COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Rob Thornton]

Placed a new thread here dealing with COIN LOG requirements. Best Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

With VN, I use the statement in direct reference to MACV under Westy and his staff. I know it was picked up on at lower levels (with varying degrees of success), but at the end of the day it was a higher headquarters push that was needed. Abrams got it...his predecessors didn't.

"We." Thus I missed the direct reference. My apologies.

I'd also state that the "varying degrees of success" were specifically related to the knowledge of the commander on the ground and his willingness to do what was right instead of what his boss or his bosses boss thought was the politically astute thing to do.

As you say it was indeed higher headquarters comprehension and vision that was needed and lacking in the pre-1968 days.

[TT]

Slapout9 – Thanks for link, the paper looks interesting!

Steve,

Thank you very much for elaborating on the Sioux example. What you describe is generally what I was thinking towards. What knowledge I have on Native American culture and the Indians wars was gleaned some thirty odd years ago from some limited readings, one or two anthro classes and some conversations with members of the Blackfoot located in Alberta. So the details are kind of fuzzy these days.

It is interesting that a number of Army commanders figured out many of the social as well the other ones you mention, such as logistics and mobility. Stemming from the discussion on ‘the Concept of Adaptation’ thread with respect to rehabilitating past commanders to serve as new hero-warrior icons for COIN - (around about here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=3478&page=3) an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

And, no, I am not really expecting an answer to this last, just musing in print. But I expect there are a fair number of interesting, and potentially very valuable, papers to be written on this subject.

[Ken White]

Slapout9 – Thanks for link, the paper looks interesting!

...an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

. . .

I did not know Eddy (Slapouts good link Div Cdr) and do not know Petreaus but I've briefed and just talked to Abrams and Westmoreland. Both the latter two were courtly, did not shoot messengers and were smart. The difference was that Abrams listened and asked pertinent questions then listened to the answers. As an aside, Westmoreland had an awesome memory for names and faces and used that to good effect, Abrams did not have that people skill but he did have an awesome recall of events and circumsatnces.

My impression is that Eddy did and Petreaus does the same thing Abrams did. Listen...

[Steve Blair]

an intriguing question is what was it about these commanders (other trial and error) - that meant they had the insights they did, when it seems other commanders simply were not able to do the same?

And, no, I am not really expecting an answer to this last, just musing in print. But I expect there are a fair number of interesting, and potentially very valuable, papers to be written on this subject.

Thanks in part to Rob's suggestion I'm starting to work up a possible article about the ability of commanders to adapt (or not adapt) when moving from the Civil War to the Indian Wars. It is, indeed, a very interesting question and one that hasn't really been looked at in any detail (or at least with this sort of specific intent).

[Dr Jack]

Clausewitz defined Center of Gravity as "the hub of all power and movement on which all else depends." One of the problems caused by that definition was that many believed it meant that there could only be a single COG. It was a great debate. But you could find places in the 8 books where Clausewitz suggested that there could be more than one COG. The other issue related to COGs was the common view that they represented targets. In fact, the COGs were the source of the enemy's strength.

I've entered into this discussion a bit late, but here is what we currently teach at Leavenworth:

Joint doctrine describes centers of gravity (COGs) as “agents or sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance—what Clausewitz called ‘the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.’”

The intent is that the definition of COG is not just the "hub," but the source of strength...

From a planning perspective, determining the COG should be to discern where the real power is and where a knockout blow can take the enemy out, or at least bring the enemy to a culminating point where he ceases to be effective. At the strategic level this is almost always the population that is resolved to win or the leader who is leading out ahead of the population with firm resolve and dedication. This distinction of the leader vice the population begs the “chicken-egg” argument with a big gray area, but it is still useful to analyze and determine from a planning perspective which of the two is the strategic COG.

There is always a lot of disagreement about using either a leader or the population; this is just the starting point we use to help start the discussion and to get our arms around the concept.

At the operational level the COG is almost invariably specific military or insurgent forces. Because the operational level of war is more fluid and subject to changes, the COG at the operational level is more likely to change over time.

The biggest discussions center around the Operational COG; in a COIN situation or fighting a compartmented enemy such as AQ (with different components doing planning, recruiting, funding, etc., without knowledge of the other components) this is particularly problemmatic. That's life.

The COG at the operational level is, of course, theater-specific and should represent an entity that can be attacked either directly or indirectly. It is preferable, from a planning framework, that there only be one COG, but this is not always the ground truth—there may be more than one. This is especially true in a campaign that has multiple logical lines of operation such as humanitarian operations, offensive operations, and other stability operations that are ongoing simultaneously.

Many don't think you can have more than one COG, but I don't agree... particularly at the operational level and when conducting full spectrum ops.

There will no doubt be wide variance between planners on determining the COG at the strategic and operational levels. This should not be cause for concern. The debate and discussion that lead to identifying the COGs help focus the staff and commanders on the all-important task of identifying and understanding the problem. The discussion will help to identify the sources of power and assist in identifying how to address these sources.

This is the key; all of the discussion doesn't get you to the point of agreement -- it's to the point of understanding the adversary and the environment by considering the constuct of COG.

More at this link (including how lines of operation are used) -- and this document will be updated in the next couple of months:

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/show...lename=378.pdf

[slapout9]

Here is an article with a very different view by Dr. Milan Vego. You can not name a COG (focus of effort) until you name an Objective and the COG will always be found in the Objective. If you have multiple Objectives you will have multiple COG's. If your Objective changes your COG will have to change. Also points out on how the error in translation has led to many misconceptions about what a COG is. Very good article in my opinion and certainly makes the concept a lot clearer, at least in his opinion.

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_prog...pring_2006.pdf

[wm]

Here is an article with a very different view by Dr. Milan Vego. You can not name a COG (focus of effort) until you name an Objective and the COG will always be found in the Objective. If you have multiple Objectives you will have multiple COG's. If your Objective changes your COG will have to change. Also points out on how the error in translation has led to many misconceptions about what a COG is. Very good article in my opinion and certainly makes the concept a lot clearer, at least in his opinion.

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_prog...pring_2006.pdf

I like Vego's description. I have always considered a COG as the point where you get the most bang for your buck. This needs more refienment however, because different operations seek different sorts of bang. For example, if you want to keep the Comanches from going out on raids (the bang, AKA, objective or mission) then perhaps the most cost effective way to do so is to eliminate their mounts. Other options include killing them all off, fencing them in and mounting a 24-hour guard, etc. But which is most effective and efficient, which produces the best payout for the least investment?

I still don't understand the need to overintellectualize this stuff. It goes back to the concept of METT-TC, IMHO.

I concur that a COG is only defineable after an objective or mission is determined. As an alternative way to understand this, one that allows for multipler COGs, view a military operation as a causal chain of events. Every link in that causal chain is potentially a COG, depending on what the commander chooses (or is directed) to target. Remember the old causal chain: "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse, the rider was lost. For want of a rider, the battle was lost." If it were that simple, then the COG in this case would be that nail of your opponent's. But, the shoe, the horse, or the rider could also be COGs, depending on ETT-TC in METT-TC. (I presume that M was "win the battle.")

If you wish to take MarcT's point about COGs being derived from Newtonian physics, then look at gravitaional forces in our solar system. Each planet has its own center of gravity. They interact with the other bodies in the solar system as well to produce additional centers of gravity. If I remember my high school physics correctly, the universal law of gravitation talks about the force of attraction between two objects being based on the product of their masses divided by the square of their distance apart. So, in this case, we have at least three items that we can focus on to disrupt a force of gravity--each, I suppose, could be considered a center of gravity.

[slapout9]

Posted by wm:
I still don't understand the need to overintellectualize this stuff. It goes back to the concept of METT-TC, IMHO.

Do I ever agree with that statement.
METT-TC is Strategy to me as opposed to the Ends, Ways, and Means used now.

[Ken White]

a bad tendency to try to build templates and matrices and over complicate things to enhance our 'professionalism.' We are professional (no quotes) and need to avoid clouding something as complicated as fighting a war with any more confusing ideas.

Studying war in a vacuum is neat and good ideas and words can abound -- and should, seriously. However, that study and verbosity must be reduced for implementation. At the implmentation point, it needs to be simple. Period.

Much of this is, I think, an effort to produce voluminous guides and easy to follow (though they aren't) steps to allow anyone and everyone to be a great captain. Not going to happen. Some have it and some don't and all the aids in the world will be of small benefit to those who don't.

[PhilR]

The COG discussion is always fascinating and enlightening... and it is endless. It is a good technique to drive discussion in planning teams and staffs as to what is important, what should we focus on, what makes the enemy tick, etc. At the end of the day, however, what is necessary is for the commander to describe what he thinks the COG(s) is, why he thinks it is a COG, what does it mean to him that its a COG, and what he thinks we should do about it.
Doctrine goes along way to get us (collectively) on the same sheet of music with the COG concept, but it is apparrent from all of the discussions, books and articles, that there is a fairly wide divergence of opinion on COGs. This is all well and good for discussion and learning, but for application, the commander needs to ensure that everyone has his same understanding, or else the resulting logic of the plan can be lost on his subordinates. Of course, this requires the commander to be an active thinker and not just bless off of a slide put in front of him. in most cases where that happens, I see that the commander doesn't really consider the COG (that is presented) as a critical piece. After the course of action is approved, it can sometimes be hard to go back and demonstrate how it is really getting after the COGs defined early in the planning.

[Ken White]

above. I think PhilR summed it up nicely.

We've all watched an amazing number of folks try to follow complex plans and orders with bad effects...

The academic discussions on strategy, operations, tactics and methods absolutely need to occur in the Universities, the Think Tanks and above all in the service Schools. It should also take place with our Allies and even with non-Allies -- we are terrible about the "not invented here" syndrome (both inter and intra) -- and the results debated endlessly with one thought in mind; to produce sensible, easily followed doctrine (while always bearing in mind that Halsey's dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." [emphasis added / kw] is important).

The results then need to be synthesized and simplified into simple doctrine. I submit that is much more of an intellectual challenge than merely establishing ever more complex methodologies with only limited applicability simply due to their complexity. We effectively won WW II with Field Manuals that would fit in a pocket. I'm not advocating regression; rather smarter progress.

We should also ban Power Point...

[TT]

PhilR
The COG discussion is always fascinating and enlightening... and it is endless.

Agreed. Definitely fascinating and enlightening. Many thanks!

Ken White
It should also take place with our Allies and even with non-Allies

I have the good fortune to interact with officers of many different Allied nations on a fairly regular basis. Once upon a time I had thought that COGs was pretty much straightforward but how different nationalities and different officers perceive COGs left me believing that it really is dependent on a range of factors, including national experience and training, organizational culture and so on.

Ken White;
I did not know Eddy (Slapouts good link Div Cdr) and do not know Petreaus but I've briefed and just talked to Abrams and Westmoreland. Both the latter two were courtly, did not shoot messengers and were smart. The difference was that Abrams listened and asked pertinent questions then listened to the answers. As an aside, Westmoreland had an awesome memory for names and faces and used that to good effect, Abrams did not have that people skill but he did have an awesome recall of events and circumsatnces.

My impression is that Eddy did and Petreaus does the same thing Abrams did. Listen...

Thank you for this, Ken, as it is an interesting insight on how different individual officers behave. The willingness to to listen, ask pertinent questions,and then listen, is one I had not considered before but now that you have pointed it out it seems intuitively to be an important character and command trait.

Steve Blair
Thanks in part to Rob's suggestion I'm starting to work up a possible article about the ability of commanders to adapt (or not adapt) when moving from the Civil War to the Indian Wars. It is, indeed, a very interesting question and one that hasn't really been looked at in any detail (or at least with this sort of specific intent).

This would be an interesting and valuable study, and I would love to read it. If you are interested in an academic perspective, I would be more than happy to read and comment on a draft when you have finished.

[Ken White]

angle, in addition to listening ability (really listening), a suggestion if I may. You might consider another intangible imponderable...

A lot of people in positions of power have really big egos. Understandable and not all bad; as someone once pointed out, "You wouldn't want your kids going to war under a guy with an inferiority complex, would you?"

Good question. I suggest the answer is no -- but (as they say)...

I have met a number of senior folks who had adequate egos but who were surprisingly lacking in simple self confidence. They mostly covered or hid this well but seemed to continually question themselves while reacting strongly and frequently adversely to a question from anyone else. They also tended to be excessively concerned with unimportant minutia. Thus, I think we sometimes do send our kids to war under a guy with an inferiority complex of sorts.

For a good Commander, I believe a blend of ego, self confidence, willingness to listen and plain old strength of character as well as an intuitive sense of combat have to meld. I've been lucky to know and serve under a number of folks who had that blend; I've also known and served under a perhaps larger number who did not but just, usually, got by -- generally at some unnecessary cost to the unit involved.

[Armchairguy]

but what Ken said about consulting allies had a real ring to it. Does anyone in a really methodical way ask the former insurgents what types of messages. media, and ways of turning them from the insurgency would have worked with them? Seems they would have a more culturally astute eye for stuff that would or would not be worth doing. I was thinking along the lines of fairly widespread questionairres or polls. Just seems there is a ready made focus group with a relatively close demographic.

[Steve Blair]

angle, in addition to listening ability (really listening), a suggestion if I may. You might consider another intangible imponderable...

A lot of people in positions of power have really big egos. Understandable and not all bad; as someone once pointed out, "You wouldn't want your kids going to war under a guy with an inferiority complex, would you?"

Good question. I suggest the answer is no -- but (as they say)...

I have met a number of senior folks who had adequate egos but who were surprisingly lacking in simple self confidence. They mostly covered or hid this well but seemed to continually question themselves while reacting strongly and frequently adversely to a question from anyone else. They also tended to be excessively concerned with unimportant minutia. Thus, I think we sometimes do send our kids to war under a guy with an inferiority complex of sorts.

For a good Commander, I believe a blend of ego, self confidence, willingness to listen and plain old strength of character as well as an intuitive sense of combat have to meld. I've been lucky to know and serve under a number of folks who had that blend; I've also known and served under a perhaps larger number who did not but just, usually, got by -- generally at some unnecessary cost to the unit involved.

Ken,

The group I'm dealing with (Indian Wars officers with CW service) certainly had egos...in plenty. That is something I was going to factor in...ego combined with an ability to learn and set the ego aside when the time came to assimilate new experiences and ideas. One of my factors, actually, is the ability of the officer to lay aside old CW ego battles and get on with the new job. Some of them could, some could not, and others were a middle ground of sorts.

[John T. Fishel]

The ends, ways, means approach to strategy is not, and cannot be, the whole story. It depends on, as well as drives, a METT-TC analysis. That analysis, usually takes place at the operational and tactical levels but there is no reason it cannot or should not take place at the strategic. Still, strategy is usually defined as the relation of ends to means (or vice versa) [through ways]. In other words, strategy must answer the questions: What do I want to accomplish? How do I expect to do so? And, what resources do I need?

Listening, really listening, I agree, is the key to successful leadership. In the end, I also agree that the commander's understanding to the enemy COG(s) and friendly COG(s) must be adopted by all in the chain but the commander must listen first to other views before he puts his stamp on it.

Steve, your proposed article on adaptation from the CW to the IW raises the question I have ponered here and elsewhere: Why do we always seem to have to relearn the lessons os Small Wars? I will look forward to reading the article and await it with anticipation.

Cheers

JohnT

[Steve Blair]

Steve, your proposed article on adaptation from the CW to the IW raises the question I have ponered here and elsewhere: Why do we always seem to have to relearn the lessons os Small Wars? I will look forward to reading the article and await it with anticipation.

Cheers

JohnT

This has always interested/baffled me as well, and is one of the things that pushed me in this research direction.

[TT]

Thank you very much for your additional insight. You are right that the characteristics you raise are intangibles, and that means that they are very easy for an academic such as myself to overlook. So I do appreciate and value your insights.

Best

TT

[Rob Thornton]

I got a PM asking me about my thoughts I put up front. I thought it might help - the PM went to relevancy of operational thinking:

From my response,

The operational level is really about projecting a series of operations, lines of operation and/or logical lines of operation toward an objective that provides a distinct enough advantage as to have strategic consequence. So I think a political line of operation that might start with local reconciliation, but ended in large scale, national reconciliation by easing pressures might be a good example (or it could be the other way around - depends on how you pursue it). FID or the ongoing advisory effort and the operational steps needed to realize that might be another good example of a logical line of operation toward enabling partner capacity. A series of security operations beginning in Baghdad and spreading outward (the ink blot) might be a physical LOO in the context of COIN operations - hope that helps.

These are not meant to say that these LOOs have succeeded or failed (I'm just using them as examples), but that operational thinking is "a way" to apply resources in time and space toward seizing the initiative from an enemy, with the goal of making strategic progress. The question might be asked, if you don't think in operational terms how to do this - what method do you use to keep from just flailing about - meaning managing and synchronizing resources so that they can be sustained over time. The same question might be used for COG analysis in terms of its apllicability - but I think members have already hit that one well - its a process that allows you to consider relationships between strengths and weaknesses, then apply resources to their best ends.

Ken makes a point that I've been cogitating on since he posted it about the extension of the operational environment. I think its wisely stated, and something we should include in the context of all wars where public will is accessible.

Thanks, Rob