Hamas in Gaza (merged thread)

[Entropy]

Hamas and Hezbollah don't want peace. Hamas and Hezbollah, are both militant/military/political groupings dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the extermination of all Jews in the Middle East. They are racists and extremists, and no different from the Taliban, AQ or the Iraqi insurgents.

I mostly agree with that.

What do you suggest as the basis for negotiation. Israel can only strive for their suppression or destruction, by continued existence.

Here is where you and Israel go wrong. That strategy is obviously failing. My main point is that you should not keeping beating your head against that wall and expect a different result. Hamas and Hezbollah are where they are today in no small measure because of Israeli action. Israel might keep them weak militarily with this policy, but it comes at the expense of strengthening them politically. This is a strategy that certainly brings short-term rewards but at the cost of long-term risk and danger. Take Hezbollah, for example. Hezbollah, like it or not, is a legitimate political force in Lebanon. It has a real political constituency. There can be no political solution in Lebanon without Hezbollah. Israeli actions helped create and nurture this. How has Israel benefited? Israel now finds itself in a position where it has few options for dealing with Hezbollah. The same thing is going to happen with Hamas.

Why has the election of Hamas got any bearing on their legitimacy? As all Israelis school children will tell you, Hitler died democratically elected by 19 million Germans. Elections in Gaza are nothing like Elections in Rhode Islands. If you don't believe me, look what happened after the election.

Hamas is not Hitler. The intent may be the same but the capability is much different. In fact, I would suggest that the fatal flaw in Israeli strategic thinking is the apparent inability to distinguish between intent and capability.

My point on the Hamas election was that it represented an opportunity to set them up for failure and delegitimize them in the eyes of the population. Israel's actions did the opposite. At the rate you are going, Hamas is going to be another Hezbollah before too long. Moderate Palestinians, with whom a deal might be struck, have little legitimacy anymore. How exactly does that benefit Israel?

[William F. Owen]

Here is where you and Israel go wrong. That strategy is obviously failing. My main point is that you should not keeping beating your head against that wall and expect a different result.

The ONLY stratergy is survival. How is that failing? Having a state is the strategy. The strategy is not peace, at any price.

When all Arabs recognise Israel within the 1948, and allow Jews to exist in peace, then there might be peace.

The legitimacy of Hezbollah, or Hamas is utterly irrelevant. It's their actions and beliefs. I'm sure the Taliban has a following in A'Stan.

If you have any ideas that don't pre-suppose that the enemy is reasonable or will listen to reason, then me, and six million others are very interested.

[Rex Brynen]

I think it is absolutely essential, in cases like these, to understand the subtleties and complexities of the organizations, cadres, and supporters involved.

Hamas did not win election in 2006 on a "destroy Israel" platform. Indeed it deliberately underplayed this (since it was a vote-loser) and emphasized reform and good governance issues instead. Polls show that most Palestinians accept a two-state solution to the conflict—including, by some surveys, most of those who voted for Hamas in 2006.

Among Hamas cadres, the distribution of political views is somewhat different. However, even here there is a substantial minority of Hamas activists who would accept a two-state solution based on the 1967 lines. They are yet to articulate this in a way that would have much credibility in Israel, however, and their weight has been eroded since 2006 by the growing influence of Gaza-based members of the Hamas military wing.

I'm not at all surprised by the current Israeli military action—even though the upsurge in rocket attacks was likely a Hamas effort to pressure Israel into renegotiating the ceasefire on better terms (notably with regard to access issues--in the Palestinian view, Israel never really implemented the previous agreement in this respect), they clearly miscalculated. They also read the Israeli political context very poorly if they thought an election campaign would dissuade Kadima and Labor from military action.

In the short term, its not clear to me how and when the current confrontation will wind down. I don't think Israel wants to be back in much of Gaza with ground troops for any period of time--rather they want to punish Hamas as best they can, weaken it, and impose a new "understanding" on Israeli terms. Hamas will probably decide that they can ride this out, and will want to be the last one firing a rocket. At this point I suspect we'll a matched reduction in violence over a period of time, followed by more Egyptian-mediated ceasefire talks. However there are several other possibilities, especially if Hamas rockets actually do some serious damage.

The longer-term issue is what needs to happen to weaken the appeal of Hamas and other radicals, and to shift the great majority of the Palestinian electorate back into the moderate Fateh camp. This is a complex and multi-dimensional challenge: it requires improvement in economic and security conditions in the West Bank; Fateh reform (now effectively on hold again with yet another postponement of the Fateh 6th Congress); a real halt to settlement activity (seen by Palestinians as every bit as threatening as Israelis view rockets from Gaza); governments on both sides prepared to make real compromises (rather than a weak Abbas and likely a harder-line Israeli government post-elections); and US and international leadership of a meaningful peace process.

It would also be nice to engage Hamas soft-line cadres. Sadly, that has become more and more difficult in the past two years.

In my view, the best thing a new Obama Administration could do it to dust off the Clinton Parameters, rename them, get them endorsed by the UNSC, and tell the parties "we can't make you negotiate or agree, but we can nail down the goalposts and make it clear what sort of agreement the international community expects from you eventually." With the Hamas hard-liners (who may be strengthened by the current military activity in Gaza) rejecting a two-state solution, and Bibi Netanyahu doing so too (albeit it more subtly), I think this is more important than ever.

[reed11b]

Bill,

One new approach that I would like to see in the middle east is to use the vatican city model for both Jerusalem and Mecca/Medina. The first is a crucial holy site for all Jews, Christians and Muslems and should not be part of any one state. I'd pick a council with three equal governors from those three faiths, with lead rotating on a set pattern to rule a separate city-state of Jerusalem. I don't know if there is a "Switzerland" that could provide a security force, but some similar mixed option of Muslim, Christian and Jewish security forces working together could have its own beneficial second order effects.

If there is a "Switzerland" in the ME it is Jordan. They are the only ME country that has recognized Israel to my knowledge and there Military and security forces are supposed to be top notch. That is a very interesting suggestion, BW, but Israel would have to have a very good reason to "buy in" to have any chance of success. Any idea what a good reason for an Israel "buy in" might be?
Reed

[Surferbeetle]

I think it is absolutely essential, in cases like these, to understand the subtleties and complexities of the organizations, cadres, and supporters involved.

Hamas did not win election in 2006 on a "destroy Israel" platform. Indeed it deliberately underplayed this (since it was a vote-loser) and emphasized reform and good governance issues instead. Polls show that most Palestinians accept a two-state solution to the conflict—including, by some surveys, most of those who voted for Hamas in 2006.

Rex,

Defining who is who in the major league game that is the ME is vital. References are always appreciated by those of us working on improving our understanding. I would also note that the never ending 'negotiation' takes place in many venues and via many different methods (have I mentioned DIME lately?).

I would ask your patience as I share a little hard won first hand knowledge. Wrongly or rightly the fault line that is Judaism, Christianity, and Islam takes on a more urgent and 'in-your-face' quality in some parts of the ME. With many of the more educated and older folks I was humbled by the hospitality that was offered to me in Iraq. Over time many of the kids that I dealt with came to learn that a Christian such as my self was not the nasty stereotypical caricature that they had been taught. Jews, in my opinion, had it worse than I. With fighting age folks things were always precariously balanced and for a good part of my tour I was consistently and pleasantly surprised to wake up the next morning. Perhaps things are different in Israel, I have not yet lived there, so I can not truly say...however with regards to Hamas' history and potential for change my trust levels are low.

Regards,

Steve

[Icebreaker]

Bill,


One new approach that I would like to see in the middle east is to use the vatican city model for both Jerusalem and Mecca/Medina. The first is a crucial holy site for all Jews, Christians and Muslems and should not be part of any one state. I'd pick a council with three equal governors from those three faiths, with lead rotating on a set pattern to rule a separate city-state of Jerusalem. I don't know if there is a "Switzerland" that could provide a security force, but some similar mixed option of Muslim, Christian and Jewish security forces working together could have its own beneficial second order effects.

Similar with Mecca/Medina, but with a Sunni-Shia council. Saudi Arabia (The decisive point of what we call GWOT IMHO, but that is another topic) cannot evolve as a nation and a government and address the failures that leads to their populace making up 3/4 of the 9-11 attackers and 40% of foreign fighters in Iraq, until the role as guardian of Islam's holy sites is taken off their shoulders. This would allow them to evolve their horrible constitution, reduce Sunni/Shia tensions, make the presence of westerners in the Kingdom less offensive, etc.

Neither move is a cure-all, and there would be more fighting, but I would much rather see the US involved in brokering such moves as this rather than what we've been doing.

Keeping Jerusalem out of the original Jewish state was part of the original British plan, recognizing the emotional issues involved. I don't recall the details or why that key components was written out.

They once had a system somewhat like that when the area was a British Mandate form the end of World War I to the creation of the State of Israel. The British had the “British Palestine Police Force”. Below is a link to this forces “Old Comrades Association”:

http://www.wyevalley.worldonline.co.uk/index.htm

They handled a number of incidents related to holy sites. Below is a quote I took off of the website about an incident regarding the famous “Wailing Wall”:

The Wailing Wall

The Wailing Wall in Jerusalem has always been a source of potential trouble between Jews and Arabs. It is all that is left of the third temple built by King Herod the Great and destroyed by the Romans in 70 A.D. It is on the site of the western boundary of the Jewish temple built by King Solomon and is thus holy to the Jews. This area is also holy to Moslems as it is from this place that Mohammed is claimed to have ascended to Heaven upon El Buraq, his white horse.

While the Wall has been accepted as Moslem property by Jews and Moslems alike, it has been the custom for Jews to pray there freely. The Wall formed a boundary of the Haram esh Sharaf area, holy to the Moslems within which was the Mosque of Aksar and the Mosque of the Dome of the Rock.
Certain rules were understood by Jews and Arabs alike and incidents arose when these rules were infringed upon, sometimes with deliberate intent to cause trouble. When Moslems wanted to remove weeds from' their' Wall, Jews protested and when Jews attempted to place seats or screens near the Wall, Moslems protested.

On 24th. September, 1928, The Day of Atonement, an unpleasant incident was avoided when Police were ordered to remove screens which had been placed against the Wall by Jews. The authorities were attacked in the Press for their actions which had almost certainly prevented an incident from occurring.


The Palestine Police eventually got caught between the Arabs and the people who wanted to create the state of Israel. After they were disbanded in 1948, many of them were shipped to various other colonies that were nearing independence – such as Malaysia and Kenya. In that way they had an influence on counter-insurgency operations and small wars.

[William F. Owen]

In my view, the best thing a new Obama Administration could do it to dust off the Clinton Parameters, rename them, get them endorsed by the UNSC, and tell the parties "we can't make you negotiate or agree, but we can nail down the goalposts and make it clear what sort of agreement the international community expects from you eventually."

With the greatest respect Rex, this is same pie in the sky stuff that the Middle East Peace Industry always comes out with.

Everywhere Israel withdraws from creates new rocket bases for the Iranian backed extremists like Hezbollah and Hamas. That's an historical fact and a reality for the foreseeable future.

Making peace with the so-called "moderate" Palestinians is not a workable reality.

Sure you sign a piece of paper and withdraw from from 95% of the West Bank. Two week or three years later the first Grad-B slams into Petach Tikva, followed by 30 more every day, because the moderates have been over ruled and the extremists are back in the driving seat. 99% of Israel population is then within man-carried SSM range. That IS an Iranian plan, as much as some would like to deny it.

"Oh but you made peace with Egypt and Jordan" - so what? Israel still has to maintain a big army because one day the extremists will be in the driving seats in those countries as well, and they will have large US-equipped armies under their control. Egypt is especially suspect.

Now make no mistake, I loathe the idea of occupying the West Bank with passion, as do most Israelis (contrary to what the BBC would like you to believe), but the achievable peace is merely lulls in the fighting. The father of the last Israeli soldier to die in Gaza has not been born yet.

Put Gaza under UN-control? Well the UN is doing nothing/practically nothing to stop Hezbollah re-building it's military capabilities, so I don't see that one as a good idea either and the next attack by Hezbollah on Israel is merely a matter of time.

[Rex Brynen]

With the greatest respect Rex, this is same pie in the sky stuff that the Middle East Peace Industry always comes out with.

Oh you would be surprised what a hard-bitten cynic I am, Wilf. Years of working on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does that to a person

More to the point, what I've advocated is almost the exact opposite of what the MEPP industry has done—since Oslo, and again with the Road Map, and even with Annapolis, the international community has systematically failed to articulate a clear vision of what permanent status arrangements would look like. The only time it did so was for a brief few weeks in December 2000, with the Clinton Parameters—which were then pulled off the table by the Bush Administration in January 2001.

If you reread my post, you'll see that I'm not predicting that laying the ground rules and contours for eventual peace will make it happen any time soon. I am arguing that it makes it harder for the radicals on both sides to drag the conflict even further away from any future agreement.

Sure you sign a piece of paper and withdraw from from 95% of the West Bank. Two week or three years later the first Grad-B slams into Petach Tikva, followed by 30 more every day, because the moderates have been over ruled and the extremists are back in the driving seat. 99% of Israel population is then within man-carried SSM range. That IS an Iranian plan, as much as some would like to deny it.

Paradoxically, this is the Hamas critique of negotiations with Israel too:

"Sure you sign a piece of paper and agree to negotiate peace. Two week or three months later a settlement expands or a new settlement outpost is established, followed by more every week, because the moderates have been over ruled and the extremists are back in the driving seat. More Palestinian land is then increasingly de facto annexed by Israel. That IS a Zionist plan, as much as some would like to deny it."

Those two narratives are a mutual recipe for never-ending conflict.

I would neither suggest nor predict that Israel would withdraw from the Palestinian territories while there is no stable Palestinian government there able to maintain a secure environment—hence the need to bolster both the legitimacy and security capacity if peace is ever to be achieved. This won't happen soon.

Everywhere Israel withdraws from creates new rocket bases for the Iranian backed extremists like Hezbollah and Hamas. That's an historical fact and a reality for the foreseeable future.

Hamas isn't particularly an Iranian proxy, even if--for obvious reasons--it accepts Iranian aid.

Israel's ill-fated and ill-considered 1982 invasion of Lebanon gave rise to the birth of Hizbullah, which didn't exist before then. Sharon's decision to not effectively coordinate Gaza disengagement with the PA, coupled with PA/Fateh failings and equally ill-considered US policy, helped propel Hamas into power there. When Israel withdrew it knew from Gaza the way it did it knew full well this day could come—something that was made amply clear at the time to me and others working on implementation at the time.

Now make no mistake, I loathe the idea of occupying the West Bank with passion

I think on this we both agree. In addition to all of the things the Palestinian side needs to do, I think we would both agree that a real halt to freeze on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank would be in the Israeli, as well as Palestinian interest.

[William F. Owen]

If you reread my post, you'll see that I'm not predicting that laying the ground rules and contours for eventual peace will make it happen any time soon. I am arguing that it makes it harder for the radicals on both sides to drag the conflict even further away from any future agreement.

Well I may have misunderstood what you said and you may have to say it again, but make it clearer!

Paradoxically, this is the Hamas critique of negotiations with Israel too:

"Sure you sign a piece of paper and agree to negotiate peace. Two week or three months later a settlement expands or a new settlement outpost is established, followed by more every week, because the moderates have been over ruled and the extremists are back in the driving seat. More Palestinian land is then increasingly de facto annexed by Israel. That IS a Zionist plan, as much as some would like to deny it."

Very well aware, but the West Bank is not Gaza. They are and will become two separate nations. Negotiating them together harks back to the Arafat Pan-Palestine, stance of 1964, that is out of touch with political, historical and even ethnic reality.

Hamas isn't particularly an Iranian proxy, even if--for obvious reasons--it accepts Iranian aid.

Sure, but Iran wants Hamas to be an instrument of their foreign policy. Knowing the Iranians I'm sure they'll make it happen.

Israel's ill-fated and ill-considered 1982 invasion of Lebanon gave rise to the birth of Hizbullah, which didn't exist before then.

Ill-fated and ill-considered occupation of Southern Lebanon, I'll grant you.

I think on this we both agree. In addition to all of the things the Palestinian side needs to do, I think we would both agree that a real halt to freeze on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank would be in the Israeli, as well as Palestinian interest.

Absolutely, but that's part of a West Bank solution, not a Gaza solution, or even an complete Israeli security solution.

[Rex Brynen]

Former Israeli policy advisor/negotiator Daniel Levy, at his Prospects for Peace blog:

What next on Gaza/Israel and Why Americans Should Care

For many people, what has happened today between Gaza and Israel may have all too familiar a ring to it – Israel warns and then retaliates to an alleged or real Palestinian escalation of violence, there is Arab condemnation and international exasperation, eventually things de-escalate but according to Israel’s timetable as the U.S. prevents effective early international mediation, and we’re back to where we started - with the addition of more blood and death (many innocent, some less so), more wounded and more shattered families.

Most of those involved, often including Israel, tend to regret things not coming to a halt sooner. The Israel Defense Forces with their modern weaponry try to pinpoint targets but invariably, predictably, and painfully there are plenty of “misses”; the Palestinians – well their weaponry is by definition more crude, they use what is available and the results are correspondingly messy and indiscriminate. Bottom line – Arabs and Jews are killing each other – so what’s new? And why on earth would America want to be involved?

Here’s the bad news folks – America is involved, up to its eyeballs actually. Today, after Israeli air-strikes that killed over 200 Palestinians in Gaza, the Middle East is again seething with rage. Recruiters to the most radical of causes are again cashing in....

[Rex Brynen]

Interesting Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, as always, from bitterlemons.org:

War in Gaza
December 29, 2008
Edition 46

• Limited strategic objectives by Yossi Alpher
  Under the best of circumstances, this operation will not solve our Hamas problem.
  
• War crimes in Gaza put PA in awkward place by Ghassan Khatib
  The Israeli attack on Gaza is strengthening Hamas politically and increasing public support and sympathy for the movement.
  
• Replaying the 2006 Lebanon War by Yisrael Harel
  Israel's reticence to deploy ground forces will generate a very negative outcome.
  
• An Israeli trap for Hamas by Mkhaimar Abusada
  Military operations are like snowballs: the more momentum they gather the bigger they become.

A sample (more at the link above):

AN ISRAELI VIEW
Limited strategic objectives
by Yossi Alpher

Israel has opted to launch a major attack on Hamas in Gaza. The idea appears to be to use heavy military force, primarily from the air, but with a limited objective: to weaken Hamas to a point where it returns to a ceasefire on conditions congenial to Israel.
The opening conditions are favorable from Israel's standpoint: it achieved tactical surprise in launching a Sabbath attack while much of the world is busy with Christmas and New Year celebrations. The United States is supportive and is in any case between administrations; PM Ehud Olmert's recent visit to Turkey gave Syria an incentive not to meddle; Egypt shares Israel's frustration with Hamas and seemingly--through the vehicle of FM Tzipi Livni's meeting with President Hosni Mubarak on the eve of the attack--gave its blessing. The Israeli political scene, both (Zionist) left and right, is supportive, to the extent of setting aside the current election campaign.

Militarily, Israel ended up with little alternative but to respond to Hamas rocket attacks. Even the Egyptian mediators between Israel and Hamas agreed that the latter had unilaterally broken a ceasefire. Hamas seemed to believe it could fire rockets at Israeli civilians with impunity, while arming and fortifying Gaza and flouting Egypt's invitation to negotiate a unity government with the West Bank-based PLO.

Yet the difficult part for Israel is to attack, achieve something, then get out. Minister of Defense Ehud Barak and IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi are clearly not anxious to get drawn into ambiguous ground warfare that could multiply Israeli losses and lead to reoccupation of Gazan territory. Nor is the Israeli public or body politic interested in renewed, open-ended occupation of 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza or even a portion thereof. On the other hand, the ghost of Israel's failed war against Hizballah in 2006 hovers over this operation: it must end by strengthening Israel's deterrent profile against the militant Islamists.

At the end of the day, however, the operation confirms the contention I have voiced in these virtual pages repeatedly over recent weeks and months: neither Israel nor anyone else has a long-term workable strategy for dealing with Hamas in Gaza....

[Entropy]

The ONLY stratergy is survival. How is that failing? Having a state is the strategy. The strategy is not peace, at any price.

Survival against what, Hamas? Hezbollah? They have the means to destroy the Israeli state?

My point here is that the "survival" strategy succeeds in the short term but fails over the long term and will likely continue to fail.

When all Arabs recognise Israel within the 1948, and allow Jews to exist in peace, then there might be peace.

And here's some evidence Israel's strategy is failing. Over 25 years of punitive expeditions and the Arabs apparently still don't get it! How much longer is it going to take?

The legitimacy of Hezbollah, or Hamas is utterly irrelevant. It's their actions and beliefs. I'm sure the Taliban has a following in A'Stan.

Their legitimacy is completely relevant. That they are legitimate in the eyes of their populations means there will be no peace and Israeli actions, on the whole, serve to increase and not decrease that legitimacy. Considering Israel is unwilling or unable to decisively use its military power to impose its will, what exactly is the end state? Hope that Israel's enemies will tire of attrition and endless conflict? How is that success?

[Rex Brynen]

Very well aware, but the West Bank is not Gaza. They are and will become two separate nations. Negotiating them together harks back to the Arafat Pan-Palestine, stance of 1964, that is out of touch with political, historical and even ethnic reality.

Certainly there are social differences, but the differences are not much greater than between, say, Ramallah and Hebron—and arguably much, much less than between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

Ethnopolitically, they are all Palestinians. It is certainly true, however, that current political dynamics tend to reinforce, rather than weaken, the regional differences.

[William F. Owen]

Their legitimacy is completely relevant. That they are legitimate in the eyes of their populations means there will be no peace and Israeli actions, on the whole, serve to increase and not decrease that legitimacy.

Their legitimacy is irrelevant to the only population that Israel cares about and that is their own. Israelis do not care what Arabs think for the most part. Do you really care what the Iranians or Sunni Insurgents think of the US? Do you care what the Taliban thinks?

Considering Israel is unwilling or unable to decisively use its military power to impose its will, what exactly is the end state? Hope that Israel's enemies will tire of attrition and endless conflict? How is that success?

The end state is still being here in another 100 years and then then another 100. Endless conflict? You might want to read Jewish history, and then ask that question again.

Existence, not Peace, is the prize. Do not apply Liberal US Caucasian values on folks from a completely different culture.

Success? Look at the progress Israel has made in 60 years, of being constantly attacked. I've seen incredible social and economic progress just in my life time. (I'm 45)

[Rex Brynen]

Ha'aretz
17:19 30/12/2008

Defense establishment to recommend 48-hour truce with Hamas

By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent

The defense establishment on Tuesday said it would recommend that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert seek out a diplomatic initiative to abate the war against Hamas and embark on a 48-hour truce, before it becomes necessary to begin a significant ground invasion of the Gaza Strip.

Senior defense officials believe that such a diplomatic process need not be a unilateral Israeli procedure, but should rather be based on an initiative originally proposed by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.

The goal of the temporary calm would be to see if Hamas can abide by the truce and cease firing rockets at Israel.

The initiative is seen as a possibility to cease the operation before sending a massive Israel Defense Forces ground corp into the Gaza Strip.

[Entropy]

Their legitimacy is irrelevant to the only population that Israel cares about and that is their own. Israelis do not care what Arabs think for the most part. Do you really care what the Iranians or Sunni Insurgents think of the US? Do you care what the Taliban thinks?

Yes I do because I realize there are limits to the military instrument and if I want to obtain my strategic objectives, I need to understand my enemy. Knowing what they "think" of the US in important in that regard. I find it quite amazing to hear you state you do not care what your enemy thinks, particularly given your frequently cogent comments on Clausewitz. How are you going to impose your will on your enemy if you're not willing to learn or understand what fountain that will flows from?

The end state is still being here in another 100 years and then then another 100. Endless conflict? You might want to read Jewish history, and then ask that question again.

Existence, not Peace, is the prize. Do not apply Liberal US Caucasian values on folks from a completely different culture.

For me this is not about values and I don't have a dog in this fight. A rational examination of the long-term existence of Israel is exactly what I'm talking about. My basic argument is that Israel's short-term actions make its long-term existence less likely, not more likely. Pretty much everyone understands Israel's lack of strategic depth. My argument is that "endless" conflict is a conflict Israel will lose. Time and the regional demographic realities are decidedly not on Israel's side.

Success? Look at the progress Israel has made in 60 years, of being constantly attacked. I've seen incredible social and economic progress just in my life time. (I'm 45)

Yes, it has made great progress, but sixty years is not very long. Israel's enemies are comparatively weak for now - will they be in another 60 years, another 160? To me, that's the question - the long-term survival of Israel - and It seems to me Israel's actions may be sowing the seeds of its future destruction.

I would be interested in any Clausewitzian analysis you have on Israel's current strategy. To me it doesn't make any sense. To me, Israel is misusing the military instrument.

[Entropy]

BTW, I don't agree with the whole thing, but I think Rami Khouri makes some good points:

Israel's use of its clear military superiority against Palestinians, Lebanese and other Arabs has consistently led to five parallel, linked and very predictable results:

1. Israeli power has momentarily shattered Palestinian and Arab military and civilian infrastructure, only to see the bludgeoned Arabs regroup and return a few years later -with much greater technical proficiency and political will to fight Israel. This happened when the Palestinians who were driven out of Jordan in 1970 eventually re-established more lethal bases in Lebanon; or when Israel destroyed Fatah's police facilities in the West Bank and Gaza a few years ago, they soon found themselves fighting Hamas' capabilities instead.

and

5. Israeli policies over decades have been a major - but not the only - reason for the transformation of the wider political environment in the Arab world into a hotbed of Islamism confronting more stringent Arab police states. The Islamists who politically dominate the Arab region - whether Shiite Hizbullah, or Sunni Hamas or anything else in between - are the only Arabs since the birth of Israel in 1948 who have proved both willing and able to fight back against Zionism.

All these trends can be seen in action during the current Israeli attack against Gaza: Palestinian and Arab radicalization, Islamist responses amid pan-Arab lassitude, the continued discrediting of President Mahmoud Abbas' government, and regional populist agitation against Israel, its US protector, and most Arab governments. None of this is new - which is precisely why it is so significant today, as Israel's war on Gaza paves the way for a repetition of the five trends above that have plagued Israelis and Arabs alike.

Read the whole thing.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, it has made great progress, but sixty years is not very long. Israel's enemies are comparatively weak for now - will they be in another 60 years, another 160? To me, that's the question - the long-term survival of Israel - and It seems to me Israel's actions may be sowing the seeds of its future destruction.

I would be interested in any Clausewitzian analysis you have on Israel's current strategy. To me it doesn't make any sense. To me, Israel is misusing the military instrument.

60 years is no time at all, especially in Jewish history and Israel has been over run and destroyed a couple of times in recorded history... and keeps coming back!

Clausewitz wrote on War, not strategy, and I am not a strategist. I think Clausewitz would be doing what the IDF are doing now. I can make better sense of what the IDF do, than I can the US and NATO in A'Stan.

...but what do you suggest? Everyone assumes it's up to Israel to make peace, with people who do not want peace. All Israel's enemies want is Israel's destruction.

[Rex Brynen]

...but what do you suggest? Everyone assumes it's up to Israel to make peace, with people who do not want peace. All Israel's enemies want is Israel's destruction.

I think that if one looks at what happened during the Oslo era of negotiations (1993-2001) there's plenty of blame to go around for all sides.

There are clearly Palestinians who want to destroy Israel (including most of the Hamas leadership). There are clearly Israelis who would permanently retain control of most or all of the Palestinian territories and deny the Palestinians meaningful self-determinations (including most of the current Israeli opposition parties).

There are also a great many Palestinians and Israelis—a majority by most polls—that whatever their dislike for the other or historical grievances, would be willing to live in peace with each other on the basis of a stable, negotiated two-state solution. They don't have to love each other for there to be peace and security, just an appropriate balance of interests.

The policy challenges that arise from all this are multifold:

1) How do we strengthen the moderates and undermine the hardliners (on both sides)?

2) How do we build Palestinian capacity and will to assure that any future agreement will endure?

3) How do we deal with the current challenges of violence and terrorism, without undercutting longer-term objectives #1 and #2? The current Gaza operation makes this an immediate priority.

4) While the focus is on military violence, how do we not lose sight of the structural violence of occupation, land confiscations, and illegal settlement construction? I don't think that firing rockets from Gaza at Sderot is an effective or acceptable way of stopping this. However, I'm not the least bit surprised that some people do. If Iran started annexing part of Texas, I'm sure there would be a few Texans taking potshots at them too.

Finally, having said all that, perhaps I can refocus all of this a little on the question of the next few weeks. How is the current violence likely to play out? Is there a clear war termination strategy (and, for that matter, clear war goals) on the Israeli side? What are Hamas' options? How can humanitarian suffering be alleviated (malnutrition rates already rivaled those in Africa before the fighting started)? Where does all this leave Fateh?

Update on my earlier post above--IDF sources are now denying that they recommended a 48 hour truce.

[William F. Owen]

I think that if one looks at what happened during the Oslo era of negotiations (1993-2001) there's plenty of blame to go around for all sides.

Not denying it. There are Jewish groups here I loathe as much as Hamas and Hezbollah, and Jews who would kill Jews to prevent peace.

But fact is that Israel has made peace with Arabs such as Jordan, Egypt, and Qatar.

There are also a great many Palestinians and Israelis—a majority by most polls—that whatever their dislike for the other or historical grievances, would be willing to live in peace with each other on the basis of a stable, negotiated two-state solution.

...and that has been true since 1948. It was true in 1929, when the Arab Governments started rejecting all and any plans for peace.

If Iran started annexing part of Texas, I'm sure there would be a few Texans taking potshots at them too.

I concur. However it is not a "few" Texans. It is the official and supported policy of the Government of Gaza. Those rockets fly because Hamas wants them to, and they have 1,200 approx. trained and salaried men dedicated to doing it.