COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Dayuhan]

I agree a 100%, but in both Iraq and A'Stan the US/NATO is suppressing armed rebellions in support of Government they put in place.

I've thought from the start of this current round of conflict that it was not wise to run about trying to install governments in other countries.

[jmm99]

reason to have a resident philosopher on board -

Besides your overall look at "legitimacy" (I won't ask you to define what I can only exemplify), I was reminded from this point:

from wm
If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails.

of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

I wonder if we shouldn't be reading the Small Wars manual and do what it says instead of all this other stuff?

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Establish a US Military Government and make them pay for it.
4-Hold an election and turn the Military government over to the people.
5-Celebrate victory and come home.

It's more honest and forthright instead of all this build them a country and they will like us stuff?!.

[jmm99]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

I suspect the question that needs to be addressed is connected to the legitimacy of a government, but it is not whether the populace views the government as legitimate. Logically prior to that question is determining whether the populace sees a need (or, in other words, has a desire) to be governed. If folks don't want governance, then any form of government placed upon them will be viewed as lacking in legitimacy.

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes noted that people in the "state of nature" are in a constant state of warre[sic]. He asserts that warre is bad and therefore people have a duty to seek peace. This duty is best (perhaps only) met by establishing a government (the Leviathan) to protect the people from each other, thereby eliminating the constant state of warre.

Bob's World seems to share this Hobbesian view that governments are necessary. I'm not so sure that the various tribes in A-Stan subscribe to it though. If one does not view Hobbes' State of warre as bad, then the rest of the argument that justifies one's surrending one's liberty to an outside governance fails. (BTW, I submit that the two other great Western myths about the origin of governance, promulgated by Locke and Rousseau, share the Hobbesian assumption that warre is a bad.)

Another point of interest: Hobbes does not really argue that a state of warre is bad. In Part I, Chapter 13 of Leviathan, he asserts that certain things--like agriculture, navigation, and the building of big buildings--do not happen while in a state of war and concludes from this that famous Hobbesian assertion "the life of man [is] solitary, poore, brutish, nasty, and short." A poor induction to say the least.

(I have to confess, while I read Hobbes in the War College, I couldn't hold a 30 second conversation on what he's all about).

But I don't think that "government" is necessary, so much as I believe that "governance" is inevitable in some form. This may be very informal and tribal in nature; with little regard or care for Western concerns such as defining and defending hard borders, or having a single over-arching leader that can sign international treaties and speak for the whole.

But I also believe:

that whatever form governance takes, any form chosen by the governed is better that any form imposed upon the governed;

that when a populace perceives their governance as legitimate, they will forgive small sins, and even major ones (as TJ spoke to in the US Declaration of independence); and

that if this same populace has a trusted, certain, and legal means to shape governance they will employ it, staying away from drastic, illegal forms of changing governance unless forced to do so by that same governance; and

that the majority of the US's current challenges around the world with what we (inacurately, IMO) call "wars" in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the entire phenom of "Global Terror" are in fact related directly to the US taking policy positions that intercede in the "legitimacy of governance process" of many populaces around the world as we work to establish, promote, and protect governments that are willing to subjugate themselves to US interests over the interests of their own populaces (typically while serving the personal interests of a handful of elites at the same time); and then also turn a blind eye to the elimination of the processes of Hope because, while we know we wouldn't want that in America, its ok elsewhere so long as it increases the likelihood of our friendly government staying in power.


This really is not rocket science. In the most simple terms we just need to be a little less cavalier about how we go about serving our national interests around the globe. By accepting a little more risk in terms of having to continualy deal with new leaders and governments (just like the entire globe has to do with the US, btw), and getting out of the business of thwarting Popular Sovereignty and propping up of dictators who have lost their local legitimacy, we win.

[slapout9]

You give its Long (5-step) BLUF. There was also a shorter one (my edit from yours):

1-Invade with just cause.
2-Kill anybody that opposes us until they surrender.
3-Celebrate victory and come home.

The shorter version (the punitive raid) was used much more often by the Corps; but the longer version (e.g, Carib islands & Cent America) was much better known cuz those interventions lasted longer.

So, the question boils down to the national command policy that drives the military (and perhaps political) intervention. Do the masters want something that can done in a a 10-day or 10-week "in and out"; or do they want something ("state building") that can only be done in 10 (or more) years ?

Regards

Mike

That will work just fine

[wm]

I was reminded . . .of similar points by Marc Legrange re: the South Sudan and other "poore" African places where a state of "warre" (if not allowed to get out of hand) is relatively better in-security than the state of "security" promised by a government external to the population group.

Regards

Mike

Could not have said it better. I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).

[jmm99]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (1912)

Laws and regulations are instruments for procuring happiness. If the laws and regulations are good, the happiness of our people will certainly be great. Our people fear only that the laws and regulations will not be promulgated, or that, if promulgated, they will not be effective. It is essential that every effort be devoted to the task of guaranteeing and upholding such laws, never ceasing until the objective of perfection is obtained. The government and the people are mutually dependent and interconnected, so how can there be any reason for distrust? On the other hand, if the laws and regulations are not good, then not only will there be no happiness to speak of, but there will also be a threat of harm, and our people should exert their utmost efforts to obstruct such laws and regulations. Even though you want us to have confidence, why should we have confidence? But how can one explain the fact that Shang Yang encountered the opposition of so large a proportion of the people of Qin?

The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (1919)

It is not that basically we have no strength; the source of our impotence lies in our lack of practice. For thousands of years the Chinese people of several hundred millions have all led a life of slaves. Only one person - the 'emperor'- was not a slave, or rather one could say that even he was the slave of 'heaven'. When the emperor was in control of everything, we were given no opportunity for practice.

We must act energetically to carry out the great union of the popular masses, which will not brook a moment's delay. . . our Chinese people possesses great intrinsic energy. The more profound the oppression, the greater its resistance; that which has accumulated for a long time will surely burst forth quickly. The great union of the Chinese people must be achieved Gentlemen! We must all exert ourselves, we must all advance with the utmost strength. Our golden age, our age of brightness and splendour lies ahead!

So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:

I think that Chinese might have a similar view as they emerged from the "Warring States" period (or the much more modern struggle between Mao and Chiang).

Regards

Mike

[wm]

Mao wrote two early pieces that reference the Qin and Han of the end of the "Warring States" period.

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang - How Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole (1912)



The bolded sentence may be the germ of Mao's "from the people, back to the people" concept. The final question may have caused him to think less highly of Qin Legalism and more highly of Han Syncretism in the 1919 piece.

To the Glory of the Hans (1919)



So, Mao's early thoughts appear to support your theory:


Regards

Mike

Mike,

Nice pairs of quotations from the Chairman. Just shows to go you, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

As I recall the writings of Lord Shang, he was an early Chinerse equivalent of Hobbes--believed that people were basically bad and that they needed a government to keep them in line. That thread runs throughout the Legalist School of China, IIRC. The Legalists took the view, from Hsun Tzu, that people are basically bad and mixed in the principles of utilitarianism taught by Mo Tzu. This synthesis yielded the view that, to maximize happiness (true happiness, not selfish,egoistic hapiness), one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government. No wonder that Mao drew a teaching point from a Legalist. Stalin probably would have as well, had the Russians had an equivalent to the Chinese Legalist Philosphers.

[Backwards Observer]

...one must force people to act in certain ways through the stern hand of government.

As I learned growing up in a Hakka Chinese family concerning the carrot and the stick; one gets hit just as hard with the carrot. Usually harder, just so one doesn't get any funny ideas.

[William F. Owen]

OK, I'm starting this because otherwise it'll die in the Blog.

Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents

IMO, this article is attempting to try and forgive how "COIN" has been turned into a pseudo-science. The reason folks are kicking back against it, is most of the folks who claimed to be experts turned out not to understand how to fight a war and saddled us "pet-rock" social engineering theories.

[Fuchs]

My understanding is that the hearts & minds stuff belonged to 2002-2004 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq. We could have used that to quickly expand a Humint network for gaining control and surveillance.

The human mind becomes entrenched with its opinion and hardly changes his mind (cognitive dissonance problem), even closes his mind to the offers and influence of the "other team". War furthermore includes hardship and rumours - both can all too often work against the "other side", as they get blamed even for things they didn't while the own side can even get away with inflated claims.

To turn hostiles or their supporters around in a later stage would have required more classic Afghan diplomacy - and some of their options were not available to us.


or in short: The soft COIN strategies were probably not so much wrong as they were late, and not so much military as they were civilian.

[David Ucko]

William F. Owen wrote

IMO, this article is attempting to try and forgive how "COIN" has been turned into a pseudo-science. The reason folks are kicking back against it, is most of the folks who claimed to be experts turned out not to understand how to fight a war and saddled us "pet-rock" social engineering theories.

William (if I may),
The article attempted to provide some reasons why a concept that once was welcomed as a breath of fresh air after a decade plus of RMA-talk and transformation lingo so quickly lost its shine. It did not attempt to forgive 'COIN's turning into a pseudo-science'.

But, has COIN turned into a pseudo-science? I don't agree. There may be those who perceive counterinsurgency theory as a science of warfare, but do they own the right to define this concept? Can the interpretation of some be used to discredit the entire concept, any more than Jomini could be used to discredit the entire field of strategic studies (with his arguably 'scientific' understanding of war)?

I see a a need for greater specificity in your broadside against counterinsurgency researchers and scholars. Sure, some of it is awful, misleading, ahistorical, but much like in any field, some of it is also valuable, not least for the five reasons that I cited in the conclusion of the blog post.

[William F. Owen]

But, has COIN turned into a pseudo-science? I don't agree. There may be those who perceive counterinsurgency theory as a science of warfare, but do they own the right to define this concept? ?

War is war. There are varying types of warfare, but defeating an irregular enemy is rooted in some fairly well understood methods of applying military force. What we see with "counterinsurgency theory" is a collection of fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason.
If you inflict military defeat on the enemy, you remove his ability to use violence as a political instrument.
You do not out-govern the enemy. You kill him.

I see a a need for greater specificity in your broadside against counterinsurgency researchers and scholars. Sure, some of it is awful, misleading, ahistorical, but much like in any field, some of it is also valuable, not least for the five reasons that I cited in the conclusion of the blog post.

Well it's the awful, misleading, ahistorical, parts I have run out of patience on, as any examination of my many posts would reveal. How specific do you wish me to be? I simply reject the idea that there is merit in inventing an area of study and theory predicated on a woolly idea like COIN.
I submit that understanding is best enabled by studying war AND warfare in depth and breadth. There may be merit is studying regular warfare or irregular warfare, each in some specific detail, but you have to be well versed in one to talk about the other.

To quote your article,

To me, counterinsurgency retains value because it:
reaffirms the need to understand the social, cultural and political dimensions of the operating environment;

All war is political. You have to understand the enemy you are fighting. How is this unique to something called COIN?

reaffirms the significant requirements of effective intervention in foreign polities;

You have to resource wars properly and fight win?

emphasises the political essence of armed conflict;

So again, nothing unique to COIN

recognises the local population as a significant player, rather than as an obstacle to circumvent;

The population is relevant because war is political. Politics is power over people. The relevance of the population lies in the policy.

recommends a more-than-military approach to the problem of political violence.

As in all War, - not just so called COIN- but unless you defeat the enemies armed force you will suffer armed defeat. War and warfare is primarily a military activity, albeit for a wholly political purpose.

[David Ucko]

Well you may be surprised to hear I agree with pretty much everything you said, particularly the bit about the need to study war AND warfare in depth and breadth. The problem is that by and large, the study of war and warfare prior to the COIN revival was so deeply flawed, ahistorical, apolitical, scientific -- I am talking about the tendency to see intrinsic value either in 1) RMA technology or 2) overwhelming force as strategies in their own right, and thereby to subordinate war's political essence. That's why I feel that the introduction of COIN was a good thing, for the five reasons that you cite in your post.

As I mention in the conclusion to the article, if we can agree on an understanding of war that is more integral, more politically-informed, then we can also dispense with 'COIN' and talk about war being war. The problem, as I see it, is that a lot of people who talk about war still see it in very reductionist terms and 'COIN' is a good means of reinforcing the point that war remains a political phenomenon, doesn't occur on some isolated battlefield, and doesn't end neatly, and roll the credits.

The one part I don't quite agree with is this:

fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason

... mostly because I think there are many means of defeating an irregular force, not all of which are dominated or specifically marked by the application of lethal force.

[William F. Owen]

The problem is that by and large, the study of war and warfare prior to the COIN revival was so deeply flawed, ahistorical, apolitical, scientific -- I am talking about the tendency to see intrinsic value either in 1) RMA technology or 2) overwhelming force as strategies in their own right, and thereby to subordinate war's political essence.

Yes, the study of war and warfare is mostly woeful. In the English language this lies at the door or people such as Fuller and Liddell-Hart, and good many others who are still revered due to lack of rigour.

That's why I feel that the introduction of COIN was a good thing, for the five reasons that you cite in your post.

...so actually the answer would have lain in suggesting greater understanding of Clausewitian observations, and holding the study of military history to greater rigour - something the "War Studies" community has failed to do. We didn't need something like "COIN" to do that.

The problem, as I see it, is that a lot of people who talk about war still see it in very reductionist terms and 'COIN' is a good means of reinforcing the point that war remains a political phenomenon, doesn't occur on some isolated battlefield, and doesn't end neatly, and roll the credits.

Well then the problem is that COIN is a very bad way to do that, for all the reasons I cite and many more.

The one part I don't quite agree with is this:

fallacies that seeks to suggest that somehow defeating an irregular force in rebellion or revolt is not best enabled by applying lethal force against the right people for the right political reason

... mostly because I think there are many means of defeating an irregular force, not all of which are dominated or specifically marked by the application of lethal force.

I agree to an extent, but lethal force has to have primacy of place in breaking will. Killing, capturing the resultant breaking of will, is what creates success. Building schools and hospitals is mostly utterly irrelevant, as is competing to be the Government.
You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.

....and welcome to SWC.

[slapout9]

You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.

Quote of the week nomination.

[Polarbear1605]

but lethal force has to have primacy of place in breaking will. Killing, capturing the resultant breaking of will, is what creates success. Building schools and hospitals is mostly utterly irrelevant, as is competing to be the Government.
You end up being the Government because the competition is dead or runaway.

....and welcome to SWC.

I have to agree with Wilf here on the lethal force. We have been avoiding killing bad guys in Afghanistan for a while under the requirement to avoid collateral damage, eg –civilian deaths, from supporting arms and small unit actions. Because we have not been focused on killing and hunting down the bad guys we have allowed these characters to operate to their advantage. Consequently, Afghanistan civilian casualties from enemy action have increase approximately 40% per year since the 2008. My argument is because we are not hunting down and killing the bad guys we are actually causing more civilian casualties then we are preventing. If the enemy is killing civilians at will, we are never going to be able to provide the security they desire to support our current efforts. COIN is not popular because all this PC academic smoke cloud stuff is not working. Yes it is nice to have later in the war after you let the enemy know if he operates it will cost him. I think another issue is why is the US military idea of COIN being discussed…the US just does not have the stomach for COIN because the opposition party will always apply for political purposes the US “Boy Scout “ standards of trustworthy, brave, clear and reverent. For example, the current US COIN manual that has been written by the two best COIN generals the US has (in theory). The manual presents some glaring holes in this general approach to COIN. Kitson's pseudo ops (never mentioned) would be political suicide for a US general.

[Ken White]

I have to agree with Wilf here on the lethal force...the US just does not have the stomach for COIN because the opposition party will always apply for political purposes the US “Boy Scout “ standards of trustworthy, brave, clear and reverent... Kitson's pseudo ops (never mentioned) would be political suicide for a US general. (emphasis added /kw)

Good points all.

We have not done and will not ever do this COIN (or even Heavy FID...) bit well due to the factor noted by your comment I placed in bold.

We really need to develop Plans E-Z because our Plans A-D don't ever work...

[MikeF]

Good discussion. Only one comment to add.

This current post-modern counter-insurgency theory only studies very limited case studies over a sixty year period. Guerrilla warfare (Rebellion, Revolutionary, Separatist) have been around since the first gov't formed.

My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight .

Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.

Mike