Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Bob's World]

As SWC regulars (and irregulars) appreciate I am a big believer in the criticality of reconciliation of the issues of poor governance that are at the heart of causation for the Taliban Leadership in Pakistan. This to be followed up by Constitutional Loya Jirga that is focused on producing a constitution that prevents any one organization, ethnic group or office from gaining too much power (create trust) and identify and protect key individual rights, and defining a trusted, certain and legal construct that makes sense to these people for selecting leaders and enacting laws at all levels.

Vocal opponents to such logic stand, proclaim "Why would the Taliban negotiate?!" and sit back down, their argument made and their business complete.

Why indeed. The Taliban are proving to be quite resilient to the Coalition's surge, and according to many reports are actually gaining in strength and influence. Either they will "win" outright; or perhaps, if the West is willing to settle for a "decent interval" to declare success, break contact and return home, they can surge then in their own right a seize power by force. This is all quite logical.

But how long could they hold such power once they surrendered the sanctuary of their non-state status for the vulnerability of a sovereign state? How long would it take the U.S. to go back in and conduct a strategic raid to send them fleeing right back into Pakistan. Days? Perhaps weeks?

It is this misunderstanding of "sanctuary" that drives a fault line of illogic through our entire current approach to this operation. The Taliban can win Afghanistan, but in so doing loses their sanctuary and are quickly defeated. The same is true for AQ and the Caliphate. If AQ ever gained even a single state, they would lose the sanctuary of their status and merely become another weak state and be quickly defeated. THEY understand this, it is the West that for whatever reason fails to grasp this essential point.

So, the entire argument that we must stay and prop up Karzai's regime regardless of how outrageous his behavior or corrupt and "poor" his governance is for fear that the Taliban may return to power and grant AQ the sanctuary of the sovereign Taliban State is specious. They could only do so for those few day or weeks, then they would all be on the run once again back to their caves. The same is true for the argument that we must prop up despotic leaders across the Arab world and help them build capacity to suppress the nationalist insurgencies within thier populaces for fear that AQ will form a Caliphate.

We are like the sheriff in blazing saddles, holding a gun to our own heads:

"[the Johnsons load their guns and point them at Bart. Bart then points his own pistol at his head]
Bart: [low voice] Hold it! Next man makes a move, the nigger gets it!
Olson Johnson: Hold it, men. He's not bluffing.
Dr. Sam Johnson: Listen to him, men. He's just crazy enough to do it!
Bart: [low voice] Drop it! Or I swear I'll blow this nigger's head all over this town!
Bart: [high-pitched voice] Oh, lo'dy, lo'd, he's desp'it! Do what he sayyyy, do what he sayyyy!
[Townspeople drop their guns. Bart jams the gun into his neck and drags himself through the crowd towards the station]
Harriet Johnson: Isn't anybody going to help that poor man?
Dr. Sam Johnson: Hush, Harriet! That's a sure way to get him killed!
Bart: [high-pitched voice] Oooh! He'p me, he'p me! Somebody he'p me! He'p me! He'p me! He'p me!
Bart: [low voice] Shut up!
[Bart places his hand over his own mouth, then drags himself through the door into his office]
Bart: Ooh, baby, you are so talented!
[looks into the camera]
Bart: And they are so *dumb*!"


Only no one's going to help us either, only we aren't so clever as the good sheriff. We're more like the townspeople.

Be firm with Karzai and demand reconciliation and a new constitution to protect the populace from the government. At the same time open talks with the Taliban (realize not a monolith, but no major group will want to get cut out of the final deal) support their re-entry into Afghan political process so long as they turn over key AQ figures and evict the rest, along with the various groups of foreign fighters. Remind them that while we are quite willing to support whatever form of self-determined government comes out of the loya jirga, that if the Taliban try to pull a fast one and return to their old ways we will be back with a vengeance, and not nearly so many will be able to escape the next time. They can gain power without us, but they can only retain it with our blessing once the lose the sanctuary of non-state status.

If Karzai refuses to play ball? Go home. It will be him who abandoned us, not the other way around.