Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

[Ratzel]

"While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary." (William F. Owen)

I think this statement is the most important thing I took away from this article. Instead of developing a doctrine that features one kind of thought or another, we should be developing [A]leaders[/U] who can asses situations and react with the assets available to them. Sometimes this will require bypassing an enemy strong point and moving to his rear areas to confuse and disorient him. Other times it might be necessary to smash the enemy at his strong point. There is no right answer, except the one that works.

This doesn't mean we shouldn't think about different ways of overcoming an enemy, or accomplishing a mission, it just means we shouldn't base our whole zeitgeist on one kind of tactics. The overreaching military zeitgeist should be that of a "leader-centric" variety. Figuring out how to develop quick thinking problem solvers with an arsenal of knowledge should be the number one project we embark on..

During OIF the two biggest battles showcased both maneuver warfare, and attrition warfare. During OIF I, coalition forces used maneuver warfare to take down Iraq in 3 weeks. Later on, during the second battle of Fallujah, it was necessary to use attrition-like tactics while clearing every room in the city. Both of these scenarios required differing tactics and approaches.

[jcustis]

But religion means beliefs and believers, and it would be interesting to see how many and who these believers have been since MW became doctrine in the Marine Corps. Is MW really orthodoxy in the USMC? And what does this belief mean, for practical purposes? I've suggested that I do not think there are that many who truly believe (and even fewer who can demonstrate effective understanding) of MW in the USMC today. This would be worth a serious academic investigation.

I would certainly not consider myself to have an effective grasp of MW, but perhaps I can assist with this line of query, based on my training, career timeline, and operational background:

-I graduated TBS in 1996, AWS in 2002, and am in the midst of C&S non-resident right now.
-I participated in ops in Somalia in '94, OIF, OIF 2.2, and am currently on a OIF 08.2 rotation. I also participated in the March Up, and Fallujah vers 2.0
-I've been an infantryman all the way through.

-I believe that the enemy is a series of parts that aggregate as a system, and since he is a system, you can attack certain elements of that system and eventually defeat the whole. That is why we have high value and high payoff targets.
-I was taught that at the Company and often Battalion-level, every atack is a frontal attack. You need to get to the Operational Level of war before maneuver is apparent.
-I believe that speed and tempo are relative. It doesn't matter if you are slow, so long as you are faster than your oppo and continuously force him to react to you. This is true for both the offense and defense. If you can force him to hit more decision points than he can realistically manage, as well as making those decision pts somewhat cloudy as to what is truly going on, you stand an even better chance of defeating the enemy on your terms as opposed to stumbling upon victory.
-I believe that certain concepts, like OMFTS, can run afoul of simple issues like weather. We are limited in our operations right now by "red air" days. It doesn't necessarily mean that the enemy will stop moving on the ground.
-Fallujah was a fight where we were attempting to seize terrain, and thus that necessitated a frontal attack of sorts. Even within that attack though, there were supporting efforts that were designed to offer commanders a certain degree of freedom of maneuver should the opportunity present itself. We also shaped the hell out of that fight (from IO, PSYOP, fires, HUMINT, you name it), but the details of those things just aren't out there to be able to readily recognize.
-COIN totally changes the rulez!

[ericmwalters]

I'll confess I'd been egging on Mike Wyly to say something about this, given that he got in on "the ground floor" of the MW movement and was--if you read Fideleon Damian's thesis--perhaps the most important major player in MW as he was inculcating its ideas in the heads of a lot of captains at the time (myself included)....

Anyway, he sent me an e-mail on this debate and is letting me quote him here:

Two points I would make right off the bat:

1. First and most important - From the standpoint of my involvement in proposing change to how we fought, which began in earnest in 1972 when I was an AWS student, it, in the beginning, had nothing to do with Blitzkrieg or the Israelis, or rapidity or the OODA Loop. Those things came later. My concern was singular: We were not studying our profession in a scholarly way. I was an academy grad, I'd been to several Marine and Army professional schools, and no one had required me to look into and learn whatever Nimitz, Patton, et al., had learned.

Academy curriculum had morphed more and more into the curriculum of a civilian universtiy - the result of some kind of an inferiority complex the Navy seemed to have. Marine schools had settled into teaching rules and checklists, not theory. I was a bachelor at AWS with no wife to want me home in the evenings and little interest in boozing it up at Liversedge so I spent my evenings at Breckinridge Library. I READ FERDINAND FOCH'S "PRINCIPLES OF WAR" among many, many other works because I felt like that's what a professional officer ought to be doing. To skip over many details of a very long story, when I found myself on the faculty of AWS in 1979, I decided it was time to start doing whatever I could in whatever small way to fix the problem of not approaching our profession as would a scientist or an artist, looking for new ways, better ways--just viable ways--to do our job effectively. That's WHY I introduced myself to anyone and everyone who seemed to be working on the problem, too. That's why I introduced myself to Bill Lind in 1979 and it's why I took Bill up on his suggestion that I introduce myself to John Boyd. It's why I went into General Trainor and argued that we ought to get Col. Boyd down to Quantico. And then as we moved forward, sifting through the body of literature that existed, including Foch (whose writings didn't electrify me), Fuller (whose writings did electrify me), Liddell Hart (who was useful in a number of ways), Manstein (whose writings were great), sifting, rejecting, accepting - and out of it all came something that somebody (over my objection and over Boyd's objection) had decided to call Maneuver Warfare. But the MW buzzword was catching on and this was a good thing. Neither John nor I thought it would be productive to waste time arguing over a name - that was, after all, part of the problem at Quantico. Marine officers were arguing over names for control measures and checklists for attacks and defenses. Out of it came what went into FMFM-1 after Al Gray became CMC. So--it's not as Owens seems to think-- that somebody had a theory he wanted to float. All we really wanted to do was to get professionals acting like professionals, studying, questioning, etc. I hope we are still doing that.

2. This one just a burr that stays under my saddle. THERE IS NO DISCONNECT BETWEEN SO-CALLED MANEUVER WARFARE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTERTERRORISM. I can lay it all out for the 999th time - but not now.

[William F. Owen]

So--it's not as Owens seems to think-- that somebody had a theory he wanted to float. All we really wanted to do was to get professionals acting like professionals, studying, questioning, etc. I hope we are still doing that.

Owen (note: no s) never said someone had a theory to float. To quote my article,

This paper will argue that the community it was intended to
serve based its wide acceptance largely on ignorance and a lack of intellectual
rigour.

Please note: "Wide acceptance" and "largely on ignorance." I then examined all the major works usually cited in defence of the concept, and to demonstrate that the use of the historical examples, had clearly not been subjected to rigour.

I am in no way surprise that Col Wyly has read all the major relevant works. The Colonel patently did do rigourous work, as did many others.

As I have said before, if MW did something good for the USMC, then cool. That's not the source of my complaint. My questions still remain,

a.) Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare"?
b.) Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
c.) Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
d.) Why is Recon Pull, and the OODA loop part of MW theory?

[ericmwalters]

Wilf asks:

a.) Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare"?
b.) Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
c.) Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
d.) Why is Recon Pull, and the OODA loop part of MW theory?

All good questions that he still thinks he needs answers for. So I'll take a stab at summarizing where I think I can. Some I can't without additional explanation and I'll have to defer the answer for other threads, other places, and with much more depth.

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?" I'd argue they are "opposite" in many ways, but not "opposing" in the sense that one is going to triumph over the other. As has been said before (by Wilf and others), a master of the art of war needs both in the kitbag. They are possibly complementary, depending on how a campaign or war unfolds--you may be able to use one style to push the opponent where you can best attack him using another style. But they are indeed opposite styles in the sense of the methods used to achieve the result. If this isn't clear, consider style in the fine arts world--music for example. Jazz Band improvisation or formal symphony hall orchestra? Both can be pleasing to the ear, but take opposite approaches towards achieving that sound. They are certainly not "opposing" styles...and I'm curious where we see this characterization in the literature.

Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals? Not sure how that relates to the issue at first blush. This probably deserves another discussion thread. My short answer is that he wrote for emperors, mostly so the bloodshed that had been so rampant in the Warring States period could (1) be reduced through a reduction of "unnecessary wars," (something only sovereigns with the power to make and end war can do) and (2) if the sovereign is going to mount a campaign, there's at least some basics that can't be ignored if he is going to conserve strength and resources to achieve greater victory at the least cost. I think Wilf may be hinting that the maneuverists' fondness for Master Sun may be inexpertly applied to tactical matters and audiences, which aren't really the best fit. But I don't know this and perhaps he can clarify why this question is germane to the discussion.

Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory? Frustratingly for some, I will answer that it depends on who you are and what you do with the "useful" history and theory. For me personally, it's very interesting and explains a good deal of why some historical decisionmakers may have done what they did, particularly if they were at all influenced by his work. But do I find myself thinking about it when I'm attacking my opponents in wargames? No. Because it's too obvious that you should take "the indirect approach" when you can. The real problem for me, personally, is accurately evaluating "when you can" and especially "when you can't." I'm reminded of a game I did last year as the Hessian General William Knyphausen, running a feint against George Washington and Lafayette at the Battle of the Brandywine. Maybe it's because I'm a product of my Marine culture, but I didn't do much flanking, even though I could have. I took very much the direct approach because: (1) I thought I could pull it off given my opponent that day; (2) I needed to immediately fix the maximum amount of Allied combat power so that the northern flanking force (Cornwallis, played by a teammate) could make the most headway before Washington could respond; and (3) I was always going to maintain the threat of flanking (keep that complementary force dilemma going) at all times, even when I wasn't doing it--that way Washington's reinforcements would come my way and not elsewhere).

That said, when I ran some TDGs in my "Surfaces and Gaps" series--despite read aheads that talked about the utility of "going 'round" and one of Wyly's solitaire/practice TDGs in Maneuver Warfare Handbook--when we did the TDG "wind sprints" I witnessed my seasoned Marine officers and SNCOs hurling individual fireteams 300 meters across open ground against enemy squads with automatic weapons on hilltops with insufficient smoke/suppressive fire. Had the attackers been Gurkhas or British Marines and the defenders been Argentinian conscripts at the Falklands, this might have worked. But this is not a method I would rely upon for success in most cases. For these Marines, reading BLH's Strategy might do them some good.

Why is Recon Pull and the OODA loop part of MW theory? This is a most important question and the one I really must defer because the answer isn't easy to summarize with any real sufficiency. I'd argue, for the sake of making my position known, that the OODA loop is a necessary part--indeed is a foundational proposition--for both "German School" and "Soviet School" MW. I'll have to explain that in some detail over at the OODA Loop thread next week because I know that just making this bald statement is completely unsatisfactory without justification. Recon-Pull is ONLY a part of "German School" MW theory--it does not exist in the "Soviet School." Again, that deserves some explanation. My apologies that I'm only whetting appetites here, but I cannot do more at present. Bear with me and I'll get to that. It's going to be a long ride, I'll just warn you.

[Cavguy]

My apologies that I'm only whetting appetites here, but I cannot do more at present. Bear with me and I'll get to that. It's going to be a long ride, I'll just warn you.

Eric,

Your posts have been thoughtful, balanced, and enlightening. I appreciate your efforts to educate us from your experience. I for one am learning a lot on these threads.

[ericmwalters]

Yet another e-mail snippet I've gotten permission to post from the eminent Michael D. Wyly:

It was never my, John Boyd's, or any of the others' who worked and wrote to form the tenets of what we now call maneuver warfare, intent that we produce some new doctrine (Boyd eschewed the word "doctrine") that would stand unchanged over the years. What we wanted was an Officer Corps of professionals that would keep military thought alive and dynamic. In other words, the debate must go on. It must be unending. And it must be based on real and open minded, relentless study of what works in war. And the only way we have of knowing what works is through a good undestanding of what has worked. But we need to realize, too, we can never be sure. He who has to wait until he is sure is of little value in combat. The ability to decide and act and apply sound judgment trumps knowledge in a battle. --MIKE WYLY

[Rex Brynen]

Eric,

Your posts have been thoughtful, balanced, and enlightening. I appreciate your efforts to educate us from your experience. I for one am learning a lot on these threads.

Ditto

[William F. Owen]

...and stabbing away generally,

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?"
I can't see why we think in terms of "styles" of warfare. There is what works and what does not. Context is everything. It is the application of the tool set, to gain victory. I don't think history shows that most generals have opted for efficiency over effectiveness or vice versa. They have done what they needed to do.

Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy. MW is, in terms of it's current existence, Military Doctrine, and it's limit is the military instrument. Like Machiavelli Sun-Tzu was concerned with far more than the military.

Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
To quote/paraphrase Roger Spiller, he formulated a theory and then set about ransacking he historical record to support it. Very very little of what I read in Liddle-Hart impresses me. He was far more concerned with self promotion and his legacy than doing a good job.

Why is Recon Pull and the OODA loop part of MW theory? If you tell that attacking enemy flanks and rears is good and that you should always aim to use surprise, then I'll accept it.

I submit that both those things are simpler, more useful and better proven than Recon Pulling or OODA looping - and they are not tied to a style of warfare. Not aiming to do them, when you can, is not "Attritional", it's just stupid.

[Mark O'Neill]

a bit here. His work actually is more practicable than just a 'theory' with re-engineered history to support it. Arguably , he (along with, somewhat ironically, Australia's John Monash) came up with the tenets that informed one of the most succesful examples of MW - Bliztkreig.

BLH also had a fair degree of influence upon Andre Beaufre. (one of the most forgotten, but useful, stategic theorists of the 20th Century). People on this site, with their obvious predilection for COIN issues, might find it useful to read about the 'total strategy' that the apartheid era South Africans developed in response to his writings. Noxious regime, great COIN strategy.

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?" I can't see why we think in terms of "styles" of warfare. There is what works and what does not. Context is everything. It is the application of the tool set, to gain victory. I don't think history shows that most generals have opted for efficiency over effectiveness or vice versa. They have done what they needed to do.

Ah, but that is why it is termed "the Art of War" and not the "Science of War." Style is very much at the heart of the Art. How one defines "what works" varies from individual and from situation to situation. What is better for one won't be for another. Despite this, judging works of military violence still shows that some efforts transcend all the others for their excellence in application.

Certainly there is some science behind the art. In painting, in sculpture, physics can't be changed. In music, harmonics/physics of sound and ergonomics still bounds what can and cannot be done. One must master the science before one can apply oneself to the art. But in the realm of the art, there's a lot of room for creativity, and individual commanders definitely show evidence of style preferences. The truly great ones can adopt a range of styles when the situation calls for it. That's what makes them so formidable--they can be very hard to predict.

We see this in Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) quite often. Solutions will usually run the gamut in well conceived/designed TDGs--and the situation precludes easy answers. Yet in the critique (much like art and architecture school), the better solutions tend to be evident. Not that the worse solutions "won't work"--they potentially could, given the right assumptions. It's just that the quality of some solutions emerges more readily than others given a wider variety of assumptions. There are some basic questions to ask when critiquing TDG solutions, and if anyone is interested in that, send me a PM and I'll get that to you (along with some very basic examples).