Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

[Steve Blair]

Seems like a recurring historical theme - promises that technology can eliminate the fog and friction in war, organizations buying into the system, a process becoming the end rather than the means, and an inevitable failure due to the nature of conflict jerking the service back to reality.

Interesting.

You betcha. The "tech will fix anything" idea has been floating around for ages. And I'd also argue that it also can extend to processes and methods.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

You betcha. The "tech will fix anything" idea has been floating around for ages. And I'd also argue that it also can extend to processes and methods.

Personally favor the human element of warfighting for most operations. Technological wonders, computerised warfighting & strategic metrics could be relegated to the higher echelon planning sections where they have great impact already.

Present emphasis revolves around the forcing of common operational picture, shared environmentals, artificially delegated communications & long distance micromanagement through observation.

Am convinced General Patton was correct on the non-wonderful nature of the so-called wonder weapons which threaten to dehumanise the military. Choose to focus on individual human attainment & its effect on national greatness/goodness.

[CR6]

RE: Rules of the Game. Totally agree. I read it alongside Leonhard's Book.

If you don't have time to wade through the massive tome, you can extract most of the lessons from just a few chapters.

For what it's worth, a reader can also get the heart of Gordon's thesis by reading his chapter in Murray and Sinnreich's The Past as Prologue.

[Bob's World]

In this discussion of what form of warfare to wage, of the two, function is far more important than form.

Grant is dicussed as a General who used a mix of position, maneuver, trench warfare depending on the circumstance to do whatever he deemed would be best suited in that particular circumstance to accomplish his primary end. Key being, total focus on what he was trying to accomplish vs total focus on a particular form of warfare to be applied regardless of situation.

By this focus on Objective, and also by being very business like in his approach of simply getting it done now (ability to overcome fear of the unknown) instead of waiting for some elusive perfect set of conditions, I believe he also discovered the key strategic lesson of the past 230 years.

At the start of Chapter 48 of his memoirs he clearly states that of the several armies that he set in motion upon taking overall command of the Union forces, his main objective was "Lee with the capital of the Confederacy." Due to this focus he positioned himself with Meade and the Army of the Potomac. But he sent his most trusted Army and his most trusted Commander to takes Atlanta and sweep through the South, defeating both Johnston's Army and the ability of the South to resource the war (Sheridan was sent on a similar campaign to destroy the main breadbasket of the Shenandoah). The main effort campaign accomplished the two primary goals of warfare at that time. Defeated the enemy's main army and Commander, and captured his capital. But the simple instruction to Sherman in his letter of 4 April 1864 produced the enduring victory that I contend (along with the honorable terms of surrender offered at Appomattox) led to the defeat of the will of the Southern populace (the Nation was defeated, not just the Army) that created the enduring peace:

"You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desireable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way."

Some lessons in leadership in that short statement as well. Pick your most trusted commander for your most second most important job, let him know what and why you want it done, then let him do it. Position yourself at the most important place, and know that due to your presence you can trust that operation to a capable, but less trusted subordinate to lead.

To the point of the aritcle though, the important thing is that no one size fits all, and the most important thing is to ensure that you understand what needs to be done first, and then set about getting done in ways uniquely designed for the circumstances that present themselves.

(Great side story that could only happen in America, is that while his roots were West Point and Regular Army, here you have a Militia Commander who by his own deeds was elevated to overall command of the Army, not by right of birth, or professional pedigree).

[jmm99]

from BW
... that I contend (along with the honorable terms of surrender offered at Appomattox) led to the defeat of the will of the Southern populace (the Nation was defeated, not just the Army) that created the enduring peace

realizing that there are many differing views of the aftermath of the Civil War.

I'd suggest that Appomattox was, in effect, a ceasefire - which was followed by a continuation of war by other means (reversed CvC).

I'd also suggest that the Compromise of 1877 was, in effect, a truce - which continued to operate for some 75 years, until it was supplanted by the political action of the 50s, continuing to the present.

No doubt that the North won the war; but a fair argument can be made that a part of the South won the peace - at least for 75 years.