Reply With QuoteWhich reminds me of my favorite bumper sticker,Originally Posted by Steve Blair
Trust the Government? Ask the Native Americans.
David Ucko- Sir, good to see you here.
I can only second Mike's comment. The current fixation on Vietnam and so on really shortchanges historical COIN/Small Wars and ensures that we ignore many of the institutional blindspots that have existed regarding this sort of warfare. We either need to widen our scope or own up to the blindspots and go from there.Good discussion. Only one comment to add.
This current post-modern counter-insurgency theory only studies very limited case studies over a sixty year period. Guerrilla warfare (Rebellion, Revolutionary, Separatist) have been around since the first gov't formed.
My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight.
Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.
Mike
I actually consider the USMC Small Wars Manual to be a touch more intellectually honest than many of the current studies in that the SWM was very up-front about its focus as well as its limitations. Mountain Scouting is something of an earlier counterpart, although the author spends a shade too much time advertising products and does make claims about the universality of his experiences that might not hold up (he campaigned mostly in the Pacific Northwest, so his observations might not have total utility for either the Southwest or the campaigns in Texas and Montana, for example). But there's stuff to be learned from those works, which avoid politics for the most part and focus on the nuts and bolts on the ground.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Which reminds me of my favorite bumper sticker,
Trust the Government? Ask the Native Americans
David Ucko- Sir, good to see you here.
The only people who have been successful not once but twice are the CIA (in A'Stan). The first Problem is by using their UW/Guerrilla warfare methods it makes the whole DOD expensive and obsolete so big Army had to come up with some kind of theory/doctrine to justify this. So they got a bunch of PH'D's to write a bunch of stuff to justify their existence.
Which led to the second problem, which is the enemy dosen't care about any of that. They just just keep right on using basic Simple Guerrilla's in the mist to win.
Look to the Content, not the Label
You may call "it" an insurgency, revolution or several other alternatives (including an "armed conflict not of an international character"); and then add "counter-" to show you're against "it". But, whatever you suggest, pontificate, etc., will have merit (if any) based on its content, and not on the label you attach to the piece.
So The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (1966) by Jack McCuen (RIP, COL) works fine for me - not because magic lies in the phrase "counter-revolutionary warfare" (he might as well have entitled it "Examples and Lessons from Recent Irregular Warfare"); but because he captures the military lessons and the political lessons (especially the political lessons) from the then-recent armed conflicts he analysed.
That "counter-insurgency" literature is not dead is easily evidenced in a couple of other recent articles from SWJ.
E.g., John A. Kendall, Afghanistan: The Importance of Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency Operations (SWJ 2010):
Co-ordination of the political struggle with the military struggle follows the approach taken by MAJ Jim Gant - e.g., Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shura (SWJ 2010).Summary
Any commander operating in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment is besieged by the constant need to make numerous and varied decisions critical to the successful execution of a COIN campaign. While all military and political campaigns are challenging due to the “fog of war”, COIN campaigns can prove particularly difficult for military personnel due to a military culture that does not understand how to politically maneuver in semi to non-permissive environments.[1] This paper demonstrates the need for military organizations to gain a better understanding of their operational environment before executing political maneuver in a full spectrum COIN campaign.
[1] David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: NY, Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 71. Political Maneuver is defined by Dr. Kilcullen as an operational plan that seeks to separate the insurgents from the people by finding local allies amongst the power players, connecting the government to the population, and increasing local governance capacity in order to generate progress across the four principle dimensions of counterinsurgency (security, governance, development, and information).
Some revisionism seems to be entering the "COIN" literature - at least where the political effort must mesh with the military effort - as in CPT Kendell's citation of none other than Roger Trinquier:
What we are talking about is the civil side (the police and its intelligence service of "Special Branch" talents and networks) operating under the Laws of War in a paramilitary fashion, until it can transition with stability to the Rule of Law.Police action will therefore be actual operational warfare. It will be methodically pursued until the enemy organization has been entirely annihilated. It will not end until we have organized the population and created an efficient intelligence service to enable it to defend itself.
--Roger Trinquier
Still sticking with the shades of a revisionist past we have a 2010 book review, A Third COIN Course of Action, of A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (2009), by Mark Moyar (Wiki):
It is scarcely surprising that Moyar would suggest a "leader-centric" approach since his first literary effort of consequence was Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (1997) ISBN 1557505934; republished in 2007 as Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam with a foreword by Harry Summers and a new preface and chapter; ISBN 0803216025.As a military professional who has read most recent works that have been heralded as "must-reads" or as works providing unusual or original insights into counterinsurgency, I have been disappointed the vast-majority of the time. Rarely have I read anything on counterinsurgency that provided true "food-for-thought" other than that which was produced by Galula, Kitson, or Thompson. But Dr Moyar has produced a volume that may be as influential as those written by the Big 3 COIN savants. The book is very well organized, and it provides overwhelming evidence for the author's hypothesis in a manner that does not become repetitive and boring. While those currently benefitting from the lack of original thought within counterinsurgency circles may deride this work and Dr Moyar personally, he is an expert, and his assertions deserve further examination and your considered thought. For all true military or national security professionals, take my advice - take a week of leave and digest all three of Dr Moyar's books.
LtCol Adam Strickland is a Marine Infantry Officer with previous combat tours in Iraq. During his last tour, he engaged daily with former insurgents, members of the former regime, and civic leaders as part of Marine counterinsurgency efforts in Anbar Province, Iraq. He is a graduate of USMC Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting, and MIT’s National Security Studies Seminar XXI Program. He is scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in 2011 in support of continuing USMC counterinsurgency efforts.
Bringing in Roger Trinquier (for his counter-organizational theories, not his torture theory) and CORDS-Phoenix (with its neutralization of - kill, capture or convert - political cadres), might be too much for the "Boy Scout" image; but perhaps we should realize that we have not been Boy Scouts, and that there are constraints and restraints (short of merit badge qualification) that still accord with our principles.
Regards
Mike
The CIA Does Pretty Good With B-52's To
jmm99, here is 3 for you from 1962. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency an Anthology. Done for the Industrial War College.
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001a.pdf
Nice catch, Slap
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency:An Anthology from the beginning of the use of the term "counterinsurgency" (1962) - and so, before Galula, Kitson, Thompson, McCuen, SORO, et al published.
For the rest of the book, change the end letter before the pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001a.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001b.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001c.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001d.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001e.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001f.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001g.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001h.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001i.pdf
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/imag...171701001j.pdf
Tanks a lot.
The last part has a order re: a SF 1961 village level operation in Laos. The much larger Laos operation, providing for Ho Chi Minh Trail interdiction and more, was shelved. From Dave Petraeus' thesis:
JCS Laos 1962.jpg
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 07-24-2010 at 03:24 AM.
I think Major Few nailed it!!My favorite guerrilla (separatist type) was Brother Moses. He brought locust and the Angel of Death to his fight
Bin Laden is a pansy compared to him.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
More like a Divorce Lawyer than an insurgent...
Facilitated an ugly breakup with one abusive partner, then set up a deal to move in on some other poor unsuspecting bastard and take everything he had.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
reminds me of two quotes
This discussion brings to mind two quotes worth pondering I think:
"Before a war military science seems a real science, like astronomy; but after a war it seems more like astrology." Rebecca West
"Then anyone who leaves behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who receives it, in the belief that such writing will be clear and certain, must be exceedingly simple-minded." — Plato, Phaedrus
And my own contribution for your amusement:
"we can characterize such conflicts as in the Philippines (or Colombia or Afghanistan or in Africa, etc) as playing monopoly on a 3 dimensional chess board with one side playing rugby and the other is using soccer rules."
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
Ice T-Colors
Listen to the words.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8fQDV18PR0
Colors lyrics by Ice T
Yo Ease let's do this...
I am a nightmare walking, psychopath talking
King of my jungle just a gangster stalking
Living life like a firecracker quick is my fuse
Then dead as a deathpack the colors I choose
Red or Blue, Cuz or Blood, it just don't matter
Sucker die for your life when my shotgun scatters
We gangs of L.A. will never die - just multiply
You see they hit us then we hit them
Then we hit them and they hit us, man
It's like a war, ya know what I'm sayin'
People dont even understand
They don't even know what they dealing with
You wanna get rid of the gangs it's gonna take a lotta work
But people don't understand the size of this
This is no joke man, this is real
You don't know me, fool
You disown me, cool
I don't need your assistance, social persistance
Any problem I got I just put my fist in
My life is violent but violent is life
Peace is a dream, reality is a knife
My colors, my honour, my colors, my all
With my colors upon me one soldier stands tall
Tell me what have you left me, what have I got
Last night in cold blood my young brother got shot
My home got jacked
My mother's on crack
My sister can't work cause her arms show trax
Madness insanity live in profanity
Then some punk claimin' they understandin' me
Give me a break, what world do you live in
Death is my sect, guess my religion
Yo my brother was a gang banger
and all my homeboys bang
I don't know why I do it man, I just do it
I never had much of nuffin man
Look at you man, you've got everything going for yourself
and I ain't got nuffin man, I've got nuffin
I'm living in the ghetto man
just look at me man, look at me
My pants are saggin braided hair
suckers stare but I don't care
my game ain't knowelgde my game's fear
I've no remorse so squares beware
But my true mission is just revenge
you ain't in my sect, you ain't my friend
wear the wrong color your life could end
homocides my favorite venge
Listen to me man
no matter whatcha do don't ever join a gang
you don't wanna be in it man,
You're just gonna end up in a mix of dead freinds and time in jail I
know, if
I had a chance like you,
I would never be in a gang man
but I didn't have a chance
You know I wish i did
I'll just walk like a giant police defiant
you'll say to stop but I'll say that I cant
my gangs my family its all that I have
I'm a star, on the walls is my autograph
You don't like it, so you know where you can go
cause the streets are my stage and terror's my show
phsyco-analize tried diognising me wise
It was a joke brother the brutally died
But it was mine, so let me define
my territory don't cross the line
Don't try to act crazy
cause the bitch dont thank me
you can be read like a punk
it wouldn'ta made me
cause my colors death
thou we all want peace
but our war won't end,
they'll always see
See the wars of the street gangs will always get to me man
But I don't wanna be down with this situation man
but I'm in here, if I had something betta to do I think I'd do it but
right
now I'm just down here boye
I'm trying to get money cause I'm smart
I'm gunna get paid while I'm out here
I'm gunna get that paper, ya know what I'm saying
If I had a chance like you,
maybe I would be in school
but I'm not, I'm out here living day to day surviving
and I'm willing to die for my colors
Yo'll please stop, cause I want ya all to live.
This is Ice-T, Peace...
Last edited by slapout9; 07-24-2010 at 02:22 PM. Reason: add lyrics
Careful Slap. You're venturing into my world. In the Salinas project, I didn't talk to a single police officer or government official. I went to see the gang leaders. I wanted to hear their truth first.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lexLA...ext=1&index=27
Last edited by MikeF; 07-24-2010 at 02:44 PM.
Mike,I remember and I think we exchanged a few PM's over it. My point is how many people in Government would even think of or be willing to do such a thing? There are some out there but not many.
Now for COIN discontent.
The COIN manual is better for inside America
I would like to return to a matter I raised in another thread for which I got little or no support. This is the single biggest error being made by both US and NATO forces in Afghanistan and that is the short duration of the operational "tours".
The Brits at 6 months is absolutely laughable with the US army's 12 months sounding almost respectable by comparison. There is no way that any force can navigate their way through the human and geographical terrain that is Afghanistan to the extent that they can take on the Taliban by hunting them down and killing them.
Perhaps COIN is not popular in certain quarters because it is more difficult to execute than the more conventional warfare. There lies the crunch of this matter. You just can't make a difference by swinging by for a quick 6 month tour every two years. If anyone thinks it does they need their head read.
I suggested the potential of raising specialised battalions along the lines of the US's Merrill’s Marauders of the past for permanent deployment in Afghanistan. Again the response to this concept was a predictable... its new, therefore strange, therefore frightening, and therefore too scary to be supported. The only objection that was raised was the theoretical threat of an increased incidence of PTSD.
This is why all bold military actions of this nature are carried out by senior officers with vision and not through a committee of middle level field officers and self styled "analysts".
Essentially what it will take for progress in Afghanistan is (first) the political will in Washington to seize the initiative then (second) a commander like Templer (supported by the likes of Thompson in Malaya) or a Patton or a Kitchener (of Omdurman and the 2nd Boer War fame) to take the situation by the scruff of the neck. Sad to say Patraeus is not that type of leader.
A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?
JMA, I'm neither risk nor casualty averse,
but I don't see where the 5307th Composite Unit (provisional) fits into the present picture. According to the Wiki (I didn't check Bidwell's book on my shelf), they began operations in February 1944 and ended in August 1944:
This looks like a 6-month tour to me, with very little institutional memory to pass on at the end since almost everyone belonged in a hospital bed.A week after Myitkyina fell, on August 10, 1944, the 5307th was disbanded with a final total of 130 combat-effective officers and men (out of the original 2,997). Of the 2,750 to enter Burma, only 2 were left alive who had never been hospitalized with wounds or major illness. [39]
39. ^ Hunter, Charles N. (Col.), Galahad, Naylor Press (1963) p. 215
That is not to pi$$ on your parade (re: the length of tours), as that is not my SME; but merely to point out that you might come up with a better long-term tour example which was not used up in the course of the tour (your RLI ?).
Regards
Mike
that is a very good question.
Is this what this thread is about?
Says who? As long as the G2 effort is coherent, I can see no evidence that giving people 18+ month tours would increase unit effectiveness.The Brits at 6 months is absolutely laughable with the US army's 12 months sounding almost respectable by comparison. There is no way that any force can navigate their way through the human and geographical terrain that is Afghanistan to the extent that they can take on the Taliban by hunting them down and killing them.
Not popular with who?Perhaps COIN is not popular in certain quarters because it is more difficult to execute than the more conventional warfare. There lies the crunch of this matter.
So so-called "COIN" is more difficult to fight than the Falklands, Korea, or Fighting in 21st Army Group 1944-45? Sorry, that's just not true. No COIN operation in history has had to worry about being DF'ed by Corps level artillery, FGA or taking on a Company of MBTs. Psychological casualties in Normandy eventually rose 10-15% of men requiring evacuation. I've never seen a figure like that from a conflict in which the enemy was solely irregular. Regular warfare against competent enemies is the gold standard of skill.
This makes no sense. You have an Army use it. Why is the UK only deploying 10,000 men? Because that is all the strategic risk the UK wants to run. It is NOTHING to do with manpower availability.I suggested the potential of raising specialised battalions along the lines of the US's Merrill’s Marauders of the past for permanent deployment in Afghanistan.
Not strange, or frightening, or original. It's just not a good idea.Again the response to this concept was a predictable... its new, therefore strange, therefore frightening, and therefore too scary to be supported.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I used Merrill’s Marauders purely as an example of a specialised unit that was raised for a specific task during that war.
This unit was not considered a success but I raised the example to illustrate a concept. So lets focus on the concept shall we?In the Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) of August 1943, Allied leaders decided to form a US deep penetration unit that would attack Japanese troops in Burma... [snip] ...A call for volunteers attracted around 3,000 men.
In the thread Fire with Fire the idea was flighted of a need to raise a force that can take the war to the Taliban. This requirement to actually try to kill the Taliban rather than hold ground or whatever the ROE allows is becoming a recurring theme. This seems in the main driven by frustration at the restrictions imposed through the ROE. This is only half the story though as probably an equal limitation on military performance in Afghanistan is the almost total lack of knowledge of the people and culture, the terrain and the enemy (or roughly in the new language METT-TC).
(Now before someone says they have done 2 six month tours over the past four years and sets themselves up as some sort of "old hand" expert on Afghanistan please just think about just how pathetic that experience level is against the Taliban. It is not close to an even fight.)
So to me it seems obvious that the METT-TC aspect also needs to be addressed rather than just hearing the increasing wining about the ROE.
So how does one act to ensure that there is a radical improvement in the METT-TC aspect of OEF in Afghanistan?
It is quite honestly appalling that while ISAF forces are reeling under the double whammy of restrictive ROEs and almost total and universal ignorance of METT-TC the majority just unquestioningly go with the flow in true lemmings fashion.
Where is the MacArthur? Where is the Patton? Where is the Roberts or Kitchener? Where is the Templer? Where is the Guderian? Where is the Allenby? Perhaps it is this absolute lack of inspired military leadership that is the undoing of the ISAF efforts in Afghanistan.
Oh yes... we were talking about six month/nine month tours. This war after nine years has got beyond amateur hour and now as the death toll rises demands a move to a more professional approach. Truly a war in search of inspired leadership.
One thing which I'll never get about all the COIN theories is why they're so militaristic.
It's obvious that the military power in place is powerful enough to minimise the (para)military options and effectiveness of the enemy.
The two major shortcomings are the coverage (military numbers) and the political effort. I doubt that an increased hunting activity would have a good chance of strategic success.
The greater problem was the political effort. The military only deserves the rank of a sideshow once it's suppressed the bold open resistance.
The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.
TB might move into a village and fore the village to cooperate superficially - but there's no way how TB could force them to really cooperate. Even hostages cannot ensure 100% cooperation. The minimum objective is to ensure that the population uses its remaining freedom of action to assist us.
The whole thing lasts way too long, though. It seems as if it becomes impossible to solve such conflicts in a smart way after a few years.
It seems to take the internal decay of one party or a heavy dose of brute force to end such conflicts if they already burned for years.
Why do villagers not turn on the Taliban?
JMA asked this:I asked a friend who studies local culture along the Durand Line and in reply came this:A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?There are several posts on Pashtunwali, but on a quick check I could not find an answer there.The first rule of thumb in Afghanistan, eradicate the outer menace before you turn the guns on yourself. Outside influence in the land of Roh is considered sacrilege and must at all costs be defended.
Hewad is detailed in Pashtunwali as defence of culture and land, the Coalition is viewed as the invader, once this has been settled they'll turn on themselves.
We need to understand the pyschology of occupation and in this case the occupied, if Britons were murdered by a fellow white Briton would this cause more of or less of a stir than if the perpetrator happens to be a Muslim occupier.
Now multiply that scenario a hundred times and you may begin to understand the stance of a tribal Pashtun, a fella who probably takes courage from his ancient code, thrity years of instability, killing of local civilians, his religion and a heap of other local grievances
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-25-2010 at 07:46 PM. Reason: Add two sentences
davidbfpo
"Difficulty" and "Danger" are two very separate things. While conventional combat is typically much more dangerous than Insurgency is, it is also very simple in its measures of success or failure. To defeat armies, or seize terrain is relatively simple to understand when one is failing or succeeding at what they are doing.
Similarly, there are estimates that as many as 50,000 French civilians were killed, primarily by allied bombing, during June-July 1944 operations in France. Such casualties are of small impact on an Army liberating the same populace from an earlier invader. A cost of freedom. Now put those same civilian casualties being caused by an outside force coming in to help a country suppress an insurgency among its own populace. Disaster! The insurgency would grow in support from such heavy-handed tactics.
To even look at insurgency as a form of warfare leads to dangerous assumptions. Perhaps insurgency is indeed warfare by a populace against its government; but COIN addressed as warfare in turn is to sink into a quagmire of waging war against one's own populace in order provide peace and good governance to the same. In the law such situations are described as "the slippery slope." Slippery indeed.
Far better that the military take the position that COIN is not warfare at all. That it is the business of civil governance and that it will lend its capacity and capabilities to augment the same under the rules of MSCA whenever tasked, but that lead, and responsibility must always remain with the civil authorities; and focus also must likewise remain on the repair of the failures of governance rather than on the punishment of those who dare to complain about the same.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
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