Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[tulanealum]

Although these talks are welcome, the representatives of the Taliban are fringe guys...

Would the hardcore TB guys really want to talk? Probably not...however, district commanders in some areas may be amenable to such activities...the question is, what will the government have to give up to get the TB to stop fighting? I'm willing to bet more than it would compromise.

And does anyone really believe the TB and AQ will completely part ways?

I don't...

Key thing to remember is that the TB is not monolithic and is also not the only group fighting in Afghanistan.

[MikeF]

Would the geography of the region allow the primary AQ and Taliban affiliated tribes to be isolated by military force? Reed

Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem. I think we'll need a five-pronged strategy:

1. FID/IW w/ Paki brothers
2. COIN in Afghanistan
3. Reconciliation with TB moderates
4. Massive reconstruction/humanitarian assistance to the area
5. Precise DA strikes- kill irreconciliables

Even if this approach was Pol/Mil feasible, the big elephant in the room would still be the drug trade.

Very difficult problem set.

v/r

Mike

[reed11b]

Reed, from the little that I've read, it seems that isolation has been our policy for the last twenty years that exasperated the current TB problem.

True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.

[Ron Humphrey]

True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.

Consider that in order for that to happen there would have to be sufficient capability to force all trafic through given checkpoints.
(Probably not possible, but if it were)

By isolating those areas you are isolating their populations from economic interaction with the rest of the markets.

1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country

2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.

3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)

Just a couple of more definitive ramblings

[MikeF]

1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country

2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.

3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)

Just a couple of more definitive ramblings

Again, it is a very unstructured/wicked problem if you will.

[Entropy]

An excellent piece on the history of negotiating with the Taliban.

The Taliban (Afghan and Pakistani) pattern of behavior will hopefully be in the mind of any negotiator who finds himself opposite a Taliban representative claiming to deliver on the ground in Afghanistan. Assuming those at the negotiating table can actually make their field commanders comply with the political leaderships' decisions, the Afghan government/coalition would be foolish to offer too much up front.

At the moment there is great speculation about exploratory talks and negotiations, up to and including a comprehensive negotiated settlement. Beyond the issue of the Taliban's history of neglecting to deliver on agreed terms is this question: why would a force on the rise negotiate honestly and seriously with a force that still appears to be on the decline? I don't believe in assigning a rigid pattern of behavior to any social/historical entity and then expecting predictions based on that to be completely accurate. Variables, sometimes unseen, can change. However, the recurring pattern of the Taliban failing to honor agreements should instil wariness in any potential negotiator.

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, Apr 09: Reconciling With the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan

Negotiating with the Taliban—who are convinced military victory is within sight—is the worst possible approach to stabilizing Afghanistan, and one that would fail. The author warns that U.S. signals of impatience and a desire for an early exit could motivate insurgents to maintain a hard line and outlast the international coalition. Though costly, a long-term commitment to building an effective Afghan state is the only way to achieve victory and defend U.S. national security objectives.

Key Conclusions:

• Negotiation with the Taliban is premature and unnecessary.

• A lasting peace in Afghanistan and defeat of the Taliban can only come from a political-military victory that diminishes the rewards for continued resistance.

• The United States must reaffirm the goal of building a democratic and stable Afghan state.

• Although counterterrorism cooperation by Pakistan is desirable for U.S. success in Afghanistan, American goals in Afghanistan can be—and if necessary must be—attained without Islamabad’s assistance.

• Portending coalition defeat in the “graveyard of empires” is an inadequate analogy. Neither the British nor Soviet experience mimics the current situation.

• President Obama’s recently announced “Af-Pak” strategy is courageous and responsible, but still incomplete.

[MikeF]

True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.

I would suggest that your recommendation is a definite consideration in Iraq, but not Afghanistan (given the current environment).

In Iraq, the "Surge" allowed us to create a secure enough environment that we can isolate diyala province and conduct reconstruction/stabilization ops throughout the rest of the country.

In Afghanistan, IMO, we have not shown the same ability to dominate, control the populace, secure the terrain, etc...IOT isolate problem areas.

v/r

mike

[MikeF]

Occupation. As far-fetched as this sounds, it may work. Arguably, IMHO, the two most dangerous places in the world today are the FATA of Pakistan and Afghanistan border and Diyala Province in Iraq.

Again, very difficult problem set, but I thought I'd throw it out there.

v/r

Mike