COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[jmm99]

From Bk 1, Ch 1, pt. 24:

24. Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln

So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln. Was dem Kriege nun noch eigentümlich bleibt, bezieht sich bloß auf die eigentümliche Natur seiner Mittel. Daß die Richtungen und Absichten der Politik mit diesen Mitteln nicht in Widerspruch treten, das kann die Kriegskunst im allgemeinen und der Feldherr in jedem einzelnen Falle fordern, und dieser Anspruch ist wahrlich nicht gering; aber wie stark er auch in einzelnen Fällen auf die politischen Absichten zurückwirkt, so muß dies doch immer nur als eine Modifikation derselben gedacht werden, denn die politische Absicht ist der Zweck, der Krieg ist das Mittel, und niemals kann das Mittel ohne Zweck gedacht werden.

24.—War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.

We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the art of war in general and the commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may react on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

Fortsetzung = continuation, pursuit.

bloße = mere, simple (in the sense of nichts ... als, as in the Nachricht-Notice = nothing but)

[jmm99]

How to handle "insurgencies" - what I've learned so far are that there are two main branches (the second with two sub-branches):

1. Employ the Military Struggle, with or without diplomacy, argument and discussion (which to me suggests dealing with leaders, not the masses ) - as per Wilf.

2. Employ both the Military Struggle and the Political Struggle and reach down to the people in either of two ways:

2a. Population-centric, which looks more to the physical separation of the population from the insurgents, and control of the population; along with a large number of TTPs which look to reinforcing the legitimacy of the HN government - as in FM 3-24 et al.

2b Populace-centric (the term coined by Bob Jones, but what follows is not claimed as a summary of his theories), which is more a reverse-Mao approach using such concepts as "from the masses, back to the masses" (as to the Narrative) and "mobilization of the masses" (turning them into active strugglers, either military or political, against the insurgents). Basically, this follows the concepts from the 1960s of John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (good book; reprint available from Hailer Publishing).

As to 2a, a problem exists if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads cuz the HN Narrative (if truthfully framed) is not likely to gain purchase among the masses; and if not truthfully framed, its contradictions will cause it to sink. So, in the absence of a valid Narrative, population-centric COIN is left with the Military Struggle and a bunch of TTPs. The problem is multiplied where third-party COIN is involved cuz the Assisting Nation has to not only swallow the HN Narrative without puking, but also prepare and sell an AN Narrative acceptable to its own population - a difficult task if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads.

As to 2b, the HN Narrative will be acceptable to the masses cuz that where it came from ("from the masses, back to the masses" - an interactive process of the masses, the HN government and the AN government if on scene). But, if the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads, the narrative from the masses is not likely to be accepted. E.g., the masses say we want an anti-corruption, anti-feudal and anti-foreign agenda. The HN government cannot grant that agenda if it is corrupt, controlled by vested interests and in bed with a foreign power. If the AN government takes up the causes of the masses, it in effect would be mounting a revolution against the incumbant HN government.

In any event, those are the three major counter-insurgency strategies which I have learned here (albeit as I see them). All of those strategies are subject to Bill Moore's caveats about the spectrum of conventional and unconventional warfare.

There is a fourth strategy not much discussed here (given the overwhelming emphasis on COIN[*]), which is that of Peace Enforcement, whose doctrine is found in Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations (Chap III), and in a host of other publications.

That strategy is quite flexible and can be very robust and conventional (e.g., the Korean War). The advantage to the Assisting Nation is that it can frame its AN Narrative in peace enforcement terms; and it can call both sides knuckleheads and attribute fault and harm where it is deserved; and direct its big bores and small bores at whichever side needs knocking.

Perhaps, we (US) should be looking at Peace Enforcement as a primary option when we are deciding on the COA to take in our foreign interventions (or force projections, if that term is preferred).

Credits to Jon Custis for the term "knuckleheads" - I like that.

Attached is a chart illustrating my view of the Political Struggle and Military Struggle:

Politics-Military Struggles.jpg

It is strategy-neutral (the law follows the strategy selected).

Regards

Mike
----------------------
[*] To this civilian, COL Gentile's concerns (valid in part) seem overkill - a type of argument worthy of a lawyer's brief - e.g., emphasis added:

But the most damaging consequence to the American Army from the new zeitgeist of COIN is that it has taken the Army’s focus off of strategy. Currently, US military strategy is really nothing more than a bunch of COIN principles, massaged into catchy commander’s talking points for the media, emphasizing winning the hearts and minds and shielding civilians. The result is a strategy of tactics and principles.

Really; is it "really nothing more" ? I don't get that from the myriad of Joint publication; and I believe that our Soldiers and Marines will get it right, despite everyone's inability to predict what the "next war" will look like.

Anyway, the proper mix of conventional and unconventional training and readiness is not my province; but an issue for the Army and Corps to resolve.

See this thread started by Cavguy.

[slapout9]

jmm99, there is the fifth and most successful option raise a Guerrilla army and kick the hell out of the insurgency/terrorist/criminal organizations and then help them build a country.

[jmm99]

Well, as to your fifth option (waging traditional uncoventional warfare using special ops people assisting an indigenous guerrilla force), you can prove it was a successful option in Astan. That's exactly what we did in 2001 with the Northern Alliance.

Aside from not capping our AQ brethren at Tora Bora, where (in your opinion) did we go wrong in strategy after the initial 2001 successes ?

Half the World was then "helping" them "build a country". Where did that strategy go wrong ?

The intent of the questions is not to knock your fifth option, but to establish some lessons learned if the strategy were employed in the present or future.

In a sense, Jim Gant is suggesting a form of unconventional warfare on a local level; but still ties that kind of local effort to the existing Astan government. An obvious option to his suggestion would be to delink it from the present Astan government and develop key strategic base areas for our own purposes.

What groups could be co-opted to provide the guerrilla fighters at the present time ?

A number of different sub-branches could be posited for that strategy (whole country, regions, key enclaves) (link or not to present government) (juncture or not with conventional US forces) - and more if conventional forces are involved, such as Peace Enforcement or not (if not, what is the status of forces, especially if the existing Astan government is de-linked).

Cheers

Mike

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Wasn't that Gentile's premise: There are lots of other options that get overlooked if we focus too hard on one paradigm.

Steve

[slapout9]

jmm99,STP, I just had oral surgery and really feel like ........so I will respond later as I can. But the short answer is BIG Military screwed it up. Link to the new JFQ edition with the greatest article ever written about A'stan so far.
Double H/T to Colonel Gurney for publishing it and General Warner for writing it. And the Intelligence Operator who gave the interview
http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/2.pdf

I will talk some about my own experinces with UW as I was taught back then. STP, Gentile is right about a lot of things and we should pay more attention to him. Bedtime guys.

[William F. Owen]

As first comment, I would say: one thing that stunned me is how COIN has became the model of war rather than one way to do war. COIN is just one way to do war. What is different is the war among the people (And it's an old history) rather than COIN.

COIN is a imprecise description of the political context of some conflicts - Countering an Insurgency"
It's not a way to do "war" - do you mean warfare?
Nor is in necessarily among the "people" - and what does this mean? The Battles of Okinawa and Hue were among "people". So what? If you mean that harming civilians might undermine the political objective of the conflict, then OK.

Secondly, not here but sometime ago, most of the authors, including P Gentil, were found of Algeria war. And here we have the exact opposite of Wilf position: Algeria war was a defeat despite a military victory. At the end of the war, most of FNL were jailed and FNL was no more a threat. OAS was a threat and a real one.

You can add in Rhodesia and Vietnam as well. How is that the opposite of Clausewitz or me? It is an exact demonstration of the phenomena that Clausewitz refers to. No one has ever said military victory always gains the desired political outcome. War is a continuation of politics, not a substitute. If military success comes at too higher cost or cannot be sustained, then it fails as an extension of policy. Rhodesia being an excellent example of military success, but political defeat.

1) Military action is the main part of war but not all of it. War has several fields, including military. Politic is one of them. Algeria or Suez just prove that you may military win a war and politically lost it (which is in accordance to Clausewitz but not with Wilf post).

What I said was military force can only be applied in the context of a military problem. That statement in no way differs from Clausewitz. How successfully this is done is extremely context specific. That it gets done badly is not evidence of it not being true.

Gandhi was an insurgent for the British but not for the Indian. (And he was not non violent neither).

Not true. Gandhi did not use violence and therefore was not an insurgent. He deliberately set out not to be an insurgent. The Brits fought numerous insurgencies in India, all of which failed. Gandhi was not an insurgent, by any stretch of the imagination.

As theoretical example, if an enemy overflows US with fake money, conducting to massive economical break down and violence among civilian be an insurgency? Would the response be a COIN operation? Not sure. But here, I go out of Wilf mantra: war is just a military operation between military.

No it's not an insurgency. Was the violence after Katrina an insurgency? Of course not. Football riots are not insurgencies either.
I never said "war is just a military operation between military." I said military force should be applied to military problems. - I never defined a military problem, because I assumed that was self-evident from the rest of the points I made.... apparently not.

Hope I am not too much out of the target.

You can hope.

[Cavguy]

jmm99,STP, I just had oral surgery and really feel like ........so I will respond later as I can. But the short answer is BIG Military screwed it up. Link to the new JFQ edition with the greatest article ever written about A'stan so far.
Double H/T to Colonel Gurney for publishing it and General Warner for writing it. And the Intelligence Operator who gave the interview
http://www.ndu.edu/press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/2.pdf

I will talk some about my own experinces with UW as I was taught back then. STP, Gentile is right about a lot of things and we should pay more attention to him. Bedtime guys.

Great find, Slap!

[Steve the Planner]

Slap:

Ditto to Cavguy.

I've spent the last few months listening to presentations by knowledgeable Afghan specialists, and reading a lot.

It all fits.

Steve

[Ken White]

because it is totally unrealistic due to current US political, educational, social and military constructs. IOW, it's not going to happen.

Most of what's proposed in the "interview" by GEN Warner are not Armed Forces issues. I think there's an intended message in that. An intel-operator centric view is offered and it is noted that introduction of the Army and Marines -- the 'conventional' armed forces fouled up the effort. While I do not totally agree, there is some merit in that assertion. The real issue is that the force introduced had NO training in the mission they were to perform.

Lot of dreamers out there. It's noteworthy that said dreamers always know what 'should' be done AFTER the fact...

The solution is to provide the government of the US with a permanent set of truly competent strategic planners who can do long term strategizing. That requires us to better educate the US populace (unlikely), destroy the current social fabric by pushing diversity (likely) while espousing fairness and merit equally (not possible), rebuild and de-bureaucracize the Armed Forces (unlikely).

To do all those things, you need a revised US political system and that is not going to happen in our lifetimes.

It also does not need to happen. We have ways of effectively using the forces we have to accomplish our aims; the problem is a lack of will compounded by significant shortfalls in strategic thinking and a system that insists everyone has to be involved in order to maintain the budget and garner more ribbons or advance. We always forget the old cliche about too many cooks...

The real overarching issue is that one should use the various elements of ones Armed Forces for the purpose for which they were designed, equipped and trained recalling that if it takes five years to make a really tactically competent junior NCO or Officer and twenty to make truly effective senior people then it'll take that long to switch gears. Use your purpose designed force for other things and you are going to get less than satisfactory results. We need to learn that just throwing people and money at a problem is no substitute for PPP. I'm unsure why that's so hard for many to comprehend.

This one's on autopilot and it will work out; the Great Thinkers ought to quit wasting time on Afghanistan and devote their time to preventing or at least better planning and prepping for the next one...

[jmm99]

Hi Ken,

As usual, you provoke thinking - here first on a current local issue (the intel-operator centric interview), and second on the much broader future issue. So, briefly on both.

-----------------------------
Mr C

Mr C's factual analysis of Astan seems largely on point taken as a whole. The problems are more political than military (Astan does not fit into the neat little box of a Westphalian nation-state, and probably never will). So, many of the current doctrinal solutions (based on that construct) won't work.

Mr C's solutions (all 11 of them) are something of a grab-bag running from the general to the specific. Here are the bullet points:

1. Immediately initiate a three pronged PSYOP [psychological operation] program using all media—Internet, radio, television, and discussion forums ...

2. Appoint Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian ambassadors, businessmen/scholars conversant with the diversity of Islamic culture and history. ...

3. Open a private dialogue with Iran, initially working toward NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] partnership to assist Iran in gaining recognition and respectability in the Middle East. ....

4. Encourage Iranian and Tajik economic exchanges, even fund them if necessary, to further fence and contain Afghanistan.

5. Encourage cultivation of foodstuffs, biofuel, and plants for fabrics and industrial uses as alternatives to cocaine poppies and drug production.

6. Encourage mutual interests of Tajikistan, China, and India to diplomatically squeeze Pakistan.

7. Enlist China’s aid to cool off Kashmir and further politically squeeze Pakistan.

8. As a political—not military—statement, increase significantly the number of armed Predator and Hellfire strikes on Taliban strongholds and movements in the FATA. ....

9. Treble the covert action special operations and paramil forces we have operating in FATA forward and deploy also into the rear areas of North and South Waziristan and Tribal Agencies of Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur. ...

10. Accept no logistic routes offered through or controlled by [Vladimir] Putin and company. Recognize that he remains KGB/Federal Security Service with the burning ambition to restore the Soviet hegemony.

11. Secure the Afghan eastern “border” in Afghanistan with U.S. combat troops but allow no incursions by them into the FATA. ....

Each of these proposals, and many of the issues raised in the body of the interview, could be discussed in the specific context of Astan until the cows come home.

----------------------------
The Future

However, whatever our COA is going to be in Astan (which will established by our actions, not rhetoric); that COA, though not carved in stone, is carved (it may well include some of Mr C's proposals).

from Ken
This one's on autopilot and it will work out; the Great Thinkers ought to quit wasting time on Afghanistan and devote their time to preventing or at least better planning and prepping for the next one...

And that, of course, is what COL Gentile and others in that debate, and many other debates about the future, are pointing to. Ken, in his typically optimistic approach ( ), points out some of the problems in developing and implementing a long-term strategic vision for the US. I agree.

Perhaps, Ken and others would also agree that everyone lacks the ability to predict what the "next one" will look like, unless he or she lucks out ?

In any event, the odds against calling the "next one" correctly are evidenced by many examples in Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle. That book has become my "nightstand" reader (re-reading snips), along with John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Those are not "bibles", but a source of identifying issues - and then thinking them through by reference to their sources and others they do not mention.

What I've learned (and frankly re-inforcing my own ideas developed over the last 50 years) is rather trite: US strategy (rarely worked out before the event) has been determined by the US Worldview and the actions taken to carry out that Worldview. What have been the US Worldviews ?

I see two (painted with broad brush strokes):

1. Prior to WWII, the US Worldview focused on the Americas (as to continental landmasses) and to the littorals of the Atlantic and Pacific (as to the limits of force projection). While I can't resurrect John Pershing to ask him, I suspect his answer to the question ("General, how would our Soldiers and Marines be best employed in Astan ?") would be along the line of "You need to have your head examined".

2. During and after WWII, the US Worldview became Global - in essence, a New World Order, as exemplified by the UN and a much larger international structure (over which the US sought to exercise some measure of control). Concomitant with that global geo-political view, the limits of force projection were extended not only to all littorals, but to all continental landmasses as well.

Currently, we are still in New World Order mode, certainly as to our elected officials where the concept of less than full use of Global DIME is rare. The arguments in the Beltway hinge on different views of how the New World Order should be administered. A majority of the public (of those who think about geo-political issues and Worldviews) probably generally support some form of New World Order.

Now, there are old dinosaurs (like JMM) who believe that the pre-WWII US was at the height of its power. The engineering metaphor is that of the power contained in a compressed spring. Once the spring expands, it loses power (gives up energy). And, if it is extended too far beyond its capabilities, the spring either snaps or becomes flacid.

There is no doubt that the Worldview can change. Whether the present situation is a watershed akin to WWII, I dunno. I expect the current New World Order mode may well continue for the duration of Ken's and my lives. However, you younger guys may see a sea change in how the US views its role in the World. May you live in Interesting Times.

Regards to all

Mike

[slapout9]

Admiral Mullen interview on Al Jerzeera TV......Oh Yea we got a plan Still feeling a little weak so be back later. All I can say is waterboarding ain't nothing compared to a Dentists. I would have confessed to anything.



http://english.aljazeera.net/news/as...926404830.html

[Ken White]

Hi Ken,

As usual, you provoke thinking - here first on a current local issue (the intel-operator centric interview), and second on the much broader future issue. So, briefly on both.

-----------------------------
Mr C

Selected items only:

2. Appoint Pakistani, Afghan, and Iranian ambassadors, businessmen/scholars conversant with the diversity of Islamic culture and history. ...

Fix our education and political milieus to enable that, let me know when we're ready...

4. Encourage Iranian and Tajik economic exchanges, even fund them if necessary, to further fence and contain Afghanistan.

Fencing and containing Afghansitan is not a good plan. People who are fenced and contained tend to rebel at their nominal fate -- and can do that in strange and unpredictable ways.

6. Encourage mutual interests of Tajikistan, China, and India to diplomatically squeeze Pakistan.

Once you get past the antipathy between China and India, good luck with that...

9. Treble the covert action special operations and paramil forces we have operating in FATA forward and deploy also into the rear areas of North and South Waziristan and Tribal Agencies of Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur. ...

Uh, good idea -- Ummm, where do those extra folks come from? Who cares if the Pakistanis get upset...

10. Accept no logistic routes offered through or controlled by [Vladimir] Putin and company. Recognize that he remains KGB/Federal Security Service with the burning ambition to restore the Soviet hegemony.

While others want to restore US hegemony??? Sounds like a pot / kettle thing to me...

11. Secure the Afghan eastern “border” in Afghanistan with U.S. combat troops but allow no incursions by them into the FATA. ....

Dreaming -- we do not have enough troops to do that. We and NATO do not have enough Troops to do that (even including Turkey who probably wouldn't play) and forget about tours and rotations.

----------------------------

The Future
. . .
Perhaps, Ken and others would also agree that everyone lacks the ability to predict what the "next one" will look like, unless he or she lucks out ?

No way to tell what it will look like -- what we can and should do is a great deal more to insure it doesn't look like the last three big stellar successes...

There is no doubt that the Worldview can change. Whether the present situation is a watershed akin to WWII, I dunno. I expect the current New World Order mode may well continue for the duration of Ken's and my lives. However, you younger guys may see a sea change in how the US views its role in the World. May you live in Interesting Times.

I do believe they probably will (to both mayhaps)...

[Steve the Planner]

Ken's criticisms are on point.

What I read was consistent with what a lot of experts have indicated---it all fits.

But a lot of it is so much "wishing for World Peace."

Stanford U had a conference on December 4, accidentally after the President's speech.

http://news.stanford.edu/news/2009/n...ce-120409.html

But that put Dorronsoro and others on a stage right afterwards.

I find his point on governance interesting in that it clearly draws the contrasts between our local versus central reconstruction efforts, ie, we can stable some "oil spots," but in doing so, we might further undermine a central government needed for an expeditious exit.

Dorronsoro predicted:

There will be local successes in the next year. After that, the problem will be that the legitimacy of the central government will be totally dead.

We cannot withdraw, because there will be nothing left...The next step will be negotiating with the Taliban.

His points about the Kashmir problem, addressed by Warner's article, are pretty simple:

The U.S. has not the power to broker the deal. We don't have time. The Afghan war will be lost or won in the next 18 months.

So where, on a spectrum of accurate analysis versus praying for world peace does a functional strategy lie?

[slapout9]

Well, as to your fifth option (waging traditional uncoventional warfare using special ops people assisting an indigenous guerrilla force), you can prove it was a successful option in Astan. That's exactly what we did in 2001 with the Northern Alliance.

Aside from not capping our AQ brethren at Tora Bora, where (in your opinion) did we go wrong in strategy after the initial 2001 successes ?

Cheers

Mike

Time to catch up some. jmm99 we actually did it twice. We have won in A'stan twice by UW means first in 1989 when the USSR left and 2001 when the Taliban/AQ left. We didn't hold or build anything, we kicked the Hell out of the enemy with combined Guerrilla Forces and US support and yes there is most definitely some lessons to learn. Where we messed up both times was not having a Peace Plan to follow the War Plan. And I don't mean nation building I mean Diplomatic relations followed by proper Economic support for supplying the needed future Intelligence access we need to avoid future problems/attacks. UW is offensive the mission is to win (Defeat the Enemy) COIN is defensive and has expensive long term resource requirements and there is no good way to win, just avoid losing.


Good link for UW as I was taught it,especially the 7 step operational method. Sometimes called the 7 steps from Hell.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconve...fense_doctrine)

[slapout9]

Latest 2 part interview of Lawrence Wilkerson. Part 2 has maps of the planned pipeline through Helmand Province in A'stan.




http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?...74&jumival=485

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

Back from the Dead? Did you see the light at the end of the tunnel?

You and Wilkerson are following that stupid map problem that I keep thinking about---that the accidental map of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan has other dimensions and issues, and will find a solution, one way or another.

Question arises whether we are on the verge of seeing a few super-giants, one of which (India) doesn't yet have all the land area/resources it needs yet. Fingers crossed that the competition will be economic, not necessarily by warfare.

Back to the issue of "Alexander's Dream of Empire"---if India, at the time and after, was the dominant player (including over Pakistan and large parts of Iran) ex Persians, whether history points through the past to a future.

Steve

[slapout9]

Slapout:

Back from the Dead? Did you see the light at the end of the tunnel?



Steve

STP, no light but I saw ALABAMA beat the Florida Tebow Taliban 32-13

You know what Karzid did before he became Prez of A'stan? Consultant to UNICAL Your Map problem is intriguing.

[slapout9]

STP,speaking of map problems check this one out per Ralph Peters


http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.p...xt=va&aid=3882

[Steve the Planner]

So, one day last year, I was sitting in a UN office in Baghdad looking at a stack of maps---all the variations on the supposed Green Line between KRG and the rest of the known and actually definable world.

The most stubborn to displace were the early 1990's NIMA maps, because, having been uploaded on the internet, plus coming from the US government itself, must have been gospel---sure.

Personally and professionally, I see drawing a line on a map, especially one which might end up on the internet, as a sacred and dangerous act, because somebody some day might fight and die over it.

Instead, we get all these stupid maps, especially one that somebody is actually playing with at War Colleges.

I was looking at a cool little map of Armenia (c.1895) that shows the southern boundary of Armenia (before the Armenian and Assyrian Genocides), the three lower sub-districts of one Armenian province (Hakkari) appear to be what we now call parts of Dohuk (Iraq).

I just tried (briefly) to imagine the mass genocidexs and migrations that would happen to make that map a reality. Who makes up this stuff?

In these areas of, arguably, Western Asia, (from the Mediterranean to India), one hardly needs to make up a map. The grim comedies of history have done it all before.

Steve