This is the real issue here, and we can see it in the various posts on this discussion thread. I'm not even sure I understand what William Owen thinks it is. I agree that the MCDP 1 definition as articulated is not much help. Robert Leonhard's definition works much better for me, but that isn't exactly the way Bill Lind, John Boyd, and others would see it. For them, it's either German School Maneuver Warfare (Auftragstaktik) or nothing.

A lot of worthwhile points to discuss and I'm going to wade into this since Mr. Owen seems willing. But I need to get through a bit of truth in advertising before diving into this so everybody understands my particular bents and biases.

When I came into the U.S. Marine Corps in 1980, I was pretty dismayed at what I found. I'd been a military history buff and wargamer since I was 14, and what I was seeing in the Marine Corps (I was a tank officer) wasn't squaring with what I was reading and experiencing on the historical board wargame maps. Of course, the USMC had a rich tradition of storming fortified areas and throwing bodies/ordnance/ammo against it. But I noted that we all too often went for the "thickest part of the hedge" instead of going around when that chance was offered. I still see this today, believe it or not. More on that in a bit.

Met Bill Lind in 1988 and we became fast friends. It was then I first got exposed to MW and got the terminology I needed to explain things that just didn't seem quite right. Through him I met John Schmitt, the author of FMFM 1 who was working on a "white book" on campaigning. We seemed to see things in much the same way. In 1993 as an AMU masters student, I met Colonel Mike Wyly (who figures so prominently in the Marine Corps adoption of MW) and Bruce Gudmundsson, author of STORM TROOP TACTICS, a seminal work on German tactical innovation in WWI that busted a lot of myths about storm troop tactics in that era. Bill and Bruce ran a TV show called "Modern War" in 1994 that I was fortunate enough to have participated in. I'm still in contact with all of them. I will admit all these men affected my thinking a great deal. In 1994 I was part of "The Great Synchronization Debate" in the pages of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and carried on a lengthy correspondence with Robert Leonhard who was writing PRINCIPLES OF WAR FOR THE INFORMATION AGE--that's me as a Major in the acknowledgements. We didn't agree on a number of things, but I think I can articulate his views relatively well after all that. His work affected me greatly, particularly his book FIGHTING BY MINUTES as I quote it extensively in my chapter on Soviet decentralization in Stalingrad, 1942 in John Antal's and Brad Gericke's anthology, CITY FIGHTS.

So here is the "Apostles of Mobility" creed--yes, I am a maneuverist. I need to say that up front. Hopefully I can make points better than what we have often seen in the advocacy rhetoric. That said, I am not one to claim MW is the end all be all warfighting philosophy. I happen to particularly like it, but that's because I grew up in a Marine Corps that was unable to think beyond the beachhead and/or fortified line, that had been seared by its institutional experience against the Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese that seemed inured to any other approach than "kill them all and let God sort them out." There is certainly a time and place for that, but what I noticed was that we were seemingly incapable of doing anything else, even when the situation seemed to call for it.

I'll just make two points before I address the specific items brought up here in future postings.

1) MW was a medicine designed to address a particular warfighting "disease," borne out of Vietnam war experience. Like any medicine, it loses a great deal of its relevance when the disease goes away. I have a hard time talking and thinking about maneuver warfare in any instance other than when seeing attritionist approaches applied to situations that aren't suited for such a style of warfare--but the attritionist approach is applied nevertheless.

2) I am not sure MW has really been embraced by the USMC. I'd say there are those who have--and they are about 10-20% of the total. That may be enough. Sure, many can parrot the manuals and the buzzwords, but they show little practical understanding in the cases, TDGs, field exercises, and combat situations handed to them. For those who point to the doctrine, I will simply say that doctrine has no force if it is not followed. Additionally, many of the doctrinal tenets in the USMC "White Books" are not carried through to the detailed Marine Corps Warfighting Publications that contained more of the "how to" guidance. In fact, in some situations they are actually contradictory.

Some will point to Grenada, the Persian Gulf War, and OIF I to prove that I am wrong--that the Marine Corps had leaders who understood and applied MW. I can't disagree with that--we were lucky to have had them. And perhaps one should not expect more than this, that our senior leadership understands and can apply the concept. It's far from clear that our juniors can. It's very much a mixed bag. And much depends on how you define the term "maneuver warfare," which brings this particular reply back full circle to where I open.

In short, I want to make sure I understand what flavor of MW we are talking about. Are we talking the USMC definition? Lind/German School definition? Or Leonhard definition?