Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Bill Moore]

Help me out here, we went into Afghanistan to kill those who perpretrated 9/11 and numerous other acts of war against the West and even their own people.

In the process of doing so we accidentlly acquired care taker status of a nation-state was that was a non-functioning nation in most respects. We quickly established a central government of meager means to exert control over its domain, and since then we have with some success expanded the central government's capability to exert it authority throughout Afghanistan (obviously a long ways from mission success). You can argue our mission to kill those who attacked us on 9/11 has been derailed to a large extent by the efforts to build a nation, but we won't go down that path, if the stated strategy is to build an effective nation are we on the right track?

If your you're stated goal is to empower the government of Afghanistan to reject deny terrorists safehaven (along with numerous other objectives related to economics, security, etc.), the clear intent then is to empower the central government to do this.

As stated by others, the concern about the Sons of Iraq, is that organizations are being empowered by the coalition, not the government, and these organizations in some cases challenge State authority. This is a bottom up approach, which is counter productive to a top down approach (working through the HN central government, regardless of how flaky it may be).

While all COIN is local (to a point), we should empower the government to empower these local organizations to defend and govern themselves. With this approach these local entities become an extension of government power, which is what our objective is, unless we're supporting the insurgents.

If the government of Afghanistan is reaching out and faciitating reconciliation more power to them, but if it is the coalition I think we need to take a step back and reassess.

[tulanealum]

One of the key factors in any successful COIN op is to attract defectors and surrenders. This isn't happening in Afghanistan...no incentives are being created...and the truth is the bad guys don't necessarily think they are losing...once they begin to think that, some may want to jump ship...it's the Afghan way.

But to say the majority or to imply that the majority of the TB are religious ideologues is inaccurate...some are just fighting because of tribal isssues, some for a job...some because they don't understand what the situation is...mark my words, there will be no success in Afghanistan without defections, surrenders, and some kind of reconciliation...

[h2harris]

"September 30, 2008
Associated Press

KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said today he has asked the king of Saudi Arabia to help facilitate peace talks with the Taliban in order to bring an end to the Afghan conflict.

Karzai said there has not yet been any negotiations, only requests for help. But he said that Afghan officials have traveled to both Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan in hopes of ending the conflict.

"For the last two years, I've sent letters to the king of Saudi Arabia, and I've sent messages, and I requested from him as the leader of the Islamic world, for the security and prosperity of Afghanistan and for reconciliation in Afghanistan ... he should help us," Karzai said."

Interesting. For more -

http://www.military.com/news/article...tml?ESRC=eb.nl

[Entropy]

Taliban to split itself from Al Qaeda and seek peace?

Taliban leaders are holding Saudi-brokered talks with the Afghan government to end the country's bloody conflict -- and are severing their ties with al Qaeda, sources close to the historic discussions have told CNN.

The militia, which has been intensifying its attacks on the U.S.-led coalition that toppled it from power in 2001 for harboring Osama bin Laden's terrorist network, has been involved four days of talks hosted by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, says the source.

The talks -- the first of their kind aimed at resolving the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan -- mark a significant move by the Saudi leadership to take a direct role in Afghanistan, hosting delegates who have until recently been their enemies.

They also mark a sidestepping of key "war on terror" ally Pakistan, frequently accused of not doing enough to tackle militants sheltering on its territory, which has previously been a conduit for talks between the Saudis and Afghanistan.

According to the source, fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar -- high on the U.S. military's most-wanted list -- was not present, but his representatives were keen to stress the reclusive cleric is no longer allied to al Qaeda.

Details of the Taliban leader's split with al Qaeda have never been made public before, but the new claims confirm what another source with an intimate knowledge of the militia and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the past.

More at the link.

[jmm99]

Here are two articles from the Telegraph and Financial Times.

Afghan president offers Taliban a role in governing country
President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end.
By Nick Meo in Kabul
Last Updated: 7:03PM BST 11 Oct 2008

The offer was made through his brother Qayoun at a secret meeting in Saudi Arabia of which Britain was aware.

Britain has been encouraging the Kabul government to talk to its Taliban enemies for more than two years and the Americans are thought to be coming round to the idea of a deal which would end the costly war in Afghanistan.

But The Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al-Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal.

Under the Saudi Arabian initiative more than a dozen former senior Taliban figures travelled to the kingdom with the approval of President Hamid Karzai's government. ....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...g-country.html

US open to Taliban peace talks
By James Blitz in London
Published: October 10 2008 03:00 | Last updated: October 10 2008 03:00

Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said last night that Washington could "ultimately" contemplate the idea of negotiating with the Taliban to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the Afghan government were to pursue such talks.

In comments that add to the growing sense across Nato that the alliance will never achieve a comprehensive military victory in Afghanistan, Mr Gates said a political settlement with the Taliban was conceivable.

However, he insisted the US would never negotiate with al-Qaeda forces, who are also seeking to destabilise Hamid Karzai's Afghan government.

"There has to be ultimately, and I'll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this," Mr Gates told reporters at a summit of Nato defence ministers in Budapest. "That's ultimately the exit strategy for all of us."

But when listing conditions for reconciliation, he said: "We have to be sure that we're not talking about any al-Qaeda."

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66faed7a-9...077b07658.html

One wonders how much events - the economic problems - are now driving foreign policy decisions.

Of course, these talks may come to nothing. After looking at the Taliban's history a bit extensively today and tonite, I find it hard to see why anyone would want them in a government. Despiration, I suppose.

[Ron Humphrey]

how media tend to try to fit anything they hear into their own boxes.

With perhaps the exception of the Brit General whom I have know idea what he was thinking; most everyone else is simply talking about nothing more than what we already try to do.

Differentiate between the really bad guys and those who simply took on an affiliation in order to survive and/or protect their own. Much like Iraq just because someone belonged to the Bath party did not necessarily mean they were evil, but rather in many cases they had little choice should they want to at least be able to have some say in the lives of their families/Tribes/ etc.

How about we look at the number of Lawyers who belong to an organization because of its status in the legal world, or Holly/Bollywooders who join org's for what it represents status symbol wise, or people who join the HOA so that they can at least try to fight for their right to put a sign in their yard

Long and short: This ain't rocket science and Its probably about time some stop trying to make it so

[reed11b]

Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? I know closing the border is a no-go since A. the topography is not an ally (mountains) B. The Paki's are not a reliable ally, but isolation seems like it might be more possible. From there efforts to reintegrate the disinfected tribes might make ground. Just a thought, would love feedback.
Reed

[Surferbeetle]

From the Washington Post by Greg Bruno The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security

The decision to cut ties with AQI was dubbed the "Anbar Awakening" by Iraqi organizers, and has been hailed as a turning point in the U.S.-led war effort. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told lawmakers in Washington the uprising has reduced U.S. casualties, increased security, and even saved U.S. taxpayers money. "The savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence," the general said in April 2008, "far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts." Yet the future of the Awakening -- Sahwa in Arabic -- is a matter of increasing debate in foreign policy circles. Internal disputes within the predominantly Sunni groups have threatened the stability of the revolt, some experts say. Sunni groups have also complained about low pay and a lack of opportunities for employment within Iraq's army and police forces. CFR Senior Fellow Steven Simon writes in Foreign Affairs that while the Sahwa strategy may bring short-term stability to Iraq, the long-term effect could be runaway "tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism."

Wikipedia's entry on Paramilitaries in Colombia

Paramilitary groups, whether of private or public origin, having legal or illegal support, were originally organized during the Cold War proxy wars as small groups, being created as either a preemptive or reactive consequence to the real or perceived growing threat represented by the actions of guerrillas and militant political activists of Marxist-Leninist ideology.