What Is Our Strategic Endstate in Afghanistan?

[SWJED]

?

[Entropy]

You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

[Hacksaw]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

[Eden]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

Uhhh...looks like we'll need to invade Pakistan, too.

I would propose:

A place run by sons-a-bitches who don't like the Taliban and are in it strictly for the dough.

Not that it matters, since NATO is running the show now. Any government supported as legitimate by Afghanis would not pass muster with the Europeans.

[wm]

Uhhh...looks like we'll need to invade Pakistan, too.

I would propose:

A place run by sons-a-bitches who don't like the Taliban and are in it strictly for the dough.

Not that it matters, since NATO is running the show now. Any government supported as legitimate by Afghanis would not pass muster with the Europeans.

Actually, I think we have a major violation of the principle of war Unity of command. We seem to have two different agendas running: the NATO one and the US one. Perhaps we cannot clearly identify a strategic endstate because of that fact.

[Hacksaw]

This should help...

General David D. McKiernan, United States Army, for reappointment to the rank of general and assignment as Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan. He is currently serving as Commander, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan.


The dual hat puts him in charge of all forces... still doesn't fully address the myriad of problems - specifically national caveats - but its a start

[wm]

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

I think that the third goal may well be a bridge too far. Suppose we throw that one out and recognize that the area we now call Aghanistan has had a long history of surviving by means of an economy based on subsistance agriculture/herding and banditry/law breaking of one sort or another.

The concern in point 2 is different, I submit. It has nothing to do with the amount of security forces (as "adequate" seems to imply) available. Rather it has to do with the will of those running the country to act in a way that we in the US (and the rest of NATO since ISAF is now in Afghanistan) want them to act. Pakistan has the means to handle the NWFP/FATA problem but not the desire. I suggest the Taleban were in a similar situation when they held sway in Kabul. I doubt our continued occupation of the country will change the national Afghan will (if there even is such a thing) in this area.

The need for Point 1 is a mystery to me. Did the Afghans have such a thing before we got there? Have they ever had such a thing?
I am also unclear why we need Afghanistan to be stable enough to resist adventurous takeover attempts by its neighbors (condition 4). As far as I can tell, these positions are a holdover from the England vs. Russia Great Game "### for tat" mentality which is now being re-enacted between the US and Russia with such things as NATO naval exercises in the Black Sea being countered by joint Russian-Venezuelan naval exercises in the Caribbean.

[Hacksaw]

Caveat first... the stated end state was more or less articulated to CENTCOM leadership in May '02 in response to a question in a briefing, but let me take some of these on...

What is the alternative to a legitimate government described as such by recognized as legitimate by its citizens? I didn't specify form - our sensibilities would prefer a mini-me democracy, but I agree that isn't in the cards... the government does need to be legitimate in order to avoid creating large swaths of ungoverned areas from which terrorists of all sorts of ilk can take refuge and plan future attacks. This seems self-evident, but if it needed stating so be it.

Why did you limit the term adequate to mean only quantity of security forces? Isn't adequacy in any situation a function of quality and quantity. Not sure why you would assume that a million man army unwilling to security its own territory would be deemed "adequate" because its large...

Something other than a narco-economy is tough but not a bridge too far? I'll note I didn't say poppy cultivation reduced to zero, I simply said it can't dominate economic activity, otherwise it prejudices all other activities to the point of irrelevance. Of course this means something other than a military solution -- imagine that..

As for able to resist military adventurism - this is important. The vestigages of the old grand game is that in some cases it is best to create instability in the neighboring nation to mitigate it as a threat, or to create instability on a rival's border to create another challenge for the rival. In any case Iran, Pakistan, India, and Russia all have a history of doing so -- ungoverned areas, failed state etc etc...

Now I'm not wedded to these by any stretch. To be honest I had to stretch to remember them in paraphrased form, but I don't think they are nearly as far off as you. You might ask why we chose to declare war on the Taliban, but once in these aren't so bad...

Now as for Pakistan and their ability but unwillingness to do something in the FATA, that is debatable and is really a US centric view. Could/should/would we like them to do more? Yep Is it necessarily feasible for them to do a lot more -- room for disagreement.

Live well and row

[Hacksaw]

I think I was the first who proposed an answer to the question this thread posed. Whether it is the stated end state or a proposed end state matters little for my purposes. As a reminder, this is what was proposed (more or less) back in 2002...

A legitimate government - one recognized as such by its citizens

Adequate security forces - to preclud ungoverned areas that could host terrorist staging activities

an economic system not reliant upon narcotic production

Stable enough to resist adventurist actions of its neighbors

"In other words, doesn't have to smell like roses, but it can't smell like a pile of $hit either" -

end state (more or less) proposed to CENTCOM CDR o/a May 02

I've been following the thread since and I'm somewhat surprised the turn that it has made. It seems unless I'm mistaken, that the collective wisdom of the council is "do we need, or can we know" the end state.

WHAT!!!!!

An end state provides the word picture for the commander's intent... It gives ultimate purpose and direction to all activity -- or should. If we are unable or unwilling to pose an end state for fear that we will need to adjust that end state should conditions change, than shame on us and everyone who put someone in harm's way. Stealing a phrase from another recent thread -- Fuzzy or Fraud, I go with Fraud!!!

Maybe I missed something along the way in this thread, but I think we collectively somehow allowed ourselves to get into group think mode.

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????

If the arguement is we started without an idea of how it ends in either IZ or AFG - agreed. If we think we ought to continue to muddle along until an idea of how it ends emerges - you be on the wrong side of that discussion

Live well and row

[Steve Blair]

To dip my toe in the waters, I do think you need to have some sort of end state in mind, informed by local conditions and what actually might be achievable (or feasible) in the region. "Muddling through" has never served us well in the past, and I've seen no breakthrough that will change that.

Having said that, I think that we will most likely not be able to form a good vision of an end state because our domestic and political conditions simply don't allow for the sort of enclosed planning that used to take place. We fixate on short-term goals, unable (or unwilling) to grasp that these sorts of things take years. Looking back to our own history, the Frontier took decades to pacify (a full century really-if not more-given the changing nature of what was considered the Frontier). The Philippines took over ten, and many of the so-called Banana Wars lasted longer than our efforts to date in Afghanistan. In all those efforts, the operational planning shifted many times, but the end state focus remained pretty consistent. Granted, all these examples would be considered Imperial efforts...and that's why I feel that we can no longer plan this way.

Any end state vision that would take longer than two years to attain will be labeled "Imperialist" by every talking head and typing hand out there with the inclination to do so. It doesn't matter if the end state vision is or isn't imperialist...once the accusation is made the burden of proof swings immediately to the planners, and they'll run for cover (especially on the political side).

So, Hacksaw, I agree we desperately need a realistic end state vision, but I doubt our ability to produce one based on the factors I mentioned. I'd love to be pleasantly surprised....

[William F. Owen]

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????

Excellent question. I subscribe to both CvC and Delbruk, in terms of either annihilation or exhaustion. If COIN is biased away from Combat and more to Security, then I would suggest you aim to exhaust as nothing decisive can be done, in terms of annihilation.

To exhaust, keep doing what works and try not to do those things that do not (killing civilians). As I said it is like maintenance, and not construction. You've won when the other guy cannot go on. The desired end state will appear. You'll recognise it because it will look very different to the undesired end state, and you know what they look like.

[Cavguy]

You've won when the other guy cannot go on. The desired end state will appear. You'll recognise it because it will look very different to the undesired end state, and you know what they look like.

Wilf - What kind of mumbo-jumbo is that?!?!?! Come on! You're the person always asking "so what?"

What Hacksaw is articulating is the need for a Commander's Intent for Afghanistan - something to focus all operations against. He is asking what that should look like?

We should muddle along until something magically appears?!?!?!

Since it seems to be lost in the "it's hard" - what should our intent/endstate be?

Similar to the 2002 articulation or changed?

[Ken White]

...I've been following the thread since and I'm somewhat surprised the turn that it has made. It seems unless I'm mistaken, that the collective wisdom of the council is "do we need, or can we know" the end state.

Are they saying that or saying this in a different way:

"... If we are unable or unwilling to pose an end state for fear that we will need to adjust that end state should conditions change..."

Seems the latter to me...

I also think this statement of yours is interesting:

An end state provides the word picture for the commander's intent... It gives ultimate purpose and direction to all activity -- or should...

While I totally agree with that militarily, my perception has long been that geopolitically on the macro level that is a confining and too often unachievable dictum and, regrettably, the issue transcends the military and enters the political realm.

Maybe I missed something along the way in this thread, but I think we collectively somehow allowed ourselves to get into group think mode.

Wilf are you out there??? If COIN/IW is war, and war is war, exactly how do you conduct it without an idea on how it ends????

We go to the war our political masters send us to and we fight hopefully well and as best we can with an idea of 'winning' -- until they say stop. That may be short of a 'win.' Again, I say look at both Korea and Viet Nam, neither ended in any sense the way the US Army would have liked -- or tried to achieve. What we want and what the Politicians get are often two very different things...

If the arguement is we started without an idea of how it ends in either IZ or AFG - agreed. If we think we ought to continue to muddle along until an idea of how it ends emerges - you be on the wrong side of that discussion.

I think you have it backwards. We started with an idea on how it would end and have to backfill and adapt, to downshift, to changing (and unconsidered) circumstances.

We can and do have an idea how we'd like it to end and my perception is that in Afghanistan, that state tracks broadly with your comments above. The issue, I think is will all the varied players, internal and peripheral allow that to happen -- we may have more votes than most but we do not have them all. Shame we can't have nice clean simple wars anymore...

[Entropy]

You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

We're not even in agreement over whether we can have an endstate, much less what it could or should be.

Maybe it's better to examine our priorities instead. What are they in Afghanistan? Instead of an endstate, I think we need to reexamine our fundamental purpose for being there.

But returning to "endstates" briefly, we've already had a few of them. Here's my very abbreviated history of Afghanistan:

Our first end state, going back to the mid-1990's, was the end of an AQ safehaven in Afghanistan. When you look at the history it becomes clear the US didn't have much interest in Afghanistan in general, or the Taliban in particular, except for its associating with and harboring of AQ. The goal of eliminating the AQ safehaven was basically accomplished by the spring of 2002

Once the Taliban and AQ were initially defeated, the goal changed and became all about preventing the return of a safehaven for AQ - that became our "new" endstate. Since the Taliban were still allied with AQ, our goal included preventing their return as well. We've pursued this goal since.

At some point in the past year or two a consensus has grown that our desired endstate of an enduring Afghanistan hostile to AQ and its associates cannot be acheived without also eliminating the safehaven in Pakistan, which the Pakistanis are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do. So now our political leadership and potential future leadership seem to be advocating for and acting on that growing consensus.

So we are, in a sense, at a crossroads, because eliminating the safehaven in Pakistan is not nearly the same as eliminating it in Afghanistan for a host of reasons I won't go into here, but which should be apparent to anyone with any knowledge of south Asia.

What has stayed consistent, though, at the root of everything, is AQ and the threat it poses to the US. We can and do and should debate on what policy and amount of blood and treasure should meet that threat, but I think it's fair to say that our "endstate" is ultimately about AQ. So far, the importance of AQ in our policy and desired end states has remained preeminent.

What I suspect will happen is that at some point that calculus will change, maybe when UBL and AAZ are killed/captured, for example, and when that happens all the supporting goals and polices and "endstates" will change too. This gets back to what I was talking about before in mentioning "priorities." If AQ goes away as a priority, then those goals and policies may fall like a house of cards without that foundation unless something else replaces it. We shall see.

[Ron Humphrey]

?What Is Our Strategic Endstate in Afghanistan?

You've identified the fundamental problem with our intervention in Afghanistan.

The ones who WILL ultimately decide that probably aren't getting a whole lot of input into that particular discussion.

[Rank amateur]

If you keep asking these kind of questions, my presence here will serve absolutely no purpose whatsoever.

What it was: to remove the Taliban from government, which was obviously insufficient.

What our objective is now: to disrupt Al Qaeda, which arguably we are being somewhat successful at it, but there are still many problems and that objective does not include an end state.

What it should be: more or less what Hacksaw said, but in order to achieve that will need significantly more troops and it will need to deny the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan. (Dropping a few bombs, and launching a few raids won't do it; that's just makes it easier for the Taliban to gain support amongst Pakistani tribes.)