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Thread: Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

  1. #41
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Look before you leap...

    Ken,

    I fully agree that a well articulated strategy can be a beautiful and team building thing.

    Colorado has some heavy duty terrain that impressed upon me the importance of terrain's vote upon operations (DIME, PMESII, ASCOPE, SWEAT-MS, TLP, METT-TC take your pick). Iraq taught me about what the lack of functional infrastructure will do to a population. From my reading Afghanistan is a much woollier and wilder version than either Colorado or Iraq.

    I vote for the historians here on SWJ to share some recommended reading about past campaigns in Afghanistan so that we can identify some reoccurring problem sets and solutions...

    Regards,

    Steve
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    It doesn't surprise me in the least some of the troops will get deployed south of Kabul. The reports don't seem to make it into the media (most of the reporters seem to be in Helmand or the east), but the situation around Kabul, particularly in Lohgar, has been deteriorating since the spring.

  3. #43
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    Default What are we doing?

    Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.
    Surferbettle, thanks for this post, I find this fasinating, and it really gets to Ken's point,

    I'm dubious. I still see absolutely no evidence that anyone has really thought this through and has an achievable and sensible goal for a very different country and people.
    When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 we had a clear enough objective to neutralize AQ, but somehow that seems to have become a distant priority. Now it seems we're expermenting with various COIN TTPs and calling that a strategy, but to accomplish what? Deny safehaven to AQ? They already have safehaven in Pakistan and Somalia and I'm confident in other locations. Are we going to apply this strategy (surging more troops and building capable governments) worldwide? I'm finding myself leaning more and more towards some of Gian's opinions. It seems we're becoming a missionary Army of sorts, but we're not bringing Christianity, instead we're bringing dreams of (and in some cases hope) capitialism, free markets, and democracy, which will supposedly equate to security and prosperity for all. If we don't achieve a condition that looks like that, then it will look something like a loss, and we all know what type of baggage that brings.

    As Ken stated, a lot of folks are saying they don't mind it if it takes several years if that what we'll have to do. My question is how thin are we going to spread our Army (and our limited Whole of Government assets) over the coming decades if this is our focus? Gian's points shouldn't be dismissed lightly. Ideology drives most of us, but we still have to operate in the real world.

    One case in point, during the Vietnam War the U.S. government became somewhat myoptic (not the military leaders), and at the end of it we learned that the Soviets surpassed us in capacity by greatly increasing their general purpose forces and nuclear arsenal. We had limited ability to execute Kennedy's flexible response options, which was the strategy intended to keep conflict below the nuclear level, until Reagan rebuilt our forces in 80s.

    Admittedly there is no longer a USSR, but we don't really know what threats are in our immediate or distant future. I still think the primary role of the military should be to defend the U.S., not reform other nations. We should continue to focus on letting Special Forces, Civil Affairs, USAID, etc. take he lead on these types of missions for several reasons, but primarily it is a minimal footprint in country, thus the onus is on that country to fix their problems. If they can't, then we can withdraw with honor. It really doesn't make big news if a handful of advisors withdraw because the HN government failed to transform.

    By all means, GPF need more training on how to function in a FID/COIN/IW environment (they sure has heck didn't understand it 2001-2005). When we need to commit GPF individuals and units to serve in an advisory role, then there should be an established mechanism for training those individuals and units. COIN doctrine is theory, not science, and historically "no one" has been very effective (a few cases do not equate to a trend) of intervening in and transforming another country's government and society.

    Failed states have a way of emerging into the world once again, somehow Europe managed to after the Middle Ages. Maybe we just need to learn to do our nation-state business with Kingdoms, city-states, and tribes.

  4. #44
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    Iraq taught me about what the lack of functional infrastructure will do to a population. From my reading Afghanistan is a much woollier and wilder version than either Colorado or Iraq.
    Steve, I think you have some great insight, but I want to add one caveat. Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought. What we saw in Iraq (I get to say we, I was there as well) was the lack of a previously existing infrastructure. That infrastructure has never existed in Afghanistan. Working on creating it is good because it is the right thing to do, not because it will win the "heart and minds". Defeating an insurgency is like defeating any enemy, restrict there freedom of movement, find there lines of communication and destroy them. This is why I prefer Wilf's principles of warfare to the Army ones, they apply across warfare spectrums. I hope my ramble makes sense.
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

  5. #45
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Trust the guy on your left and right and give it what you got...

    Bill,

    I am glad to see that you let your inner bean-counter off of the leash now and then . These financial metrics that might be of interest to you as well.

    Of late I have been spending some time considering America’s strengths: My thesis is that we are an idea, one which speaks to all of the inhabitants of the world, funded by the world’s strongest business community (13 trillion dollar USD at our peak), and protected by the best trained (real world ops baby) military in the world. Heady stuff to be a member of that team, but as we all know pride goeth before a fall.

    We certainly have lost our way when it comes to humility however, and as a result of this our idea has been carelessly dropped in the mud, much of our business community is busy getting kicked in the head, and parts of our military are way overstretched. Fortunately, collectively, we are one tough sob and there is no doubt in my military mind that we will get back up and prevail. In the meantime it’s time to fight and we need to focus on the 25- meter target with everything (DIME) that we have.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 we had a clear enough objective to neutralize AQ, but somehow that seems to have become a distant priority. Now it seems we're expermenting with various COIN TTPs and calling that a strategy, but to accomplish what? Deny safehaven to AQ? They already have safehaven in Pakistan and Somalia and I'm confident in other locations. Are we going to apply this strategy (surging more troops and building capable governments) worldwide? I'm finding myself leaning more and more towards some of Gian's opinions. It seems we're becoming a missionary Army of sorts, but we're not bringing Christianity, instead we're bringing dreams of (and in some cases hope) capitialism, free markets, and democracy, which will supposedly equate to security and prosperity for all.
    Your military questions, if I may paraphrase, are: Is Afghanistan part of that 25-meter target and is COIN the method?

    Short answer: I don’t know and yes.

    Focusing exclusively upon Afghanistan, it has a high cost and in all of my reading I have yet to come across a compelling argument as to the benefit(s) that will offset this cost. Being a brother soldier however, I will salute the flag and move out smartly because America has never let me down.

    When it comes to the TTP’s of accomplishing the Afghanistan mission, COIN is certainly raw and ugly (and some GPF’s would say it’s new and its not cricket baby) but it works most of the time. MDMP and EBO are planning/management answers born of the direct/indirect environment that we have/currently face and they will continue to evolve as our enemy evolves. On the flip side this endorsement of COIN does not mean that MCO TTP’s are dead. Like it or not we have to be prepared to win using more than one method.

    GPF are the high dollar/high visibility military answer and SOF are the low dollar/low visibility military answer to different problem sets. When GPF are covering down on SOF mission sets and vice versa we need to take a hard look at what it is that we want, how we have resourced and allocated things, what our timelines are, and how applicable our solutions are to the problems we are facing.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Sapere Aude

  6. #46
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Heh. Clever

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    ...Like it or not we have to be prepared to win using more than one method.
    Yes it was...

    However, I'm not at all sure I understand what this means:
    GPF are the high dollar/high visibility military answer and SOF are the low dollar/low visibility military answer to different problem sets. When GPF are covering down on SOF mission sets and vice versa we need to take a hard look at what it is that we want, how we have resourced and allocated things, what our timelines are, and how applicable our solutions are to the problems we are facing.
    ??? ???

  7. #47
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default That was quite a ride....

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post

    Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought. What we saw in Iraq (I get to say we, I was there as well) was the lack of a previously existing infrastructure. That infrastructure has never existed in Afghanistan. Working on creating it is good because it is the right thing to do, not because it will win the "heart and minds". Defeating an insurgency is like defeating any enemy, restrict there freedom of movement, find there lines of communication and destroy them. This is why I prefer Wilf's principles of warfare to the Army ones, they apply across warfare spectrums. I hope my ramble makes sense.
    Reed
    Reed,

    Iraq was like nothing that I have ever experienced and I am glad that you made it through as well. Some of my family raves about Alaska and one of these days I hope to make the trip. In the meantime I suspect that Wilf has some historical recommendations on Afghanistan that we can all learn and benefit from and hopefully he will share some.

    With respect to Afghanistan I hope that our collective aim is true. A focus upon Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services seems to be the West's answer in this fight. Iraq and Afghanistan are very different however, as you correctly note.

    It seemed to me that a non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Electricity in Iraq would have paid dividends for a population centric strategy. A non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Water may be worth considering for a population centric strategy in Afghanistan. I'd like to throw out three brief late night thoughts and references:

    In Rome (and Iraq from my observations) people were motivated to support the State by clean water and agricultural water connections (Renaissance Quarterly, LXI, 4, Winter 2008 - Hydraulic Engineering and the Study of Antiquity: Rome 1557-70, by Pamela O. Long). I suspect that this will apply in Afghanistan.

    Effective use of Hydrology and Hydraulics Teams can help Commanders in accessing Water for their AO's (Hydrological Sciences Journal, Volume 53, Issue 6, December 2008 - Performance of MARS in Predicting Runoff in Mid-Himalayan Micro-Watersheds with Limited Data, by V.N. Sharda, et. al) This could be a tool used to influence the populace.

    A USAID case study speaks to this idea.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-08-2008 at 06:51 AM.
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    Default Infrastructure matters, because

    Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought.
    posted by Reed

    Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.

    Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.

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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    It seemed to me that a non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Electricity in Iraq would have paid dividends for a population centric strategy. A non-lethal infrastructure focus upon
    Regards,

    Steve
    Keen observation on Iraq and I had the same one when I was there in the summer of '03.
    While providing a water infrastructure will not win the cross border insurgency we face in A-stan, I am intrigued that it might provide positive benefit. I still feel the focus is to be military and law enforcement solutions, but water infrastructure is a thought that I am going to be chewing on for awhile.
    Reed
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    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    posted by Reed

    Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.

    Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.
    Bill, I disagree. Even in '03, the violence that the insurgents caused was unwelcome by populace in Iraq, but they were more afraid of them then us. This has only escalated. Yes, it had some influence, but an immediate and full fledged effort to rebuild the infastructure would not have defeated the insurgency. We should have realized the importance of elictricity and worked to get it back on-line because it was the right thing to do, not because it would have defeated the insurgency. Your intelectual friends sound like they were rationalizing to me.
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

  11. #51
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    Default We may agree after all

    Bill, I disagree. Even in '03, the violence that the insurgents caused was unwelcome by populace in Iraq, but they were more afraid of them then us. This has only escalated. Yes, it had some influence, but an immediate and full fledged effort to rebuild the infastructure would not have defeated the insurgency. We should have realized the importance of elictricity and worked to get it back on-line because it was the right thing to do, not because it would have defeated the insurgency. Your intelectual friends sound like they were rationalizing to me.
    Reed
    Last post, then I'm going to bed. We may be in violent agreement if you consider what I meant. First, my intellectual friends were presenting the history they witnessed in the narrative that the Iraqi people understood it. Much of what they shared has been backed up by various studies I read, and unfortunately AQ used the sanctions and the suffering it caused has a rallying call with its propaganda also long before the war started. Sanctions in any situation rarely hurt the leader we're intending to undermine, rather they tend to strengthen his position because he now has control of the few resources available to distribute, and of course Saddam was a master of rewarding those loyal to him and crushing those he saw as threats.

    I have argued previously you can't fix electric power infrastructure until you have established security, which in this case would have meant suppressing or defeating the insurgents so we could fix it, and show the benefits of the U.S. and transition government winning. Some folks were going to fight us anyway, no dobut about it. However, others who were sitting on the fence may not have if we improved their standard of living.

    I agree with you that in 2003 the infrastructure expectations didn't contribute much to fueling the insurgency, because there was a long window of uncertainity before the flames of rebellion were fanned by a number of issues, but I think the lack of electric power and other issues was one of the many insurgent propaganda themes that contributed to recruitment and overall subversion efforts circa 2005.

    It definitely was not the only factor, nor the most important factor, but I do think it was a contributing factor. Expectation management is important if you are believer in population centric engagement. We failed to manage expectations in this case. Think about for a while, if you still disagree let me know. I receptive to new ideas, as long as you don't incorporate EBO into them

  12. #52
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Thinking out loud about Problem sets and solutions….

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Yes it was...

    However, I'm not at all sure I understand what this means: ??? ???
    Ken,

    Over a cup of coffee in a place far from the sound of any battle let’s see if we can make a small collaborative dent into TTP’s, Troops to Task, & GWOT which was the point of my paragraph that you cite.

    My assumptions:

    1) Afghanistan/Pakistan is the next 25-meter target. (a)
    2) Limited US resources require a favorable cost/benefit solution to our problems. (b)
    3) National & International will to apply the necessary resources to the problem is in short supply. (c)

    The problem defined:

    There are continuing strikes against US Interests led by adequately trained, resourced, and decentralized movements which are currently massed in and around Afghanistan and amenable to a multifaceted/multiagency response (DIME).

    A proposed solution:

    Precisely apply a long duration, small footprint, and highly trained and motivated DIME force in order to develop a solution amenable to US Interests.

    Historical Precedents’:

    SOF in El Salvador
    Jesuits in India, Asia, etc.
    Ottoman Janissaries


    (a) WSJ

    Senior U.S. military and civilian officials have grown increasingly pessimistic about Afghanistan and Pakistan. Last month, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told lawmakers he was planning to develop a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan that would for the first time focus on both countries, which he said were "inextricably linked in a common insurgency that crosses the border between them."
    (b) Wikipedia

    As of November 19, 2008, the total U.S. federal debt was $10.6 trillion.[2], with about $37,316 per capita (that is, per U.S. resident). The October 3rd, 2008 bailout bill (H.R.1424), section 122, raised the U.S. debt ceiling from $10 trillion to $11.3 trillion. Of this amount, debt held by the public was roughly $6.3 trillion.[3] In 2007, the public debt was 36.9 percent of GDP [4], with a total debt of 65.5 percent of GDP.[5] The CIA ranked the total percentage as 27th in the world.[6]
    (c) Zogby

    Do you believe the country is heading in the right direction or are things off on the wrong track?
    Regards,

    Steve
    Sapere Aude

  13. #53
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thanks for the coffee

    and the response -- we are, as they say, in total agreement.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.

    Now, the counterinsurgent has the added risk/burden of the negative strategic communications effect of not being able to hold or secure key cities, LOCs, etc, and the wise insurgent will exploit this while at the same time committing to holding nothing.

    The bigger issue is not one of city vs country; but rather one of a Afghan governance overly shaped and formed by Americans vice an Afghan governance truly shaped and designed by Afghans for Afghans.

    In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).

    Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.

    Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?

    My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.

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    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Well spoken...

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post

    My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.
    Here is a small concrete step in that direction:

    Language company first in Army

    The company, which officially unfurls its flag Oct. 23, provides uniform-wearing interpreters and translators to units deploying to places like Iraq and Afghanistan. While not yet fully manned, the unit will eventually include more than 140 native speakers of languages like Arabic, Farsi, Pashtu, Kurdish and Dari.
    Once upon a time the US direct commissioned people with rare and necessary skills, and one could argue that language and cultural skills are in fact just that. If done with an eye for the strategic and pragmatic issues, I would suggest that a 'unconventional' solution can found to the problems that we all share...
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 12-09-2008 at 09:25 PM.
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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    One of the basic tenants of insurgency (and therefore COIN), is that seizing and holding physical terrain means nothing. The terrain being contested is that of the support of the populace.
    I agree and disagree, if holding terrain denies freedom of movement or access to the population (i.e. cities) then it has benefit, I still argue that COIN is 66% military (though often by unconventional means, more on that later) 33% Law Enforcement and 1% Social Service/Infrastructure. To state that physical terrain is meaningless in COIN is counter-productive.


    In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).
    Good points, and ones I will comment on at a later time.

    Excluding Taliban from the government is probably similar to excluding Nazi's from a post WWII government in Germany. Many Afghans support the Taliban position, and for them to not have representation is a problem that is sure to fester, and it appears that it has.
    I would argue that this is not true; they had support w/i a limited tribal framework and terrorized the rest of the country into deferring to them. They still do not have true popular support w/i the country, hence their base of operations in Pakistan.

    Then there is the catch-22 of our own presence. We need to be there to help this government build adequate capacity to stand alone, yet our very presence breeds a resistance insurgency that is not against the government so much as being against having a foreign power so prominent in their country. This is not insurmountable, but it is that very real baggage everytime you conduct FID; but particularly when you transition from UW to topple the government to FID to support the new government that replaced the old one. Can you say "conflict of interest"?
    Again, I disagree strongly. If we had removed the Taliban from power and left after Karzai had been elected, The Taliban would have attacked all the same w/ exactly the same base of support, which is limited and ruled through fear again. Our presence does little to attract support to the Taliban except when we choose to act poorly (i.e. Air Strikes). If it was a popular uprising then I would say your points had more merit.

    My thought is, that before we can move forward in Afghanistan, we must first step back. At the end of the day; the U.S. is far better served by an Afghan government that has the support of its own populace; than it is by an Afghan government that supports our government. Ideally we should strive for both, but if it can be only one, we want to be "blamed" for facilitating the former over the latter.
    I agree only in that by stepping back we can examine what the LOC that the Taliban and AQ use, as well as there support base and formulate an effective strategy based on this knowledge, instead of our current tendency to "act" even when we are not sure what exactly it is that we are doing. The Taliban could care less about the support of the populace, fear will work just as well for their purposes.
    Reed
    P.S. Sir, I do want to make clear that I feel that you are a fantastic addition to this forum and that I agree more often then disagree with what you have to say.
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Don't appologise for disagreeing. If I wanted to find a group of people who agreed with everything I said I would just adopt the party line and go talk to my peers. I put ideas out here not to bend people to my perspective, but because I believe the majority position that is being put out by "experts" has serious flaws to it, and that by putting out a new perspective it allows people like your self to challenge yourself, and to challenge me; and also allows me a broad perspective of feedback to sort out where perhaps I am off base, or where I just need to tighten up my argument. You all make me think, and that helps me give my boss better product.

    Many people think of COIN as a military operation; though most of the guys whose work on COIN has stood the test of time (note, anything published in the last 8 years has not stood that test yet), concur that COIN is civil business and must remain under civil lead to ensure that operations do not become too military (i.e., counterinsurgent vice counterinsurgency) in nature as they are likely to do if the military is in charge.

    An insurgency and the military is best thought of in the same way we respond to natural disasters. An event occurs and it is incumbent upon the local governance to handle the situation, to include local militia (local guard commanders can respond without approval or authorization to save lives, property, etc). When it is beyond their capacity, they ask the governor for a declaration of disaster and the state applies its resouces to the problem as well, to include the national guard on state orders. As the event continues to exceed capacity a federal declaration is sought bringing in federal resources and the active military. If the event exceeds even that, international support from NGOs and states come in, to include foreign military. As the situation calms down, these resources come off in the same order they went in. Military at every level is last in and first out. The Mayor remains in charge of his city, the Governor his state, etc. Military always answers to civil authority. This is how COIN should work as well. The whole goal is to simply get the situation back down within the capacity of the local government.

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    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    If we had removed the Taliban from power and left after Karzai had been elected, The Taliban would have attacked all the same w/ exactly the same base of support, which is limited and ruled through fear again. Our presence does little to attract support to the Taliban except when we choose to act poorly (i.e. Air Strikes). If it was a popular uprising then I would say your points had more merit.
    While I agree that the Taliban would have attacked the Karzai government with or without a coalition presence, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which the presence of foreign troops both undermines Karzai's legitimacy (especially in the south) and generates popular resentment (thereby facilitating Taliban recruitment). The Taliban's base of support does not wholly rest on fear.

    This isn't to say that the Afghan government would be more stable or successful without a coalition presence. The positives, for now, outweigh the negatives.

    It is to say, however, that the local political and ideological consequences of a foreign military presence are far from inconsequential, and need to recognized and addressed.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    While I agree that the Taliban would have attacked the Karzai government with or without a coalition presence, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the extent to which the presence of foreign troops both undermines Karzai's legitimacy (especially in the south) and generates popular resentment (thereby facilitating Taliban recruitment). The Taliban's base of support does not wholly rest on fear.
    This isn't to say that the Afghan government would be more stable or successful without a coalition presence. The positives, for now, outweigh the negatives.

    It is to say, however, that the local political and ideological consequences of a foreign military presence are far from inconsequential, and need to recognized and addressed.
    I agree that the base of support is not wholly out of fear, most of it is tribal in nature with a few ideologue converts, but it's expansion capacity is limited as is our ability to recruit there support to our side. The numbers are not fixed, but there is a fairly fixed range, if that makes sense. Of course I am on the outside looking in, and dependent on open source information, so I could be very wrong.
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    Interesting discussion here. A couple of points.

    It's important to remember (since the media and our chattering class have forgotten) that after the Taliban defeat in 2002 the priority in Afghanistan was DDR. While I would agree that more effort should have been made at preventing a Taliban resurgence, the problem of large, heavily armed militias was a serious one that had to be addressed. After all, it was warlordism that provided the space and popular support for the original rise of the Taliban in the 1990's.

    Bob's world said:

    The bigger issue is not one of city vs country; but rather one of a Afghan governance overly shaped and formed by Americans vice an Afghan governance truly shaped and designed by Afghans for Afghans.

    In a land of militias, and weak central governance, we demanded they stand down militias and build a strong central governance and army to enforce its will. One has to ask, do the people of Afghanistan see this as their government representing them, or do they see it as one that is a puppet of the U.S? (Note, not asking how do we see it, nor what it is, but how does their own populace perceive it).
    This is a very important point. I've been meaning to write something on governance for a while now - maybe I'll find the time. Anyway, I would argue that there are many in Afghanistan who do not want central "governance" no matter it's character. "Governance" is all the rage these days and is the policy that naturally flows from the view that a stable, functioning and legitimate government is a universally desirable end goal. And it's easy to argue that point of view because certainly from our perspective, dealing with legitimate governments is preferable to alternatives.

    So what happens with societies who have no interest in governance - societies that have long existed under different notions of stability and legitimacy? Are we going to show them the way to the benefits of governance and globalization (whether they like it or not)? What happens when they refuse?

    If and when they refuse (as is likely and already happening) then we will be set on a course of conflict with these societies as we try to implement our idealistic notions of how societies should be ordered. We are already seeing a lot of that in Afghanistan and its neighbors. We are trying to "sell" governance and key players are not buying. These players see benefits flowing from a central government as, at best, a prelude to the disruption of their societies and local power structures and the imposition of unwanted central authority and dependence on outsiders.

    The point in all this is to suggest that policies designed to bring governance in any time-frame shorter than generational are likely to be counterproductive in these areas and will bring more conflict, not less, as the "ungoverned" resist our efforts.

    Sometimes more isn't better. I would therefore argue that in many parts of Afghanistan we need to quit pursuing our paternalistic notions of governance and work with the local power structures to ensure their independence from all outsiders - Kabul and Taliban alike. The irony here is that in order to save a central government in Kabul, we may have to undermine its authority in some parts of Afghanistan - at least until it grows in capability and legitimacy enough to overcome the very real and long-standing hostility to central authority among many populations in Afghanistan. In trying to control the entire country, the coalition and Afghan government are overreaching. Better, IMO, to work on governance and legitimacy in those areas where that goal is realistically achievable over the short-to-medium term. In those areas where it is not, try to strike deals that guarantee local independence in exchange denying sanctuary and support to the Taliban and their allies.

    Anyway, that's my theory.

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