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Thread: COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

  1. #661
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CSC2005 View Post
    Any movie will do. The class is for a LE group.
    Send me a plane ticket....I'll teach some good stuff

  2. #662
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by CSC2005 View Post
    Any movie will do. The class is for a LE group.
    My law enforcement/forensics students produced a GREAT set of videos, and we were looking at creating more. I'd suggest the same thing. Reverse the process. Make your students make the videos. If you've got the time. We made about 40 videos this semester. All ten minutes or so long.
    Sam Liles
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  3. #663
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    My law enforcement/forensics students produced a GREAT set of videos, and we were looking at creating more. I'd suggest the same thing. Reverse the process. Make your students make the videos. If you've got the time. We made about 40 videos this semester. All ten minutes or so long.
    Good idea Sam, here is an example and there are actually some very good techniques in here, each one about a minute long.

    Ask a spy series from the TV show Burn Notice.
    http://www.usanetwork.com/series/bur...video/spytips/

  4. #664
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default Pakistan Undecover

    You should get a copy of this CD. This whole CD is about Intelligence and collecting it in the WOT/GWOT/COIN/CRIME/MEAN GUYS WITH GUNS or whatever we are calling it these days.



    http://channel.nationalgeographic.co...ideos/06840_00

  5. #665
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    The film The Dancer Upstairs comes to mind, but it is more CT than COIN; some good intel scenes, iirc. Tropa De Elite (The Elite Squad) and The Untouchables come to mind with regard to criminal insurgencies. I will try to think of some specific scenes in them.

    I have always liked this scene in Men in Black, but never knew what to do with it.

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    The scene in Star Wars: ANH where the alien tells the stormtroopers where Luke & company are going.

    The scene in Green Zone where the guy is trying to tell the Americans about the meeting of all the high-ranking Iraqis and they scuff him up.
    "The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
    -- Ken White


    "With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap

    "We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen

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    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1c4VEuts70U

    Colors has a good scene summing it up, in my opinion.
    "The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
    -- Ken White


    "With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap

    "We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen

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    What about the conversation between Lawrence and Feisal in Feisal's tent towards the beginning of LAwrence of Arabia?

    There's also a clip where (Either Archibald Murray or Allenby?) tells Lawrence to "find out what sort of a man [Feisal] is". Another good clip.

  9. #669
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    Quote Originally Posted by Starbuck View Post
    What about the conversation between Lawrence and Feisal in Feisal's tent towards the beginning of LAwrence of Arabia?

    There's also a clip where (Either Archibald Murray or Allenby?) tells Lawrence to "find out what sort of a man [Feisal] is". Another good clip.
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSvik9WPigE
    "I cannot fiddle, but I can make a great state from a little city."

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2qA_c...eature=related
    "The English have a great hunger for desolate places."
    "The status quo is not sustainable. All of DoD needs to be placed in a large bag and thoroughly shaken. Bureaucracy and micromanagement kill."
    -- Ken White


    "With a plan this complex, nothing can go wrong." -- Schmedlap

    "We are unlikely to usefully replicate the insights those unencumbered by a military staff college education might actually have." -- William F. Owen

  10. #670
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    Default Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War

    Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War

    Entry Excerpt:

    Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War
    An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile
    by Octavian Manea

    Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

    I’ve carefully read your commentary concerning David Galula’s work on counterinsurgency and its applicability for today’s COIN campaigns and you seem to identify a special kind of lesson or warning than the ones that influenced the development of FM 3-24: “its tactical brilliance was divorced from a strategic purpose. So don’t repeat the same mistake. After all, France lost Algeria”. So, why do you think that by embracing Galula’s tactical brilliance, we tend to lose sight of the art of strategy?

    That has been the whole problem with the COIN narrative that developed at least in US Army circles since the end of the Vietnam War. It was, and is, premised on the idea that the Vietnam War could have been won by better counterinsurgency tactics and operations. This is the basic nugget of an idea that had a snowball effect; in the 1980s with Andrew Krepinevich’ The Army and Vietnam, then in the 1990s with John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, and more currently many of the writings of Colonel Robert Cassidy and others.

    The idea of a better war through improved counterinsurgency tactics has come to define causation in the Iraq war too. Recent books like Tom Ricks’s duo of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq and Linda Robinson’s Tell Me How this Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq offers the notion of a bumbling, fumbling conventional army that is doing counterinsurgency incorrectly, but because a better and enlightened general comes onto the scene combined with a few innovative new officers at the lower levels who figure out how to do counterinsurgency by the classic rule and voila the operational Army is reinvented and starts doing the things differently. And it is because the Army does things differently on the ground that it produces a transformed situation, as the narrative states. It’s the idea that better tactics can rescue a failed policy and strategy.

    Download the Full Article: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

    Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).



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  11. #671
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    Default COIN Intel Clip Thanks

    Guys

    Thanks for the ideas. They are great. I have already pulled a couple of them into my class. thanks

    Art

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    Default Tossing the Afghan COIN

    Tossing the Afghan COIN

    Entry Excerpt:

    Tossing the Afghan COIN by Michael A. Cohen at The Nation. BLUF: "...what should really be taken away from the US military's experience over the past ten years is not that the United States understands how to fight and win population-centric counterinsurgencies but that counterinsurgencies are as violent and inconclusive as any other conflicts, and that the United States should avoid such wars at all costs."



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    Default U.S. Army COIN Center SITREP

    U.S. Army COIN Center SITREP

    Entry Excerpt:

    Here's the latest U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center SITREP. From the Director's Comments: This SITREP highlights current initiatives in the Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare Communities of Interest to help keep you apprised of some important ongoing activities. It has been a dynamic time at the Combined Arms Center since the last COIN SITREP -- the COIN Center has been involved in several organizational changes -- creation of Mission Command Center of Excellence and the Army Irregular Warfare (IW) Fusion Cell -- intended to harmonize efforts across Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, and security force assistance communities; several extended trips to Afghanistan; and assumption of the mission to deliver COIN Seminars to deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) beginning in May, 2011.



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    Default U.S. COIN Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces

    U.S. COIN Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces

    Entry Excerpt:


    Innovation,Transformation, and War: U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and
    Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007
    (Stanford University Press) by Dr. James A. Russell is now on the streets and available for purchase.

    From Amazon's product description: Within a year of President George W. Bush announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, dozens of attacks by insurgents had claimed hundreds of civilian and military lives. Through 2004 and 2005, accounts from returning veterans presaged an unfolding strategic debacle—potentially made worse by U.S. tactics being focused on extending conventionally oriented military operations rather than on adapting to the insurgency.

    By 2007, however, a sea change had taken place, and some U.S. units were integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect. In the main, the government and the media cited three factors for having turned the tide on the battlefield: the promulgation of a new joint counterinsurgency doctrine, the "surge" in troop numbers, and the appointment of General David Petraeus as senior military commander.

    James Russell, however, contends that local security had already improved greatly in Anbar and Ninewah between 2005 and 2007 thanks to the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders—evidenced most notably in the turning of tribal leaders against Al Qaeda. In Innovation, Transformation, and War, he goes behind the headlines to reveal—through extensive field research and face-to-face interviews with military and civilian personnel of all ranks—how a group of Army and Marine Corps units successfully innovated in an unprecedented way: from the bottom up as well as from the top down. In the process they transformed themselves from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations into ones with a unique array of capabilities for a full spectrum of combat operations. As well as telling an inspiring story, this book will be an invaluable reference for anyone tasked with driving innovation in any kind of complex organization.



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    Default PI: COIN, CT Operations Fruitful in 2010

    PI: COIN, CT Operations Fruitful in 2010

    Entry Excerpt:

    Philippine Military: Counterinsurgency, Terrorism Operations Fruitful in 2010 - Xinhua via The Manila Bulletin. BLUF: "The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) said Friday it had further reduced the strength of leftist and terrorist groups in the country in 2010, owing to its " successful operations" throughout the country."



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    Default Will China have to master third-party COIN?

    Will China have to master third-party COIN?

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    In the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly, Ely Ratner, an Associate Political Scientist at RAND, asserts that one of the consequences of China’s rapid rise in global influence will be increasingly complicated and difficult security challenges for the Chinese state. Ratner believes that most Western analysts who study China’s future influence on global security have failed to take these challenges into account.

    Ratner contends that the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has made a thorough study of the lessons learned from the experiences of other rising powers in history. He claims that China’s foreign policy is attempting to avoid the errors made by these powers. However, Ratner asserts that China’s expanding commercial and political connections throughout the world, an unavoidable consequence of China’s need for raw materials and export markets, will lead to clashes with states and non-state actors that will acquire grievances against China’s decisions, methods, and actions. In addition, China’s eagerness to transact with authoritarian regimes otherwise shunned by the West may lead to surprisingly large “blowback” directed against Beijing.

    It is highly likely that China will find itself using the same tools – covert action, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, proxy wars, third-party counterinsurgency, etc. – that other past global powers have used to defend their interests in quasi-colonial situations. Ratner recommends that U.S. policymakers take this estimate of China’s future security difficulties into account when formulating their own strategies, to including cooperation with China when security interests with the United States overlap.

    Click here to read this interesting paper.

    Nothing follows.



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    Default COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

    COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

    Entry Excerpt:

    COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges
    by Joshua Thiel

    Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

    “Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency” (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army’s Handbook on Counter Insurgency, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).

    Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

    Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict.



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    Default The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

    The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

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    The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN
    by A. Lawrence Chickering

    Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

    In a series of short reflections, Tom Ricks neatly summarizes major themes in current thinking on how to strengthen COIN. Sharing a trait that is evident in most current theoreticians, he omits serious discussion about how to recruit the populace of countries threatened by insurgencies to play an active role in COIN. This failure has several dimensions. I want, in this short essay, to address one of the most interesting of them, which relates to the importance of basic principles in physics to counterinsurgency warfare. I will focus, especially, on the difference between the “old” (Newtonian) physics and the “new” physics of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

    Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

    A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.



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    Default Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards

    Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards

    Entry Excerpt:

    Counterinsurgency Conference and COIN Qualification Standards by Colonel Daniel Roper, U.S. Army COIN Center.

    Conference: “To foster dialogue between ISAF members over tactical lessons from Afghanistan, particularly at the company level”—that was the purpose of a conference held at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London last December. The conference, organized by the British Army’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Centre, the US Army COIN Center, the USMC Irregular Warfare Center, and the ISAF COIN Advisory and Assistance Team, drew civilian and military academics and practitioners from Afghanistan, Belgium, the Netherlands, the US, and the UK. Speakers included the former commander of Regional Command-South; the US Army Command and General Staff College COIN Chair; a US Army brigade commander, the director of ISAF CAAT, the director of the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and an official from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. You can download the conference report here.

    COIN Qualification Standards: The COIN Qualification Standards are nine tasks and fifty-two sub-tasks submitted by Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), and approved by Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Robert M. Gates (see here).

    RFI: "We would like to hear your thoughts on the COIN Qualification Standards and how they might help your unit prepare for deployment."



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    Default Is COIN Dead?

    Is COIN Dead?

    Entry Excerpt:

    Mark Safranski, aka Zenpundit, asks "is counterinsurgency dead?".

    "By that, I mean contemporary, mid-2000’s ”pop-centric” COIN theory as expressed in FM 3-24 - is it de facto dead as USG policy or is COIN theory formally evolved to officially embrace strong elements of CT, targeted assassinations, FID, “open-source counterinsurgency” and even bare-knuckled conventional warfare tactics?"
    What say you?



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