For the links. Is it me or is there a noticeable lack of people talking about the situation in Gaza on small wars?
al-Jazeera English is considerably more balanced than its Arabic broadcasts are at the moment, although it still is sympathetic to the Palestinian side.
Among English-language Israeli sources, try Haaretz (center-left, and an excellent source), the Jerusalem Post (center-ish), and YNet (center-populist).
Useful English-language Palestinian sources are the Maan News Agency and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights.
On humanitarian conditions, try the OCHA ReliefWeb website for the occupied Palestinian territory.
For the links. Is it me or is there a noticeable lack of people talking about the situation in Gaza on small wars?
Davidoff,
Yes, you are right there is little comment and I would suggest that many of the issues around the context of this conflict can be found on the earlier thread on the action against Hezbollah. Secondly the more military / tactical details are similar and may not be available from open sources.
I digress now to other points.
Secondly the timing of the decisions - by both sides - to use violence coincided with the Xmas and New Year holiday. Many politicians and government officials here (UK) have been on an extended break and return tomorrow (5th Jan). MSM also has a lower staffing ration and as others have commented many analysts too have been away. Here some odd people have appeared to comment, for e.g. Sky News.
So fewer watchers? Yes, with a potentially bigger public audience, although at such a time of goodwill I suspect quite a lot of turning off the news.
The public protests here have attracted tens of thousands, not more. Estimates vary for the national demo in London yesterday (from 12k by police to 60K plus from organisers). Little sign of massive mobilisation, although anecdote suggests large donations to Palestinian supporting charities.
davidbfpo
BESA Center, 4 Jan 09: Has the IDF Earned the Support of the Israeli Public? An Interim Assessment of the IDF's Performance in Operation Cast Lead
Complete 5-page paper at the link.The current Gaza operation offers the IDF an opportunity to repair at least some of the damage caused to the image and reputation of the Force by its less-than-stellar performance during the Second Lebanon War. Here is an interim, and mixed, assessment of the IDF's performance thus far in three spheres: (a) public communications; (b) treatment of reservists; and (c) performance of the Rear Command.
ICG, 5 Jan 09: Ending the War in Gaza
Complete 28-page paper at the link......A massive intervention that in effect topples Hamas is looking increasingly possible. But who will take over on the back of Israel’s occupation? How could a then discredited PA assume power? Even crushing military victory ultimately might not be that much, or that lasting, of a political win.
Fighting that began as a tug-of-war over terms of a new ceasefire has become a battle over terms of deterrence and the balance of power – with no easy way out. Israel in principle wants a ceasefire, but only after it brings Hamas to its knees, strips it of long-range capabilities and dispels any illusion of a fight among equals in which rocket fire has the same deterrent effect as airforce raids, all of which could take a long time. Hamas, too, has an interest in a ceasefire, but only in return for opening the crossings. In the meantime, it sees every day of conflict as testimony to its resistance credentials. Both inexorably will see more benefit in persevering with violent confrontation than in appearing to give in.....
Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-05-2009 at 08:22 PM. Reason: Added second link.
Haaretz - 04:01 06/01/2009
ANALYSIS / The price of stubbornness over Gaza exit is dead soldiers
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz Correspondents
Also:Since the beginning of Cast Lead, most of the cabinet and the army have praised themselves for their thorough application of the Winograd recommendations from the Second Lebanon War. But the Winograd Committee's criticism of the poor coordination between military action and diplomatic achievements seems relevant in this round as well. Most of the military at the operational level is pushing for continuing the operation deep within Hamas territory. That is exactly what is expected of them.
In contrast, Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi was very cautious in presenting the risks and opportunities in Friday afternoon's cabinet meeting. Ashkenazi is likely to be satisfied with a quick end to the ground operation, in the coming days. However with the defense minister and the foreign minister both beginning their days trying to figure out how to thwart the success of the other, and the (outgoing) prime minister toying with the idea of smashing Hamas, it's little wonder that a diplomatic solution is still far off.
Haaretz, 04:37 06/01/2009
ANALYSIS / Israel is on its way to reoccupying all of Gaza
By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent
The way events played out yesterday did not stir the political leadership into thinking of stopping the ground offensive and moving toward a cease-fire. On the contrary, Israel is moving toward a decision to occupy the whole Gaza Strip.
The message yesterday from Jerusalem was that it is impossible to end Operation Cast Lead without an achievement, and if in the next two days there is no satisfactory diplomatic solution, Israel will have to broaden the operation.
"Broadening the operation" could mean moving from house to house as in Operating Defensive Shield in 2002 in the West Bank, aiming to kill or capture as many Hamas fighters as possible. Or it could mean surrounding Gaza City, similar to the way the Egyptian Third Army was cut off in 1973, or like the siege of Beirut in 1982, until Hamas? leaders emerge from their hideouts with their hands up. This could take several weeks.
...
Israel is in a bind. If it pulls out now from Gaza, it will appear to have cut and run at the first sign of trouble in battling Hamas. And if it goes on to a full occupation of the Strip, it may pay a heavy economic and political price without achieving its political goals.
Last edited by Rex Brynen; 01-06-2009 at 03:08 AM.
Whats the likelihood of any international presence in order to replace them thus allowing them to stand down?Or it could mean surrounding Gaza City, similar to the way the Egyptian Third Army was cut off in 1973, or like the siege of Beirut in 1982, until Hamas? leaders emerge from their hideouts with their hands up. This could take several weeks.
You know hey we don't want to be here but these #@#$@'s keep using southern Israel for target practice and mommas getting a little pissed off so whats a guy to do?
Somehow one wishes it were only that simple
Why does it seem like thats the only part of the world where it apparently doesn't seem like a bad idea to keep throwing pebbles at your next door neighbors windows when he's a gun collector and a professional hunter to boot???
I don't think I'll ever understand it
Last edited by Ron Humphrey; 01-06-2009 at 04:19 AM. Reason: addendum
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Its worth remembering that the IDF couldn't prevent the initial growth of Hamas in 1987-94 when they were in full and complete control of Gaza, nor in 1995-2005 when they still occupied large parts of the Strip.
I get worried when policymakers start throwing around the idea of an "international presence" without any sense as to whether the mandate and mission are actually feasible.
throwing around the idea of an "international presence" without any sense as to whether the mandate and mission are actually feasible, however, though not a gambler, I'd be willing to bet a large sum of money on that being a non-viable mission...
The actual objective (as opposed to stated) for IDF military action is essentially to force the International Community to combat Hamas by making them monitor the strip, or to commit to action to tackle Hamas as an armed Force.The message yesterday from Jerusalem was that it is impossible to end Operation Cast Lead without an achievement, and if in the next two days there is no satisfactory diplomatic solution, Israel will have to broaden the operation.
If there is a ceasefire based on that, and the EU or UN then fails to make it happen, then this falls into line with Israeli opinion that neither the EU or the UN can be trusted and you have to go again.
Concur. Obviously the ability to use "armed force" to stop the rockets would be a must. That means an EU or UN occupation of Gaza until Hamas rejects violence.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
This would widely be seen in Gaza—and not just by Hamas supporters—as UN or EU occupation. While public opinion polls show that a majority of Gazans supported continuation of the ceasefire (and support a negotiated two-state solution to the broader conflict), they also show a large majority support the right of Palestinians to engage in armed resistance so long as Israel continues to occupy Palestinian territories. (This is to be expected—it is hard to imagine any population under foreign military occupation with different views.)
A robust international presence could work if it were combined by equally robust international diplomatic action to bring an end to all Israeli settlement activity. Otherwise it could end up doing substantial longer-term harm to Western interests in the region, with the international force seen as an Israeli enforcer.
More likely we'll end up with something like the Temporary International Presence in Hebron—largely useless, other than as a fig-leaf that allowed parties to climb down from their initial positions.
Tom has done the "international observer" part in both Lebanon and the Sinai ends as part of UNTSO, so he may have some views on this.
So linking Gaza to the West Bank, again, for no useful purpose. No rockets coming out of the West bank (yet).
I for one, am utterly disgusted by the acts of the illegal (mostly ultra-orthodox "new comers") settlers in the West Bank. How is the theft of an olive grove near Tul Karem, a block to peace in Gaza, with a Terrorist group bent on the destruction of Israel? To link the two defies good judgement and plays in Hamas's hands.A robust international presence could work if it were combined by equally robust international diplomatic action to bring an end to all Israeli settlement activity. Otherwise it could end up doing substantial longer-term harm to Western interests in the region, with the international force seen as an Israeli enforcer.
...and two weeks later, Hamas renews it's rocket attacks, and it all has to be done again, at even greater cost.More likely we'll end up with something like the Temporary International Presence in Hebron—largely useless, other than as a fig-leaf that allowed parties to climb down from their initial positions.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Much as some might want to delink them, Palestinians still see them both as Palestine.
There are over 282,000 settlers currently living the in occupied Palestinian territory, and at any given time almost one-third of the West Bank is off-limits to most Palestinians. From a Palestinian point of view, settlement activity is an existential threat too, threatening to permanently prevent them from ever enjoying self-determination in an independent state. Indeed, I think it could well be argued that West Bank settlements are more likely to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state than Gaza rockets are to destroy the Israeli one.
Arguing that you should disarm while a foreign power is gobbling up your territory isn't likely to sell any better in Gaza than it would anywhere else in the world.
Let me be clear on the rocket fire coming out of Gaza: it is criminal and stupid in equal measures. I'm not the slightest bit surprised that Israel has shifted to a strategy of massive retaliation in an effort to change that particular equation. I am arguing, however, that no one should expect any kind of international force to end the challenge of an armed Hamas, absent a whole series of other things happening in the broader peace process (none of which I see happening).
What are we therefore left with? I would suggest the following:
1) An Israeli exit strategy that leaves a sense that leaves Hamas both physically and politically weakened. The tricky part here is the latter, since it may only take a few rockets the day after the IDF withdraws for Hamas to make a credible argument to its constituency that by surviving 2(+) weeks of Israeli onslaught and still firing back at the end it "won."
2) Impairing the ability of Hamas to rearm by working with the Egyptians to reduce smuggling from the Egyptian side of the border. This is better done with technical assistance than a high-profile international presence.
3) Recognition that as long as the siege of Gaza continues a ceasefire won't last. Returning the border crossings to PA control would provide Israel with political excuse to reopen them properly (something that never really happened even BEFORE Hamas was in control of Gaza), and would assure that credit for this doesn't flow to Hamas.
4) A reinvigorated Fateh, more able to take Hamas on politically. This requires both Fateh reform and a meaningful post-(Israeli) election peace process. I'm not optimistic on either score.
I would have added something on Fateh-Hamas reconciliation dialogue too, but to be frank I think the current violence makes that unlikely any time soon.
If one wants to add a few international observers in the mix as diplomatic window-dressing, that's fine. But be clear that's all they are.
A comparatively recent view. Post 1948 and 67, they were seen as part of Egypt and Jordan respectively.
...and a fair few of the 200,000 want to leave and go live somewhere else. They are only there because they were settled their in the 1970's to help protect Israel. It is extremely important to differentiate from those who would gladly move, if correctly compensated (not yet happened to those who moved from Gaza) and the nutters living in Portacabins on hill-tops.There are over 282,000 settlers currently living the in occupied Palestinian territory, and at any given time almost one-third of the West Bank is off-limits to most Palestinians.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Certainly not by Gazans, who were never encouraged (or inclined) to feel Egyptian. It the West Bank it was a little more complicated, since there was so pro-Jordanian sentiment 1950-70. This was essentially gone by the 1970s, however. Palestinians in the territories see themselves as Palestinian.
On settlements and settlers I think we are in full agreement.
I guess the reason I felt compelled to ask a question that I already had a fairly good idea of what the answer would be was because of the very fact that since the answer seems so apparent why should Israel be expected to do anything but what they are now.
If its a gimmee to any one in the know that international force, presence, etc is not only unlikely but almost guaranteed useless then why even bother discussing ceasefires. If the problems are as diverse as Rex infers and as Ken states international presence is probably unviable then what business does anyone who can and will do absolutely nothing to stop the consistent aggression by hamas to the conflict but wants to complain about fairly inane aggression by the Israel(how dare you settle here). This goes doubly if as both William and Rex seem to agree that most those settlers would move in ten seconds flat given the right motivation and actual believable promise of real peace because if you know that then it's almost a guarantee that they know it too.
As to the current actions in Gaza considering that they could level the place and their not but rather trying to minimize casualties and they are making efforts to get aid in, not trying to starve them out then not sure how much more could be asked for.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
What about an Iranian force to monitor the strip?
Iran is Israel's natural and historical ally, and they are also one of the few Muslim nations who could provide such a force to ensure order. I keep hearing how Hamas cannot be negotiated with because there is so much disunity between hardliners and moderates. The Iranian could ensure unity...keep everyone in line.
Yes Ahmadinejad is crazy.......but again he has no power. Even the Israeli's will agree that Iran is not crazy.
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
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