Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[jcustis]

Sometimes, it just boils down to the basics. This is a great piece, and a memory jogger that sometimes, you aren't as #### hot as you think you are. It takes going back to the basics in the same manner that the 28 Articles tried to bring things down to earth

I have tried to wrap my head around this business of LOO management, LOO metrics for measures of effectiveness, and the linkage of objectives and tasks/purpose, and I have come to agree with Neil's section arguing that data is not understanding. Heck, I've always argued that there is a distinct difference between knowledge and understanding...now I wonder if data is even knowledge.

Without jacking this thread too much, all this LOO stuff could easily be coordinated, recorded, and tracked using the standard Marine Corps-issue lime green log book that fits into a cargo pocket. When I asked a Regimental-level IO manager recently what to make of the massive spreadsheets, templates, methodologies and spreadsheets embedded in their sharepoint page, it took some time for him to figure out where to start...There is something wrong in that.

LOO folks are commuting to work in some AOs, and it is as fundamentally wrong to do that as it is to have your security elements commute to work. Perhaps if we made the essential services LOO dude live at the water plant project until it was finished, the POA&M might get compressed and executed more quickly.

The ice-cream cone continues to lick itself, over and over it seems.

[sullygoarmy]

Neil, great article buddy.

[Ken White]

Great job in concisely hitting the critical points.

[Cavguy]

Saw this in the blog today:

Hayes is unequivocal in naming the key to the 24th MEU's success in Helmand province: "It's a real simple concept -- we learned during this mission that the best way to combat this type of enemy is to mass forces and stay. We actually replaced a small British force that was spread thin trying to cover too much ground with too few troops. Instead, we flooded a town that was strategically important to the enemy with overwhelming forces. That's the way you can win this kind of fight -- with boots on the ground."

It seems to work in A-Stan too.

[Ken White]

is adequate capability in both quantity and quality and, as always, being at the right place at the right time.

Lacking adequate capability, failure to be in time and selection of the wrong places can complicate the processes significantly. Lot of varied political inputs and impacts on those factors, many unfortunately outside military control...

[Mark O'Neill]

hence useful piece.

best,

Mark

[Eden]

Great article. I'm posting it to our servers here.

Let me jack up the problem to the next higher level, and ask your input. As an ISAF planner, I argued just what you were saying, that we had to flood areas to gain and maintain control. The problem was, there weren't enough infantrymen available to 'flood' all the areas we needed, ultimately, to control. In fact, there were only enough to 'flood' a handfull.

So, from an operational viewpoint, when you don't have the resources to control everything, how do you go about selecting which areas are most important?

Our discussions devolved into a three-cornered argument:

Position 1: Concentrate your forces in selected areas to properly secure them. Start with those areas that are already relatively pacified. Grow the ANA and ANP in those areas until they can take over, and then move to the next targeted area. Wash, rinse, repeat, gradually extending your influence outward until you have squeezed the enemy out entirely. This is the classic oil-spot treatment; the downside is that you let the rest of the country go to hell in a hand-basket while you are securing your selected areas.

Position 2: Basically the same, except you start off securing the 'hot spots', the most difficult areas. This is initially tougher, with higher casualties, less success at the front end, but - supposedly - will lead to greater and quicker success at the back end.

Position 3: Politically and militarily it does not make sense to abandon parts of the country. Whatever local success you may gain in your oil-spots will be more than counterbalanced by the impression that you are retreating from the countryside. Far better to maintain a presence throughout the area by spreading your infantry thin and maintaining your ability to influence events and disrupt enemy activities wherever you choose.

Interested to get your thoughts on the above. I also have a corollary question that came up: the need for an operational reserve. I argued that a reserve force of infantry was a luxury we could not afford, that maintaining an infantry reserve in COIN was like maintaining an artillery reserve in conventional warfare: a misuse of scarce assets.