Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[jcustis]

Afghans are reportedly known for sending in emissaries who aren't the person but represent that person, in order to flush out the intentions of the other side.

I experienced this once, and wonder if we have the same thing happening here.

[slapout9]

Washington Post article claiming it was the UK that brought the impostor forward.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...112503577.html

[Jedburgh]

USIP, 12 Jan 11: Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society

Summary

• The Afghan public, along with the international community, appears increasingly supportive of opening negotiations with the Taliban to end the war. The Karzai administration also supports this, as reflected by the June 2010 Peace Jirga held in Kabul and the 70-member High Peace Council that was formed thereafter.

• In spite of the talks, no one in Washington or Kabul has clarified what reconciliation means in practice, particularly with respect to accountability for abuses that occurred during the rule of the Taliban as well as those that occurred when rival factions fought with each other before the Taliban came to power.

• On November 10, 2010 representatives from Afghan and international NGOs, as well as the UN, gathered for a one-day Conference on Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice in Kabul to revitalize public discussion on peace and reconciliation among the government of Afghanistan, the international community, and Afghan civil society.

• The discussions revealed a troubling disconnect between the High Peace Council and Afghan civil society representatives who strongly criticized the Council’s inclusion of former militia leaders among its members, the lack of transparency in its activities, and the lack of clarity in its objectives.

• These criticisms indicate that for a peace process to have broad, popular support, the Afghan government and the international community must make greater efforts to engage local leaders in a dialogue and account for the interests of communities and interest groups that are not represented in the High Peace Council.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to Canadian pointer. Wilton Park, a UK conference centre, held a meeting a month ago on 'Talking while fighting: conditions and modalities' and has now released a summary and podcasts.

Link:http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/news...s&id=532534382

Introduction:

The conference examined a wide range of internal conflicts, including thematically focused case study sessions on Iraq, Nepal, Nagaland (Northeast India), Tajikistan, Darfur, El Salvador, and Afghanistan during the 1980’s. We concluded with an assessment of the generalised lessons from these case studies that might be of most relevance to Afghanistan.

The podcasts features: Ashok Mehta, Independent Security Analyst and retired lieutenant general, Noida, India; Mukkhidin Kabiri, Chairman, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Dushanbe; Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, Mediator-in–Residence, United Nations, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), New York.

[zenvagabond]

USIP, Sep 08: Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation

The problem with the whole Afghan issue is the fact the allies actually won the war, which was back in 2001. There should never have been any attempt at the ridiculous concept of nation building; this is now the same as the Soviet situation and the South Vietnamese war. The allies will continue to win the battles, but will lose the war because the enemy will simply keep fighting, they don't have to actually win anything significant in order to win the end-game.

Political opportunism has supserseded the reality on the ground in this 'country', which is not actually a country but merely a mish-mash of disparate tribes and ethnic clans; most of whom hate each other for one reason or another and will continue to do so until the end of time.

Afghanistan is not developing for several reasons, mainly since there is no national identity amongst others; how an you unite people who don't want to be united?

Also, the US has simply no idea how to (i) manage and win a guerilla war/insurgency and (ii) no idea how to conduct nation building. They have no recent success stories to draw upon and they continually fail to understand history or learn lessons from their historic failures (Vietnam: hello).

The US government has all but mastered the art of bureaucracy and has ensured that their military, intelligence agencies and other agencies such as the State Dept. actively work against each rather than vice cersa, thereby ensuring defeat.

Jihadi doctrine also ensures there will be an endless supply of cannon fodder from Central Asia, the Caucaus and Arab countries. There is no success story here, the allies will simply withdraw under some form of 'negotiated peace' if that, and then Afghanistan will revert to what is was before; a chaotic wasteland.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting Reuters article, hat tip to the Lowy Institute, in part reflective on the situation in Afghanistan and after reading a new book (due out on the 18th January 2012):http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/20...n-afghanistan/

But what are we actually looking at here? A quick-fix settlement that could provide just about enough cover for war-weary western governments to pull their troops out before Afghanistan descends again into civil war? Or a serious process which might offer an enduring peace? Do we believe the Taliban are now more amenable to talks than they were before? Or rather that domestic political compulsions in the United States are driving it more rapidly towards the exit?

Let’s be clear. The idea the Taliban would be willing to negotiate some kind of power-sharing deal, and that talks could be helped by measures like the release of prisoners, has been around for a couple of years, if not longer. Moreover, a lasting settlement would require not just a deal with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, but also reconciliation among all the different actors inside Afghanistan as well as deep-rooted governance reform.

One hopes that the ISAF tactic of eliminating parts of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan has considered this point:

Arguably the chances of reaching a lasting settlement are less now than they were before the United States sent extra troops to Afghanistan in 2010 aiming to decisively turn the tide and force the Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Since then, the military campaign has splintered the Taliban, making it harder for its Pakistan-based leadership to bring younger and more radicalised fighters into an overall settlement.

The new book is:

... by Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn could hardly be better timed. “An Enemy We Created, The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010” should be compulsory reading for anyone trying to separate reality from political spin. It is also an essential guide to what might yet be achieved through talks, and what might have been achieved had serious talks been held earlier.

Link to publisher's notice, with some impressive reviewers quoted:http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?BookId=661 and the book's website:http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_E...d/Welcome.html

I know there is a long-running SWC thread 'Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan', but for now this deserves a new thread. For reference the thread is on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6048

[Kevin23]

The Taliban has announced that is is suspending talks with the US and the government in Kabul.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/0...143689#s777097

[82redleg]

The Taliban has announced that is is suspending talks with the US and the government in Kabul.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/0...143689#s777097

Did anyone believe that they were really serious in the first place?

[Kevin23]

Did anyone believe that they were really serious in the first place?

82redleg,

In my personal IMO no not really.

However, even though I'm not schooled on the exact details of Afpak/ I haven't been to the region or dealed with the Taliban in any capacity. But looking at things from the Taliban POV, I figure they did have at least some incentive to seriously talk to the Coalition/Afghan Government. Because if we were willing to consider talking to them in the first place, the Taliban could only gain from such an exercise. Even though I think they were unlikely to follow through on their end of the bargain/give anything back in return.

Kind of along the lines of how North Vietnam benefited from talks with the US/S. Vietnam back in the late 60's/early 70's.