Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

[Rex Brynen]

Eric,

Your posts have been thoughtful, balanced, and enlightening. I appreciate your efforts to educate us from your experience. I for one am learning a lot on these threads.

Ditto

[slapout9]

Eric, you and others have worked hard now and from your recent posts others before you to teach Marines how to fight like Marines! So why shouldn't it just be called Marine Warfighting Theory??

[William F. Owen]

...and stabbing away generally,

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?"
I can't see why we think in terms of "styles" of warfare. There is what works and what does not. Context is everything. It is the application of the tool set, to gain victory. I don't think history shows that most generals have opted for efficiency over effectiveness or vice versa. They have done what they needed to do.

Did Sun-Tzu write for Emperors or Generals?
Sun-Tzu wrote about Strategy. MW is, in terms of it's current existence, Military Doctrine, and it's limit is the military instrument. Like Machiavelli Sun-Tzu was concerned with far more than the military.

Is BLH's Strategy, actually good/useful military history and theory?
To quote/paraphrase Roger Spiller, he formulated a theory and then set about ransacking he historical record to support it. Very very little of what I read in Liddle-Hart impresses me. He was far more concerned with self promotion and his legacy than doing a good job.

Why is Recon Pull and the OODA loop part of MW theory? If you tell that attacking enemy flanks and rears is good and that you should always aim to use surprise, then I'll accept it.

I submit that both those things are simpler, more useful and better proven than Recon Pulling or OODA looping - and they are not tied to a style of warfare. Not aiming to do them, when you can, is not "Attritional", it's just stupid.

[Mark O'Neill]

a bit here. His work actually is more practicable than just a 'theory' with re-engineered history to support it. Arguably , he (along with, somewhat ironically, Australia's John Monash) came up with the tenets that informed one of the most succesful examples of MW - Bliztkreig.

BLH also had a fair degree of influence upon Andre Beaufre. (one of the most forgotten, but useful, stategic theorists of the 20th Century). People on this site, with their obvious predilection for COIN issues, might find it useful to read about the 'total strategy' that the apartheid era South Africans developed in response to his writings. Noxious regime, great COIN strategy.

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

Are Attrition and Manoeuvre "opposing styles of warfare?" I can't see why we think in terms of "styles" of warfare. There is what works and what does not. Context is everything. It is the application of the tool set, to gain victory. I don't think history shows that most generals have opted for efficiency over effectiveness or vice versa. They have done what they needed to do.

Ah, but that is why it is termed "the Art of War" and not the "Science of War." Style is very much at the heart of the Art. How one defines "what works" varies from individual and from situation to situation. What is better for one won't be for another. Despite this, judging works of military violence still shows that some efforts transcend all the others for their excellence in application.

Certainly there is some science behind the art. In painting, in sculpture, physics can't be changed. In music, harmonics/physics of sound and ergonomics still bounds what can and cannot be done. One must master the science before one can apply oneself to the art. But in the realm of the art, there's a lot of room for creativity, and individual commanders definitely show evidence of style preferences. The truly great ones can adopt a range of styles when the situation calls for it. That's what makes them so formidable--they can be very hard to predict.

We see this in Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) quite often. Solutions will usually run the gamut in well conceived/designed TDGs--and the situation precludes easy answers. Yet in the critique (much like art and architecture school), the better solutions tend to be evident. Not that the worse solutions "won't work"--they potentially could, given the right assumptions. It's just that the quality of some solutions emerges more readily than others given a wider variety of assumptions. There are some basic questions to ask when critiquing TDG solutions, and if anyone is interested in that, send me a PM and I'll get that to you (along with some very basic examples).

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

Why is Recon Pull and the OODA loop part of MW theory? If you tell that attacking enemy flanks and rears is good and that you should always aim to use surprise, then I'll accept it.

Oh, we've had attacking enemy flanks/rears and aiming for surprise long before recon pull and OODA loops. The latter are analytical lenses/design tools that assist in configuring organizations, training, techniques and procedures, command and control, and employment schemes. How this will be done I will get to next week...and it's going to be long discussion. Not sure which OODA Loop thread I will use, so I'll put the same discussion in both. But first I'll be cataloging the complaints about recon pull and the OODA loop so I can (1) clarify the issues people have with the concept and (2) demonstrate that I understand the the complaints sufficiently enough to respond to them.

Regarding Sun Tzu and BLH, I'd love to digress into that, but it's perhaps best for another thread at another time. As I suspected, Wilf thinks the "maneuverists" quote Master Sun for tactical applications when he was talking more about strategy (of sovereigns) in general. That's worth some discussion sometime...whether or not one should do that or not. What are the dangers in doing it.

My personal frustrations with theory is that nothing seems to stand alone without context. You have to have a situation/scenario in front of you to make any headway. Otherwise two people find themselves talking past each other.

[CR6]

Seriously, there is an excellent work called "Rules of the Game" which should be required reading for anyone interested in this area!

This book is excellent. I ordered it after reading this thread and thus far it is an impressive detailing of how society, historical memory and experience blend to inform doctrine, C2 and service cultures. The chapters on the Victoria/Camperdown collision and the perils of blind obidience make it worth a read. Great recommendation William!

[slapout9]

I picked up Robert Leonhard's The Art of Maneuver over the weekend and have started reading it. He goes through several definitions of Maneuver but on page 181 he states "Maneuver is by nature a sustained moral threat to the enemy" Does anybody know what he means by that ?? Did he mean mortal threat? Or is he talking about something else?

[Cavguy]

This book is excellent. I ordered it after reading this thread and thus far it is an impressive detailing of how society, historical memory and experience blend to inform doctrine, C2 and service cultures. The chapters on the Victoria/Camperdown collision and the perils of blind obidience make it worth a read. Great recommendation William!

Interestingly, if you go to amazon.com and look for it, you find a guide to picking up women!!

[CR6]

. He goes through several definitions of Maneuver but on page 181 he states "Maneuver is by nature a sustained moral threat to the enemy" Does anybody know what he means by that ?? Did he mean mortal threat? Or is he talking about something else?

Without presuming to speak for COL Leonhard (or COL Walters, Wilf, or anyone else for that matter) I read that section as using the definition of moral to mean "of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind". Hence, Leonhard advocates the use of maneuver as a means to psychologically unhinge the enemy rather than physically destroy him (ala kinetic fires). He goes in to a good discussion of this on pp 74-75 when discussing disruption as a form of maneuver that can affect enemy morale and render an otherwise strong force ineffective.

[Steve Blair]

the difference between amazon.com and amazon.co.uk (which is where CR6's link comes from)....

[CR6]

amazon.com if you search with Andrew Gordon's name. I found the same "handbook" Cavguy did when I searched amazon with just the title. I still don't think HH6 believed I was researching C2 literature...

[William F. Owen]

Without presuming to speak for COL Leonhard (or COL Walters, Wilf, or anyone else for that matter) I read that section as using the definition of moral to mean "of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind". Hence, Leonhard advocates the use of maneuver as a means to psychologically unhinge the enemy rather than physically destroy him (ala kinetic fires).

I have no problem with that. Defeat is when the enemy, as a whole, gives up. If someone wants to call attacking an enemies "will to fight" "Manoeuvre", then OK, but it is the detail and reality of those actions which you choose to unhinge him. Can he even be unhinged? What if he's the Japanese?

An enemy may be psychologically "unhinged" by having 10% of his force annihilated. The debate is essentially one about what best "unhinges" the enemy. My answer is always, "depends on the enemy."

[slapout9]

Without presuming to speak for COL Leonhard (or COL Walters, Wilf, or anyone else for that matter) I read that section as using the definition of moral to mean "of, pertaining to, or acting on the mind". Hence, Leonhard advocates the use of maneuver as a means to psychologically unhinge the enemy rather than physically destroy him (ala kinetic fires). He goes in to a good discussion of this on pp 74-75 when discussing disruption as a form of maneuver that can affect enemy morale and render an otherwise strong force ineffective.

CR6, thanks. I think of moral as right and wrong. So in this case he is talking about the will to fight.

[wm]

I picked up Robert Leonhard's The Art of Maneuver over the weekend and have started reading it. He goes through several definitions of Maneuver but on page 181 he states "Maneuver is by nature a sustained moral threat to the enemy" Does anybody know what he means by that ?? Did he mean mortal threat? Or is he talking about something else?

Perhaps he is channeling the thoughts of du Picq and later Foch who speak of the moral aspect of combat. For example, this from du Picq might help explain what he means by "moral:"

The Romans believed in the power of mass, but from the moral point of view only. They did not multiply the files in order to add to the mass, but to give to the combatants the confidence of being aided and relieved. The number of ranks was calculated according to the moral pressure that the last ranks could sustain.

And then there's this:

The effect of an army, of one organization on another, is at the same time material and moral. The material effect of an organization is in its power to destroy, the moral effect in the fear that it inspires. In battle, two moral forces, even more than two material forces, are in conflict. The stronger conquers. The victor has often lost by fire more than the vanquished. Moral effect does not come entirely from destructive power, real and effective as it may be. It comes, above all, from its presumed, threatening power, present in the form of reserves threatening to renew the battle, of troops that appear on the flank, even of a determined frontal attack.

Here's a link to the Project Gutenberg version of du Picq, from which the quotations were taken

[slapout9]

All, I was thinking of the famous quote that Jimmy Carter made during the Arab oil embargo when he called it "the Moral equivalent of War" Moral in the since it was wrong, a threat because it could create the same effects as war without firing a shot. Hence a sustained Moral threat to this day.

[ericmwalters]

By my dictionary, there are three definitions of the word "moral"--and I suggest you get different usage and meaning if you apply the wrong one in a MW context:

1. a. of or related to principles of right and wrong in behavior: ETHICAL. b. expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior. c. conforming to a standard of right behavior. d. sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment.

This is what most people think of. I would suggest this is what President Carter had in mind in his statement. But in the context of MW, the other meaning applies more frequently when talking about striking at the will of the enemy--reducing his moral force (not morale, mind you):

2. Probable though not proved: VIRTUAL (a moral certainty) 3: having the effects of such on the mind, confidence, or will.

[Cavguy]

This thread made me pickup Leonhard's 'Art of Maneuver Warface' This past week. Read it while on TDY.

What a well written, thought provoking book, free of a lot of the spurious attacks often in the Lind crowd. It adequately described the author's concept of maneuver warfare and the pluses and minuses of the "recon-pull" and "command-push" techniques. Funny thing is that I felt that command push was perhaps the stronger of the two forms, or at least the most likely to succeed.

The conclusion missed the mark by a mile (LIC is dead!), but I felt his analysis of the "thinking" deficency in Army culture is as valid today as when written.

I couldn't help thinking that his main argument wasn't the 2GW/3GW strawman but the need for leaders that "think" and can conceptualize problems outside of checklists and dogma.

Great read, an easy read, a must read for Army types, it will force you to question your assumptions.

[Cavguy]

This book is excellent. I ordered it after reading this thread and thus far it is an impressive detailing of how society, historical memory and experience blend to inform doctrine, C2 and service cultures. The chapters on the Victoria/Camperdown collision and the perils of blind obidience make it worth a read. Great recommendation William!

RE: Rules of the Game. Totally agree. I read it alongside Leonhard's Book.

If you don't have time to wade through the massive tome, you can extract most of the lessons from just a few chapters.

Seems like a recurring historical theme - promises that technology can eliminate the fog and friction in war, organizations buying into the system, a process becoming the end rather than the means, and an inevitable failure due to the nature of conflict jerking the service back to reality.

Interesting.

[slapout9]

The conclusion missed the mark by a mile (LIC is dead!), but I felt his analysis of the "thinking" deficency in Army culture is as valid today as when written.

I was surprised at that to. I read it some time ago but reread parts of it during the discussions on this thread. Does anybody here know if he has ever commented on that since he first published his book?