COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Dayuhan]

"I do not care about the policy." ... My interest is Warfare. I study it and write about it. Therefore I have to study ad understand the instrumental use of violence, to set forth policy. (War) That is what Strategy is.

Once it has nothing to do with killing, it is politics. It is no longer War.

I don't see how a discussion of counterinsurgency operations in general, or of any specific counterinsurgency operation, can be complete, or relevant, without review of the underlying policy issues.

[William F. Owen]

I don't see how a discussion of counterinsurgency operations in general, or of any specific counterinsurgency operation, can be complete, or relevant, without review of the underlying policy issues.

I'm not sure I agree. You can prepare Soldiers to fight almost any type of irregular on the planet and lack a specific policy. Policy is really only relevant to ROE, as it is the violent expression of policy. Would we say the same given other forms of warfare? Once you have to apply violence, the options are not exactly endless, or that varied.

Now, if you want to discuss specific operations, or specific strategies, then yes you have to have a policy. Again, if you are committing to the use of force, the options are not that many, as concerns stupid or sensible applications.

[Dayuhan]

You can prepare Soldiers to fight almost any type of irregular on the planet and lack a specific policy.

Probably true. But if you're going to actually join a fight you're going to need a policy, and you're going to have to evaluate that policy carefully to be sure it's realistic and that it reflects the actual circumstances of the fight. If you've already joined a fight and it's not working out and expected, the first step toward determining why is to review and reevaluate the policy that got you into the fight.

It still seems to me that any discussion of COIN, general or specific, that doesn't include the policy aspect is going to be incomplete.

[William F. Owen]

Probably true. But if you're going to actually join a fight you're going to need a policy, and you're going to have to evaluate that policy carefully to be sure it's realistic and that it reflects the actual circumstances of the fight. If you've already joined a fight and it's not working out and expected, the first step toward determining why is to review and reevaluate the policy that got you into the fight.

It still seems to me that any discussion of COIN, general or specific, that doesn't include the policy aspect is going to be incomplete.

Concur. No policy, no strategy. No Strategy, no military force.

[Rex Brynen]

I absolutely agree. ROE are actually just a form "operationalised" guidance for "rules" that should already be in place. It needs to be taught from Basic training onwards, but very rarely, if ever, is.

Not entirely. The political requirements of the mission, operation, or campaign may well require that soldiers not use force in cases where they would otherwise be justified in using it under the general laws of war. In other words, it isn't simply a case of operationalizing LoW and IHL, but doing in a way that is contextually sensitive to political, diplomatic, and other requirements.

[William F. Owen]

The political requirements of the mission, operation, or campaign may well require that soldiers not use force in cases where they would otherwise be justified in using it under the general laws of war.

That is precisely my point. You need to train for that from the word go. You cannot just dump it on the boys at the last minute, and hope they'll muddle through (well you can, but why do that?). You need to give folks a basic tool set, that remains largely constant.

[Commando Spirit]

This is the UK's Afghan COIN Centre's recommended reading list.

AFGHAN COIN CENTRE RECOMMENDED READING LIST

Introduction

1. There is now a wealth of literature focussing on Afghanistan and the Taliban, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This Recommended Reading List aims to highlight those that the Afghan COIN Centre considers to be the most useful for individuals with limited time preparing for deployment. As such, the books are listed in priority order in each thematic area.

On Afghanistan



Ahmed Rashid, Taleban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond, London: I B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010 and Descent into Chaos, London: Penguin, 2009. Rashid is one of the leading writers on the situation in South-West Asia. Well-connected in Afghanistan and Pakistan, his book Taleban, was the first really authoritative and readable account of its rise and subsequent removal from power. Descent into Chaos provides a provocative assessment of the region and the causes of and possible outcomes of instability.

Antonio Giustozzi (ed), Decoding the New Taliban, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2009. Giustozzi builds on the success of his book The Laptop, Koran and the Kalashnikov to edit this timely book providing a detailed insight into the ‘New Taliban’ via a series of case studies across Afghanistan and Pakistan. Contributors include David Kilcullen, Thomas Ruttig and Giustozzi himself.

Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Short History, London: Longman, 2002. McCauley draws on his vast knowledge of the region and its history to provide a clear and highly readable account of Afghanistan and the other Central Asian republics from their medieval pasts to the unpredictable present. He examines the rise of militant Islam and its impact on the region, the push and pull of global economics and politics, and possibilities for stability in an inherently unstable part of the world.

Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, Walking the Frontline of the War on Terror With a Woman Who Has Made it Her Home, London: Portabello Books Ltd, 2007. This excellent book provides a detailed insight into the Afghan mindset as well as that of the Taliban. Chayes examines the Afghan in an affectionate and understanding manner. It is an excellent source for troops deploying to work closely with the ANSF in a partnering capacity.

On Insurgency and Counterinsurgency


AFM Volume 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency, January 2010. This is the core text and all personnel deploying on a COIN operation must be familiar with it and commanders even more so. It is the conceptual bedrock for the conduct of COIN operations.
JDP 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, November 2009. This Joint Doctrine Publication sets the strategic context for the military contribution to Stability Operations which includes the COIN campaign in Afghanistan. Commanders and planning staff at Battle Group level and above must be familiar with its content.

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Kilcullen argues a classical approach to COIN but sets it in a contemporary context. It is highly readable and Kilcullen makes full use of his operational experience to bring the hypothesis to life.

John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, London: Hurst & Company, 2009. Mackinlay’s careful analysis of the contemporary insurgent, and his thesis of post-Maoist, information age, religiously motivated insurgency is the most compelling British academic publication since Kitson. His arguments, particularly in the last third of the book, are provocative and presented in a lively, very readable style.

Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, London: Faber &Faber, 1977. Bunch of Five is the more readable, arguably more interesting sequel to the comprehensive but inevitably academic Low Intensity Operations (1972). Kitson explains, using his own extensive experience, why low-level, bottom-up intelligence is so crucial to successful COIN.

Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Delete the word ‘communist’ from Thompson’s classic analysis, and his arguments are as relevant and applicable today as they were nearly fifty years ago: politics, law and legitimacy, planning, intelligence, strategic communications, and security operations to protect the population. His principles still have a profound effect on COIN theory.

Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges, London: Routledge, 2010. Rid has collected essays by the leading writers in the field to examine how thinking about COIN has developed in the West, what COIN means to the armed services and indigenous forces, and the challenges COIN faces: governance, culture, ethics, information operations, civil-military integration and time.

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Oxford: Osprey, April 2008. Marston and Malkasian present expertly written, succinct analyses of thirteen crucial counter-insurgency campaigns: Afghanistan today, Iraq, Ireland 1919-21, the US in the Philippines and Vietnam, the French in Algeria and Indo-China, the British totems of Malaya and Northern Ireland and its nadir in Aden, Rhodesia 1962-80, and the Israeli response to the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War, London: William Kimber, 1980, republished HarperCollins, 2000. Although not as historically detailed as John Akehurst’s We Won A War, Jeapes describes the SAS operation to raise and train the Firqa. His insights into the cross-discipline approach to civil and military development, PSYOPS and the tribal dimension of the campaign are of direct relevance to operations in Afghanistan.

The US Dimension

US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 – Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006. Commanders deploying on COIN operations need to know what the manual which prompted such a widespread reform of COIN, and so influenced commanders in the US and British Armies, actually says, and how it differs from the UK AFM on COIN.

Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008. Robinson’s book details Gen Petraeus, the US Army’s COIN revolution, and the Surge in Iraq. It is a lively, accurate and very well-informed account which brings the turning point of the war in Iraq, and the practical challenges of ‘Securing the Population’ to life.

Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American Surge In Iraq, 2006-2008, London: Allen Lane, 2009. The Gamble is a balanced counterpoint to his previous book Fiasco. He explains how the case for the Surge was developed in 2006 and, against all evidence and advice, was accepted and then implemented successfully in 2007. He focuses on the central role of Gen Petraeus and his leadership.

Further Guidance

16. Further reference material and guidance can be found at the Afghan COIN Centre Webpage on the Army Knowledge Exchange (AKX) at the link below or direct from the Afghan COIN Centre via the contact details on the AKX page.



Afghan COIN Centre
LWC, Warminster

[Cavguy]

There is one block of "COIN" in CGSC, I believe it is the O300 block in the curricula. There is a bright spot, CGSC filled its COIN Chair this January with Dr. Daniel Marston, who is published in the field and a noted COIN scholar. So changes may be coming. I also hope BG MacFarland (of Ramadi fame) will make some improvements as the new Deputy Commandant of the college.

There is no reading list. COIN instruction in CGSC is limited and disjointed. See my article "Overdue Bill" here on SWJ and article "Educating the Army in its Own COIN" in the February 2010 issue of USNI Proceedings (subscription required, try your library)

[Rex Brynen]

The New (and Old) Classics of Counterinsurgency

Laleh Khalili

Middle East Report 255 (Summer 2010)

...

In the 1930s handbook for British imperial officers, Imperial Policing, Maj. Gen. Charles Gwynn, who had seen action in both West Africa and Sudan, writes:

When armed rebellion occurs, it presents a very different military problem from that of a deliberate small-war campaign. There is an absence of a definite objective, and the conditions are those of guerrilla warfare, in which elusive rebel bands must be hunted down and protective measures are needed to deprive them of opportunities. The admixture of rebels with a neutral or loyal element of the population adds to the difficulties of the task. Excessive severity may antagonize this element, add to the number of the rebels and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. On the other hand, the power and resolution of the government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence to keep on good terms with the rebels.

Gwynn distinguishes the policing role of occupying powers from conventional warfare and even from asymmetric “small wars” against irregulars, which he defines as “deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control” and in which “[no] limitations are placed on the amount of force which can be legitimately exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the terrain permits.”[1] Pitched closer to civil governance, policing occurs where the government expects to continue ruling a population after hostilities have ended and, as such, wishes to avoid antagonizing the civilians from whom nascent rebel groups can recruit members and receive logistical and moral support.

The precise calibration of lethal force advocated in Imperial Policing is embraced as the primary tactic of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine in the United States, as most clearly set out in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006),[2] whose free Army-published online version has been downloaded by over 2 million people.[3] Since the Manual’s dissemination, which roughly coincided with the 2007 “surge” in Iraq, counterinsurgency doctrine has become a cottage industry with numerous admirers in the press corps. A key achievement of counterinsurgency doctrine, in fact, has been to bring the majority of American foreign and military affairs reporters back on board the careening bandwagon of Washington’s post-September 11 wars.

...

Also of possible SWC interest in this MER special issue on "Weapons of the Strong":

Iraq Moves Backward
Reidar Visser

“Culture as a Weapon System”
Rochelle Davis

The Problem with “Hearts and Minds” in Afghanistan
B. D. Hopkins

Drawing the Wrong Lessons from Israel’s 2006 War
Steve Niva

You'll need a print subscription to read most of the others.

[Bob's World]

There is one block of "COIN" in CGSC, I believe it is the O300 block in the curricula. There is a bright spot, CGSC filled its COIN Chair this January with Dr. Daniel Marston, who is published in the field and a noted COIN scholar. So changes may be coming. I also hope BG MacFarland (of Ramadi fame) will make some improvements as the new Deputy Commandant of the college.

There is no reading list. COIN instruction in CGSC is limited and disjointed. See my article "Overdue Bill" here on SWJ and article "Educating the Army in its Own COIN" in the February 2010 issue of USNI Proceedings (subscription required, try your library)

LTC Brian Petit is coming to Leavenworth soon as the SOF Chair. With multiple tours to Iraq, and having led his SF Battalion in the Philippines, and now in Afghanistan, he will be a gold star resource for COIN for CGSC students and cadre alike.

[William F. Owen]

If Laleh is going to quote Gwynn, then reading the WHOLE BOOK will help.

Revolutionary movements, again, may be divided into violent and, professedly, non- violent movements. The former may be on a scale which amounts to fully organised rebellion, necessitating operations in which the Government forces employ all the ordinary methods of warfare.

and,

Before closing this chapter my non-military readers may wish me to say a little about the use of modern weapons and equipment in connection with police duties.When armed rebellion is encountered, the only limitations to their use, as I have said, are those imposed by the nature of the terrain and the characteristics of the enemy.

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War." I have the 1934 Edition.

Interested in some of the other articles though. One writer in particular has a reputation for mostly completely wrong, when writing on military matters.

[Dayuhan]

Gwynn was a sound thinker, and not part of the "Oprah Winfrey Way of War."

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.

[William F. Owen]

If we're going to apply Gwynn's thoughts to today's rebellions, we need to ask a question that may not have occurred to him: in any given case, do we really want to commit ourselves to oppose a rebellion?

From the perspective of a Briton of the imperial age, the need to oppose rebellion may have been self-evident. Today it is anything but. If we're going to involve ourselves in rebellions against others, the first need is to determine whether we must and whether we should. If our opposition to rebellion is based on support for a government that cannot stand without us, we're putting ourselves in a very bad position from the start.

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

[Bob's World]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?

If anything, the Europeans (though obviously they all approached the mission differently) were more intellectually honest in their approach. They were there to subjugate a land and its people to their ends; to reap profits personally, corporately, and for their home nations; and didn't delude themselves so completely as America does that they are "the good guy" bringing modernity and democracy and "universal values" (as created and determined in current US culture) and rule of law to those who are currently oppressed and denied the same by their leadership, culture and/or religion.

A little objectivity would go a long way in cleaning up the policy of US approaches to such places, and in turn US strategy and tactics for managing our national interests there as well.


As I look at this, I cannot help but see the parallels with my own experience as an earnest, motivated, but hopelessly untrained and unprepared 2LT of Field Artillery making well intended, but tragic all the same, mistakes at Ranger School while a burly Ranger instructor loomed over me screaming "Ranger! Are you as F#%&*D up as you want to be??!"

There's no good answer to that question, (which even my malnourished, sleep-deprived brain could appreciate the irony of as my equally malnourished, sleep-deprived skinny frame attempted to sustain a front leaning rest position in full kit with my rifle across the backs of my hands). This is where we are today as a nation. We know we can't hold this position forever, we feel the tremors beginning to build even now. We appreciate that the question is rhetorical (ok, now I do), and that quitting is not an (acceptable) option, we can't go back, and can only go forward.

The question is simply what must we change as we go forward from here? A change of tactics is less than a half-measure. A change of Generals even less so. This is why I argue for a change of perspective. We must first change how we see ourselves, only then will be be able to achieve a clearer vision of how others see us, and in turn how we must see them. I'm optimistic, now as then, but the only guarantee is that succeed or fail, it won't be easy.

[William F. Owen]

All French, British, Belgian, Italian, German, etc "COIN" conducted in their colonies around the globe were to suppress armed rebellions in support of governments they put in place. No?

No. In terms of the Colonies functioning as colonies, the French, British, Belgian, Italian, and Germans, were the Governments. The men running India, were British, not Indian. The Government of India was the British Government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and A'Stan are VERY different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

[Bob's World]

no. In terms of the colonies functioning as colonies, the french, british, belgian, italian, and germans, were the governments. The men running india, were british, not indian. The government of india was the british government. It was a joined up as you can get.

Iraq and a'stan are very different. Different political dimension, so very different conflict.

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

[William F. Owen]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

It's not a uniquely American problem.

[Red Rat]

This is, perhaps, a nuance that was, and is, lost on the populaces of those fair lands...

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

[Bob's World]

The perspective from the bottom might be the same, in looking up at an imposed government as opposed to a supported government. But from a COIN strategy point of view it meant there was one government running the show, and not one (foreign) government supporting another (indigenous) in running its show - especially when the indigenous government might have very different views of what lies in its short, medium and long term interests!

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

[wm]

And the first question one must ask is "what is the perception of this populace as to the legitimacy of the governance over them?" Do they recognize the source? Then break that down, perhaps some (say those from the old Northern Alliance) do, but others (say those expelled or not represented by the old Northern Alliance and its US partner) do not.

This is the first issue, IMO, that must be addressed. When I look at the history of failure, it almost always begins with a failure to honestly assess and address this essential issue.

Only once this has been done does one move on to the other three critical perceptions of Justice, Respect and Hope. Of those, Hope is probably the second most important. Does this populace have a certain, legal and trusted mechanism of affecting change of governance? (Again, do THEY perceive that they have such a mechanism, not is one written about in the official brochure). If they do not perceive this to be the case, and if they perceive the other causal factors to exist, it is merely a matter of when, where, and how; not if, they act out illegally to affect change.

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.