Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

[SWJED]

Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

By Eric Walters, Small Wars Journal blog

See William Owen, "The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," in Small Wars Journal. Also published in August 2008, Vol 153, Vol 4. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal.

As a very minor contributor to a couple of the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication “White Books” outlining Maneuver Warfare and having once been a professor teaching Maneuver Warfare for American Military University, my attention was caught by William F. Owen’s piece, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," if nothing else than for its catchy title. One might expect it to get a fair amount of visibility due to its controversial thesis. Owen is rightly frustrated with the maneuver warfare concept, especially since he appears to rely on the U.S. Marine Corps publications FMFM-1 and its successor, MCDP-1 Warfighting as the best contemporary articulation. But to characterize the concept as a fraud? A perversion of the truth perpetrated on the U.S. military in order to deceive it? There are indeed difficulties with the maneuver warfare concept, but to label it a fraud seems a bit much. Owen argues that the “the community it was intended to serve” embraced maneuver warfare uncritically. So who is to blame—the advocates who maliciously perpetrated the concept or the U.S. Marine Corps that accepted it so naively and so readily? ...

[Render]

I'm gratified to see that I'm not the only one with some misgivings about this article.

=

As a civilian lifer I'm loath to critisize those who have or are serving in uniform. But this article seems (to me) to have several serious mistakes and/or unfounded conclusions that aren't supported by a casual glance at the historical record.

=

MCDP-1 is far from the only USMC manual and is pretty clearly part of an entire spectrum of such manuals. Is there a reason this manual was cherry picked out of that spectrum?

On pg5 Owen claims that Liddell-Hart "denigrated" the importance of Allenby's Palestine campaign, yet Liddell-Hart thought highly enough of Allenby and the Palestine Campaign to include them in a chapter of their own in his 'The Real War 1914-18' and Liddell-Hart wrote glowingly of Allenby in the aformentioned chapter.

To Wit;

"When full deduction is made for the advantages conditions of September 1918, the conclusion remains that the triumph immortalized by the already immortal name of Meggiddo is one of history's masterpieces by reason of breadth of vision and treatment. If the subject was not a difficult one, the picture is almost unique as a perfect conception perfectly executed."
-B.H.Liddell-Hart

Those are simpily not words of "denigration" by any definition or standard.

===

On a personal bias issue I have an issue with anybody or anything that quotes John Mearsheimer as an authority on anything beyond obtaining Saudi oil money grants for a university.

If we're going to rehabilitate Foch (who clearly seems to deserve it, as clearly his students do not), is it possible to do so without it being at the expense of Liddell-Hart (whose concepts have proven themselves over and over again), and without resorting to the veracity challenged (Mearsheimer) as a voice of authority?

===

On the conclusions...

I offer the Blitzkrieg (1939-41), The Israeli Six-Day War, and Operations Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom as examples of "manoeuvre warfare."

I offer Kursk, Stalingrad, Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sahn, and Grozny '95 as "attritional warfare."

Von Falkenhayn's "Bleed the French White" qoute is not of the MV school of thought, whatever that school may be determined to be.

["The purpose of manoeuvre is to gain position of advantage relative to an opponent. This advantage may be used to deliver overwhelming violent attrition."]

Not manoeuvering means fixed defenses, which may or may not have advantage relative to an opponent. This advantage may also be used to deliver overwhelming violent attrition.

- or the opponent could withdraw, surrender, just fade away, or all three.

EQUALLY
ASYMETRICAL,
R

[William F. Owen]

First, off, as I am sure Eric is aware, you have limited space to pursue an issue such as this. This was not a Research MSc, so I went with what I was comfortable with. The limited number of writers I surveyed were the most influential, and well known.

Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!

I know and have great difficulty with Shimon Naveh’s work. I fear it is misleading, and draws erroneous conclusions. I am trying to find Shimon to get to grips with him on this before becoming any more strident. Nikolas Zetterling’s rebuttal of Naveh is well worth reading. I know and have read Franz Osinga’s book. I have also met and conversed at some length with Bill Lind, so I submit I have made not come to my conclusions lightly.
I also have Hookers book,
– but obviously my attempts to remove the fuzziness have not been successful.

The use of the Word, “Fraud” may have been better considered in terms of a question, rather than a statement. I do not name names, but submit that some of those progressing the adoption of MW knew that the reasoning was weak, but dismissed that shortcoming for a supposed “greater good.”

The OODA loop I addressed was that as written about by Lind, is not what Boyd had in mind (according to Chet Richards). I have issues with the OODA loop in general, but I was concentrating on Lind’s use of it. Lind did claim it as a unique element, as he did Recon Pull and Mission Command. The defining elements are nothing to do with MW. That is my issue.

I never said that Sun-Tzu thought of in terms of a bloodless victory. I actually said the opposite.

If Lind’s understanding of Recon Pull was so worthwhile, where is the Pamphlet definition? I have received 5-6 emails with “recon pull” explanations and all are different. If nothing else, the role of “recon” is to find the enemy. Not find “gaps”. As someone with some practical experience of conducting reconnaissance, I never understood how using my initiative, (which I was required to do) defined my actions as pull or push. If I was doing my job, stuff was following. Unless recon has good comms, recon is generally useless, so letting Command know where you are is inherent to the process and cannot be avoided.

All in all, if I am only right in the areas where Eric says I am, then I am a pretty happy rabbit!

[William F. Owen]

I'm gratified to see that I'm not the only one with some misgivings about this article.

So am I!
=

On pg5 Owen claims that Liddell-Hart "denigrated" the importance of Allenby's Palestine campaign, yet Liddell-Hart thought highly enough of Allenby and the Palestine Campaign to include them in a chapter of their own in his 'The Real War 1914-18' and Liddell-Hart wrote glowingly of Allenby in the aformentioned chapter.

My reference to the denigration comes from BLH's wording in his book, "Strategy of the Indirect Approach" - and yes BLH does contradict himself.

On a personal bias issue I have an issue with anybody or anything that quotes John Mearsheimer as an authority on anything beyond obtaining Saudi oil money grants for a university.

I also have issues with Mearsheimer. That was why I cited 3 other sources.

If we're going to rehabilitate Foch (who clearly seems to deserve it, as clearly his students do not), is it possible to do so without it being at the expense of Liddell-Hart (whose concepts have proven themselves over and over again), and without resorting to the veracity challenged (Mearsheimer) as a voice of authority?

Good question. Very interesting in any answer you may have. I think BLH did great damage and his work is still causing problems. I think Fuller was far brighter, but equally flawed.

[Ken White]

...I think BLH did great damage and his work is still causing problems. I think Fuller was far brighter, but equally flawed.

is accurate and a fair summation of reality -- to wit, no Great Guru exists with all the answers. Nor is any theory of warfare of which I'm aware at this time the answer to all questions.

I though your article was balanced and pretty accurate, it illustrated flaws but did not totally discard maneuver while illustrating that maneuver without a firepower and even attritional backup is dangerous. This is a long way of saying I don't think there's much real disagreement over the pros and cons shown in the two articles. Perhaps 'flawed' in lieu of 'fraud' might've meant no discussion -- but discussion is good.

[William F. Owen]

I am actually reading Fullers thoughts on Air Power. They are far more rational and balanced than his ideas on tanks and what is more, history has shown them to be generally true! - unlike his ideas on tanks!

... and I think that "tanks" actually seem to be the start of this all MW malarkey for reasons I cannot quite yet fathom. For as much as we have gained, their seems to be much we do not yet understand.

[Ken White]

his ideas on staffs and age of Generals...

I think the Tank led us to Maneuver Warfare simply because it existed and offered a combination of offensive power and mobility that begged to be exploited, a combination that nothing previous could provide. Fuller's swarms were not outrageously impossible but they were and are beyond the state of technology, training and human capability available to large Armies -- and by definition, swarms take numbers...

Unattended Vehicles, air or ground, OTOH...

I think the natural tendency of combat between individuals or Armies and most conglomerations in between is to stasis which leads to pure attritional warfare. Instinctively, most realize this is not good and thus a desire to avoid it yet such opportunities to preclude having to "...fight it out on this line if it takes all Summer..." are offered only by a relatively rare combinations of synergistic events, a significant mistake on the part of one side or the other -- or by a truly exceptional and innovative Commander literally making an opportunity.

Lengthy way to say maneuver warfare is important and desirable but rarely able to be practiced much above Battalion level however any decent Army must have the capability of employing the techniques when that chance or stroke allows.

[Ratzel]

"While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary." (William F. Owen)

I think this statement is the most important thing I took away from this article. Instead of developing a doctrine that features one kind of thought or another, we should be developing [A]leaders[/U] who can asses situations and react with the assets available to them. Sometimes this will require bypassing an enemy strong point and moving to his rear areas to confuse and disorient him. Other times it might be necessary to smash the enemy at his strong point. There is no right answer, except the one that works.

This doesn't mean we shouldn't think about different ways of overcoming an enemy, or accomplishing a mission, it just means we shouldn't base our whole zeitgeist on one kind of tactics. The overreaching military zeitgeist should be that of a "leader-centric" variety. Figuring out how to develop quick thinking problem solvers with an arsenal of knowledge should be the number one project we embark on..

During OIF the two biggest battles showcased both maneuver warfare, and attrition warfare. During OIF I, coalition forces used maneuver warfare to take down Iraq in 3 weeks. Later on, during the second battle of Fallujah, it was necessary to use attrition-like tactics while clearing every room in the city. Both of these scenarios required differing tactics and approaches.

[jcustis]

But religion means beliefs and believers, and it would be interesting to see how many and who these believers have been since MW became doctrine in the Marine Corps. Is MW really orthodoxy in the USMC? And what does this belief mean, for practical purposes? I've suggested that I do not think there are that many who truly believe (and even fewer who can demonstrate effective understanding) of MW in the USMC today. This would be worth a serious academic investigation.

I would certainly not consider myself to have an effective grasp of MW, but perhaps I can assist with this line of query, based on my training, career timeline, and operational background:

-I graduated TBS in 1996, AWS in 2002, and am in the midst of C&S non-resident right now.
-I participated in ops in Somalia in '94, OIF, OIF 2.2, and am currently on a OIF 08.2 rotation. I also participated in the March Up, and Fallujah vers 2.0
-I've been an infantryman all the way through.

-I believe that the enemy is a series of parts that aggregate as a system, and since he is a system, you can attack certain elements of that system and eventually defeat the whole. That is why we have high value and high payoff targets.
-I was taught that at the Company and often Battalion-level, every atack is a frontal attack. You need to get to the Operational Level of war before maneuver is apparent.
-I believe that speed and tempo are relative. It doesn't matter if you are slow, so long as you are faster than your oppo and continuously force him to react to you. This is true for both the offense and defense. If you can force him to hit more decision points than he can realistically manage, as well as making those decision pts somewhat cloudy as to what is truly going on, you stand an even better chance of defeating the enemy on your terms as opposed to stumbling upon victory.
-I believe that certain concepts, like OMFTS, can run afoul of simple issues like weather. We are limited in our operations right now by "red air" days. It doesn't necessarily mean that the enemy will stop moving on the ground.
-Fallujah was a fight where we were attempting to seize terrain, and thus that necessitated a frontal attack of sorts. Even within that attack though, there were supporting efforts that were designed to offer commanders a certain degree of freedom of maneuver should the opportunity present itself. We also shaped the hell out of that fight (from IO, PSYOP, fires, HUMINT, you name it), but the details of those things just aren't out there to be able to readily recognize.
-COIN totally changes the rulez!

[ericmwalters]

I'll confess I'd been egging on Mike Wyly to say something about this, given that he got in on "the ground floor" of the MW movement and was--if you read Fideleon Damian's thesis--perhaps the most important major player in MW as he was inculcating its ideas in the heads of a lot of captains at the time (myself included)....

Anyway, he sent me an e-mail on this debate and is letting me quote him here:

Two points I would make right off the bat:

1. First and most important - From the standpoint of my involvement in proposing change to how we fought, which began in earnest in 1972 when I was an AWS student, it, in the beginning, had nothing to do with Blitzkrieg or the Israelis, or rapidity or the OODA Loop. Those things came later. My concern was singular: We were not studying our profession in a scholarly way. I was an academy grad, I'd been to several Marine and Army professional schools, and no one had required me to look into and learn whatever Nimitz, Patton, et al., had learned.

Academy curriculum had morphed more and more into the curriculum of a civilian universtiy - the result of some kind of an inferiority complex the Navy seemed to have. Marine schools had settled into teaching rules and checklists, not theory. I was a bachelor at AWS with no wife to want me home in the evenings and little interest in boozing it up at Liversedge so I spent my evenings at Breckinridge Library. I READ FERDINAND FOCH'S "PRINCIPLES OF WAR" among many, many other works because I felt like that's what a professional officer ought to be doing. To skip over many details of a very long story, when I found myself on the faculty of AWS in 1979, I decided it was time to start doing whatever I could in whatever small way to fix the problem of not approaching our profession as would a scientist or an artist, looking for new ways, better ways--just viable ways--to do our job effectively. That's WHY I introduced myself to anyone and everyone who seemed to be working on the problem, too. That's why I introduced myself to Bill Lind in 1979 and it's why I took Bill up on his suggestion that I introduce myself to John Boyd. It's why I went into General Trainor and argued that we ought to get Col. Boyd down to Quantico. And then as we moved forward, sifting through the body of literature that existed, including Foch (whose writings didn't electrify me), Fuller (whose writings did electrify me), Liddell Hart (who was useful in a number of ways), Manstein (whose writings were great), sifting, rejecting, accepting - and out of it all came something that somebody (over my objection and over Boyd's objection) had decided to call Maneuver Warfare. But the MW buzzword was catching on and this was a good thing. Neither John nor I thought it would be productive to waste time arguing over a name - that was, after all, part of the problem at Quantico. Marine officers were arguing over names for control measures and checklists for attacks and defenses. Out of it came what went into FMFM-1 after Al Gray became CMC. So--it's not as Owens seems to think-- that somebody had a theory he wanted to float. All we really wanted to do was to get professionals acting like professionals, studying, questioning, etc. I hope we are still doing that.

2. This one just a burr that stays under my saddle. THERE IS NO DISCONNECT BETWEEN SO-CALLED MANEUVER WARFARE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTERTERRORISM. I can lay it all out for the 999th time - but not now.

[William F. Owen]

So--it's not as Owens seems to think-- that somebody had a theory he wanted to float. All we really wanted to do was to get professionals acting like professionals, studying, questioning, etc. I hope we are still doing that.

Owen (note: no s) never said someone had a theory to float. To quote my article,

This paper will argue that the community it was intended to
serve based its wide acceptance largely on ignorance and a lack of intellectual
rigour.

Please note: "Wide acceptance" and "largely on ignorance." I then examined all the major works usually cited in defence of the concept, and to demonstrate that the use of the historical examples, had clearly not been subjected to rigour.

I am in no way surprise that Col Wyly has read all the major relevant works. The Colonel patently did do rigourous work, as did many others.

As I have said before, if MW did something good for the USMC, then cool. That's not the source of my complaint. My questions still remain,

a.) Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare"?
b.) Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
c.) Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
d.) Why is Recon Pull, and the OODA loop part of MW theory?

[ericmwalters]

Wilf asks:

a.) Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare"?
b.) Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
c.) Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
d.) Why is Recon Pull, and the OODA loop part of MW theory?

All good questions that he still thinks he needs answers for. So I'll take a stab at summarizing where I think I can. Some I can't without additional explanation and I'll have to defer the answer for other threads, other places, and with much more depth.

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?" I'd argue they are "opposite" in many ways, but not "opposing" in the sense that one is going to triumph over the other. As has been said before (by Wilf and others), a master of the art of war needs both in the kitbag. They are possibly complementary, depending on how a campaign or war unfolds--you may be able to use one style to push the opponent where you can best attack him using another style. But they are indeed opposite styles in the sense of the methods used to achieve the result. If this isn't clear, consider style in the fine arts world--music for example. Jazz Band improvisation or formal symphony hall orchestra? Both can be pleasing to the ear, but take opposite approaches towards achieving that sound. They are certainly not "opposing" styles...and I'm curious where we see this characterization in the literature.

Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals? Not sure how that relates to the issue at first blush. This probably deserves another discussion thread. My short answer is that he wrote for emperors, mostly so the bloodshed that had been so rampant in the Warring States period could (1) be reduced through a reduction of "unnecessary wars," (something only sovereigns with the power to make and end war can do) and (2) if the sovereign is going to mount a campaign, there's at least some basics that can't be ignored if he is going to conserve strength and resources to achieve greater victory at the least cost. I think Wilf may be hinting that the maneuverists' fondness for Master Sun may be inexpertly applied to tactical matters and audiences, which aren't really the best fit. But I don't know this and perhaps he can clarify why this question is germane to the discussion.

Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory? Frustratingly for some, I will answer that it depends on who you are and what you do with the "useful" history and theory. For me personally, it's very interesting and explains a good deal of why some historical decisionmakers may have done what they did, particularly if they were at all influenced by his work. But do I find myself thinking about it when I'm attacking my opponents in wargames? No. Because it's too obvious that you should take "the indirect approach" when you can. The real problem for me, personally, is accurately evaluating "when you can" and especially "when you can't." I'm reminded of a game I did last year as the Hessian General William Knyphausen, running a feint against George Washington and Lafayette at the Battle of the Brandywine. Maybe it's because I'm a product of my Marine culture, but I didn't do much flanking, even though I could have. I took very much the direct approach because: (1) I thought I could pull it off given my opponent that day; (2) I needed to immediately fix the maximum amount of Allied combat power so that the northern flanking force (Cornwallis, played by a teammate) could make the most headway before Washington could respond; and (3) I was always going to maintain the threat of flanking (keep that complementary force dilemma going) at all times, even when I wasn't doing it--that way Washington's reinforcements would come my way and not elsewhere).

That said, when I ran some TDGs in my "Surfaces and Gaps" series--despite read aheads that talked about the utility of "going 'round" and one of Wyly's solitaire/practice TDGs in Maneuver Warfare Handbook--when we did the TDG "wind sprints" I witnessed my seasoned Marine officers and SNCOs hurling individual fireteams 300 meters across open ground against enemy squads with automatic weapons on hilltops with insufficient smoke/suppressive fire. Had the attackers been Gurkhas or British Marines and the defenders been Argentinian conscripts at the Falklands, this might have worked. But this is not a method I would rely upon for success in most cases. For these Marines, reading BLH's Strategy might do them some good.

Why is Recon Pull and the OODA loop part of MW theory? This is a most important question and the one I really must defer because the answer isn't easy to summarize with any real sufficiency. I'd argue, for the sake of making my position known, that the OODA loop is a necessary part--indeed is a foundational proposition--for both "German School" and "Soviet School" MW. I'll have to explain that in some detail over at the OODA Loop thread next week because I know that just making this bald statement is completely unsatisfactory without justification. Recon-Pull is ONLY a part of "German School" MW theory--it does not exist in the "Soviet School." Again, that deserves some explanation. My apologies that I'm only whetting appetites here, but I cannot do more at present. Bear with me and I'll get to that. It's going to be a long ride, I'll just warn you.