comparison to NATO Armies and sometimes far higher. I know as many IDF officers as I know US officers. There is no big difference, expect Unit and Formation commanders tend to be younger.

In Beit Suhur outside Bethlehem, I have seen IDF troops shoot at Palestinian Christian women hanging out laundry in their gardens. This was done with tank coaxial machine guns from within a bermed up dirt fort a couple of hundred yards away, and evidently just for the fun of it.

... if this happened, then it is clearly unacceptable. - but as we all know, it is not a problem unique to the IDF. The US and UK armies have more than their fair share of similar, and much worse, incidents, since they have been in Iraq, and else where.

In my travels in the west Bank in March of 2008, it was noticeable that the behavior towards Palestinian civilians of IDF troops at roadblocks was reminiscent of that of any group of post-adolescents given guns and allowed to bully the helpless in order to look tough for each other. I think the IDF would be well advised to grow some real sergeants.

I was in the West Bank at that time as well. Most Marsom are actually manned by Reservists. I think you'd find the average age of a regular IDF soldier matches that of US regular soldiers -18-22. I'm not saying bad things don't happen at check points. My wife has plenty of stories, but they are pretty inherent to the task.

Why on earth should the IDF take US advice on leadership and training? Based on a track record of best practice and success, it's a pretty hard sell.

The IDF ditched the UK system, because it simply did not work when applied outside the British class system on which it is based.

[Ken White]

... if this happened, then it is clearly unacceptable. - but as we all know, it is not a problem unique to the IDF. The US and UK armies have more than their fair share of similar, and much worse, incidents, since they have been in Iraq, and else where...I'm not saying bad things don't happen at check points. My wife has plenty of stories, but they are pretty inherent to the task.

Nineteen tear olds will misbehave and the best leadership in the world cannot be everywhere. Anyone who encountered bored MPs at 0200 in the morning back in the days when they manned the gates at US posts can testify that they were not always well behaved...

My major point is this:

Why on earth should the IDF take US advice on leadership and training? Based on a track record of best practice and success, it's a pretty hard sell.

The IDF ditched the UK system, because it simply did not work when applied outside the British class system on which it is based.

Part of the issue accurately outlined in those two paragraphs is that we adopted and still use vestiges of the British class and military system neither of which ever really took root in this country. Nor will they. I can remember a Gunnery Sergeant in Korea who lamented the impending demise of his beloved Corps because "the Corps is adopting all the US Army's bad habits and none of their good ones..." In my view, he was correct -- and I say the same thing about the US Armed Forces with respect to the British. And the Prussian...

[Entropy]

Anthony Cordesman has some unusually harsh things to say:

This raises a question that every Israeli and its supporters now needs to ask. What is the strategic purpose behind the present fighting? After two weeks of combat Olmert, Livni, and Barak have still not said a word that indicates that Israel will gain strategic or grand strategic benefits, or tactical benefits much larger than the gains it made from selectively striking key Hamas facilities early in the war. In fact, their silence raises haunting questions about whether they will repeat the same massive failures made by Israel’s top political leadership during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006. Has Israel somehow blundered into a steadily escalating war without a clear strategic goal or at least one it can credibly achieve? Will Israel end in empowering an enemy in political terms that it defeated in tactical terms? Will Israel’s actions seriously damage the US position in the region, any hope of peace, as well as moderate Arab regimes and voices in the process?

To blunt, the answer so far seems to be yes. To paraphrase a comment about the British government’s management of the British Army in World War I, lions seem to be led by donkeys. If Israel has a credible ceasefire plan that could really secure Gaza, it is not apparent. If Israel has a plan that could credibly destroy and replace Hamas, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to help the Gazans and move them back towards peace, it is not apparent. If Israel has any plan to use US or other friendly influence productively, it not apparent.

As we have seen all too clearly from US mistakes, any leader can take a tough stand and claim that tactical gains are a meaningful victory. If this is all that Olmert, Livni, and Barak have for an answer, then they have disgraced themselves and damaged their country and their friends. If there is more, it is time to make such goals public and demonstrate how they can be achieved. The question is not whether the IDF learned the tactical lessons of the fighting in 2006. It is whether Israel's top political leadership has even minimal competence to lead them.

[Ken White]

one not only has no responsibility for but doesn't even have a dog in a fight.

Pardon the sour note. I've just finished my morning round of world news and am, as always, just really 'impressed' by the punditiocracy. Their lack of understanding of the reality of war and in international relations versus their refined and idealized views of what they think should be never ceases to amaze me...

[Rex Brynen]

one not only has no responsibility for but doesn't even have a dog in a fight.

Pardon the sour note. I've just finished my morning round of world news and am, as always, just really 'impressed' by the punditiocracy. Their lack of understanding of the reality of war and in international relations versus their refined and idealized views of what they think should be never ceases to amaze me...

In this case, however, I think Tony is right--he's certainly not saying anything that isn't being said just as strongly by a growing number of Israeli commentators.

Olmert seems committed to a maximalist ground campaign. Both FM Livni and DM Barak feel that Israel risks compromises its gains if it continues too long, and have pushed for the operation to be ended once Egypt commits to more robust anti-smuggling efforts.

[Ken White]

little less arrogance and condescension. I'm sure they're saying it with far more knowledge.

[Rex Brynen]

little less arrogance and condescension. I'm sure they're saying it with far more knowledge.

I agree that Tony was rather condescending in his pithiness. He also drew an excessively sharp dividing line between the IDF and the political echelons, in my view--both in 2006 and now some of the shortcomings in strategic vision have to do with apparent weaknesses in strategic assessment by the defence and intel community too.

That being said, I can't say that the Israeli media (parts of which are usually very good) has particularly good job in assessing what is going on right now, in large part because of the natural wartime rally-around-the-flag effect.

The Arab media has been even worse.

[Tom Odom]

Olmert seems committed to a maximalist ground campaign. Both FM Livni and DM Barak feel that Israel risks compromises its gains if it continues too long, and have pushed for the operation to be ended once Egypt commits to more robust anti-smuggling efforts.

Rex,

Perhaps Olmert is seeking to rebuild his political stature after the 2006 war and domestic issues that followed? At one stage he was portrayed as gone and he is still here.

Best

Tom