Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

The revolutionary idea and the act, although separated in time, are inseparably linked.

Agreed and also done on that point.

However, getting back to my original point I think there is something else we may be missing that permits the idea to be operationalized. There are conditions in society that create the will to act, and those conditions must be more than an abusive government because many people don't rise up against abusive governments. I suspect those conditions vary significantly in each case, but a topic worth discussing if it leads to greater understanding.

While revolution may not be right word, it is close. In my view we "imposed" a social and political revolution upon both Iraq and Afghanistan. The conditions were not right in either country for synergy to develop with their populace, thus no shinning city on the hill after years of sacrifice. In our UW Doctrine we used to teach (suspect they still do) you as the foreigner can't start a revolution, but you can support one. Not so sure that is a law, but rather something that is generally true, yet if we're going to continue to pursue these idealistic foreign policies, then it may be worth considering how to make a population receptive to revolutionary ideas and ready to act when the catalyst is presented (JDAMs dropping their nation's security forces). I know this is an extreme idea, but maybe extreme ideas are called for if this continues to be our mission. I don't think our current approach is working well if at all.

[Bob's World]

America likes stability and certainty in the locations around the planet where we perceive our interests to manifest.

One major component of our current challenges in the post Cold War era is that in many of those locations populaces are evolving in their expectations of governance more rapidly than the "US-approved" systems of governance that serve them. Those systems that have the flexibility to evolve in nature along with the evolving expectations of their populaces are doing better than those that rigidly seek to sustain some status quo of governance as defined by those who control the government. But changes are so rapid that all systems are struggling to some degree. Flexible systems are being bent, rigid systems are breaking.

All of that leads to instability and uncertainty, and that makes America nervous, so we launch into a massive program of excessive engagement to seek to re-establish the stability and certainty that we have come to see as so essential to our interests. It is an unsustainable situation.

We are fairly flexible at home, but very rigid abroad. A mix of domestic bending and foreign breaking. If we could only learn to allow others the same fundamental principles we demand for ourselves we would be less compelled to overly engage those breaking systems abroad, and there would likely then be less bending at home. Instead we over-engage and see the solution as pushing modern US values rather than simply allowing classic US principles. But to allow the latter is to relinquish the control and certainty we see as so essential to making our current system work.

We need to think about "stability" differently. It is not just a "phase" or an "operation" that we can conduct to "fix" an unstable situation. In fact, such operations more often than not only serve to suppress the current set of challengers to the existing unstable situation. They freeze instability rather than produce stability, then require constant input of energy to sustain that unnatural condition.

We also need to learn to deal better with, and fear less, "uncertainty." Become less of a control freak. The problem is that we have become so intertwined in the governances of some places that relinquishing control is labeled as "abandonment." Big corporations love certainty as well, and the pressure they apply to sustain status quo relationships does not help either.

I don't know what the answer is, but I do believe we need a new model better tuned for the world we live in today. That the model we apply was designed for a world that no longer exists. It demands too much energy (measured in money, engagement, influence, etc) to sustain, and as it is inappropriate for the emerging world it actually serves to make us less secure rather than more secure through its execution.

This leads us back to Afghanistan and this thread. We emplaced and now protect a system that we think will give us the stability and certainty WE "need" and are therefore reluctant to pull way back on all of the programs we are applying there to make the current system work, and to instead focus our energy on an approach designed to allow the current system to evolve to a more natural state.

[davidbfpo]

Meantime after the recent diversion back to Afghanistan:

In a rare interview, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the powerful northern warlord who was a key US ally against the Taliban and threw his support behind President Karzai at the last election, gives an interview at his Kabul home.

Slightly strange IMO, but as General Dostum rarely gets such attention worth adding here. Plus I thought he was taking a sabbatical in Turkey.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...id-Dostum.html

I am sure the General is well versed in Afghanistan's equivalent of constitutional and social propriety.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Afghans, Crocker said, have "been there and done that. ... No one wants to go back to that." Instead, he said, major politicians from various ethnic groups want to have a voice in their nation's affairs — but not at the point of a gun. And, said Crocker, because the Taliban and its allies "are equal opportunity killers" who victimize all groups, they have "actually been a unifying factor" in Afghanistan.

http://www.npr.org/2012/07/30/157580...ry-achievement

See also: http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/...ns?ft=1&f=1001

That is where the actual quote is above is from. Second article is on a report that indicates that our nation building efforts are largely for naught since they will come to fruition too late and they are unsustainable by the Afghans.

the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction warned in a report released today that U.S.-funded construction projects now underway in Afghanistan that are costing hundreds of millions of dollars are behind schedule and may not be finished before U.S. combat forces depart. And that means, the report said, that the projects may not be "viable or sustained by the Afghan government after completion."

"Implementing projects that the Afghan government is unable to sustain may be counterproductive to the [counterinsurgency] strategy," the inspector general reported, as they raise Afghans' hopes for electricity and other basic necessities only to dash them later.

[jcustis]

Col Jones, that is an excellent explanation of the problems we incur and endure. It makes for the stuff of a political science textbook that you really ought to get around to writing, because it makes for a very resilient predictive model.

[davidbfpo]

Part One was Post 194 and Anatol Lieven had a podcast interview a week ago, courtesy of the Australian Lowy Institute:

Yesterday the noted expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Anatol Lieven, spoke at the Lowy Institute. In this interview, he shared with me some extraordinary insights into some of the streams of Taliban thinking about the prospects for peace in Afghanistan, including surprising speculations on whether the Taliban would ever tolerate US military bases in a post-conflict settlement.

Podcast link, it is nine minutes long:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...o-Taliban.aspx

[davidbfpo]

There are parts of Professor Lieven's interview that jarred with me, especially having read this long article by Dexter Filkins; hat tip to Carl who added it to a SWJ discussion:http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2...urrentPage=all