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Thread: COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

  1. #261
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by UrsaMaior View Post
    Examples like Mao's advices in Three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, or the roman legions' soft power activities so brilliantly summarised in Monthy Python: Brian's Life. If we speak of the legionnaires I would like also add that apart from buidling activities, they participated in the administration of the provinces, conducted road patrols, served as embedded advisors in indigenous armies etc. Now that's full spectrum.
    I must just correct you. It is Monty Python's, Life of Brian which is a master work, and much revered here, amongst the majority secular community in Israel. Otherwise your point is excellent and well made.

    We just don't have to reinvent the wheel all of the time.
    Exactly! - and some folks should be confronted about the selective raiding the historic and operational record to support the latest bumper sticker idea, which usually has no merit.
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  2. #262
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    Default General Vincent Desportes

    General Vincent Desportes
    Small Wars Journal Interview
    by Judah Grunstein

    SWJ Interview: General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

    General Vincent Desportes is the commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center and author of The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris. Also see Judah Grunstein’s SWJ review of The Likely War.

    Small Wars Journal: You said in your book that before any intervention, the strategic objectives (which are political) must be identified. Given the complexity (multilateral, inter-ministerial) of this kind of operation, which organism would be responsible for that kind of reflection and to identify the objectives?

    Gen. Desportes: For one thing, in a lot of ways I’m defining a type of model for an ideal to attain. Now what we know is that in reality, it’s something that’s extremely difficult to do. And we notice that first we send the force to do something, and often the “end state” is defined after we’ve sent the force. The flagrant example is Afghanistan: first we sent the force, and afterwards we defined an “end state.” So the schema that we should know the end state perfectly before we construct through retroaction the coordination of lines of operation is an ideal schema. So what I’m defining is an ideal schema. What’s certain is that in fact governments respond most often in reaction, and in rapid reaction, and so the objectives are often contructed once we’ve launched the operation. So we’re pretty far from the ideal theoretic schema that I proposed.

    Now, in France, it’s probable (and the Livre Blanc says it) that we’re missing a structure of coordination and analysis that can do this sort of thing. When I wrote my book, obviously, the center for crisis coordination (which is foreseen by the Livre Blanc and which is supposed to be part of the Quai d’Orsay) didn’t exist. Now, I don’t know if that center is functioning, but it’s probably that sort of center that reunites the interminsterial expertise that, from the outset of the crisis, allows the formulation of the diplomatic, economic, military and other analyses that allow us to define an “end state” before launching the operation.
    General Vincent DesportesThe Likely War
    by Judah Grunstein, Small Wars Journal

    General Vincent Desportes (Full PDF Article)

    Articulated by Army Field Manual 3-24 and incarnated by Gen. David Petraeus’ implementation of the Baghdad Surge, the U.S. Army’s freshly minted counterinsurgency tactics are a direct response to the needs of the moment in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With their increasing ascendancy in American military doctrine still the subject of debate, a recent book by General Vincent Desportes, commander of the French Army’s Force Employment Doctrine Center, provides a strategic context for the discussion that is all the more interesting for the author’s unique perspective as a French strategic thinker well-versed in American strategic culture. Gen. Desportes served for two years at the U.S. Army War College as part of an officer exchange program, as well as for two years as Army Liaison Officer at Fort Monroe in Virginia. That was followed by three years as the military attache at the French Embassy in Washington. His analysis of the evolutions in contemporary warfare and the tactical and strategic adaptations on the part of Western militaries that they necessitate is not yet translated into English. So we’ve prepared the following extended synopsis, as well as an accompanying interview Gen. Desportes generously accorded us, to make it available to the American COIN community.

    In The Likely War (La Guerre Probable, Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris), Desportes argues that the wars for which Western militaries need to prepare will not be symmetric or disymmetric conflicts between state actors. Among the factors making such wars improbable, he lists regional integration, which renders conflict less profitable and more costly, as well as globalization, which he astutely describes as the “inheritor” of Cold War deterrence. What’s more, he argues that even conventional war is unlikely to be symmetric, as military logic recommends attacking the weak links (ie. networks and satellites) of an adversary’s technical advantages, rather than confronting its strengths head on. (He doesn’t mention it, but Chinese military doctrine comes to mind.) More significantly, though, Desportes points to recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon to argue that far from being a lesser order of warfare, asymmetric (or irregular) war is nothing other than the inevitable application of war’s eternal law: that of bypassing the enemy’s strength. “The use of the term asymmetric. . .” he writes, “reflects the refusal to imagine that an adversary worthy of the name might want to fight according to a logic other than our own.” (pp. 45-46).

  3. #263
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    Must agree that so called "counter-insurgency" is not graduate level warfare. Personally feel its graduate level diplomacy.

    Disagree with the Colonel regarding "PhDs of war" being those who understand that their actions at the beginning have consequences later.

    This is not too much to be asking of anyone at the undergraduate level. Everyone should know it not just the enlightened few, but everyone.

    Roger, actions have consequences, decisions have ramifications, that's part of the challenge of leadership.

  4. #264
    Council Member Pattonmat89's Avatar
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    Default Future of COIN and war in general

    I've heard a lot about the supposed "Crusaders vs. Conservatives" argument over how we will be fighting wars in the future (I also heard a bit about how it was slightly contrived). So I decided to add my two cents, a decision which could be as ill-advised as my decision, at age 2-3, to stomp on a fire ant mound while wearing sandals. Anyway, here goes.

    I find plausible the argument that our wars will be increasingly irregular and that we need to put a greater emphasis on COIN, but at the same time, we need to remember that conventional warfighting is not dead. I read a monograph at the Army Strategic Studies Institute about the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, and how Hizballah didn't fight a pure irregular war, and that some of the Israeli problems may have been due to loss of warfighting prowess while bogged down in the West Bank and Gaza.

    I accept the argument that the military still needs conventional warfighting skills, as well as COIN skills. At the best of times, a good military should be well-rounded, am I right? So it makes sense, given that there are still nations with large militaries that could pose threats to us, to retain the ability to give them an old-style smackdown.

    Think about it. An Army that focused too much on conventional combat and virtually ignored the problem of COIN is one of the big reasons why Iraq has been so bad. It would hardly be better to ignore conventional fighting in favor of COIN.

    If any of this didn't make sense, well, it's almost 0000, and I have class at 0800. I don't have the time to think any more tonight. Good night.

    One last thought: We should preserve conventional warfighting because no one knows what the future actually is. Before Iraq, people were saying, "Well, wars are going to get so technology-heavy, and we'll reduce the number of boots on the ground, because we have Tomahawks and magic PGMs, and the like." I'm only 19, but even I know that the term "conventional wisdom" was not intended as a compliment.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-07-2016 at 03:34 PM. Reason: Stand alone thread with 3k views until merged.
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  5. #265
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    Default Course syllabi for COIN at CGSC?

    Are there posted course syllabi for CGSC courses (or other colleges)? I'm curious to see how courses, reading lists, etc. for staff colleges has changed during OIF/OEF.

    I know they've changed, but I'd like to see specifically how.

    Articles addressing the same would be appreciated as well.

    Many thanks.

  6. #266
    Council Member Xenophon's Avatar
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    Default MCU COIN Leadership Seminar 9/23/09

    Is anyone else attending the Marine Corps University sponsored COIN Leadership Seminar in D.C. on September 23rd? I managed to get a spot but I don't know a soul going. It hasn't been publicized very much but if anyone else is going we can start a SWJ section, maybe do some heckling. I'll be the guy in the back with a high and tight trying to hide my tiny silver bars from all the flag officers.

    http://www.cnas.org/node/3314 ----link goes to the CNAS info page on the event, as I can't find the Marine Corps one, if one exists.
    Last edited by Xenophon; 09-14-2009 at 10:38 PM. Reason: URL FUBAR'd

  7. #267
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default 'Who Dares ....Wins?'

    maybe do some heckling
    Career enhancing move! Just being there will be enough and posing a few questions can impress - you can always blame what you read here, being such a vulnerable junior officer.

    I enjoyed asking questions in Whitehall many years ago as they thought I was in the military, but wasn't.

    davidbfpo

  8. #268
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default Counterinsurgency Leadership Symposium

    I'm registered and will be attending. Registration is now full - here is the e-mail I got the other day:

    Greetings ~

    The Marine Corps University's Counterinsurgency Leadership Symposium is now just two weeks away. Owing to high demand, we had to close registration a month ago and we have accumulated a very long waiting list. Thus, if your plans have changed and you are unable to come, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to cancel your reservation so that someone else can attend.

    A few reminders:

    1. Seating at the event will be on a first come, first served basis, so you are strongly advised to arrive early. Check in opens at 7 am and the symposium begins at 8 am.

    2. We have updated the list of books that can be signed during the event, as we have added a few speakers (http://www.federalconference.com/CLS/). You can bring any of these books with you for signature by the author, but no books will be for sale on the day of the event because of federal regulations.

    3. You still have a few days to purchase the optional lunch. If you buy the lunch, you will have time to speak with the panelists and obtain book signatures that would otherwise be unavailable. To purchase the lunch, please go to www.regonline.com/cls2009 and enter your email address and the password you selected at initial registration to select and purchase your lunch.

    4. Uniform: Military dress should be USMC Service "C" and Army Class "B" or equivalent / business attire for civilians.

    5. Address:

    National Press Club
    529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor
    Washington, DC 20045
    202-662-7500

    6. Link to map: http://www.press.org/directions.cfm

    7. Directions by Metro:


    Take Metro to Metro Center.
    Take the 13th Street Exit, take escalator to 13th Street; you should be at the corner of 13th and G Streets.
    Walk one block south to F Street.
    Turn right (West) and walk one block to 14th Street
    Turn left and walk downhill to the National Press Building lobby.
    Enter and take the elevators to the 13th Floor

    8. Parking:


    The PMI garage is located on the north side of G St between 13th and 14th Streets.
    Car Park is located at the corner of 15th and F Streets.
    Cost of parking in this area ranges from $20 to $35 per day.

    9. Please direct any questions to paul AT nationalconference.com.

  9. #269
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Virtual COIN

    David Betz, KOW plus, has written a journal article and Prof. Randy Borum has written a quick review on his blogsite:http://globalcrim.blogspot.com/2009/...nsurgency.html

    Betz's four main points are:
    First, we do not take it seriously enough and therefore the tools we try to fight with are not fit for purpose.

    Second, to the extent we do engage in the virtual dimension we concentrate too much on shifting Muslim opinion on an aspect of their religious faith that we as outsiders cannot effectively voice an opinion on. This is not to say we have not a stake in the outcome of that debate. We obviously do. But the surest way to make it go against us is to get involved in it.

    Third, we pay almost no attention to the audience to which we have access and understand: our own population, which includes Muslims in the West whose allegiance to global Jihad is what Islamists crave more than anything.

    Fourth, our efforts at narrative construction falter because they lack vertical coherence.
    The basic problem – Betz explains – is that
    What we say does not always align with what we do.
    His article is:Betz, D. (2008). The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19 (4), 510-540 DOI: 10.1080/09592310802462273 (I suspect this is behind a pay wall).
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-13-2017 at 02:32 PM. Reason: 8,400v before merging
    davidbfpo

  10. #270
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    Default Wolves vs. Sheepdogs: People as the Weapon

    When we talk about COIN Population Centric strategy it usually involves a sheepdog mentality. In other words, we are the sheepdogs protecting the sheep "the population".

    Thomas Marks in "Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam" noted that Maoist revolutionaries in post Vietnam Asia were defeated through citizen militias. These militias, such as in Peru, were sometimes spontaneous in nature. They were not developed by the government. Rather the population rose upon their own against the Shining Path in Peru.

    According to Mao, the people are the weapon. The guerrilla walks into a village and does not see sheep that need to be protected but wolves that can be used as a weapon. When he sees an old man, he does not see someone who needs to be coddled and protected, he sees an offensive weapon that can be used against the enemy.

    This mentality, modified, can be used .by the COIN structure to utilize the population as a weapon rather than a big blob of mass that is merely separated from the guerrillas to "dry the sea." (referring to Mao's fish and sea analogy). Think of all the energy the population can provide the COIN movement when it is utilized in an offensive fashion.

    Think of it this way, an old woman in an Afghan village is taught to use a knife in self-defense. When a Taliban comes to visit her she takes the knife and stabs him in the bladder, the kidney and then the liver and watches him bleed out. The news spreads around campfires in Afghanistan that an old grandma has just gutted a Taliban. She becomes a personality hero to those who want to resist giving more people the courage to rise up.

    What I described above is exactly the kind of stories that were spread in China around campfires during the SINO-Japanese wars of families using knives to kill Japanese. Evans Carlson was one of those who documented them.

    The people, according to Clausewitz, are what give energy to the warfighting machine. Mao following this dictum saw the people as the weapon. So should we.

  11. #271
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by War Hammer View Post
    When we talk about COIN Population Centric strategy it usually involves a sheepdog mentality. In other words, we are the sheepdogs protecting the sheep "the population".

    Thomas Marks in "Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam" noted that Maoist revolutionaries in post Vietnam Asia were defeated through citizen militias. These militias, such as in Peru, were sometimes spontaneous in nature. They were not developed by the government. Rather the population rose upon their own against the Shining Path in Peru.

    According to Mao, the people are the weapon. The guerrilla walks into a village and does not see sheep that need to be protected but wolves that can be used as a weapon. When he sees an old man, he does not see someone who needs to be coddled and protected, he sees an offensive weapon that can be used against the enemy.

    This mentality, modified, can be used .by the COIN structure to utilize the population as a weapon rather than a big blob of mass that is merely separated from the guerrillas to "dry the sea." (referring to Mao's fish and sea analogy). Think of all the energy the population can provide the COIN movement when it is utilized in an offensive fashion.

    Think of it this way, an old woman in an Afghan village is taught to use a knife in self-defense. When a Taliban comes to visit her she takes the knife and stabs him in the bladder, the kidney and then the liver and watches him bleed out. The news spreads around campfires in Afghanistan that an old grandma has just gutted a Taliban. She becomes a personality hero to those who want to resist giving more people the courage to rise up.

    What I described above is exactly the kind of stories that were spread in China around campfires during the SINO-Japanese wars of families using knives to kill Japanese. Evans Carlson was one of those who documented them.

    The people, according to Clausewitz, are what give energy to the warfighting machine. Mao following this dictum saw the people as the weapon. So should we.

    Now your talking. They don't have to stand alone, but they have got to stand up. What is this bullstuff where they walk up to American soldiers and complain that the Taliban are mean to them? Why don't they kick the crap out of em.

  12. #272
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
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    For the same reason that you rarely hear about elderly women stabbing young men to death. Because most of the time if they tried to do so they would lose.

    Members of my family on my mother's side fought in the Eighth Route Army. Do not confuse propaganda with fact. Most organized resistance to the IJA during the war was not based on village militia.

    Also, Peruvian rondas did not start to fight the Shining Path, but instead to combat cattle rustlers. Rondas that did fight the Shining Path did so in close partnership with the Peruvian security services, and under Fujimori were often directly subordinate to or officially formed by the military.

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    Doc Holliday was a criple with TB. He maybe killed two people, yet he is renowned as killing many more. Holliday was a master of propaganda. He played on the myth that he was a deadlier gunfighter than perhaps he really was because it made people to scared to mess with him.

    the point is that Taliban will think twice about going after a population that is gunning for them. Especially with stories about old women taking knives to the Taliban. And an armed population with the political goal to destroy an insurgency is as Thomas Marks said an insurgency's worst nightmare.

    The fire camp stories I was referring to were of individuals in families taking knives to the enemy. I have no doubt that some of these stories are real, maybe exaggerated. The effect of these stories was good propaganda because it reinforced the political goal of resistance in the regular army as well as popular militia. The Red Chinese were all about reinforcing the political goal in their everyday soldiers (something we do not do)

    I believe we should be training people to be the weapons, to use spears, rocks or knives to kill the enemy. Thats the way insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in other countries are won.

    Thanks for the info on the Peruvian militia. I believe Thomas Marks documented spontaneous militias rising up against the Shining Path, I could be wrong but I'll have to research.

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    Quote Originally Posted by War Hammer View Post
    I believe we should be training people to be the weapons, to use spears, rocks or knives to kill the enemy. Thats the way insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in other countries are won.
    I can just see how that would go over in a country where most households are armed.

    If southern Afghan Pashtuns universally despised the Taliban, and acquiesced in their activities only because of intimidation, we would be in a much happier place than we are at present. However, many of them sympathize with their goals, or reject our presence, or have a myriad of local grievances. An even larger proportion just want to be left alone, and generally are by the Taliban when they don't assist us. Why, in that case, risk their lives and those of their families to fight against a Taliban that they may not see as particularly threatening?
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  15. #275
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Why, Rex...

    I thought you know that if I saw the Taliban as threatening, EVERYONE must also do that...

    Hmm. Wait. Something wrong. I don't think the Talibs are threatening.

    Maybe that's because I'm not living in southern Afghanistan tonight...

  16. #276
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    To get you started, here is a 1992 USSOUTHCOM cable on rondas from 1992.

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    The knives, rocks, spears comment is one of mindset rather than actual application. I am loosely quoting Mao here. The mindset is for the people to see themselves as the weapon and that any tool they put their hand on, be it a rock or knife or AK, becomes an extension of themselves. The mind is the weapon.

    There are those in Afghanistan who oppose the Taliban. Keep in mind I am speaking of insurgencies and COIN in general here, not specifically Afghanistan. The main thesis, "The people are a primary source of power for the COIN movement." Thats if you can get them to support the COIN movement.

  18. #278
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    Quote Originally Posted by War Hammer View Post
    The knives, rocks, spears comment is one of mindset rather than actual application. I am loosely quoting Mao here. The mindset is for the people to see themselves as the weapon and that any tool they put their hand on, be it a rock or knife or AK, becomes an extension of themselves. The mind is the weapon.

    There are those in Afghanistan who oppose the Taliban. Keep in mind I am speaking of insurgencies and COIN in general here, not specifically Afghanistan. The main thesis, "The people are a primary source of power for the COIN movement." Thats if you can get them to support the COIN movement.
    Send this lady overthere, women with knives are bad news.....aks that bobbit guy about women with knives.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPu6N0rGuXk

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    One interresting experience has been conducted with some success in DRC about involving population as a pro active tool in COIN.
    The idea has been to cut the funding sources of FDLR by provinding economical alternatives to populations.
    The experience was eased by the fact that FDLR were (and are) depending on charcoal smuggling. So in addition to troops in the villages, some local NGO started to provide and train population to produce energy from other sources than wood. This had the double advantage to keep the populations away from the forests were FDLR have their bases. And to reduce FDLR sources of fundings.
    This is for me a good way to integrate people as an active security tool. I believe we should look more into developing such actions.

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    Default Bumper stickers

    My experience is that if the concept can be reduced to a bumper sticker, it fails to be very useful. That goes for both the "people as weapons" and the Mao reference. Better to look at the situation at hand and go from there. That is all.
    Reed
    Quote Originally Posted by sapperfitz82 View Post
    This truly is the bike helmet generation.

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