Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Cavguy]

My latest article excerpt:

In Greek legend, Sisyphus was a king condemned by the gods to roll a huge rock up a hill only to have it roll down again for eternity. Students of counterinsurgency often feel like Sisyphus, as the United States Army continually resists institutionalizing counterinsurgency across the force, only to have to re-learn the lessons at a heavy price later before preparing to discard them again.

About a month ago, I was asked to deliver a short presentation to the Canadian Army on tactical counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past years in Iraq. What initially seemed like an easy task quickly became difficult as I synthesized the complex and varied experiences of US Army units into relevant and concise points transferrable to a foreign army. After a long night, I produced ten observations that reflect enduring lessons from Iraq that would resonate with military audiences. They are:

• Learn from the past.
• Learn to ask understanding questions.
• Data is not understanding.
• Mass all of your resources to achieve the objective.
• Security matters.
• Population control is critical for success.
• Build human infrastructure alongside the physical.
• Understand perceptions matter far more than truth.
• Communicate effectively.

None of these are new, nor are they all inclusive, as significant areas are not covered. They do represent a start point for discussion about counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.

The rest is on the blog here.

Comments welcome.

[reed11b]

Fantastic!! Keep up the good work.
Reed
P.S. Your "quality of leadership" advice is making it to the right ears.

[William F. Owen]

Unless we can protect the population of an unstable area continuously, they are unlikely to provide information needed by the counterinsurgent to combat the enemy.

You can't make it clearer or simpler than that! Doing this will never be wrong. You just have to do it. Let someone else worry about end-states!

[jcustis]

Sometimes, it just boils down to the basics. This is a great piece, and a memory jogger that sometimes, you aren't as #### hot as you think you are. It takes going back to the basics in the same manner that the 28 Articles tried to bring things down to earth

I have tried to wrap my head around this business of LOO management, LOO metrics for measures of effectiveness, and the linkage of objectives and tasks/purpose, and I have come to agree with Neil's section arguing that data is not understanding. Heck, I've always argued that there is a distinct difference between knowledge and understanding...now I wonder if data is even knowledge.

Without jacking this thread too much, all this LOO stuff could easily be coordinated, recorded, and tracked using the standard Marine Corps-issue lime green log book that fits into a cargo pocket. When I asked a Regimental-level IO manager recently what to make of the massive spreadsheets, templates, methodologies and spreadsheets embedded in their sharepoint page, it took some time for him to figure out where to start...There is something wrong in that.

LOO folks are commuting to work in some AOs, and it is as fundamentally wrong to do that as it is to have your security elements commute to work. Perhaps if we made the essential services LOO dude live at the water plant project until it was finished, the POA&M might get compressed and executed more quickly.

The ice-cream cone continues to lick itself, over and over it seems.

[sullygoarmy]

Neil, great article buddy.

[Ken White]

Great job in concisely hitting the critical points.

[Cavguy]

Saw this in the blog today:

Hayes is unequivocal in naming the key to the 24th MEU's success in Helmand province: "It's a real simple concept -- we learned during this mission that the best way to combat this type of enemy is to mass forces and stay. We actually replaced a small British force that was spread thin trying to cover too much ground with too few troops. Instead, we flooded a town that was strategically important to the enemy with overwhelming forces. That's the way you can win this kind of fight -- with boots on the ground."

It seems to work in A-Stan too.

[Ken White]

is adequate capability in both quantity and quality and, as always, being at the right place at the right time.

Lacking adequate capability, failure to be in time and selection of the wrong places can complicate the processes significantly. Lot of varied political inputs and impacts on those factors, many unfortunately outside military control...