Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Entropy]

Taliban to split itself from Al Qaeda and seek peace?

Taliban leaders are holding Saudi-brokered talks with the Afghan government to end the country's bloody conflict -- and are severing their ties with al Qaeda, sources close to the historic discussions have told CNN.

The militia, which has been intensifying its attacks on the U.S.-led coalition that toppled it from power in 2001 for harboring Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, has been involved four days of talks hosted by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, says the source.

The talks -- the first of their kind aimed at resolving the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan -- mark a significant move by the Saudi leadership to take a direct role in Afghanistan, hosting delegates who have until recently been their enemies.

They also mark a sidestepping of key "war on terror" ally Pakistan, frequently accused of not doing enough to tackle militants sheltering on its territory, which has previously been a conduit for talks between the Saudis and Afghanistan.

According to the source, fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar -- high on the U.S. military's most-wanted list -- was not present, but his representatives were keen to stress the reclusive cleric is no longer allied to al Qaeda.

Details of the Taliban leader's split with al Qaeda have never been made public before, but the new claims confirm what another source with an intimate knowledge of the militia and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the past.

More at the link.

[jmm99]

Here are two articles from the Telegraph and Financial Times.

Afghan president offers Taliban a role in governing country
President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end.
By Nick Meo in Kabul
Last Updated: 7:03PM BST 11 Oct 2008

The offer was made through his brother Qayoun at a secret meeting in Saudi Arabia of which Britain was aware.

Britain has been encouraging the Kabul government to talk to its Taliban enemies for more than two years and the Americans are thought to be coming round to the idea of a deal which would end the costly war in Afghanistan.

But The Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al-Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal.

Under the Saudi Arabian initiative more than a dozen former senior Taliban figures travelled to the kingdom with the approval of President Hamid Karzai's government. ....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...g-country.html

US open to Taliban peace talks
By James Blitz in London
Published: October 10 2008 03:00 | Last updated: October 10 2008 03:00

Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said last night that Washington could "ultimately" contemplate the idea of negotiating with the Taliban to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the Afghan government were to pursue such talks.

In comments that add to the growing sense across Nato that the alliance will never achieve a comprehensive military victory in Afghanistan, Mr Gates said a political settlement with the Taliban was conceivable.

However, he insisted the US would never negotiate with al-Qaeda forces, who are also seeking to destabilise Hamid Karzai's Afghan government.

"There has to be ultimately, and I'll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this," Mr Gates told reporters at a summit of Nato defence ministers in Budapest. "That's ultimately the exit strategy for all of us."

But when listing conditions for reconciliation, he said: "We have to be sure that we're not talking about any al-Qaeda."

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66faed7a-9...077b07658.html

One wonders how much events - the economic problems - are now driving foreign policy decisions.

Of course, these talks may come to nothing. After looking at the Taliban's history a bit extensively today and tonite, I find it hard to see why anyone would want them in a government. Despiration, I suppose.

[Ron Humphrey]

how media tend to try to fit anything they hear into their own boxes.

With perhaps the exception of the Brit General whom I have know idea what he was thinking; most everyone else is simply talking about nothing more than what we already try to do.

Differentiate between the really bad guys and those who simply took on an affiliation in order to survive and/or protect their own. Much like Iraq just because someone belonged to the Bath party did not necessarily mean they were evil, but rather in many cases they had little choice should they want to at least be able to have some say in the lives of their families/Tribes/ etc.

How about we look at the number of Lawyers who belong to an organization because of its status in the legal world, or Holly/Bollywooders who join org's for what it represents status symbol wise, or people who join the HOA so that they can at least try to fight for their right to put a sign in their yard

Long and short: This ain't rocket science and Its probably about time some stop trying to make it so

[reed11b]

Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? I know closing the border is a no-go since A. the topography is not an ally (mountains) B. The Paki's are not a reliable ally, but isolation seems like it might be more possible. From there efforts to reintegrate the disinfected tribes might make ground. Just a thought, would love feedback.
Reed

[tulanealum]

Although these talks are welcome, the representatives of the Taliban are fringe guys...

Would the hardcore TB guys really want to talk? Probably not...however, district commanders in some areas may be amenable to such activities...the question is, what will the government have to give up to get the TB to stop fighting? I'm willing to bet more than it would compromise.

And does anyone really believe the TB and AQ will completely part ways?

I don't...

Key thing to remember is that the TB is not monolithic and is also not the only group fighting in Afghanistan.

[MikeF]

Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? Reed

Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem. I think we'll need a five-pronged strategy:

1. FID/IW w/ Paki brothers
2. COIN in Afghanistan
3. Reconciliation with TB moderates
4. Massive reconstruction/humanitarian assistance to the area
5. Precise DA strikes- kill irreconciliables

Even if this approach was Pol/Mil feasible, the big elephant in the room would still be the drug trade.

Very difficult problem set.

v/r

Mike

[reed11b]

Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem.

True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.

[MikeF]

Occupation. As far-fetched as this sounds, it may work. Arguably, IMHO, the two most dangerous places in the world today are the FATA of Pakistan and Afghanistan border and Diyala Province in Iraq.

Again, very difficult problem set, but I thought I'd throw it out there.

v/r

Mike

[Surferbeetle]

From the Washington Post by Greg Bruno The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security

The decision to cut ties with AQI was dubbed the "Anbar Awakening" by Iraqi organizers, and has been hailed as a turning point in the U.S.-led war effort. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told lawmakers in Washington the uprising has reduced U.S. casualties, increased security, and even saved U.S. taxpayers money. "The savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence," the general said in April 2008, "far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts." Yet the future of the Awakening -- Sahwa in Arabic -- is a matter of increasing debate in foreign policy circles. Internal disputes within the predominantly Sunni groups have threatened the stability of the revolt, some experts say. Sunni groups have also complained about low pay and a lack of opportunities for employment within Iraq's army and police forces. CFR Senior Fellow Steven Simon writes in Foreign Affairs that while the Sahwa strategy may bring short-term stability to Iraq, the long-term effect could be runaway "tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism."

Wikipedia's entry on Paramilitaries in Colombia

Paramilitary groups, whether of private or public origin, having legal or illegal support, were originally organized during the Cold War proxy wars as small groups, being created as either a preemptive or reactive consequence to the real or perceived growing threat represented by the actions of guerrillas and militant political activists of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

[Eden]

...what exactly do we have to offer?

In most cases where insurgents have been coopted or reconciled, they were enticed by either a share of political power, specific reforms that they had been fighting for, monetary rewards, or safety. I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.

Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?

I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.

[Ron Humphrey]

Where this got so convoluted from the original intent?

"We should never fear to negotiate, but we should never negotiate from fear"

The Taliban(org) cannot and should not be negotiated with

1_ They have nothing to offer that is acceptable to a populace that seeks representative leadership

2_ They represent all that is oppressive and truly intolerant of self destination

Those who make up their ranks however are people and can be approached through their own self and societal interests.

I find myself completely perplexed by this apparent failure to connect those dots currectly in the public message

[Surferbeetle]

From wikipedia Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder analysis is a term used in project management and business administration to describe a process where all the individuals or groups that are likely to be affected by the activities of a project are identified and then sorted according to how much they can affect the project and how much the project can affect them. This information is used to assess how the interests of those stakeholders should be addressed in the project plan.

[marct]

Hi Eden,

I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.

We had the same problem with some troublesome colonies the the late 18th century.

Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?

I have to note an interesting point - why is this entire paragraph couched in terms of "would we"? I recognize the reality of the situation in Afghanistan vise vie the US forces, but you have the little problem of not claiming sovereignty there. This leads, inevitably, back to questioning about the "would we" statements since the only claims to political legitimacy in Afghanistan the US has are on force majeur.

I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.

I really don't think it is so much a case of having a dominant position so much as having political legitimacy. As far as dealing "with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity", I'll go back to those unruly colonists we had to deal with . Apparently, they had the gall to say that we (the British imperium) lacked the political legitimacy to engage in nation building and actually took up arms against us !

Moving out of the Devil's Advocate position...

One thing to keep in mind is that "the Taliban" don't exist as a single, unitary group; it has become a label of convenience for a multiplicity of groups and movements. The second thing to keep in mind is that the situation in Afghanistan is closer to a multi-party civil war with a lot of foreigners added to the mix. In some ways, there are parallels with the Russian civil war of 1917 - 21 and, politically, with the American Revolution and the establishment of the Tetrachy (~300 ce).

The position of negotiating with the Taliban is aimed at ending part of that civil war (i.e. part of the internal, Pashtun civil war), possibly as a prelude to getting some of the foreign fighters under control. Personally, I don't think the Karzai Gov't will be able to do so, but we'll have to wait and see what happens with the elections there.

[Surferbeetle]

An Afghanistan Country Study from the Illinois Institute of Technology

Afghanistan's rugged physical environment serves to isolate residential communities and to create microenvironments. Members of the same ethnic group and tribe who reside in different locations must adapt to their own microenvironment, which may result in different kin based groups within the same tribe and ethnic group using different modes of production.