Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Rex Brynen]

Reconciliation with this band of criminals is going to accomplish exactly what?

One might have said the same thing about the Provisional IRA and the Good Friday Agreement, or for that matter those ex-Baathists and sundry other Sunni ex-insurgents currently now receiving USG support as part of the al-Anbar (etc) Awakening in Iraq.

There are Taliban, and there are Taliban. A key aspect of coalition and GoA COIN efforts should be to try to peel away the soft-liners and those motivated by a complex web of local, tribal, economic, and other pragmatic considerations from the hardline radical Islamist ideologues.

[Danny]

No, one may not say the same thing about the Sunnis in Anbar, for instance. They fought AQ, the Taliban gave AQ safe haven. The Sunnis fought primarily for reasons other than religious, the Taliban, and in particular the TTP, fight for reasons purely religious. The Anbar awakening occurred alongside or after the most powerful tribes had already turned on AQ, and the Taliban have yet to express any disdain at all for AQ. To the contrary. They have called them brothers.

The analogy breaks down quickly, and so my question stands.

[Rex Brynen]

The analogy breaks down quickly, and so my question stands.

Not quite so quickly--certainly a significant number of those who are now part of the Sons of Iraq were active in the earlier Sunni insurgency and in attacks against US personnel, and a portion were members of the various Islamic State of Iraq militias that were formal allies of AQI.

Moreover, many members of the current Afghan government, parliament, and local government administration were members of the Taliban or Taliban governmental administration at the time of 9/11.

I'm not suggesting that reconciliation with Mullah Omar is possible. I am suggesting that a significant portion of the neo-Taliban rank-and-file may not be primarily motivated by the grand ideological cause of armed jihad against the West, and can be potentially neutralized with some adroit politics. Indeed, one of the problems with the DDR and especially DIAG programmes in Afghanistan appears to be that this group has been rather poorly targeted.

[Danny]

Well, the alliances in Anbar were ad hoc arrangements involving every rogue element across the planet, including AQ, AAS, former Ba'athists, unemployed teenagers, etc. It wasn't an alliance of belief. My own son killed Somalians, Chechens, "men with slanted eyes," and others.

The alliance between the Taliban and AQ is one of world view. The proof is that AQ found safe haven inside Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The ad hoc arrangement in Anbar was forced and quickly broke down.

I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

[Rex Brynen]

I'll tell you what. I expect to see a significant uprising of Taliban fighting and killing AQ and Tehrik-i-Taliban when Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute or Cal Tech announces that pigs have learned to fly. Beyond that, if any significant uprising takes hold and drives AQ out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, I'll spread mayonnaise on my hat and take a picture of me eating it and post it on my web site with a caption that links to this discussion thread.

I hope you had fun with that, but it really doesn't pertain to the issue at hand. What is being suggested is that some of the Taliban's support can be peeled away.

It is hardly unusual to find former Taliban having switched sides—it happens literally every day, albeit often for murky reasons.

But that's COIN. Lots of murk.

[Danny]

A sense of humor, my friend. A sense of humor.

I can't believe that you cited Salaam. It is exactly the wrong example and proves my point.

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-abdul-salaam/

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/...-of-musa-qala/

[120mm]

So, is the the answer to kill everyone?

In the end, successful insurgency involves sitting down at a table whose guts you hate and you need to include them in the "solution".

I think that there are very few structural (I get to use a new word, yay!!!) insurgents/revolutionaries, that actually need to be made room temperature.

If Galula and others are correct, we should be able to separate the rebels with a cause from the hard-cases and then kill, isolate or make them irrelevant.