Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Danny]

A sense of humor, my friend. A sense of humor.

I can't believe that you cited Salaam. It is exactly the wrong example and proves my point.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-abdul-salaam/

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-of-musa-qala/

[120mm]

So, is the the answer to kill everyone?

In the end, successful insurgency involves sitting down at a table whose guts you hate and you need to include them in the "solution".

I think that there are very few structural (I get to use a new word, yay!!!) insurgents/revolutionaries, that actually need to be made room temperature.

If Galula and others are correct, we should be able to separate the rebels with a cause from the hard-cases and then kill, isolate or make them irrelevant.

[Entropy]

The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.

[Danny]

Of course the solution is not killing everyone. Most Afghans are not fighting. The estimation is that there are 8000 - 20000 fighters in the South and East. We might be able to peel away a small percentage of them, but most of these fighters fight for reasons religious and world view, versus the largely indigenous insurgency in Anbar. When you think of Afghanistan, forget the Anbar awakening. It won't happen.

And even the ones that we peel away won't turn their guns on the hard core Taliban and AQ. Won't happen. Simply won't. I'll eat my hat if it does.

[Jedburgh]

The coalition in Afghanistan has had some success in getting a few Taliban leaders to defect. IMO, such cooption is better than declaring no compromise which forces one to track them all down and kill them - probably impossible and counterproductive in the end. You need the carrot and the stick for success - and reconciliation and rehabilitation of former enemies is an important part of the carrot.

Earlier thread on Pulling Taliban Leaders into Government?.

[Ron Humphrey]

If the overall guidance is to convert or coopt whomever you can without regard to their historic practices, than not sure I agree.

If however we're talking about using those you have found those within the larger society who's opinions you can trust, then use them to determine which leaders were Tali just because the Taliban were in control and thus When the Roman's are here be Roman; Thats where I think you find the good side switches that could last.

If someone learns to play the system they are in well enough to be able to protect themselves and the interests of those who depend on them I'm not sure that's such a bad thing. Means their Adaptable. Key would seem to be figuring out how to know which is which.

[Bill Moore]

Help me out here, we went into Afghanistan to kill those who perpretrated 9/11 and numerous other acts of war against the West and even their own people.

In the process of doing so we accidentlly acquired care taker status of a nation-state was that was a non-functioning nation in most respects. We quickly established a central government of meager means to exert control over its domain, and since then we have with some success expanded the central government's capability to exert it authority throughout Afghanistan (obviously a long ways from mission success). You can argue our mission to kill those who attacked us on 9/11 has been derailed to a large extent by the efforts to build a nation, but we won't go down that path, if the stated strategy is to build an effective nation are we on the right track?

If your you're stated goal is to empower the government of Afghanistan to reject deny terrorists safehaven (along with numerous other objectives related to economics, security, etc.), the clear intent then is to empower the central government to do this.

As stated by others, the concern about the Sons of Iraq, is that organizations are being empowered by the coalition, not the government, and these organizations in some cases challenge State authority. This is a bottom up approach, which is counter productive to a top down approach (working through the HN central government, regardless of how flaky it may be).

While all COIN is local (to a point), we should empower the government to empower these local organizations to defend and govern themselves. With this approach these local entities become an extension of government power, which is what our objective is, unless we're supporting the insurgents.

If the government of Afghanistan is reaching out and faciitating reconciliation more power to them, but if it is the coalition I think we need to take a step back and reassess.

[tulanealum]

One of the key factors in any successful COIN op is to attract defectors and surrenders. This isn't happening in Afghanistan...no incentives are being created...and the truth is the bad guys don't necessarily think they are losing...once they begin to think that, some may want to jump ship...it's the Afghan way.

But to say the majority or to imply that the majority of the TB are religious ideologues is inaccurate...some are just fighting because of tribal isssues, some for a job...some because they don't understand what the situation is...mark my words, there will be no success in Afghanistan without defections, surrenders, and some kind of reconciliation...