Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[goesh]

Just a citizen's opinion but if I were a senior TB commander, I would have no need to talk with anyone - the only state of flux I would be in is tactical adaptation whereas the Afghan government and NATO remains in tactical and ideological flux, so time is on my side, I have transgenerational assurance that my sons will continue the fight - what sustains me is the terrain and the opium, both are impervious to Western dominance. If you burn the opium, the farmer will fight with me, if you buy the opium, I will rob the farmer. The only thing I fear is development of infrastructure and irrigation that will give villagers viable alternatives worthy of defending against me.

[wm]

Just a citizen's opinion but if I were a senior TB commander, I would have no need to talk with anyone - the only state of flux I would be in is tactical adaptation whereas the Afghan government and NATO remains in tactical and ideological flux, so time is on my side, I have transgenerational assurance that my sons will continue the fight - what sustains me is the terrain and the opium, both are impervious to Western dominance. If you burn the opium, the farmer will fight with me, if you buy the opium, I will rob the farmer. The only thing I fear is development of infrastructure and irrigation that will give villagers viable alternatives worthy of defending against me.

Goesh,
Are you channeling for Yul Brenner or for the village elder in "The Magnificent Seven"?

[goesh]

No WM, but I've been trying to send a psychic message to General P and channel Ghengis Khan. When the Shining Path under Guzman in Peru was really doing its thing and its soliders were making too much headway in the small villages, a crew went down there and convinced a village that wanted to be left alone to 'protect' themselves my making their own amulets and tailsmans and putting them on high poles around the perimeter of the village. Guzman was essentially regarded as a powerful shaman by most country folk. I'm getting this vision of dog skulls stuck on black poles, lots of them, up on the mountain passes and trails used by the taliban where they cross over and I'm seeing crude pictures of black dogs painted on the rocks too near the skull poles. there is something about peasants and the extreme rigidity of fundamental beliefs that always allows one crease, one opening for manipulation. When the vision is real clear, I'll 'send it off' to General P.

[Jedburgh]

The Other Side - Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks’

.....this paper advocates developing multilayered contacts (‘talks’) with different elements of the insurgency in order to differentiate between the motivations, aims and demands of its different components. A build-up of better mutual understanding and possibly some trust with reconcilable elements might be an early side-effect. But a ‘talks’ approach must be embedded in a broader ‘reconciliation’ strategy. A first step would be to differentiate between short term ‘talks’ and long-term reconciliation.

The kind of ‘reconciliation’ pursued up to date has failed because of wrong assumptions. Individual or groups of insurgents were urged to join the existing government. This ignores the fact that the character of the regime itself is one reason for many insurgents to take up arms. It cannot therefore be considered neutral and an arbiter itself. Reconciliation also cannot be approached in an ahistorical way, i.e. with some of those who either had been involved in past crimes (and contributed to the emergence of the Taleban as a ‘purification’ movement) or have later caused the alienation of many of those who have joined the insurgency setting the terms of reconciliation. The same goes for NATO and ISAF and even the UN mission in Afghanistan.

This requires a new, broader strategy on reconciliation and a political consensus about such a strategy, both internally amongst Afghan, amongst – at least – major international actors and, finally, between Afghan and external actors.......

[Rex Brynen]

Insurgent Faction Presents Afghan Peace Plan
By CARLOTTA GALL
New York Times
Published: March 23, 2010

KABUL, Afghanistan — Representatives of a major insurgent faction have presented a formal 15-point peace plan to the Afghan government, the first concrete proposal to end hostilities since President Hamid Karzai said he would make reconciliation a priority after his reelection last year.

The delegation represents fighters loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, 60, one of the most brutal of Afghanistan’s former resistance fighters who leads a part of the insurgency against American, NATO and Afghan forces in the north and northeast of the country.

His representatives met Monday with President Karzai and other Afghan officials in the first formal contact between a major insurgent group and the Afghan government after almost two years of backchannel communications, which diplomats say have been sanctioned by the United States.

[davidbfpo]

A former insurgent in Afghanistan has told how he survived daily battles with British troops and why he decided to join the peace process in what is believed to be the first ever interview given by a member of the Helmand Taliban.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...insurgent.html

Some interesting points made on reconciliation and other subjects, notably the presence of foreign fighters.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Randy Borum for highlighting a seminar at the USMC University a month ago, which did get a mention:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=emerald

I think we missed some nuggets, although a few did read that post. Notably the comments by the UK retired Major General Lamb, who is with ISAF and advising / leading on approaches to the Taliban, so check Randy's website: http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2010/...o-taliban.html

Lamb said:

The bulk of these fighters – young men who ISAF have previously and still occasionally categorize on a broad canvas of an enemy – the Afghans see as sad and upset brothers. Now, you might suggest they’re pretty upset. But that’s how they see them, many of them – sad and upset brothers. The term upset brother captures, rather nicely, the majority of those we need to convince that the cause for which they fight is a poor one by addressing their complaints head on. And understanding and situational awareness is not good enough.

Transcripts are available on this link (Randy's link is broken): http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/Pages/EE%20Symposium.aspx

[Bob's World]

Just worth considering, is that TB senior leadership can continue, and have to answer to Pakistan; or reconcile and seek their own destiny within GIROA free from their current Pakistan strings.

I suspect the recent roll-up of a large chunk of the Qetta Shura was a message from Pakistan to TB senior leadership that "there is no quitting alllowed..."

We'll see. This is more complex and convaluted than any of us can imagine, and the main players probably don't lay awake at night worrying about what the US national interests are in all of this.

I remain with the position that Mr. Karzai's Peace Jirga (and the likely follow-on events) are our last, best bet for an honorable exit strategy that reasonably supports the interests we see to be at stake.

[Dayuhan]

I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

[Bob's World]

I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

Americans see Elections as the key to legitimacy; this Jirga thing is confusing or off the radar all together for "Americans", and not well appreciated for its full potential by many of our senor leaders either, IMO.

But you are right, Karzai may well blow it, he may stack the deck with his cronies, excluding oppositions voices. If he does, it should be a Regis Philbin moment for the US, as in asking "Is that your final answer?"

If he says "yes" then he has released us from any moral obligation to stay.