COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[slapout9]

It is not that the COIN manual is wrong, it is that here is no Insurgency to counter. We were attacked from Afghanistan and they refused to cooperate and our people were killed and our property was destroyed by means of a Guerrilla Warfare Air Strike.

Time to give them a Hells Angels Air Campaign, the only civilians we are going to protect are Americans. As CvC would say:
"What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means -- either completely or enough to make him stop fighting. . . . The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole object of all engagements. . . . Direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration."

After that we should use Jewish Kung Fu (put them in a headlock and shake all their money out of them until they have paid us back).

[JMA]

"Difficulty" and "Danger" are two very separate things. While conventional combat is typically much more dangerous than Insurgency is, it is also very simple in its measures of success or failure. To defeat armies, or seize terrain is relatively simple to understand when one is failing or succeeding at what they are doing.

Yes, exactly.

[JMA]

One thing which I'll never get about all the COIN theories is why they're so militaristic.

It's obvious that the military power in place is powerful enough to minimise the (para)military options and effectiveness of the enemy.

The two major shortcomings are the coverage (military numbers) and the political effort. I doubt that an increased hunting activity would have a good chance of strategic success.

The greater problem was the political effort. The military only deserves the rank of a sideshow once it's suppressed the bold open resistance.

The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.

TB might move into a village and fore the village to cooperate superficially - but there's no way how TB could force them to really cooperate. Even hostages cannot ensure 100% cooperation. The minimum objective is to ensure that the population uses its remaining freedom of action to assist us.

The whole thing lasts way too long, though. It seems as if it becomes impossible to solve such conflicts in a smart way after a few years.
It seems to take the internal decay of one party or a heavy dose of brute force to end such conflicts if they already burned for years.

I believe we are getting closer to it now.

Yes I agree that the military component of a modern COIN war is minor indeed and I also agree that sending young infantry-trained officers into villages to "win the hearts and minds" of the locals is laughable. Use whoever you like for this task but don't expect results from young soldiers fresh out of New York City or London.

That said have you noted how it is the soldiers that get more confused about COIN than do the politicians? Is it not madness to see soldiers starting to talk and act like at company, platoon and section level the effort should be no more than 20% military stuff and 80% civil/political/other stuff?

Can someone please tell soldiers that 100% of their efforts fall within the 20% (military component) of the total COIN effort. Certainly killing civilians will not help the main COIN effort so soldiers will be expected (by the ROE) to avoid this as much as possible but for the rest they need to be formed up on muster parade everyday and reminded that their role in the COIN campaign is to "close with and kill the enemy".

Those soldiers who would prefer to be handing out Mars bars and helping to build schools and clinics should resign and join either some civil action unit or the Peace Corps. It seems that there are a lot of "sheep" in "wolfs" clothing out there turning the military into a weak and (in the case of Helmand in Afghanistan) an ineffective force. Use soldiers to do the 20% which requires military action and civvies to do the remainder.

In most cases an insurgency does not begin unless there are grounds for genuine "unhappiness" among a section of the population. The current regime will not make the required concessions until they are forced to do so. This will always take time. Sending in the troops to ruthlessly crush a revolt is a less likely option nowadays.

[jmm99]

Not all soldiers are suited for the political struggle, especially in forces such as the US and UK (e.g., Brig. "Trotsky" Davies in WWII, link and link - to Envar Hoxha in explanation for Davies' refusal to discuss politics: "Because I am a soldier and not a politician"; and Allenby, for that matter, in WWI) who take some pride in being non-poltical.

I also think that some believe that, by simplistic application of the national policy (to which, the military struggle is one continuation by other means; the political struggle is another continuation by still other means), the political struggle is satisfactorily waged.

I'd suggest that the situation is more complicated; and that these soundbites, while partially correct, are misleading:

from Fuchs
The decisive challenge was and is the political fight against the covert politics of the enemy. Sending young lieutenants on patrol and to meetings with villagers is not going to cut it. We would need real diplomats or selected senior officers with impressive personality. The diplomatic teams would need to be multinational, with representatives of Pashtu, Tajiks, Uzbeks and whatever minorities lives in the area of operation.

from JMA
Those soldiers who would prefer to be handing out Mars bars and helping to build schools and clinics should resign and join either some civil action unit or the Peace Corps. It seems that there are a lot of "sheep" in "wolfs" clothing out there turning the military into a weak and (in the case of Helmand in Afghanistan) an ineffective force. Use soldiers to do the 20% which requires military action and civvies to do the remainder.

The basics (and the advanced lessons) of the Political Struggle were laid out by both sides in Vietnam, whether one tagged it "Armed Propaganda" (Giap's original unit from 1944) or Pacification (as in ARVN BG Tran's definitive book, from his perspective ).

The bottom line is that the Political Struggle is still a violent world of neutralization (kill, capture or convert) - and is not domestic politics, the Peace Corps, or merely spending billions on reconstruction projects. Since the effort must extend to the grassroots (villages and hamlets), it requires lower level Os and NCOs (whether they are military or paramilitary); and they must be able to at least protect themselves. I'd have them doing quite a bit more than that; but all those are the details which have been laid out better by many who wrote about it at the time.

Regards

Mike

[tom_mancino]

Is it possible that we have been talking a good COIN game, but not really doing enough COIN to be effective? I ask you, how can we keep approx. 1/2 of our potential combat power (~40 K soldiers) in just two FOBs (Kandahar and Bagram ) in Afghanistan and realistically say we are giving population centric COIN (a hugely manpower intensive effort) a fair shot?

[JMA]

Is this what this thread is about?

This thread stems from your posting of the blog entry Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents by David Ucko. Counterinsurgency is becoming unpopular and is getting a bad name because IMHO the way it is being implemented in Afghanistan. So therefore if one can address why it is not working in Afghanistan one can get some clarity on this issue, yes?

Says who? As long as the G2 effort is coherent, I can see no evidence that giving people 18+ month tours would increase unit effectiveness.

I said 6 month tours of the Brits are laughable. I understand that the ability to think laterally is not a British trait. It is plain insanity to squeeze a 6 month tour of Afghanistan into an otherwise busy two-year cycle for units. Apart from the obvious message that the war is not being taken seriously or merely being used to rapidly rotate Bde HQs and units through the theatre to spread a bit of operational and combat experience around the army.

Do a little mental comparison for yourself. Compare the knowledge of terrain and population (METT-TC if you like) between the Taliban and the ISAF forces. Taliban continues to improve being in theatre most of the time and due to the low kill rate per contact while ISAF with its tours and rotations is rather like doing the Harvard Step Test (which tires you out but takes you nowhere).

Not surprised that no alternatives to the Brit 6 month tours has been forthcoming. Just going with the flow and not rocking the boat is good career advice.

Not popular with who?

The same people classed as discontents in the article you posted - Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents

So so-called "COIN" is more difficult to fight than the Falklands, Korea, or Fighting in 21st Army Group 1944-45? Sorry, that's just not true. No COIN operation in history has had to worry about being DF'ed by Corps level artillery, FGA or taking on a Company of MBTs. Psychological casualties in Normandy eventually rose 10-15% of men requiring evacuation. I've never seen a figure like that from a conflict in which the enemy was solely irregular. Regular warfare against competent enemies is the gold standard of skill.

Difficult as opposed to dangerous or risky... and yes it is true.

This makes no sense. You have an Army use it. Why is the UK only deploying 10,000 men? Because that is all the strategic risk the UK wants to run. It is NOTHING to do with manpower availability.

You need a specialised unit because certainly in the Brit Army the units come attached with their historical baggage on how they fight. under the subheading Regimental culture in Anthony King's Understanding the Helmand campaign he explains how in this case (Afghanistan) the regimental history of the British regiments deployed serves to be a drawback rather than than a benefit.

It makes sense to lateral thinkers that given the nature and duration of these insurgencies all parties would be better served at a troop level of around 10,000 troops to raise units that can provide soldiers in the field with a continually growing knowledge of the country, its people, their cultures and of the terrain.

Four years on I would be so bold as to state that the Brits would have been well served by such a force of brigade strength comprising 3-4 battalions (increasing by one battalion per year).

Not strange, or frightening, or original. It's just not a good idea.

The Brits are suffering in Helmand, yet they cling to a failed strategy and approach as if it were the Holy Grail.

[jmm99]

if you are talking about something akin to the Vietnam Pacification Program (which, in one form or another, spanned the Second Indochina War 1959-1975). The USG lacks much of the horsepower it had then in MACV, CIA, USAID and USIA; and, say all the bad you want of the GSV, the GoA has it beat all to hell and back in negatives. So, first, the horses are missing.

Second, the remaining timetable is too short. We are not talking Vietnam 1964 (where the questions of what paths to take and how far to walk them were still on the table); but Vietnam 1968-1969 (the transition from Johnson to Nixon), where the question is how best to depart. That will become more apparent once the 2010 US election results come in and the Powers That Be and Them What Wants to Be face off for 2012.

Regards

Mike

PS: Tom Mancino - I notice from your other post (here) that you're reading Mark Moyar's new book, "A Question of Command", which I've ordered following Strickland's recommendation. I'm trying to catch up with you.

[JMA]

Is it possible that we have been talking a good COIN game, but not really doing enough COIN to be effective? I ask you, how can we keep approx. 1/2 of our potential combat power (~40 K soldiers) in just two FOBs (Kandahar and Bagram ) in Afghanistan and realistically say we are giving population centric COIN (a hugely manpower intensive effort) a fair shot?

The military takes care of 20% of the effort in COIN. To be successful you need to have a legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population and can begin to provide civil/police/paramilitary link between the government and the ISAF forces. Not being provided... so quite frankly there is no hope of success beyond the narrow confines of battlefield successes where the Taliban are stupid enough to stand and fight, which is no success other than a temporary one at best.

[JMA]

if you are talking about something akin to the Vietnam Pacification Program (which, in one form or another, spanned the Second Indochina War 1959-1975). The USG lacks much of the horsepower it had then in MACV, CIA, USAID and USIA; and, say all the bad you want of the GSV, the GoA has it beat all to hell and back in negatives. So, first, the horses are missing.

Second, the remaining timetable is too short. We are not talking Vietnam 1964 (where the questions of what paths to take and how far to walk them were still on the table); but Vietnam 1968-1969 (the transition from Johnson to Nixon), where the question is how best to depart. That will become more apparent once the 2010 US election results come in and the Powers That Be and Them What Wants to Be face off for 2012.

Regards

Mike

So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.

[JMA]

Not all soldiers are suited for the political struggle, especially in forces such as the US and UK (e.g., Brig. "Trotsky" Davies in WWII, link and link - to Envar Hoxha in explanation for Davies' refusal to discuss politics: "Because I am a soldier and not a politician"; and Allenby, for that matter, in WWI) who take some pride in being non-poltical.

That was back in WWII and WWI for the Brits. Lot has changed since then. Now most all the senior officers do a spel at MoD or Foreign Office to make sure that they are adequately politicised and will not let any moral or ethical concerns ever get in the way of carrying out government policy (unless they want to commit career suicide).

I also think that some believe that, by simplistic application of the national policy (to which, the military struggle is one continuation by other means; the political struggle is another continuation by still other means), the political struggle is satisfactorily waged.

I'd suggest that the situation is more complicated; and that these soundbites, while partially correct, are misleading:

The basics (and the advanced lessons) of the Political Struggle were laid out by both sides in Vietnam, whether one tagged it "Armed Propaganda" (Giap's original unit from 1944) or Pacification (as in ARVN BG Tran's definitive book, from his perspective ).

The bottom line is that the Political Struggle is still a violent world of neutralization (kill, capture or convert) - and is not domestic politics, the Peace Corps, or merely spending billions on reconstruction projects. Since the effort must extend to the grassroots (villages and hamlets), it requires lower level Os and NCOs (whether they are military or paramilitary); and they must be able to at least protect themselves. I'd have them doing quite a bit more than that; but all those are the details which have been laid out better by many who wrote about it at the time.

Regards

Mike

What I said was essentially that soldiers deal with the 20% in a violent military fashion. The other 80% gets to be done by the politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs. Don't expect a combat soldier to become multi-skilled to the point where today he is involved in close quarter battle and killing or being killed and the next he is handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish.

Of course soldiers are confused by this nonsensical COIN strategy, they should be. Those that claim that they actually know whats going on probably need to take a polygraph.

[davidbfpo]

A second view on JMA's question:

A question: if it is true that by killing a civilian you turn the family, the village, the whole tribe against you then why does that not apply equally to the Taliban?

Cross refer an earlier answer on Post 29.

Now from another observer:

In some cases that will happen but Talibs are much more careful not to hit civilians (+they don't use airpower artillery etc) - but there a number of reasons why Talibs may have fewer problems wiith this than US forces:

1. Being more sensitive to local custom the Talibs speedily pay the appropriate amount of blood money for civilian deaths (the Yanks do to - but too clumsily).
2. The Talibs have local war lords giving them protection - if a tribal leader and to a lesser extent local mullah says Talibs are right to fight then people will see deaths of "US spies" for example as justified.
3. When the US kill an innocent person revenge will be taken on any foreign soldier - with Talibs it is more difficult as local people are sensitive to different factions etc so who should they hit back at? They would not want to kill an Uzbek if a Chechen was responsible for fear -even Afghans get scared sometimes.

[jmm99]

whether a "COIN" strategy ever existed in Astan; and whatever the "Plan", the political side of the ledger was feeble at best ("lipstick on a pig" and the the rest of the cliches).

That didn't bother me cuz my rationale for being in Astan in the first place (and I never saw a reason to change the rationale) was to mount direct action operations against the AQ leadership cadres in Astan and Pstan (more a matter of "rental" operations), based on principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

Other folks at much higher pay grades than mine, had different ideas.

Anyway, agreed: alia jacta est - and we are now in the period of Afghanization and exit strategy(ies).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

with this:

from JMA
What I said was essentially that soldiers deal with the 20% in a violent military fashion. The other 80% gets to be done by the politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs. Don't expect a combat soldier to become multi-skilled to the point where today he is involved in close quarter battle and killing or being killed and the next he is handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish.

an overly-simplified (bright line transition) from a denied (or at least contested) military environment to a permissive (non-contested) political environment where the "politicians, government departments, civil action groups and NGOs" can operate in their normal fashion.

Truth is that the Political Struggle often must accompany the Military Struggle; and as the Military Struggle abates, the Political Struggle intensifies - unless, of course, the Military Struggle manages to sweep the board clean of everyone who supported the "insurgents" with military or political effort.

I'd suspect we are not really at odds (since we both seem to like Jack McCuen); but your use of "handing out Mars bars and helping to fix an irrigation system to help the local poppy crop flourish" tends to rankle a bit. That may soundbite your views on current affairs; but it is not my view of how the political effort must be conducted (nor was it COL McCuen's).

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.

There is lip service to one but there is no dedication to actually implementing the effort as, frankly, there is no real need for it to protect US interests. There are those here who wish one to be implemented but they're losing the argument. Actually, they lost it before it started.

Many of your suggestions are valid. Provided there is political will to do what's required and see it through. That is lacking in both the UK and the US (for good reason IMO). Lacking that will, your good suggestions, much less the bad ones, are not going to be implemented simply because at high levels no need to do so is seen. Nor is there adequate troop strength in the proper types of units to do it right. Tom Mancino's accurate post above shows how serious we are not...

One could say that committing troops to the operation under such restraints is immoral -- I'd just say it's stupid. Perhaps I'm too conditioned to watching the US do dumb things but I accept it as the price we pay for the way we operate and the many benefits that flow from that. I spent a number of years in various vacation spots fighting bugs, cold, heat and unfriendly locals. Many of those fights were unnecessary, a number were really dumb -- but that was what I got paid to do so I did it and well enough to be still be here pushing 80. The kids in the UK and US Armies in Afghanistan today are in the same boat. They're fighting for pay and each other; there is no cause, per se. That makes a difference.

The US has not been at War since 1945. The US Army has not been at war since 1945. The Nation and the Army have sent forces into combat many places since then but there has been no commitment of the nation or Army to a war. None. In WW II, we totally committed and spent over 36% of our GDP each year on the war. We only recently retired all that debt. No war since then has bitten out more than 4% (Korea), Viet Nam was only about 2% and the rest have been about 1% or less. We're willing to fight but we're also willing to do it half heartedly. Dumb but there you are...

Both nations field large hidebound and bureaucratic forces -- not just Armies -- that are slow to adapt and resist change. You're correct in that assessment but you can beat the drum for change all you wish and you'll just be wasting your time and pixels. Lacking a major crisis to break that trend, there will be little or no change in that condition. That's okay IMO, the resilience to cope is there if it becomes necessary.

All that is to say, again, you have some valid points but they are not ever going to be implemented for a variety of political and cultural reasons and in the absence of an existential war -- that latter makes a huge difference. Really huge...

So yes, the exit strategy is next up on the agenda -- has been since late 2003. The delay? In the western nations, domestic politics. Things in Af-Pak? Sort of a secondary concern but with really some minor concern -- and most of the emphasis -- on the latter nation, not so much on Afghanistan...

[jmm99]

than Ken and I (don't know about you, JMA), are the deciders - From this AM SWJBlog, Petraeus Scraps Plan to Secure Kandahar:

The International Herald Tribune and Daily Telegraph are reporting this morning that General David Petraeus "has decided that a full-scale military encirclement and invasion of Kandahar was not an appropriate model to tackle the Taliban". Via the Daily Telegraph:

... Gen McChrystal had planned a summer conquest of the Taliban in Kandahar to reinvigorate the battle against the Taliban. But the operation has been repeatedly delayed by concerns that it would not adequately restore the confidence of city residents in the security forces.

Gen Petraeus is reported to believe that the operation must be a broad-ranging counter-insurgency campaign, involving more troops working with local militias. The plan he inherited was criticised for placing too much emphasis on targeted assassinations of key insurgent leaders and not enough on winning over local residents. Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said yesterday that the US-led strategy in southern Afghanistan was undergoing sweeping changes...

And so it goes as the National Command Authorities deal with exit strategies.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

So now that the COIN plan has failed all that's left to figure out is the exit strategy.

I'm still trying to figure out what the entrance strategy was.

I sometimes think we focus too much on trying to establish a perception that the existing government is legitimate or beneficial and ignore the perception of survivability. Even if people think the current government is superior to or more legitimate than those challenging it, they are likely to back the side they expect to win. Even those who nominally "support" our side are likely to be hedging their bets with equal "support" for the other side. They aren't trying to get the best or most legitimate government, they are trying to protect themselves from potentially fatal repercussions if they choose the side that eventually loses. We tend to assume that all people are seeking good and legitimate government, when in fact many are seeking to gain whatever advantage they can for themselves and their own immediate group while protecting themselves from negative outcomes. In much of the world "good government" is effectively defined as "bad government that benefits me and mine".

Where is the MacArthur? Where is the Patton? Where is the Roberts or Kitchener? Where is the Templer? Where is the Guderian? Where is the Allenby? Perhaps it is this absolute lack of inspired military leadership that is the undoing of the ISAF efforts in Afghanistan.

I suspect that the lack of inspired leadership is closely related to the lack of clear policy objectives. What's the goal? What's the desired end state? Nobody seems to know... and it's difficult to provide inspired leadership if you don't know where we're trying to go.

The first rule of thumb in Afghanistan, eradicate the outer menace before you turn the guns on yourself. Outside influence in the land of Roh is considered sacrilege and must at all costs be defended.

Hewad is detailed in Pashtunwali as defence of culture and land, the Coalition is viewed as the invader, once this has been settled they'll turn on themselves.

This I believe to be a quite accurate assessment of the "why don't the villagers turn on the Taliban" question... except that when the outsiders are gone I suspect they will turn on each other, not themselves.

[William F. Owen]

Counterinsurgency is becoming unpopular and is getting a bad name because IMHO the way it is being implemented in Afghanistan.

It's got a bad name because "COIN" is now a pseudo-science.

I said 6 month tours of the Brits are laughable.

Your opinion. That's not really a basis for discussion. What evidence are you showing that effectiveness increases given a 1 year tour

Not surprised that no alternatives to the Brit 6 month tours has been forthcoming. Just going with the flow and not rocking the boat is good career advice.

Actually a whole lot of discussion is on-going and has been for last 3 years.

Difficult as opposed to dangerous or risky... and yes it is true.

Sorry, but I cannot take seriously the idea that Regular Warfare against a competent opponent is any more difficult or dangerous chasing a bunch of men in sandals carrying AKs.
A bad decision in Regular warfare can loose you a unit. That makes it both far more difficult and far more dangerous.
Irregular warfare may seem less strategically decisive, but that is irrelevant to far greater difficulty and danger or regular formation level combat operations.

You need a specialised unit because certainly in the Brit Army the units come attached with their historical baggage on how they fight. under the subheading Regimental culture in Anthony King's Understanding the Helmand campaign he explains how in this case (Afghanistan) the regimental history of the British regiments deployed serves to be a drawback rather than than a benefit.

Rubbish. The Tony King paper is not good evidence, and it seems few here actually know what so-called "Regimental Culture" actually is!

The Brits are suffering in Helmand, yet they cling to a failed strategy and approach as if it were the Holy Grail.

I agree that the UK is suffering, and that the strategy is poor. - so why do you not talk about the strategy instead of drifting into area where you lack the knowledge to effectively discuss what is actually going on?

[William F. Owen]

The military takes care of 20% of the effort in COIN. To be successful you need to have a legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population and can begin to provide civil/police/paramilitary link between the government and the ISAF forces. Not being provided... so quite frankly there is no hope of success beyond the narrow confines of battlefield successes where the Taliban are stupid enough to stand and fight, which is no success other than a temporary one at best.

And now JMA turns into one of the "New-COIN" boys??

An armed rebellion is a 90% a military problem! = Armed force needs to be countered by armed force. If you don't defeat the men with guns, you loose! - not 20%, but 100%.

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in. - "legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population." All those things are for the men in suits - and all of it is political. The military can only set the conditions. No conditions, no suits.
Anyone here an Afghan politician? Silence?
Military force can put in place any policy it wishes. It's politically blind. How military force is applied should reflect the policy being set forth. Legitimacy is nothing to do with success. It's a liberal construct that ignores history. Cutting the hands of kids and stoning women IS LEGITIMATE for about 200 million people on the planet.
"We" the west just wish to force the Afghan people to accept out "our brand" of legitimacy.

This 80% political 20% military rubbish is "99%" of the problem. Military force sets military conditions. It sets forth the policy, by denying the opponent the means to set forth his, as in the opponent ceases to use military force. If the politicians cannot work it out, that is NOTHING to do with the efficacy of armed force.

[Fuchs]

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in.

And that should have happened in 2002.
The tragedy is that the non-combat aspect only got halfway due attention when the Taliban had their comeback.

The window of opportunity was 2002-2004, maybe into 2005 - the time when the wrong people focused on the wrong country.

The West may still defeat the Taliban, but the price will be unnecessarily and unacceptably high. It is already both simply because Afghanistan is extremely irrelevant and unnecessary, even for AQ.

[Bob's World]

And now JMA turns into one of the "New-COIN" boys??

An armed rebellion is a 90% a military problem! = Armed force needs to be countered by armed force. If you don't defeat the men with guns, you loose! - not 20%, but 100%.

ONLY when the armed threat has abated, does the POLITICAL process kick in. - "legitimate government with policies that address the concerns and or grievances of all the population." All those things are for the men in suits - and all of it is political. The military can only set the conditions. No conditions, no suits.
Anyone here an Afghan politician? Silence?
Military force can put in place any policy it wishes. It's politically blind. How military force is applied should reflect the policy being set forth. Legitimacy is nothing to do with success. It's a liberal construct that ignores history. Cutting the hands of kids and stoning women IS LEGITIMATE for about 200 million people on the planet.
"We" the west just wish to force the Afghan people to accept out "our brand" of legitimacy.

This 80% political 20% military rubbish is "99%" of the problem. Military force sets military conditions. It sets forth the policy, by denying the opponent the means to set forth his, as in the opponent ceases to use military force. If the politicians cannot work it out, that is NOTHING to do with the efficacy of armed force.

Is this then a "conservative construct" that does the same? I'm looking for examples of where military operations to defeat an insurgent movement actually defeated the insurgency as well.

Malaysia? One has to ask, did the military operations of the Brits set conditions for political success; or rather was it the military operations of the communist insurgents who set the conditions for independence and withdrawal of the illegitimate British Colonial government? Even though one group of combatants was defeated, insurgency is about the government and not the bands that rise up to challenge it. One band was defeated under one leader and one line of ideology. That is not the greater insurgency though. Insurgency is the perceptions of the populace as a whole, many who never even consider taking up arms directly, toward their system of governance. The actual resistance will manifest in many forms. To crush any one such manifestation and declare victory is naive at best and delusional.

The post WWII insurgencies in SEA were not about expanding communism, but rather about expelling colonialism.

Similarly, the Post Cold War insurgencies are not about expanding democracy in East Europe, or expanding Islamism in Africa and the Middle east; but rather about expelling overt and unwanted Soviet and Western influences respectively.


We need to evolve to a more sophisticated understanding of insurgencies. I can't get on board with what guys like Doc Nagl is selling, you can't buy off a populace in insurgency; but neither can I get on board with the position represented here, as you can't beat the desire for liberty out of a people either. Neither one makes any sense. Both are approaches rooted in ignoring changing what really needs changing, and then busting your butt to get the populace to stop complaining about it.

What history shows is that the populace may pause, but they will not stop.