Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare

[William F. Owen]

So I'll propose this before going forward. If we are talking about MW as a "style" (speed and focus) compared to something else, we'll keep calling it MW. If we're talking about "German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2. Just so we can keep the ideas straight. "Maneuver Warfare" without all this qualification is just too slippery a term, meaning too many things to too many people.

Any problems with that?

No problem with that. (and please call me Wilf). I don't have an issue with any particular "school". My issue was and is with the evidence used to suggest to advocate MW as a doctrine.

Mission tactics are always good.
"It means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior commander and that one uses all humanly practical means in order to give him satisfaction" - Foch 1903.

I am interested in the idea that,

"The Russians perfected by 1944 a system where they could mount maneuver warfare style"

Looking at the conduct of operations such as the attack of Seelow Heights that the Soviets necessarily walked the walk when it came to MW. All the theory yes - not the practice. - and I don't think Naveh's characterisations are accurate. I am not alone in this.

[wm]

If I understand the discussion so far, maneuver warfare, "speed" and "focus" as Eric (following Leonard and Wyly) stipulates it, is really just focussing on 2 of the the US's 9 traditional principles of war--speed and objective. What happened to the other 7? I am particularly concerned because one of the missing 7 just happens to be something called maneuver.

I also wonder about the apparent conflation of speed and tempo. I, for one, do not view these two as synomyms without a fair amount of further clarification and modification. As a minimum., I tend to think of speed as a tactical consideration while tempo is an operational one. Speedy movements (AKA sprints) may be part of my overall tempo, but I will also jog along between sprints and try to ensure I save enough for the final "kick" if I need it. Tempo also implies that I "kick" at the right time, neither too early nor too late. Getting there "firstest with the mostest" is all about speed, but not necessarily focus. Getting to the right place at the right time with the right amount of force is about tempo and focus.

[William F. Owen]

I also wonder about the apparent conflation of speed and tempo.

One of things I take from Leonhard is that speed is only relevant to creating surprise. Speed for speeds sake is both harmful and useless. Speed in terms of doing something for which the enemy is unprepared (temporally, positionally or technically) is a war winner every time.

Another point is that surprise does not work unless the enemy is unable to cope with the action you are performing. This is also one of my issues with the idea of cycling the OODA loop faster and faster. Speed in itself, gets you nothing.

[ericmwalters]

Ken,
Oh, for sure "Mission Tactics" in not the same thing as "German School" MW, but it's awkward to always say "German School MW" and "mission tactics" is what nearly all the usual arguments are about. So it's convenient shorthand that isn't analytical defendable, since "mission tactics" is merely one component of "German School MW." If you've got a snappier name/handle for what I'm trying to differentiate, by all means please give it to us.

[wm]

One of things I take from Leonhard is that speed is only relevant to creating surprise. Speed for speeds sake is both harmful and useless. Speed in terms of doing something for which the enemy is unprepared (temporally, positionally or technically) is a war winner every time.

Another point is that surprise does not work unless the enemy is unable to cope with the action you are performing. This is also one of my issues with the idea of cycling the OODA loop faster and faster. Speed in itself, gets you nothing.

Wilf, I understand the notion of speed but it still seems to be very different from tempo. Your additional post has not deconflicted this for me (I am just dense?)

BTW, speed has value for things besides creating surprise. For example, when on the defense, speed quite often is an effective mitigation for the risk of being surprised. Speed allows an offensive force to mass quicker than the opponent expects, even though the point of attack comes as no surprise. Speed may also enable a better/more effective pursuit of a defeated enemy (again surprise does not seem to be involved here).

[Ken White]

Ken,
Oh, for sure "Mission Tactics" in not the same thing as "German School" MW, but it's awkward to always say "German School MW" and "mission tactics" is what nearly all the usual arguments are about. So it's convenient shorthand that isn't analytical defendable, since "mission tactics" is merely one component of "German School MW." If you've got a snappier name/handle for what I'm trying to differentiate, by all means please give it to us.

Nah, just wanted to make the point; I can go with your definitions. I also agree that in the minds (and actions) of many, it evolves to that definition.

[ericmwalters]

Just to clear the decks before plunging on, since these were brought up....

Soviet-school MW: Sure, there are exceptions to just about everything. More than just the Seelow Heights assault. But in 1944, the Soviets began to achieve the ability to enjoy the benefits of tight centralized synchronization within and between echelons without many of the usual disadvantages in execution--the operation outruns the plan. That had long been the problem. Employing successive echelons where units are expended like rounds of ammunition, only having to maintain synchronization for a day's operation to take an objective and then having the follow-on echelon (with fresh forces) continue the attack solved a lot of problems. And while there were many tactical defeats, overall the operations enjoyed success as a whole because victories were won when and where they were needed and defeats were either not in very important places or were used to set conditions for victories elsewhere. The big limitation was when you ran out of echelons or you didn't have the sustainment power to back up the forces the field, everything came to a grinding halt. So you couldn't go very far, although the short distance you could go was blistering fast. So there was this pulsing quality to operations--lots of time prepping and planning, a helluva lunge, then consolidation and prepping and planning for the next big lunge. Kind of like the old WWI "bite and hold" on a much larger scale. But these met the "speed" and "focus against enemy weakness" criteria that we seem to judge MW style by.

Contrast that with Rommel's conduct of operations in Africa in December of 1941--tactically, the Germans win against OPERATION CRUSADER. Operationally, they lose since they have to retreat back due to lack of supplies. One of the big problems with Mission Tactics is that you can easily lose operational coherence and/or step too far out of your ability to consolidate and sustain your successes. That would be a master's thesis in and of itself.

Certainly speed alone is not enough for success. That speed has to be sustained (thus we often use the term tempo instead) and aimed at something. Why Boyd and Lind were significant--at least to the USMC--was that nobody had EXPLICITLY explained the mechanics of victory in such a way that there were immediately obvious implications in force structure, organization, and command and control. If Boyd's theories of fast transients were significant to the original designs of the F-15 and F-16, then "Mission Tactics" (as I'm terming German School MW) should have resulted in different USMC equipment, force structure/organization, and C2. Not sure we've seen that, not to the same degree we saw the U.S. Army reorganize for AirLand Battle. The USMC's abortive efforts towards "Distributed Operations" was perhaps the most obvious step in achieving real structural/organizational/functional realizations of "mission tactics"--at least as seen in some quarters, if not in other (for example, Bill Lind was horrified by what he was seeing with this). But there is still a Marine Corps drive towards decentralization as a way to increase speed and focus--we're just not insitutionalizing it yet. But the intent to do so is there.

Regarding speed and surprise, it's really about aiming for surprise. Like a boxer who runs through combinations of punches in a boxing round, you never are really sure which blow will land successfully ahead of time. You run through the combination hopefully faster than your opponent can parry/defend and/or counterpunch and that you get an opening.

As Wilf points out, speed by itself gets you nowhere. Using the above analogy, running through a punch combination in boxing that isn't aimed at your opponent's weaknesses/vulnerable points won't get you anywhere. It's the focus, it's the drive to make him react so much and so often that he uncovers himself and you are positioned to take advantage of it by landing a surprise blow.

[ericmwalters]

Wilf writes:

Mission tactics are always good.
"It means that one frankly adopts the thoughts and views of the superior commander and that one uses all humanly practical means in order to give him satisfaction" - Foch 1903.

Well, there's mission tactics and then there's Mission Tactics. Directive control, where the commander gives you a mission, tells you the intent/endstate he wants, and leaves it to you to figure out how to get the job done, is one thing. Detailed control, where the commander not only tells you the mission and endstate, but also the concept of operations, detailed tasks, and micromanages a lot of the warfighting functions and appears to prize the method of execution over accomplishing the mission is quite another. And having to ask "mother may I" before changing anything so that it slows down execution is definitely another.

In some situations, you want slavish obedience to orders without any deviation and absolutely NO initiative. When I was building a course on attrition warfare, I found myself looking at a lot of siege operations. Given that the enemy tied himself down, time was not typically a major factor, and that optimizing friendly force utilization was paramount; the situation turned into more of an engineering problem and one didn't tolerate too much variability/non-reliability in terms of subordinate unit performance. Likewise, the Germans threatened to shoot anyone who violated roadspace control measures as they moved mech forces through the Ardennes in 1940, prior to making contact with Belgian and French forces. For Marines, ship-to-shore movements--especially when under fire--are more choreographed than the biggest Broadway musical you can imagine. Given that, I'm not sure I can say "Mission Tactics is always a good thing." But I suspect that's because I'm thinking of this (and Foch's quote) a bit differently than Wilf is. I think this differentiation/discrimination must exist--"mission tactics" compared to something else (e.g., "orders-tactics")!

But I'm being very literal with the term here and not with this as a label for "German School" MW.

[ericmwalters]

Here I want to dive into Wilf's issues with the evidentiary basis for MW as a doctrine. This starts to dive into some pretty heavy intellectual, theoretical, and historical territory. It's also good that he brings up Robert Leonhard's later writings, compared to earlier ones, because this actually illustrates part of the larger context that MW must be seen within.

Here's what Wilf wrote:

Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!

I'll start by saying Bob's "transformation" as we begin to see in his Fighting By Minutes and matured in his Principles of War for the Information Age occur because of this very fundamental question--why MW? Why not simply "The Art of War?" By the way, he doesn't bring this out explicitly in his book. But it's there--implicitly--by how it's laid out and written. I'll get back to that.

Let's go back to the frustrations the "maneuverists" had with the post-Vietnam USMC (and for you soldiers, imagine the post-Vietnam Army as well). Instead of coming up with MW, could we not have simply said, "Bring back the Art of War!" If commanders were always reaching for the attritional style even when it wasn't the best tool for the job, couldn't we just argue for using ALL the tools in the toolbox?

I'm going to oversimplify here, but it's done so some of you will get an idea of the emotional level that the frustration of many "maneuverists" had at this time. You know the old saying of "when all you've got is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." Well, that's kind of what we had back then. We had our mastery of supporting arms against a defended beach. That's what we did, that's what we were good at, and we could throw more Marine bodies onto a hot beach than the enemy could throw back at us. We used those methods for nearly everything. They worked. Like a very strong carpenter who used the claws on the back of his hammer to hack a board apart, we could use this style for any problem. A saw would have been better. Or a plane to smoothen rough spots (we would whap at it with the hammer head until it got a little less bumpy than it was--never mind we could never get it smooth).

The maneuverists didn't want to talk about the whole toolbox. "Look at this marvelous saw!" "See these various sizes of screwdrivers!" "This plane is really good at getting edges straight and smooth!" Oh no. Given that everybody was rushing towards fighting the Soviets in Europe (and, for the Marines, that meant Scandinavia) it was clear to the maneuverists that our usual ways of doing business weren't going to work. Methods built around attrition styles weren't going to cut it when so horribly outnumbered, out-firepowered, and out-resourced. The only hope many of the maneuverists saw was how the Germans had achieved some successes (notably in the early Blitzkrieg period) against these guys. And so the German "mission tactics" model was seized upon. "Wanna make two boards out of one?" the maneuverists cried. "Use a saw! A SAW!" And so, instead of focusing on all the tools in the toolbox, they focused on one. "Mission tactics"/German school MW. Against the Soviet hordes in Europe. Yup. And it wasn't just the USMC--the Army did the same thing.

What made this adoption of German School MW more easy was that decentralized C2 was pretty much a Prussian/German tradition, dating back to the 1813 campaign against Napoleon (all the Allied armies had Prussian chiefs of staff and the Trachenberg Plan depended on independent army maneuver with lateral communications). This tradition eventually worked its way down to the battalion and occasionally company level in the Franco-Prussian War and the platoon and squad level in the stosstruppen in certain assault units in World War One.

The saw doesn't mean a whole lot without a board to cut into two. Given a board, you reach for the saw. Same thing with Mission Tactics. Doesn't stand alone quite as well as it stands when coupled with a problem it is best suited to solve.

This is why Robert Leonhard and Wilf are standing where they are on the issue. Why MW? Why a saw? If you are going to fight a war, don't you need to master all the styles? If you are going to build a house, don't you need to use all the tools in the toolbox? They are right, of course.

But that didn't fly with those watching somebody whack at a board with hammer claws. "Here's a SAW! Use it! Don't know how? LEMME SHOW YOU! HERE!" Thus the judged "pre-occupation" with MW.

Okay, hopefully by now you understand how it happened and why. This still doesn't address Wilf's complaint about this being Marine Corps doctrine. Isn't this too limiting? Too confining? What's wrong with being highly proficient across the entire range of "The Art of War?"

I'll go back to my medicine analogy. Given the USMC's "long and illustrious" history, particularly as crack assault troops thrown into the teeth of enemy defenses, we have a very nearly reflexive reach for the attrition style of warfare. It shows up in our institutional culture in so many ways. We lionize Marine Corps General Lewis "Chesty" Puller, a commander who conducted his operations with usually very high casualty rates in his obsession to kill more of the enemy. He was often the right man in the right place, but we as Marines tend to overlook some of the more thoughtful yet effective commanders we had, such as Oliver P. Smith. We celebrate our catastrophic victories, such as Iwo Jima--a battle in which more Marines were casualties than there were Japanese defenders. We do this out of pride that we can and will persevere when given the toughest jobs. All this is admirable. But it also means we are less aware, less cognizant, less practiced, and therefore less adept at alternatives. "It's easy to be hard, but hard to smart" is one Marine wag's axiom about the Marine Corps. "I'm not smart and you can't make me," is another.

So Mission Tactics/German School MW was a very specific medicine that was fed to the U.S. Marine Corps at a very specific time. Wilf suggests this is the TX Hammes perspective. Well, TX was my company commander in Okinawa back in 1991, so perhaps that viewpoint rubbed off on me. This particular medicine may not work for you given what ails you. It might even harm you. But it sure was what the doctor ordered for us at that time....

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, I understand the notion of speed but it still seems to be very different from tempo. Your additional post has not deconflicted this for me (I am just dense?)

BTW, speed has value for things besides creating surprise. For example, when on the defense, speed quite often is an effective mitigation for the risk of being surprised. Speed allows an offensive force to mass quicker than the opponent expects, even though the point of attack comes as no surprise. Speed may also enable a better/more effective pursuit of a defeated enemy (again surprise does not seem to be involved here).

This is why I adhere to Leonhard. Surprise is about creating actions with which the enemy cannot cope. Massing, quicker than he expects fulfils this criteria. The point of attack may be no surprise, but the massing quicker is!

As concerns "Tempo" perhaps I am not using tempo in the same way you are. I would class Tempo as performing consistent set of actions in a way that aims to gain you benefit by being prepared, versus un-prepared. EG: Trenches dug to stage one in 6 hours and not 8.

[William F. Owen]

Robert Leonhard

I wish Bob was here to pitch in. I did send him a link a while back. I think you have accurately summarised both his and my thoughts on this, though, I am some what of a mental dwarf in comparison to Leonhard. If it hadn't been for him, I'd still be waffling about MW. Strangely, we first met at an EBO conference in London, where I was defending MW in the face of EBO!

It also occurs to me that, while in no way comparing myself to Hammes, Lind, Leonhard, Chet Richards, or even Eric, the amount of folks who think about this stuff seriously, seems to be very small and they all seem to know each other! Small world at the top of the pyramid.

Soviet Operational Art

As I've said I do have some issues with the Sov way of doing things in practice versus all their pretty solid theory. Their writing is very seductive in both it's clarity and certainty, but it just worries me that they never seem to be able to it.

Mission Orders
Mission orders, always have a place for, IF you are in command and no one can do what needs to be done. Thus I think you characterisation is both clear and useful.

[ericmwalters]

Here I'm going to address another point Wilf raises in his piece. I had issues with this particular line of argument of his:

In 1997 the re-written manual, issued as MCDP-1, stated that the two styles were part of a spectrum. This spectrum was never illustrated nor described.

Then,

Thus the USMC sought to portray themselves as adherents to MW placing themselves in contrast to an organisation that may have sought proficiency across a spectrum or styles, to be used as and when appropriate.

And finally,

The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis. While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary [methinks he means complementary in American English--EMW]. They are in no way distinct or alternative forms of warfare.

So I wrote this:

If Owen is dismissive of the notion that there are separate styles or forms of warfare, one wonders how he would judge Leonhard’s careful characterization of the two maneuver warfare schools, which he differentiates in how they practiced command and control. I would also strongly recommend Leonhard’s 2000 book, Principles of War for the Information Age, in describing the idea of spectrum ranges and justifying styles of operations.

Wilf said this--now, remember, this was before the discussion board missive of mine articulating where I think both he and Leonhard agree:

Robert Leonhard is a good friend of mine and I would suggest that his “Principles of Warfare for the Information Age,” actually stands in opposition to his “Manoeuvre Warfare” writing. Robert and I do not agree on all, but I have questioned the source closely. I have all his books, bar one. In my opinion, “POWFTIG” is one of the most of the most important and original works on military thought ever written, and understanding it lead to my rejection of MW of which I have previously been a rabid groupy!

Now, I think we don't have an argument that mastery of the Art of War in its entirety is preferable. That's where we all want to be. I can't argue against that perspective. All I'm saying is that MW was a very specific remedy for a very specific warfighting "ailment" that was perhaps unique to the Marine Corps (although I suspect it wasn't since the U.S. Army adopted a good bit of it as well). That "remedy" does not appear to make much sense without the "ailment" it is intended to address. It may be that outsiders can't see the ailments that the USMC suffers from, but I'll readily concede that quite a number of Marine Corps insiders can't see it either (and Colonel Craig Tucker isn't the only one who doesn't, whose Masters Thesis Wilf acknowledges). Over the years there's been a lot of articles questioning MW in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and elsewhere.

Okay, I've got two bones to pick at here--and Part 1 of this post will start with the first. This is the idea that Mission Tactics was intended as preferable over the ability to attain "proficiency over a variety of styles, to be used where and when appropriate." Wilf says this (see above) but I wish he'd put an explanatory footnote and/or citation, because I can't find that anywhere. Mission Tactics was preferable over a slavish devotion to the attrition style of warfare. That was the dichotomy set up and none other. The attrition style is NOT representative of a capability to attain "proficiency over a variety of styles, to be used where and when appropriate." So if Wilf has got something that says USMC MW is the best thing for everybody in all circumstances, I'd like to see it.

That's not what I read. I'll cite the original FMFM-1 introduction by General A.M. Gray:

This book describes my philosophy on warfighting. It is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight.

and further:

You will notice that this book does not contain specific techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.

In other words, this is a doctrine for the Marine Corps. There's no claim that it's intended for anyone else. And, as I hope I've illustrated, it was designed to scratch a particular itch of ours. If you buy that (1) we had that itch (contentious in some quarters) and (2) this was the right scratch for that itch (also contentious in some quarters as some would say just advocate a return to the Art of War), then this makes sense. If you have an issue with either (1) or (2) or both, you won't buy this. And that's pretty much the end of discussion argument, because the debate then centers around differing assumptions about the nature of the problem and the best solution. Fine.

But if you do buy (1) and (2), you may have a legitimate worry that the USMC will be too focused on Mission Tactics to the exclusion of all else. Well, I'd submit we've never had a problem mastering Attrition Warfare styles--ever. Maybe someday. But not in the past, recent past, or even now. Still, attrition and maneuver are two styles and so far we've been characterizing them pretty theoretically. There's dangers in that. Very interestingly, the revision of FMFM-1, MCDP-1, contained this in General Charles Krulak's forward to the document:

Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energentic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister services.

General Gray (retired) piled on in the Preface:

Warfighting has stimulated discussion and debate from classrooms to wardrooms, training areas to combat zones.

and

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 stated, "While the basic nature of war is constant, the means and methods we use evolve continuously." Like war itself, our approach to warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated.

So while the basic tenets and principles of Mission Tactics/MW are refined in MCDP-1, both FMFM-1 and MCDP-1 concede that this is not the end-all, be-all. And while other militaries and U.S. services are interested and copied some of what is written, this doctrine remains USMC doctrine. That's who it is intended for. And it will change over time.

Of course, we're not seeing much change at this point. But that's not to say the doctrine won't change--there's an intention that it will. Let's assume that we fight Irregular Warfare for over twenty years and get pretty comfortable with Mission Tactics/decentralized C2 (which is what many of our most successful units are using right now). Then that becomes what we reflexively reach for in any and all situations. Then we get involved in a major conventional fight where there are times and places where centralized C2 is not only desired, but absolutely needed/demanded. Then I'd expect some changes in doctrine to reflect that. But trust me, we're nowhere near that--Marine Corps culture is pretty hierarchical and centralized. It will be a while before we forget how to do that.

[ericmwalters]

The title of this series of posts is "Of Spectrums, Styles, and Pendulum Swings." Here's my second bone to pick with Wilf's argument.

Wilf appears to take issue with the notions of spectrums/styles when he wrote: "The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis." By now I hope it's clear that he is thinking of the Leonhard definition of MW, not the USMC/Boyd/Lind defintion, which is really "Mission Tactics" with a huge focus on decentralized C2. Given his understanding/definition of MW, I can understand why he would say this. But that's not the definition the USMC understands or officially accepts.

One of the goals of MCDP 1 revision of FMFM 1, according to General Krulak in the Foreword, was to: "...clarify the descriptions of the styles of warfare." And it seems that Wilf is not satisfied with the description of the styles on pages 36-39. Again, given the definition he's using for MW, this is understandable. I do want to point out a couple sentences that should disabuse anyone that the USMC advocates one style over all others and it's found on page 39:

All warfare involves both maneuver and attrition in some mix. The predominant style depends on a variety of factors, not the least of which are our own capabilities and the nature of the enemy.

Now, if we look at this from a C2 philosophy perspective, MCDP 6 Command and Control gives us more on the spectrum/style description, and those are found on page 41 (a diagram of opposing conceptions of command and control), and page 81 (the command and control spectrum). Surrounding text and the OPERATION VERBAL IMAGE vignette in Chapter 1 of the publication provide a great deal of illustration showing contrasts between "orders-tactics" used in the attrition warfare style and "mission tactics" used in the maneuver warfare style. Significantly, there is a definite bias towards "mission tactics"/maneuver warfare style--there's no discussion of when and where "orders tactics"/attrition style would be most effective. And that would be a fair criticism. But remember who the patient is that we're administering this medicine to!

Given this definition of MW that is focused on "mission tactics"/decentralized C2, we now turn to Leonhard's book, Principles of War For the Information Age. I argued that he makes the case for thinking about spectrums and styles in this work. For those not familiar with this ground-breaking thesis, Leonhard's primary contribution is to point out the deficiencies in past principles of war, stated as a string of words such as "Maneuver," "Objective," "Offensive," "Surprise," "Economy of Force," "Mass," "Unity of Effort," "Speed," and "Security." These are static terms that don't readily show relationships and tradeoffs. His principles are articulated into couplets that indicate the bounds of a range of action, or--dare I say it--a spectrum. As one example, instead of "Mass" and "Economy of Force," he pairs the ideas as "the Principle of Distribution and Concentration." Or, more controversially, there are "the Principle of Option Acceleration and Objective" (because objectives often can and do change so you need to keep options open--and pick them before your enemy can pre-empt or effectively react), and "the Principle of Command and Anarchy." The best, most agile, most supple, and most effective organization can slide along those spectrums/scales/ranges outlined by these principles as circumstances change.

But not all organizations and commanders are that supple or agile. They exhibit preferences, tendencies, or biases for one end of the spectrum over the other, and so their operations exhibit a particular "style."

Coming full circle to the beginning of this post, we'll summarize by revisiting Wilf's complaints:

In 1997 the re-written manual, issued as MCDP-12, stated that the two styles were part of a spectrum. This spectrum was never illustrated nor described.

I'd disagree, but that's because of the Marine Corps definition of MW is operative, not Robert Leonhard's/Wilf's. If I were using their definition, I can well understand this. But the manuals are explaining the spectrum and two styles in terms that are consistent with USMC focus on the "Mission Tactics" definition of MW that focuses on decentralized C2.

Thus the USMC sought to portray themselves as adherents to MW placing themselves in contrast to an organisation that may have sought proficiency across a spectrum or styles, to be used as and when appropriate.

I find no basis for this in the manuals or any other "maneuverist" article/chapter/book or reference that I know, but Wilf may have something I don't. In fact, as I have just shown, there are acknowledgements/provisions for the choice of style as the circumstances dictate, at least within MCDP 1.

The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis. While the selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better explained as complimentary [methinks he means complementary in American English--EMW]. They are in no way distinct or alternative forms of warfare.

Again, using the Leonhard understanding of MW, this makes sense. But if you apply the USMC MW definition, you can begin to see how Leonhard's principles of war for the information can make the case for spectrums and distinct styles of war.

[William F. Owen]

I have to say I am learning a lot here, but the premise of my article was that the idea was not subjected to sufficient rigour and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged. Had it been, we may have got a better product.

I still stand by that premise.

In fact the first person I know who actually looked for sources of MW thinking and wrote them down was Leonhard.

It could be that you could place MW in the left hand column of Leonhard’s paradigm and Attrition in the right, but this would only make sense (as you allude) if we were using Leonhard's arguments. – and I find that instructive.

[Ken White]

I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with both of you on four salient points:

1. MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost due to the fact cited in number 2. below.

2. MW is not a replacement for attrition or other forms of warfare but is a methodology to be used when possible.

3. The USMC (Full disclosure; been there, done that) is prone to frontal assaults and really needed an antidote to that. The US Army suffers from the same disease to a slightly lesser extent and also jumped on the wagon -- well, on the tailgate of it anyway. In both cases, the adoption was primarily but not totally lip service while a strong strain of skepticism about it was maintained by senior people who feared loss of control and (wrongly, IMO) excessive casualties. I'll again add: this is partly due to a tacit knowledge that our training is only marginally adequate thus leading to an innate distrust or lack of total faith in subordinates taking the 'correct' actions.

4. Both services have made some strides toward decentralization (thanks primarily to Afghanistan and Iraq) but still tend to hold the reins a little too tightly.

Thus we (both services) have a doctrine which says one thing while we actually do something a little different -- and more cautious...

Nothing new in that, been that way since 1949 at least in my observation.

Obviously some paraphrasing in there and I do not mean to pin either of you to my choice of words. My additions re: training are my own and not inferred from either of you. However, my sensing is that you two are closer than you seem to think.

[Cavguy]

I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with both of you on four salient points:

1. MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost due to the fact cited in number 2. below.

2. MW is not a replacement for attrition or other forms of warfare but is a methodology to be used when possible.

3. The USMC (Full disclosure; been there, done that) is prone to frontal assaults and really needed an antidote to that. The US Army suffers from the same disease to a slightly lesser extent and also jumped on the wagon -- well, on the tailgate of it anyway. In both cases, the adoption was primarily but not totally lip service while a strong strain of skepticism about it was maintained by senior people who feared loss of control and (wrongly, IMO) excessive casualties. I'll again add: this is partly due to a tacit knowledge that our training is only marginally adequate thus leading to an innate distrust or lack of total faith in subordinates taking the 'correct' actions.

4. Both services have made some strides toward decentralization (thanks primarily to Afghanistan and Iraq) but still tend to hold the reins a little too tightly.

Thus we (both services) have a doctrine which says one thing while we actually do something a little different -- and more cautious...

Nothing new in that, been that way since 1949 at least in my observation.

Obviously some paraphrasing in there and I do not mean to pin either of you to my choice of words. My additions re: training are my own and not inferred from either of you. However, my sensing is that you two are closer than you seem to think.

Wow! Great summary Ken, and well articulated.

[William F. Owen]

Yep, we may be violently agreeing. I may not be totally right. As I say, my beef was/is with the evidence.

Good is good, and having more than one bat in the golf bag seems to get the best results. No argument there.

...I will now retire to the garden and read Clausewitz!

[ericmwalters]

Here I'm about to finish with expanding on my argument with Wilf's main points. All else is really nitpicking, which I can get into later, but aren't central to the thesis that he presented.

It's worth looking at Wilf's recent post above where he writes:

...the premise of my article was that the idea was not subjected to sufficient rigour and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged. Had it been, we may have got a better product.

I still stand by that premise.

In fact the first person I know who actually looked for sources of MW thinking and wrote them down was Leonhard.

This seems like a pretty straightforward and simple set of statements, but it isn't. There's a lot to dicuss here. If I've not killed everyone with the length of my previous posts, I probably will with this one.

Okay, let's cut to the chase for starters--that the maneuver warfare idea in the Marine Corps "was not subjected to sufficient rigor and the historical and epistemological evidence not challenged." I'll say right up front that I agree with the first part--MW wasn't subjected to sufficient rigor--but not necessarily on the last part. Not challenged is a pretty bold statement. Maybe insufficiently challenged, possibly. I'll just point Wilf to Fideleon Damian's masters thesis, The Road to FMFM-1, particularly Chapter 3 entitled "The Maneuver Warfare Debate" which spells out in a good bit of detail the challenges to the historical and epistemological evidence made in the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette. And Fideleon really only mentions a handful of them, not all of them. Now, are these challenges as sophisticated as they could have been? Of course they weren't. And they could not have been, given the venue. But these challenges were still made. So I'll disagree with Wilf that they weren't.

Now, had there been a Robert Leonhard with his 1996-2000 mindset challenging the concept as opposed to the authors we had writing against MW at the time, no doubt we would have gotten a better product. Oh well.
Gotta work with what you have to work with.

Let's face it, Marines are practical people with not a lot of patience for theory. Let's go back to my medicine example made in previous posts for a minute. If you are sick with something, you are far more interested in that the cure works. You are less interested in HOW it works. So long as the "fix" cured your "ailment," you are not as obsessed with whether an medieval alchemist's potion hooked you up or whether a modern doctor and pharmacy did. Of course, your risks of undesired side effects and other health factors are higher with that alchemist, right? But back in the bad old days, you didn't get a choice. Today you do.

Today, if you are having muscle spasms in your back, you can get Chinese acupuncture, chiropractic, or traditional medicine. You'll find people that swear by one over the other two. Who is right? Each will claim they have all the "sufficient rigor" they need to justify the treatment, but their justifications won't sit well with adherents to other treatments.

So it is with Marine Corps-style MW/"Mission Tactics." We grabbed it because it worked to cured our attrition warfare style bias "ailment." We weren't terribly interested in the arcane theoretical ups and downs of it.

To borrow a phrase from Wilf's tag line, "I don't care if it works in practice! I want to see if it works in theory!" is not something the USMC was adhering to.

Okay, so the Marine Corps grabbed onto this without studying the thing to death. So what?

After all, we'd done this before. Amphibious Warfare doctrine didn't go through a lot of "sufficient rigor" either--and the then-contemporary historical examples (e.g., Gallipoli) didn't offer a lot of encouragement. Helicopter-borne operations--whether practiced by the Marine Corps or the Army in the 1950s and early 1960s didn't go through a lot of sufficient rigor either. Neither did U.S. Navy, British, and Japanese efforts at carrier-borne aviation. Or submarine warfare. And these were NEW, UNTRIED fields of endeavor!

Of course, all that conceptual work didn't deliver a "better product" either for amphibious warfare, heliborne ops, carrier warfare, submarine warfare (and so on), when it came to doctrine. But it was good enough. And it's been refined over the decades. Marine Corps MW wasn't trying anything particularly new. It was actually a fairly well-established and well-proven concept. We were, in fact, adopting something old, something accepted in other militaries. I'd say our adoption of amphibious warfare doctrine was far more bold, daring, and risky than was our adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine.

So Wilf can stand by that premise that the MW concept "was not subjected to sufficient rigor" and I just shrug my shoulders and say, so what?

To me, the most important questions are (1) has the Marine Corps really embraced MW? And (2) is it better at combat because of it? If anybody is looking for a master's thesis or PhD dissertation topic, there you have it.

Before I get accused of being too combative with Wilf, I'll just say this--I have no objection with anybody trying to apply analytical rigor to the MW concept now and continuously. And as we saw in the FMFM 1 and MCDP 1 preliminary matter, neither did Generals Krulak or Gray. No problems there. I just think it's unrealistic to expect militaries to study things to death before they embrace change and/or innovation (especially the latter). And my academic/professorial side is sympathetic to many of his complaints when they are well founded in historical examples and theory.

Now, regarding Wilf's last observation that Robert Leonhard was the only one who had "looked at the sources of MW thinking and wrote them down"--I have to take issue with that. Understand that I think Robert Leonhard has done THE BEST JOB of looking at the sources of MW thinking. I used his The Art of Maneuver as the central text of my 400-level maneuver warfare course. But there were other people who did this before he did.

The most prominent, if outdated, example is William S. Lind's own Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press published it in 1985, whereas Leonhard's first book did not come out until 1991. This work contains not only Lind's writings, but also Colonel Michael D. Wyly's lectures on tactics and self-paced Tactical Decision Games that were developed at Amphibious Warfare School when he was there and leading the Maneuver Warfare Seminar (see Fideleon Damien's thesis for the details on this).

Keep in mind, however, that this book is STRICTLY "German School" maneuver warfare. Leonhard is much more comprehensive and critical. Which is why I used his book in my course and not Lind's/Wyly's. Plus, Lind's/Wyly's was really written for Marines, and that comes out in the text. It has much less power for other audience not afflicted with the USMC-peculiar "attritionitis disease." (See previous posts on that). As such, it's really a work of advocacy and basic instruction in the USMC flavor of MW/Mission Tactics. It resonates best with Marine audiences, although it's less so now than when it was first published.

I might say the Robert Leonhard's was the first "scholarly" work on the maneuver warfare subject, even though he was a practicioner/serving Army officer. But he was certainly not the first to have written about MW and sources of MW thinking (Sun Tzu, Liddell-Hart, "those dead Germans," etc).

[ericmwalters]

Ken wrote:

MW offers many benefits on paper but is devilishly hard to do in practice; I'll add: the increased training at all levels required to attain true proficiency is possibly not worth the cost....

I'll take the liberty of quoting my April 1995 Marine Corps Gazette article, "Is Mission Control The Weakness of Maneuver Warfare?," which goes into this to some depth. For thread readers, mentally substitute "Directive Control" or "Mission Tactics" for "mission control" (which has nothing to do with NASA or space flight in this context!):

The problem "maneuverists" have with detailed control is that we Marines spend so much time and effort doing it. Mission control always seems to get short shrift....

Substantive criticisms of Mission Control:

Maj Leonhard remarked in his Army [magazine] article that "mission control fails at least as much as it succeeds." This is a serious charge, although his one example, that of Guderian at Yelnia, does not support his claim....

Units unfamiliar with mission control are bound to have major problems when they first try it....But continuous practice brings with it mistakes and continuous learning. After a few successes, the unit grows confident and is encouraged to try more. After this, success comes more frequently and the effect snowballs. Of course, this doesn't happen if the same people aren't kept on the team....what is to be done with a unit that hasn't practiced and/or is victimized by constant personnel turnover?

This, then, is the fulcrum of the whole argument, that mission control is simply too hard for Marine Corps to do, given current operational realities. It could be true that without the necessary institutional changes to support it, mission control cannot be expected to work well enough in combat to bring success.

Funny to read this again after thirteen years. COIN operations in combat would seem to be engendering decentralization even when our institutions back in the rear aren't able to--at least not able to sufficiently enough.

Is MW not worth the cost? I suspect it may be in peacetime, but the crucible of extended combat is making us adopt more of its features (the German School aspect of it, anyway). Why else would we be doing development on Enhanced Company Operations (ECO), which is looking more and more like "stosstruppen on steroids?"

[Render]

Former Corp Commandant (29) General A. M. Gray also wrote the foreword for the Tom Clancey non-fiction book “Marine.”

MCDP 1-2 Campaigning is available online at…

http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bibl/mcdp1_2.pdf

FMFM-1 Warfighting is available online at…

http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallAr...arfighting.htm

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Sports analogy warning (sorry, it’s football season)…

From my perspective as a civilian lifer I see MW as somewhat analogous to the NFL’s Run-And-Shoot offense. At the right time, on the right field position, and against the right opponent the Run and Shoot is all but unstoppable, but you wouldn’t want to build your whole team around that one offensive scheme at the expense of all other offensive schemes. There is a time and a place in every single game where plowing the ball up the middle for three yards and a cloud of dust (attrition strategy) isn’t just the right plan, it’s the only plan.

The three late 80’s – early 90’s NFL teams that went to the full Run and Shoot package, (no Tight Ends or Fullbacks even on the roster), at the expense of all other offensive options (Detroit, Houston, and Atlanta) were fun to watch as they moved the ball up and down the field like aerial flying circuses. But once they reached the Red Zone, (inside the opponent’s 20 yard line), they couldn’t score as often as there was less room on the field for pass patterns, and they lacked the traditional Tight Ends and Fullbacks to block for a short yardage running game. (160lb Wide Receivers don’t block 250lb Linebackers and 280lb Defensive Ends, they just get in the way for a second or two. As a former 155lb 4.2/40 high school and semi-pro Wide Receiver I would know this – and have a special love for the Run and Shoot.)

Nowadays many NFL teams use the West Coast offense or some variation of it, but they almost all keep a four or even five Wide Receiver formation in their playbooks, for special occasions.

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Eric: I’m a Strategypage alumnus who remembers an all black 10-3 Squad Leader named Major Hendricks (that bastard), 6-6-8’s, and still plays Steel PanthersMBT/WW2 instead of Solitare. And that’s really about all I have left to offer this table. My “Render” nic is homage to OSC.

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Wilf: All in all kudos for the article. Not because I agree with some points and disagree with others, but for spurring an extremely informative and interesting (to me at least) thread. I learned a bunch of stuff, so it had to be good.

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Ken: I think I was leaning toward the Hussites and their war wagons at some point back in there, but your Mongels and infantry outflanked me so I’ll yield the right of way while hiding my chariots behind a hill.

Marines to the front, because somebody has to rescue the Airborne.

STREAK
PATTERN,
R