Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Ron Humphrey]

Did not mean to infer that ANA is slacking in their efforts at all but rather was referring to possible issues of giving too much help so as to actually keep them from growing and gaining experience in the way they should.

From what I know they are getting it right. Just commenting in the overall approach context.

As to projection of power, although I think I understand the concern with this approach I question if it's not required given that even in countries where most of the outer areas are almost autonomous the central governing authority has to be able to tie in somehow be it through physical, military, political, or social.
So Power in the most general of definitions not necessarily kinetic

[Cavguy]

Seems like Dr. Kilcullen agrees with my idea of protecting the cities first:

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...len-on-af.html

Let’s take these one at a time. Has there been too much emphasis on offensive operations, especially air strikes? We read a lot recently about civilian deaths and growing Afghan anger. Should we cut back on the use of air power and put in more ground troops, as Obama has said he will? Or is this not a matter of managing numbers and assets so much as changing the focus of our tactics?

It’s both. There has been an emphasis on fighting the Taliban, which has led us into operations (both air and ground-based) that do a lot of damage but do not make people feel safer. Similarly, we have a lot of troops in rural areas—small outposts—positioned there because it’s easier to bring firepower to bear on the enemy out in these areas. Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.

The underlying reason as I mentioned before is here - the real threat is the political organization developing in the cities while we chase units in the mountains:

It sounds like you’re proposing classic counterinsurgency strategy: a combination of offensive and defensive military operations, political and economic development, and diplomacy. Isn’t that what we’ve been doing these past seven years? Have we just not been doing enough of all these? Or do we need to change strategy to something fundamentally new?

Well, we need to be more effective in what we are doing, but we also need to do some different things, as well, with the focus on security and governance. The classical counterinsurgency theorist Bernard Fall wrote, in 1965, that a government which is losing to an insurgency isn’t being out-fought, it’s being out-governed. In our case, we are being both out-fought and out-governed for four basic reasons:

(1) We have failed to secure the Afghan people. That is, we have failed to deliver them a well-founded feeling of security. Our failing lies as much in providing human security—economic and social wellbeing, law and order, trust in institutions and hope for the future—as in protection from the Taliban, narco-traffickers, and terrorists. In particular, we have spent too much effort chasing and attacking an elusive enemy who has nothing he needs to defend—and so can always run away to fight another day—and too little effort in securing the people where they sleep. (And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations).

(2) We have failed to deal with the Pakistani sanctuary that forms the political base and operational support system for the Taliban, and which creates a protective cocoon (abetted by the fecklessness or complicity of some elements in Pakistan) around senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

(3) The Afghan government has not delivered legitimate, good governance to Afghans at the local level—with the emphasis on good governance. In some areas, we have left a vacuum that the Taliban has filled, in other areas some of the Afghan government’s own representatives have been seen as inefficient, corrupt, or exploitative.

(4) Neither we nor the Afghans are organized, staffed, or resourced to do these three things (secure the people, deal with the safe haven, and govern legitimately and well at the local level)—partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.

So, bottom line—we need to do better, but we also need a rethink in some key areas starting with security and governance.

[Ken White]

Problem is that you do that; most of the bad guys in the cities just lay low and chill and chat with your patrols, smiling broadly and improving their English, while some of them move to the boonies -- and not as reluctantly or in as small numbers as in Iraq; the crowds in cities are a recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, they're basically country boys. They can climb those hills like mountain goats and a guy in armor isn't going to catch them.

When they get out of town, they'll join up with new hires from Pakistan and start rolling up the hinterlands; then you've got a full scale war on your hands. I'll guarantee you they will move faster than we do under current conditions...

The key to that is more Aviation; the key to more aviation is longer tours for the airplane units.

No easy solutions there...

I agree with him re: Pakistan but I think he's being a little unfair to a lot of people. Pakistan is trying, it's just devilishly difficult for them and it will take some years yet. We all can wish that weren't so but I suspect it will remain troublesome for another couple of years at least.

Understand, I'm not disagreeing with you or him, merely playing devil's advocate and pointing out minor things he elides.

He does make two very important points:

"(And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations)."

Totally true but problematic due to this:

"...partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.

While the last two items are true, the first is the major problem and will remain so. Something about the "U" in MOOSEMUSS, I think. That, most unfortunately, is unlikely to improve. As I said, no easy solutions...

[slapout9]

Seems like Dr. Kilcullen agrees with my idea of protecting the cities first:

The underlying reason as I mentioned before is here - the real threat is the political organization developing in the cities while we chase units in the mountains:

Cavguy, I just read that yesterday. 80% in the cities WOW! Physical security of the people is somehting that the military can do well and will have to be done, but you can only do it for so long. The bigger problem is long term economic security. In your article Retaking Sa'ad at the end under lessons learned you talk about this and it was one of the most important parts of the article. Iraq has oil so their future is pretty well determined, Astan has......drugs wicked problem!

[Bill Moore]

My biggest beef with Kilcullin's proposal is that he is proposing that "we" have to protect the population. That isn't a counterinsurgency, that is an occupation and again I beat my drum "armed nation building".

I assume the analysis exists (well maybe not), but is it a fact that the people are turning to the Taliban because they're being coerced because we're not protecting them, or do they simply prefer Taliban leadership? It sounds to me like we're making some wild assumptions here based on our Western bias of what good government should look like. Does you're average Afghan really want to live under a Western Style government with radically different values? Are they fighting us because the Taliban is standing behind them with bayonets to their backs, or are they fighting us because well...... we're us?

I don't necessarily disagree with starting in the cities first, I don't see how you could it any other way, but two notes of caution. One we're not starting, we been there seven years now. Ideally you would have a strategy before you start fighting, but we weren't afforded that luxuary in Afghanistan. Two, you better have a plan to expand out from the cities without losing the cities, otherwise the cities become isolated outposts, which leads to economic isolation and ruin. The bad guys will eventually hurl a few diseased carcasses into the city and....., you know the deal.

Beyond that, begin with the end in mind, and that requires answering what type of government do the Afghan people want? Acceptance and evolutionary change at a glacial pace is generally more effective than revolutionary change imposed by an outside power. Revolutions succeed because they are the will of the people, not a foreign power.

Once we determine what type of government they want, how do we empower that government, how do we put their face in the lead on all operations, how do we empower them to control their population? That needs to be our long term exit strategy, and if we have to keep that in mind at all times. We can provide security to some degree (unless we pass the tipping point and turn the populace against us, which we may be doing if you believe the media reports), but before we commit to these major security operations (it terribly late in the game to start implementing step one of a basic COIN strategy), why are we doing it? Security of the populace is critical because it creates a window of opportunity for something to happen (a political settlement), and we should have that something in mind in mind before we act. Protectng the population is essential, and that is beyond debate, forget the myth of network targeting and focus on changing the environment. Just remember that protecting the population in itself doesn't win the conflict. How do we win? Strategy before tactics.

[Entropy]

Hmm, I wonder where Dr. Kilcullen is getting his population data. Reliable date is admittedly hard to come by (the last census was in the 1970's). There was supposed to be a census this summer, but it was cancelled because of poor security.

However, Dr. Kilcullen's 80/20 figure is completely inconsistent with any of the many population guestimates I've seen. Estimates from Afghanistan's central statistics office (as good as any) put the combined population of both Helmand and Kandahar provinces at about 1.6 million (a conservative figure - other estimates put it over 2 million). 80% of that is about 1.3 million. None of the figures I've seen put Kandahar city above 400k in population and Lashkar Gah above 60k. I expect wide margin of error when talking population stats for Afghanistan, but for Dr. Killcullen to be correct the actual populations for these two cities would have to be at least 2-3 times any of the estimates. And that's assuming he only means Helmand and Kandahar provinces when he says "the southern half of Afghanistan" which seems unlikely. The six southern-most provinces have an estimated population of just over 3 million. 80% of this number would give Kandahar and Lashkar Gah cities almost 2.5 million people combined and make Kandahar as populous as Kabul and Lashkar Gah almost as big as Herat. That is simply wrong.

It's not an 80% urban insurgency in the south or anywhere else. On this point he could not be more wrong, and this faulty premise completely undermines the entire strategy laid out in the interview. Most of southern Afghanistan is rural - small towns and villages. Regardless, both Kandahar and Lashkar Gah are comparatively secure (and have been), though the situation is worsening. One might argue that worsening is not from the failure to protect the cities, but failure to protect the surrounding districts and provinces. Putting more resources into the those two southern cities will therefore not accomplish much (and quite possibly be counter-productive) except cede vitally important small towns, villages and district centers to the enemy.

I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error.

[Ken White]

catching that, I called a neighbor who's a USAR CA guy who returned from Kandahar less than a year ago. He says that if The good Doctor is correct, the population of K-town has more than tripled in a year. He, too is dubious. I have another contact with fairly recent experience and current acquaintances there. I'll try to get hold of him this weekend.

This comment:

"I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error."

made me smile as I recalled making a similar comment years ago (when I was new to BIG staffs in high places) about a sharp young Action Officer's strange boo-boo to an old Colonel who smiled and pointed out that you can assign a guy a project he absolutely hates and after 90 days of working on it he'll defend it to the death; they, he said "...marry their programs and lose sight of how ugly the Bride was..."

ADDED: Sunday, 16 Nov 08. Around 2015 local, talked to the one who had also been to Kandahar on his last tour. He too is highly skeptical and really doubts that percentage of urban dwellers but will ask some who are there during the coming week for a current assessment.

[Cavguy]

It seems like the city strategy wins ...

http://feeds.reuters.com/~r/reuters/...4B601U20081207

NEW YORK (Reuters) - Most of the additional U.S. troops heading to Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near Kabul, reflecting worries about the capital's vulnerability, The New York Times reported in Sunday editions.

Citing U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan, the Times said the plans for incoming brigades would result in fewer or no reinforcements being available, at least for the time being, for areas of Afghanistan where the insurgency is most acute.

The focus on the capital also meant most of the new troops would not be deployed with the main goal of containing the cross-border insurgent flow from their rear bases in Pakistan -- something U.S. commanders would like and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also recommended, the Times said.

[Rex Brynen]

Regarding the security situation around Kandahar, a couple of interesting graphics from the (Toronto) Globe and Mail:

• control of districts
  
• geographic location of all Canadian deaths in Afghanistan

A few of the latter seem to be slightly misplaced, but it nonetheless gives a good sense of how much the fighting has clustered relatively close to Kandahar city.

[Ken White]

It seems like the city strategy wins ...

in the long run, I suspect.

As I said on the SWJ Blog:

"Have to side with Gian on that one. Dave is correct in that most are in fact saying that the two theaters are dissimilar and that most acknowledge different approaches will be required.

However, while I read what is said, I also see what is happening. We need to be quite cautious in what we do in Afghanistan. The inadvertent human tendency to do what worked before confronted with a different situation is difficult to overcome and it appears to me that Gian is correct. We are about to apply, intentionally or not, an Iraqi template in a totally different situation. This, in my view is unwise."