Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Kings of War blog for providing a link to a new paper ' Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001-2011' by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn. Note the duo have recently published a book (see Post 111 Talking to the Taliban:an elusive peace in Afghanistan).

It is a very short paper and the Executive Summary states:

This paper aims to answer the question of what the Taliban wants. In doing so it illuminates some important points about the Taliban as an organisation – it is neither a unified nor a static organisation. The fluidity of people of influence within the Taliban, the shifts in views that can be seen to be core to it, and the mystery surrounding its figurehead, Mullah Omar, are all aspects that can only usefully be brought out by experiences gleaned within Afghanistan. This paper provides an historical context to the current position, and then goes onto explore some of the Taliban’s strategic goals, offering some valuable context in which future negotiations with the Taliban might occur.

Link:http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/About/Policy/D...rntTaliban.pdf

[davidbfpo]

A newspaper report which is not unexpected:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...tegration.html

A taster:

New figures have now shown that over the last 18 months the "reintegration" scheme which Britain has funded with £7 million has attracted only 19 militants in Helmand province, where British troops are fighting.

[Bob's World]

A newspaper report which is not unexpected:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...tegration.html

A taster:

Reports like this should not surprise anyone.

Reintegration of resistance fighters without reconciliation of the revolutionary drivers of conflict between the Northern Alliance government in power, and the Taliban government in exile is a well intentioned waste of time and money.

We design and implement so many tactical programs in an effort to push success from the bottom up, but revolution is driven from the top down, so all we can do at the bottom is suppress/mitigate symptoms. Time for a refresh on the strategic design.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for a pointer to an ICG report, 48 pgs. long:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/F...fghanistan.pdf

Circling the Lion's Den summary:

...negotiations could even lead to further destabilisation of the country. The Afghan security forces will find it hard to fill the power vacuum following the withdrawal of foreign troops and growing political differences within the country will undermine the prospects for peace. The ICG recommends the appointment of a UN-mandated mediation team and the adoption of a more realistic approach to resolving the conflict.
The report says President Karzai's government and its international backers have adopted a "market bazaar" approach to negotiations: "Bargains are being cut with any and all comers, regardless of their political relevance or ability to influence outcomes. Far from being Afghan-led, the negotiating agenda has been dominated by Washington’s desire to obtain a decent interval between the planned U.S. troop drawdown and the possibility of another bloody chapter in the conflict."

The ICG report adds that efforts to start negotiations have been half-hearted and haphazard, stoking fears among ethnic minorities, civil society and women: "A thorough reassessment of Karzai’s national reconciliation policy, the role of the High Peace Council and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is urgently needed. The program has faced staunch resistance from local security officials mistrustful of participants’ motives, and its impact has been minimal at best."

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....-to-build.html

[davidbfpo]

From an earlier post (No. 184) and edited down: ' Lessons Learnt: “Islamic, Independent, Perfect and Strong”: Parsing the Taliban’s Strategic Intentions, 2001-2011' by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn.

The authors spoke at IISS in February and a podcast (1hr 2 mins)is on:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/2012-events-archive/february-2012/the-myth-of-the-taliban-al-qaeda-merger/

[davidbfpo]

A BBC News report:

Arsala Rahmani was a former Taliban minister and a key member of Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which leads Afghan efforts to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban.....Mr Rahmani was responsible for the committee within the peace council that considers the release of Taliban prisoners from Bagram and other Afghan prisons....The Taliban have denied involvement in the killing of Mr Rahmani.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049265

[davidbfpo]

Must have missed these developments:

Abdul Ghani Baradar, who, together with Motasim, was later arrested by the Pakistan military. What lay behind this was the fact that Motasim was prepared to consider negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan, whilst Baradar was more reticent. Both men were released last year following pressure from the United States and soon after Motasim was shot several times in Karachi by members of the Taliban.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....ions-list.html