Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

Problem was...The North ultimately "won" and the parties reconciled...

Slap and I agree, grudgingly, with the first part, not with the second!

As to "fixing other peoples problems" that is never what I have stood for.

That may be true but you often seem to advocate our entry into disputes in this manner:

Sometimes such parties, particularly those with a tremendous disparity of legal power, need a more powerful 3rd party to act as Mediator or even Arbitrator. To provide the balance, trust and protection that the current imbalance Denys. To empower the parties to have the conversation that their current position and recent actions prevent. This is not dictating to others HOW they should govern.

When you advocate our participation -- or unilateral action -- in such cases, that is in every sense interference in the affairs of others.

When you follow that sort of idea with this:

It is in our current COA that we do that (without much success though, making us look weak. We demand that bad governments improve womens rights, become more democratic, etc and they ignore us and we continue to protect them anyway out of fear for what might happen if they nationalize some oil facility, raise their prices, favor the Chinese, close access to a LOC or port, etc.) The US far too often looks impotent over the issue of making moral demands on others that our own fiscal and security fears prevent us from backing up. That is not a smart approach to foreign policy.

You are advocating a course or courses of action in accordance with your personal beliefs and thus you, in appearance if not in fact, are opting for "fixing other peoples problems" and in a certain way at thaty.

As you say:

Either don't make the demands, or be willing to back them up if you do. Pick one.

That may not be advocating undue interference in the affairs of others but it sure comes terribly close...

Thus, you may not intend to advocate "fixing other peoples problems" but your words IMO imply otherwise, often quite strongly. Add that IMO, your words often appear to recommend, suggest or demand (it varies from post to post) that such 'fixing' be in accordance with your -- or general enlightened Western -- precepts which in the opinion of many others may not be desirable or even feasible. That "51st State" comment by Omar applies...

On your understanding of the 'Founding Fathers and the Document they wrought:

1. They grew up oppressed (mildly at times) second class citizens of their own King and kingdom.

That's not really true. They were second class citizens due to the vagaries of human nature -- it's noteworthy that in the eyes of many current Europeans, Americans of today are generally accorded Second Class (if not Third Class... ) status. Indeed, in the eyes of some Americans today, other Americans are lesser beings (that's a broad brush with much and varied applicability...). IOW, the 'status' was a vagary of human nature as much as it was anything. Most of the myths spread by the Sons of Liberty et.al. were just that, myths. The protests against tax and tax policies had some merit but it was quite similar to today's crowd who want the deficit chopped, taxes not increased -- while all the 'entitlements' remain untouched or are increased. People are selfish. The British had a right to ask the Colonies to pay for their own defense, the fact they went about it in a ham handed way doesn't eliminate the selfishness of the Colonists -- and the quest for power -- of those "oppressed" Citizens.

2. They became subversives, and then Insurgents to throw off that government that they felt to be illegitimate ("no island should rule a continent"), unjust, disrespectful, and that denied any legal recourse to their reasonable complaints. These were the the wealthy, landed, ruling class of a people enjoying the highest standard of living on Earth at that time. And they became insurgents, engaging in illegal politics, betting everything they owned (their reputations, their wealth, and their very lives) over the powerful human nature factors of causation at work.

In assigning causation to the American Revolution, one should ponder at great length the juxtaposition of the words "disrespectful" and "wealthy, landed, ruling class of a people."

3. Then, from the day of the surrender at Yorktown, they became Counterinsurgents ... This was genius COIN.

The problem with having a hammer is that every problem must resemble a nail. The problem with the belief that one has the only correct answers to 'insurgency' is that one tends to see every problem as an insurgency, incipient or otherwise.

Sometimes a Constitution is just a reasonably well designed document of governance produced by folks who are willing to compromise to achieve a solution that will work for the good of most -- rarely possible to get to all -- people as they see it at the time...

As an Attorney, you will appreciate the Scottish verdict (and the legal subtleties thereunto pertaining) of this humble juror: Not Proven

[Infanteer]

1. The discussion of the U.S. Constitution is interesting (I recommend Reed's "biography" of that document to anyone interested) but irrelevant. It is so unique to American political culture that it should stay there. I come from a country that has had over a century of stable government and only in the last 20-30 years has possessed a formal written constitution. The UK has had centuries of uninterrupted Parliamentary Democracy sans constitution. I don't think there is much use tarrying around this uniquly liberal western political construct and its various .

2. What is "good governance"? For the average Pashtun, it probably means being a good muslim and having a nice scooter. What's constitutionalism got to do with all of this? Probably about the same as elections and universal sufferage. This seems like a "bottom-up" vice a "top-down" issue.

3. BW mentions it, but I'm not entirely convinced by his assumption that the insurgents are concerned about the viability of a future Taliban state. As stated above, it is probably erroneous to assume that anybody in the west will want to come charging back to the Arghandab once we've pulled out. If this assumption isn't a given, then the Taliban understand that, as a worst possible case, they can at least dictate terms to Kabul. Even as a worst case this is far better for them (ideologically) than falling in line with NATOs terms.

4. So, if the assumption that the Taliban's only option is to negotiate isn't true, than why would they come to the table, especially considering the postion they are in? Would American revolutionaries have come to the table after Saratoga in exchange for the repeal of a few statutes by Whitehall?

[Dayuhan]

Sometimes such parties, particularly those with a tremendous disparity of legal power, need a more powerful 3rd party to act as Mediator or even Arbitrator. To provide the balance, trust and protection that the current imbalance Denys. To empower the parties to have the conversation that their current position and recent actions prevent. This is not dictating to others HOW they should govern.

Possibly so, but how is the US qualified to serve as a mediator? Isn't it pretty much axiomatic that a mediator has to be a neutral party acceptable to all other parties? Our status as a combatant pretty much disqualifies us, no?

It is time for us to stop taking counsel from those who proclaim that we have "existential threats" in AFPAK. We don't.

It is time for us to stop thinking a Karzai regime that excludes that Taliban is the best answer to govern Afghanistan. It isn't.

Agreed, but I'd add one:

It is time for us to stop pretending that the various contesting parties in Afghanistan are going to sit down and negotiate a peaceful solution to their issues just because that's what suits us. They won't.

Afghans would have their own issues and their own solutions. As always, it is the principles of the law rather than the black letter that matters most. They won't do it on their own though.

They won't do it on their own right now. They will, alas, have to do it on their own eventually, because neither we nor anyone else can do it for them, or force them to do it.

It is time for us to stop fearing that a Taliban influenced Afghanistan will become a "sanctuary for AQ." they can't. (The Taliban as a non-state actor is immune to most tools of statecraft and takes sanctuary in that status far more than the do in the physical terrain of the FATA. Once they become a state they have all of the burdens and vulnerabilities of statehood and would have too much to risk to continue to offer their sanctuary to AQ. They also know that we could do any number of major strategic raids to punish them that would cost the fraction of a single year of "nation building.")

This remains speculative. They did it before, they may be able to do it again... and they certainly might believe they can do it again.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I see two underlying assumptions in your argument

1. The only thing the Afghans need to settle their issues is the right Constitution.

2. If we sit them down in a Loya Jirga and tell them what to do, they will create that Constitution.

I think those assumptions are highly optimistic, to say the least. I think an effort at negotiating "peace" and generating a new Constitution might serve as a marginally face-saving device to toss the non-Pashtun minorities under the bus and get us out of there, but I don't see it producing anything like peace.

[Bob's World]

First of all, Canada gets away with not having all kinds of things that other similarly situated nations find necessary. Comes from having oceans on three sides, a high resource to populace ratio and only sharing borders with a trusted, and very powerful neighbor.

Second, I have never proclaimed that a constitution is some magic cure-all for insurgency. What I have stated, and stand by, is:

A. That the US Constitution is a masterpiece of COIN and that it was designed by a group of former insurgents for the express purpose of preventing the nation from succumbing to insurgency. Preventative COIN, which is far superior to reactive COIN.

and

B. That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

C. It is therefore my stated position that Reconciliation is the #1 Critical task to attaining stability in Afghanistan; and that such reconciliation MUST be accompanied by a constitutional loya jirga. Not because a constitution is a cure-all; but because the current constitution is the primary source of insurgency and instability and must be replaced.

Lastly on this topic I have suggested that,

D. That when viewed through the lens of insurgency and COIN there are tremendous lessons to be learned from both the process the produced the US constitution (I highly recommend David O Stewart's "The Summer of 1787") and from the intent and nature of the content (rather than the specific terms of the provisions.

I studied Constitutional law in law school and we never talked about insurgency or counterinsurgency either one. I think law schools get so focused in subsequent case law that they miss out on a very significant and amazing aspect of this document.

[Dayuhan]

That the US Constitution is a masterpiece of COIN and that it was designed by a group of former insurgents for the express purpose of preventing the nation from succumbing to insurgency. Preventative COIN, which is far superior to reactive COIN.

Agreed, but I see no particular relevance to Afghanistan. Just because it worked for us doesn't mean a similar process will work for them. The situations are very, very different.

That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

Is the Constitution the primary driver? I'd have said the primary causal driver was the removal of a more powerful party from a position of governance and its replacement by a less powerful party imposed by a foreign invader. The Constitution is window dressing: the base reality here is that we threw the Taliban out and replaced them with the Karzai administration, because that's what we wanted to do. The Taliban want power back, and they think they can get it: Karzai is weak and dependent and our commitment is limited. It's not about documents: the issue is power. Compromise and sharing won't happen because we want them to happen.

Whoever takes power in Afghanistan will be corrupt and will exclude their rivals no matter what the Constitution says. That's the way they govern. That's the prevailing political culture; it's what they know and what they do. A new political culture may evolve over time, but a document will not create it.

It is therefore my stated position that Reconciliation is the #1 Critical task to attaining stability in Afghanistan; and that such reconciliation MUST be accompanied by a constitutional loya jirga. Not because a constitution is a cure-all; but because the current constitution is the primary source of insurgency and instability and must be replaced.

Reconciliation suits our interests and we want it, because it would let us leave an awkward and expensive situation. Do the parties we propose to reconcile really want reconciliation? Do they see it as anything more than a way to advance their own interests and seize power for themselves? If they don't want to reconcile, it ain't happening, no matter what we want and what we do. It's not something we can force them to do.

[Steve the Planner]

Whoa!!!!

This is getting pretty thick: The US Constitution is the product of COIN by former insurgents????? Just like we should do in Afghanistan.

Is this just so much eating soup with knives to delude ourselves into believing we have co-opted the poor bastards we are assigned to share an AO with?

As the product of a very small island (Isle of Man) with the oldest parliament in the world (Tynwald, a Viking Parliament), I was schooled in Virginia and taught a great deal about all those great American heroes, including some of the non-heroic stuff (the local gossip passed down about the local patriots).

The Va. planters were up to their eyeballs in debt to London money lenders for all the furniture to outfit their colonial palaces up and down the James River, at a time of serious economic turmoil. Repudiation of debt was a really great feature built into our freedom. Doesn't diminish their heroic accomplishments, but brings that back to earth (self-interest).

Britain was in another one of those "Blood and Treasure" economic reversals, and folks back home were tired of paying for those global experiments. Taxes to support the outrageous costs of protecting those far-off colonies (and costs reduction measures like quartering of troops in people's homes) were the order of the day, and colonists weren't up for it. If they had to pay for their own defenses, they might as well do it themselves and cut King George out of the loop, but that was just some folks. Not everyone was on board.

The insurgents did take the bull by the horns, and throw those foreign minions (including Hessian mercs) from a far-off and out-of-context empire out of their country in favor of home rule.

They could never have done it without widespread public support (WIIFM), and had to build a case amongst cohorts, many of whom had fled Europe?Britain due to persecution, poverty, etc..., trading strenuous and dangerous self-initiative to escape poverty and oppression.

What does all of this have to do with Afghanistan?

How does the fact that it was devastated by decades of foreign occupation/interference, followed by warlords and drugs, and land and resource mismanagement and decline, relate to the American experience?

How do we, the heathen foreign occupier, become the saviour of an arguable nation with one of its prior governments (indigenous even if nasty) still in exile and fighting to destabilize the heathen foreign occupier's corrupt puppet regime?

There was a fragile and fleeting opportunity for domestic home rule through the old king, who knew that "national power" in Afghanistan was, at best, only achieved through fractious local coalitions. But that assumes that he was up to the task, others did not have different ideas, and outside forces were not poised to derail any Afghan self-determination.

Fast forward to today. We know that military success cannot bring an end to active conflict in Afghanistan, so where is the end game?

Somewhere in Kabul? Somewhere in Quetta?

Is the end game going to create the kind of "nation" that we are trying to establish, or a fractured paper nation, or no nation at all?

I suspect that events in Northern Africa today, driven opposition to graft, corruption and poverty, and by realistic or unrealistic expectations of positive alternatives, or hope for them, paints an alternative path for Pakistan and Afghanistan (and even Iraq) if leaders cannot get their acts together.

What if folks in these places simply say: I'm mad as hell and not going to take it anymore!?

What other scenarios exist that are both realistic and outside of our current radar screens (which seem to be murky at best)?

I'm far from proposing any great unified, and overly simple, theory to solve this problem, but it is clear that our COIN theories and tactics are not going to accomplish minimal functional reconciliation. So, what's next?

[Bob's World]

Steve, You just need to connect your final sentence back to your first one.

"COIN" (as defined in U.S doctrine currently) and CT tactics are not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan. In fact, our efforts in those two areas have contributed significantly to the current state of affairs there. Layering on a tremendous "Development" line of operation will not fix this either. Nor will continuing to ignore the severe problems of the Karzai government while attempting to "build legitimacy from the bottom up" in a small fraction of the total villages in the country.

We cannot turn back the clock and erase everything that followed the initial strategic raid to punish AQ and the Taliban for their accomplice liability in the events of 9/11. We are where we are. We move forward from here.

We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Task one must be some form of reconciliation at the leadership level. (Focus on reintegration of local fighters is like bailing out the Titanic with a teacup. Or in this case perhaps "3 cups of tea."

Task two must be a new constitution. Not because a constitution is a guarantee of stability, but because the current constitution is a guarantee of instability.

(and yes, the U.S. constitution, being written by a group of former insurgents provides some valuable insights into this process; and yes, as it prevented the decline of the new nation into growing insurgency, from splitting into several small weak nations, or returning in part or whole back to British rule, it absolutely was the best and most powerful kind of COIN. It focused on fixing government rather than fixing the populace, and it was proactive rather than waiting for the situation to devolve out of the control of civil authorities).

All of our current efforts in Afghanistan have good aspects to them, those just need to be re-prioritized and resized to fit under a new construct. Recognizing that the US faces no truly "existential threat" in AFPAK is also important as we gain a clearer perspective and priority. Also recognizing that while the US is definitely in combat in Afghanistan, it is not a "US War." Labeling such activities as "wars" has pros and cons, but the biggest con is the strategic risk to our national influence associated with "losing" a war colors our thinking and leads to poor choices. We worry more about securing our "win" on our terms than we do about empowering a stability that works for the people in question.

We got to this point by increments, one decision, one event at a time. It will require a landmark decision to get it back on track though. Currently we are avoiding that and taking an incremental approach to our efforts to get back on track and "win."

[Fuchs]

We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Too late.

[Bob's World]

It's never too late to do the right thing.

"While it is sometimes right to do the wrong thing, it is never wrong to do the right thing."

A variation on that bit of "Bobism" might be:

"While it may sometimes be too early to do the right thing, it is never too late."

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

That's an interesting hodgepodge of responses.

It's not our war? Whose is it?

Left to their own devices, the factions would establish their own dominions by force and conflict. Something would come out of it, but nothing you have ever identified as our intended outcome.

In Kabul, for example, I do not see a well of uprising to reform anything substantive, or to do much of anything. Where are the Afghan parties insisting that they are mad as hell and not going to take it anymore? What is there intended goal (s)?

This is very much a US war, with a particular (if muddled) agenda.

The question is either how we identify and support widespread Afghan issues, or find strong support for ours?

Lawrence did not foment Arabs to drive out the Turks. They hated each other for generations. He only piggybacked on those hatreds, helped the Arabs to focus on defeating their common enemy, and provided guns and ammo.

No amount of tea cups and soup eating has, to date, proven a viable strategy to win over enough zealots to pursue our objectives. Either they join us for a bit, then find out we are with the corrupt guys, or they join us because they are the corrupt guys.

This is not a capable people, culled from brave or desperate goal-setters, confronted, as americans were, with vast resources to exploit. Over time, the thin economy of Afghanistan, built of many shell-shocked survivors, struggling in foreign aid dependency.

Drilling down to authentic communities and tribes just reopens the old culture of incessant conflicts for different reasons. Plus the foreign aid flows that have so distorted any credible hope for a straight-line answer.

My guess is that you could start by turning down US aid, refocusing people on "their" governance systems, support homegrown, sustainable and authentic local/regional needs (not our programs), incentivize and empower allies that embrace a productive path, and, as a coordinated effort, support major change in Kabul while removing the safety nets and protections for those in power now.

None of that is a path to thirteen states on the US East Coast.

It might make more sense to delve into the coping strategies of communities/regions/peoples in a perennial geographic conflict zone (the actual circumstances of Iraq and Afghanistan), to identify and pursue the most applicable of their prior historical strategies & tactics. It's all about interim deal-making, shifting alliances, and, in short, making do with the realities that are present at the moment.

I just don't get the analogies to the US War of Independence. It is a Non-Sequitor.

[Infanteer]

B. That the current constitution in Afghanistan is a primary causal driver of the insurgency there. Far more so than the UW efforts of Pakistan or a number of other states that are waging UW there; and far more so than the UW efforts of AQ. It is the constitution that codifies the illegitimacy of government at all levels. It is the constitution that codifies corruption. It is the constitution that codifies injustice and effective exclusion from participation in economic and political opportunity to anyone that Karzai wants to deny it to.

At the risk of getting into "what ifs" would the insurgency, especially in the Pashtun Belt, be of the same intensity if there was no Constitution?

This takes me back to a discussion we had about the 10 and 90% belonging to the revolutionary and resistance insurgencies in the Pashtun belt. Are the 90% really disputing constitutional issues or are they more concerned with hundreds of thousands of western folk barrelling around their country, armed to the teeth?

Would an amiable constitution bring the 10% to the table with Kabul or was that rubicon crossed when Kabul threw its hat in with (or had its hat thrown in by) NATO.

[Bob's World]

Steve,

Please, just because we are in combat some place does not make it a US "war." Any conflict you can just quit and walk away from without setting your own nation up for defeat is not a "war."

Look out your window. Do you see a nation at war? No. We may provide our servicemembers with greater support by demanding such a status, but we place our nation at strategic risk of losing influence (with little upside potential on that same criteria); and we constrain our options and approaches that could otherwise be more reasonably considered.

As to "where are the Afghans?" Are you F'n kidding me? You have heard of the Taliban, right?

As to Infanteer, you ask a great question regarding the rural insurgency, that I contend is largely a resistance movement and apolitical. Clearly the constitution is not their primary concern directly, but it is the constitution that denies them the right to pick their own District and Provincial leadership. Once our presence is reduced much of this resistance insurgency will die down as well.

The other half of that equation, however is the upper tier of the insurgency that is VERY political and makes up the various leadership groups taking sanctuary in Pakistan. Reconciliation is the key task here, the new constitution is merely the very important supporting task. There is no way that the Northern Alliance is going to reconcile with the Taliban under the current constitution because they know precisely how controlling and destructive of local legitmacy that it is. They would fear that the Taliban would use that some tool to opress them as they use it to oppress the Taliban.

But the hard fact is, we cannot resolve the lower tier of the insurgency without first resolving the upper tier of the insurgency. It is the upper tier that keeps the movement alive and that pays the fighters you dealt with there outside of Kandahar to lay ambushes and plant IEDs.

So Step one is reconcile the issues driving the political revolutionary insurgency of the top tier and then craft a new constitution together as a unified approach to how the country moves out together. Once this is complete the Coalition can vastly reduce its presence and the Taliban will also stop funding the lower tier, and it will subside naturally.

There is just a whole lot of very bad analysis out there, and we have built faulty plans of engagement upon that analysis. That made the situation bad. We then reacted by clinging to the analysis and plans and simply adjusting tactics a bit and piling on even more foreign presence, and that is make the problems with BOTH tiers of the insurgency worse.

[Dayuhan]

There is no way that the Northern Alliance is going to reconcile with the Taliban under the current constitution because they know precisely how controlling and destructive of local legitmacy that it is. They would fear that the Taliban would use that some tool to opress them as they use it to oppress the Taliban.

The tool of oppression is physical force. It will be used no matter what the Constitution says. Whoever gains power will oppress no matter what the Constitution says. Whoever gains power will be corrupt no matter what the Constitution says. If the Constitution is not compatible with the prevailing political culture it will simply be ignored.

Even if we were able to get the contending parties to sit down together (unlikely in itself) and write their names on a piece of paper that we like, what makes you think they will pay any attention to it once they have an opportunity to seize power? The Constitution isn't the problem, the underlying political culture is the problem... and that's something we cannot change.

We must address the top. We must break from our colonial perspective on COIN that centers around the preservation of the governments one installs against all challengers, foreign and domestic. We must evolve to a new "non-colonial" perspective that is more about building an enduring influence among a populace and a nation as well as with their self-determined government, than it is about controlling and protecting some specific form and manning of said government.

Task one must be some form of reconciliation at the leadership level. (Focus on reintegration of local fighters is like bailing out the Titanic with a teacup. Or in this case perhaps "3 cups of tea."

Task two must be a new constitution. Not because a constitution is a guarantee of stability, but because the current constitution is a guarantee of instability.

I honestly think you place too much stress on the leadership level, and I can't see any reason to assume that the leadership wants to reconcile and would be willing to share power. What if they want to win, and rule, and they think they can?

In any event we can't force a reconciliation among parties who don't want to reconcile... they aren't going to do it just because it suits us.

This is the corner we painted ourselves into when we chose to try to bring good governance to Afghanistan. Bad decision. I don't see any reason to think a second attempt would work any better than the first: it's simply something that's not within our power to do. Good governance has to evolve, it isn't installed, like a light bulb or spare tire... and in Afghanistan the evolutionary process has a long way to go. Our job is not to direct or initiate that process, but simply to convince all parties to that process that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea. Unfortunately we took our eye off the ball early on, and now we're deep in the scheisse.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

I base my positions on my training, experience and instincts. I could be wrong, but I doubt I am by much. I do listen to your counters, but I don't agree with them. I think you (reasonably) focus on the wrong criteria, but that generally your instincts are good. I also think we agree far more than you know. I also appreciate that I am not going to change you any more than you are going to change me, so that is why I feel no compulsion to meet your counters point for point. We offer two valuable perspectives and (unlike so many in the middle east) we are able to have such discourse openly allowing many others to here a variety of positions and shape their own perspectives.

[zenvagabond]

USIP, Sep 08: Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation

The problem with the whole Afghan issue is the fact the allies actually won the war, which was back in 2001. There should never have been any attempt at the ridiculous concept of nation building; this is now the same as the Soviet situation and the South Vietnamese war. The allies will continue to win the battles, but will lose the war because the enemy will simply keep fighting, they don't have to actually win anything significant in order to win the end-game.

Political opportunism has supserseded the reality on the ground in this 'country', which is not actually a country but merely a mish-mash of disparate tribes and ethnic clans; most of whom hate each other for one reason or another and will continue to do so until the end of time.

Afghanistan is not developing for several reasons, mainly since there is no national identity amongst others; how an you unite people who don't want to be united?

Also, the US has simply no idea how to (i) manage and win a guerilla war/insurgency and (ii) no idea how to conduct nation building. They have no recent success stories to draw upon and they continually fail to understand history or learn lessons from their historic failures (Vietnam: hello).

The US government has all but mastered the art of bureaucracy and has ensured that their military, intelligence agencies and other agencies such as the State Dept. actively work against each rather than vice cersa, thereby ensuring defeat.

Jihadi doctrine also ensures there will be an endless supply of cannon fodder from Central Asia, the Caucaus and Arab countries. There is no success story here, the allies will simply withdraw under some form of 'negotiated peace' if that, and then Afghanistan will revert to what is was before; a chaotic wasteland.

[Dayuhan]

I base my positions on my training, experience and instincts. I could be wrong, but I doubt I am by much. I do listen to your counters, but I don't agree with them. I think you (reasonably) focus on the wrong criteria, but that generally your instincts are good. I also think we agree far more than you know. I also appreciate that I am not going to change you any more than you are going to change me, so that is why I feel no compulsion to meet your counters point for point. We offer two valuable perspectives and (unlike so many in the middle east) we are able to have such discourse openly allowing many others to here a variety of positions and shape their own perspectives.

Instinct vs instinct is a tough debate, but my instincts tell me that you're offering an American solution to an Afghan problem, and that the prospects for success lie on a long string of questionable assumptions. My instincts tell me that it is not within our power to bring anything that we would recognize as "good governance" to Afghanistan. If we try we'll be biting off way more than we can chew, and we're likely to choke on it.

My instincts tell me that trying to govern Afghanistan, or to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, was an enormous mistake, and that we should have set "nation building" aside from the start, focusing instead on demonstrating that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea, and on departing once that message was delivered.

Of course I've always preferred the limited, achievable objective; it seems to me a good way to succeed. Nothing advances the prospects for failure as effectively as setting unrealistic objectives.

Of course I could be wrong. I actually kind of hope I am wrong... but I don't think I am.

Offline a few days, lot of catching up to do...

[Bob's World]

Welcome back. But remember, I do not promote American solutions, I promote self determination as shaped by the cultures, values, and histories of the people in question for the same.

I am guilty of believing that America should act in a manner more in line with our professed principles as a nation. I am guilty of believing that their are tremendous lessons to be learned from the American experience in our own pursuit of liberty and stability (the universality of which is born out by vast diversity of people who have leveraged those same ideals in their similar pursuits of liberty around the globe over the past 200+ years). I am also guilty of believing that America can shift from dedicating our considerable talents, wealth and influence to create and preserve some particular government to one of helping to create an environment in which people can shape their own guard for their future security.

And as I have said, a good constitution will not necessarily resolve an insurgency in of itself; but a bad one will guarantee that insurgency happens. As the American constitution was written by a group of former insurgents fighting to pull their new nation out of its dive into anarchy and insurgency once again, it was written expressly for the purpose of COIN (true COIN, not the colonial intervention brand marketed in FM 3-24 and the dozens of COIN books published by European and American colonial soldiers over the years). I believe in the promise of America, but I do not allow that to blind me to the lie of many of our words and actions over the years. I am indeed guilty of believing in the power of the promise, and advocate that we can indeed be a positive force for good if we get back on azimuth with our moral compass contained in that trifecta of good governance enshrined at the National Archives.

[tequila]

My instincts tell me that trying to govern Afghanistan, or to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, was an enormous mistake, and that we should have set "nation building" aside from the start, focusing instead on demonstrating that attacking us or sheltering those who do is a very bad idea, and on departing once that message was delivered.

I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

[Bob's World]

I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

A couple of thoughts:

First, the Northern Alliance did not "flip to our side," we jumped on their side, thereby altering the balance of power and empowering their victory. This was classic UW.

Second. Pakistan would not have done anything overt to assist the Taliban then, just as, and for the same reasons, that they don't do anything to overtly help them now. They would have covertly done so just as they covertly do so now. Why would we expect anything else?

Third. The Taliban were never the issue, AQ was. It is quite likely that key elements of the Taliban would have folded back into Afghan society under the Northern Alliance. Others would have began to form a resistance movement much as they do now. The difference being that the US would not be there creating an artificial, unsustainable environment and spending $100+B/year.

We just wanted a base of operations to hunt AQ from, but because we were there we got into the business of forming and protecting the Afghan government. As we got deeper and deeper into that role and were clearly influencing the rise of Karzai and the nature of the constitution, the insurgency began to grow.

But all of that is moot, we did what we did and we are where we are. How forward from here? AQ will never have the Afghan sanctuary they had before, and truth be told, they did not need it then to be an effective non-state UW force in today's information environment. We have taught them that even if we have not learned it yet ourselves. We should assume risk that they might come back and be willing to leave, and shift our focus to getting the Northern Alliance to seriously reconcile the issues between them and the Taliban. Once that is done they can then scrap the current abortion of a constitution and form new guards for their future security together.

Our current approach is much like a team of SF candidates dragging 100 lbs of personal gear each and a couple of jeeps across several miles of North Carolina Sandhills, collapsing short of the finish point while some some cagey old SF NCO (like Ken White) lounging in the shade of a pine tree asks "Did any of you think to see if you could get one of them to start?" We're pretty good at hard work, but sometimes the smart answer seems too easy to try.

[Dayuhan]

Welcome back. But remember, I do not promote American solutions, I promote self determination as shaped by the cultures, values, and histories of the people in question for the same.

I have a hard time reconciling this statement with your oft-stated insistence that the core of the problem lies in the Constitution, rather than the political culture, and with the apparent belief that the contending parties will coexist peacefully if only the right Constitution is in place. The whole idea of resolving this conflict by mediating an agreement that would produce shared power under an effective Constitution seems to me to be a quintessentially American solution that is largely incompatible with Afghan political culture and tradition.

I am guilty of believing that America should act in a manner more in line with our professed principles as a nation. I am guilty of believing that their are tremendous lessons to be learned from the American experience in our own pursuit of liberty and stability (the universality of which is born out by vast diversity of people who have leveraged those same ideals in their similar pursuits of liberty around the globe over the past 200+ years). I am also guilty of believing that America can shift from dedicating our considerable talents, wealth and influence to create and preserve some particular government to one of helping to create an environment in which people can shape their own guard for their future security.

I see nothing in America's professed principles that asks us to assume that our principles or ways are applicable to other nations, or that expects us to impose or promote our principles elsewhere in the world.

I believe, as I've said before, that you consistently and dangerously overestimate the extent to which current conditions around the world have been "created and preserved" by the US. Our influence, let alone control, is not what you make it out to be, and our ability to reshape or recreate conditions is very limited. If we assume that the world as it is was created by US policy we can easily conclude that the world can be reshaped by adjusting US policy. If that assumption proves incorrect - as I suspect it quickly would be - any action based on that assumption would have consequences very different from those anticipated.

And as I have said, a good constitution will not necessarily resolve an insurgency in of itself; but a bad one will guarantee that insurgency happens.

I think you look at Constitutions too often as the source and origin of political culture, rather than the other way round. If we hand the Afghans a Constitution that is not compatible with their political culture they will ignore it. If we expect the Afghans to create a Constitution that is not a reflection of their political culture, we will be disappointed. People aren't going to put their differences aside and resolve their disputes simply because we want them to or because we believe that it's in their interests to do so. They will follow their perception of their interests, which is generally different from ours.

I believe in the promise of America, but I do not allow that to blind me to the lie of many of our words and actions over the years. I am indeed guilty of believing in the power of the promise, and advocate that we can indeed be a positive force for good if we get back on azimuth with our moral compass contained in that trifecta of good governance enshrined at the National Archives.

Again, that compass pointed the way for us, but we can't expect it to solve other people's problems... here, again, I think you're assuming that America's solution is everybody's solution... a very risky assumption. There are few things so dangerous as a great power trying to be a positive force for its own perception of good.

I've always been a bit confused as to how this would actually have worked in practice.

So we kick the Taliban out. The Northern Alliance takes Kabul, the Taliban flees to Pakistan. So after that, we simply withdraw all troops and tell the Northern Alliance "good luck with all that"?

What's to prevent the Pakistani military and the Taliban retaking the country in short order after that? Indeed, if we had made our intentions as clear as "we're not sticking around", the possibility exists that many of our Afghan "allies" would not have flipped to our side at all, since obviously most had done so on the understanding that we were going to ensure the Taliban would not return.

As RCJ says, the Taliban were never the problem. AQ was the problem.

Yes, when we leave the Taliban will probably come back to power. When we entered the fight the Northern Alliance was crumbling and facing imminent defeat; there's little reason to believe that this will not happen again upon our departure. That was true in 2001 and it's true now, despite the lives and the hundreds of billions spent in the interim.

My point is that our mission from the first should not have been to prevent the Taliban from ever returning, but to convince the Taliban - or whoever else came to power in Afghanistan - that the penalties of hosting AQ are too high to bear. I realize that revenge and punishment don't play well to the American populace, but I suspect that they would be more reasonable to Afghans than nation-building and democracy promotion. They'd also be a whole lot quicker and a whole lot cheaper.