COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[JMA]

The UK has done this. The 'Helmandi Scouts' which has been in the field for at least 2 years. The objection to raising a UK regular unit was (as well as the possible risk of increased PTSD rates) mostly that in a limited war we are only allowed and able to do limited things!

The Helmandi Scouts is a unit of locals? That's not what we (or at least I) are talking about. We are talking about how to best utilise foreign troops who are needed in country while the locals get their act together. Soldiers that can speak the language, understand the culture, know the terrain and climate and thereby negate the advantage the Taliban currently have.

All that said I do believe that instead of forming separate local units in lieu of what I advocate it is of value and often needed to bring in locals into such units as interpreters and trackers and the like. Perhaps over time these units can be indigenised, say over five or more years.

Now if the Brits had started out with this in 2005/6 then there would have been more options on the table.

I have a deep concern over these supposed PTSD rates. PTSD must surely come in degrees, yes? So if it seems to be inevitable than why spread it around the whole army? Why not concentrate it among a smaller group who can be followed up, treated (with X), etc etc. Now why did this PTSD seem to only blossom at current rates after around 1980? In the case of the UK we may be seeing a new angle on the theme of benefit scam. Seems a good angle to me. Do a quick 6 month tour in Helmand, then make sure everyone Knows you wake up in the middle of the night howling like a wolf and you get a disability pension for life with a free doses of X. What % of the claimed PTSD cases are for real?

[jmm99]

Connections are always interesting; though they may mislead and take one down the primrose path to perdition.

The Industrial War College is formally the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and used to be the Army Industrial College - from the Wiki:

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is a U.S. military educational institution tasked with preparing military officers and civilian government officials for leadership and executive positions in the field of national security. Established in 1924 in the aftermath of America’s mobilization difficulties in World War I, its predecessor, the Army Industrial College, focused on wartime procurement and mobilization procedures. Bernard M. Baruch, who was a prominent Wall Street speculator and Chairman of the War Industries Board, is regarded as one of the founding fathers.
.....
ICAF moved into a newly constructed facility, Eisenhower Hall, in 1960. During the next several years, a period that Baruch termed the Cold War, the character of ICAF changed dramatically. As the United States found itself increasingly involved in Vietnam, ICAF shifted to educating leaders to manage logistical resources in such conflicts, as opposed to focusing on national industrial mobilization.

Now, Bernard Baruch was an interesting figure of my youth (he lived until he was 95 in 1965, when I was 23 ), advisor of presidents from Wilson through Kennedy. Baruch was certainly linked to the Industrial College, and the Industrial College was linked to our 1962 "Counterinsurgency" anthology; but so what - Bernard Baruch did not author the book.

Slap, you've selected one Franklin Lindsay as the author with still-current impact on the subject. So, what do we know about him - actually quite a bit; but you have to go to the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Register of the Franklin Lindsay Papers, 1943-1994 (10 pages).

From that list of papers, we find Lindsay's brief bio (p.3 pdf):

1916, March 12 Born in Kenton, Ohio

1938 A.B., Stanford University

1938-1939 With Columbia Division, U.S. Steel Corp.

1940-1945 Served in the Army of the United States, to Lieutenant Colonel

1944-1945 With the Office of Strategic Services

1945 Chief, American Military Mission to Yugoslavia

1946 Executive assistant to Bernard Baruch, U.S. Delegation, U.N. Atomic Energy Commission

1947-1948 Consultant, House Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee)

1948-1949 Served as an American representative to the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Paris

1949-1953 With the Central Intelligence Agency

1953-1956 With the Public Affairs Program, Ford Foundation

1954 Consultant, Second Hoover Commission

1956-1961 With McKinsey & Co., Inc.

1961-1962 Executive Vice President, Itek Corp.

1962-1975 President, Itek Corp.

1975- Chairman of the Board, Itek Corp.

In 1946, Lindsay was 30; and running in some pretty high-flying company as Bernard Baruch's Exec Asst. Lindsay's expertise was in the area of economic aid and FID.

Another interesting connection is the first author in the anthology, Walt Rostow, DNSA to Kennedy and NSA to Johnson - but, over and above those mere positions, Rostow was the creator of this brand of economic theory:

Rostow was famous especially for writing the book The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto (1960) which became a classic text in several fields of social sciences.
...
Rostow developed the Rostovian take-off model of economic growth, one of the major historical models of economic growth. The model argues that economic modernization occurs in five basic stages of varying length—traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption. This became one of the important concepts in the theory of modernization in the social evolutionism.

(from the Wiki) That model justified the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward insurgencies and their "cures".

Rostow was also OSS during WWII.

So, there are some interesting, connected figures in this story.

Cheers

Mike

[jmm99]

An outline of your doctrine for Counter Unconventional Warfare would seem a very useful thing to post - both for future and historical references.

Can't agree more that AQ is waging Unconventional Warfare against us (some others IIRC say the same). And I have what is perhaps a unique view that Giap waged Unconventional Warfare against us in SVN (using our playbooks). If so, we ought to have waged Counter Unconventional Warfare vs the VC.

I was reading last nite this granddaddy of the vintage "COIN" manuals, 1951 FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, which is certainly based on WWII experiences. So, your comment ("US UW doctrine is a bit too mired in romantic perspectives of WWII France...") was both timely to me and humorous.

RSVP.

Mike

[slapout9]

.

Slap, you've selected one Franklin Lindsay as the author with still-current impact on the subject.

Mike

No,Sanders and Rostow use the terms counterinsurgency.....Linday uses Unconventional Warfare which can be both Offensive and Defensive. The article pints out how UW was originally the concept for COIN(at least from his point of view),in his further writings he talks about how it can be used offensively (start an Insurgency on purpose).
I have often wondered how much influence (if any he had on Mcuen)Counter-Revolutionary Warfare. Which is one of the most sensible books ever written on the subject IMO.

[Dayuhan]

By recognizing that I am countering AQ's UW program, I may realize that the best way to secure US national interests in some areas is for us to consider if we might want to usurp AQ as the champion of some oppressed populaces and perhaps take on the UW mission ourselves to best defuse the brewing instability that AQ is targeting. This would best be coupled with a diplomatic approach that gives these governments fair opportunity to heal themselves and evolve to work more effectively with their own populaces and the larger world community, or be prepared to face wrath of their own populace enabled and unleashed. Carrots and sticks work best when one holds one in each hand during the course of the conversation.

Where specifically do you propose to do this, and what's the specific goal or desired end state? Attempting to liberate someone else's populace from what you perceive as oppression sounds to me like an enterprise with abundant potential for unintended consequences, many of which could be less than pleasant.

There is no such thing as Counter Unconventional Warfare though, and we suffer for that lack of that perspective. UW however, is alive and well, and AQ is a master at that skill.

I don't see that AQ is conducting UW against us, though I suppose that would depend on how we define UW. I also don't see that AQ's UW efforts elsewhere have been terribly successful, other than the AQ/Taliban effort to gain control of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. AQ's attempt at UW in Saudi Arabia in the early/mid 90s was an abject failure: the bulk of the populace didn't buy the message and AQ was never able to generate a credible insurgency.

AQ's terrorist attacks on the US effectively derailed any moderate tendencies in the Taliban (you can imagine, for example, how AQ viewed the Taliban's sending a delegation to Texas in 97 to discuss pipeline opportunities) and successfully baited the US into giving AQ an opportunity for a new jihad. I suppose that might be considered successful UW, in that objectives were achieved. It remains to be seen how that will work out for them in the long run.

I don't see that any populace, anywhere can reasonably be said to perceive AQ as their liberator. If there was one, Osama would be cruising down the boulevard in a limo, not hiding in a hole somewhere on the AF/PAK frontier.

[jmm99]

I wasn't making the argument that Rostow and Lindsay used the same terminology - and wasn't focusing on the differences or not in usage of "counterinsurgency" vice "unconventional warfare".

My proposition, which I believe is accurate, is that Rostow and Franklin were part of a common economic theory and methodology. That theory and methodology also was part of the Industrial College program (including the anthology). The overall program incorporated a worldview going back to Woodrew Wilson and Bernard Baruch - and extending into the Kennedy-Johnson administration. No more than that.

Agreed on McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War - BTW: the magic is not in the title; the magic resides (where it exists) in the content.

Cheers

Mike

[jmm99]

SOW = Special Operations Warfare; UW = Unconventional Warfare.

Here are the doctrinal references supporting the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare, based on Robert Martinage, Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities (CSBA 17 Nov 2008), Chapter 1. A Primer on Special Operations Forces, pp.28-30 (pdf).

Martinage sums each area with doctrinal refs. Brief JMM comments re: AQ after the quotes.

The primary concept begins with the DoD definition of "special operations":

The Department of Defense defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”[13] They differ from conventional operations in the “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”[14]

13. Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 516. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 1-02.

14. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 517.

Since AQ is a near-global pariah, its operations must of necessity occur in "hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments".

More specifically, SOF are currently organized, trained, and equipped to conduct nine core tasks, starting with Civil Affairs (CA).

> Civil Affairs (CA): CA missions create a link between the commander and the local population or government by providing key social and governmental services when the local government cannot; by keeping civilians safely away from combat operations; by establishing programs to build trust between the US military forces and the local population; and by supporting information operations.[15]

15. Joint Publication 3-57.1: Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, p. II-2. Hereafter sometimes cited as Joint Pub 3-57.1

CA- It is well to remember that UBL was primarily a civil affairs officer (engineer) vs the SovComs in Astan.

> Counterproliferation (CP): CP missions are offensive actions to“locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”[16] Counterproliferation includes actions taken to prevent the development or proliferation of WMD.

16. Joint Pub 3-57.1., p. II-10.

CP- AQ, so far mostly unsuccessfully, has a tasked mission to obtain WMD. This is one of two AQ special operations (the other is CT) where their end goal is the reverse of our misson - but still a special operation (albeit, in our eyes, perverted)

> Counterterrorism (CT): CT missions are offensive actions to “prevent, deter, preempt and respond to terrorism.”[17] They include intelligence operations; attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures; hostage rescue; recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations; and non-kinetic activities such as information and psychological operations designed to decrease the influence of terrorist groups and their ideologies.

17. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 131.

CT- Another example of an AQ special operation that is the reverse of our mission.

> Direct Action (DA ): DA missions are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets of strategic or operational significance, employing specialized military capabilities. Direct action differs from conventional raids by the value of the target, the politically sensitive or hostile nature of the environment, and the need for highly discriminatory applications of force.[18]

18. Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-4. See also Joint Pub 1-02, p. 161.

DA- AQ's direct actions include 9/11.

> Foreign Internal Defense (FID ): FID missions build the capacity of partner nations to provide for their own internal security. SOF’s primary contribution to FID is to organize, train, advise and assist host-nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces. It includes SOF support to any programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.[19]

19. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 214 .

FID- AQ does it (not for nations, but for groups) - see UW below.

Here next is a twofer:

> Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting the joint force’s information capabilities.[20]

20. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 261.

> Psychological Operations (PSYO PS): Planned operations to convey selected information to foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in order to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their behavior. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to US interests. Typically, this is achieved through the dissemination of information by dedicated PSYOP units.[21]

21. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 44 ; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-11.

IO & PO- AQ does this well.

> Special Reconnaissance (SR): Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures not normally found in conventional forces.[22]

22. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 512; and Joint Pub 3-57.1, p. II-6.

SR- AQ also does this.

> Unconventional Warfare (UW): UW operations are conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, including: guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. While unconventional warfare is traditionally considered to be aimed at the destabilization or overthrow of a state, it can also be conducted against non-state actors such as transnational terrorist groups. In that application, irregular forces can be controlled by US forces directly in permissive or semi-permissive environments, and indirectly in hostile or politically sensitive areas.[23]

23. Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare; and Joint Pub 1-02, p. 572.

UW- Since most everything that AQ does takes place in denied areas, AQ can be said to be waging unconventional warfare covering a larger scope in activities than our UW definition. More to our stricter definition, AQ supports larger groups (insurgencies), smaller groups (e.g., Madrid and London train bombings), and even individuals where the support is indirect and moral only (MAJ Hasan), located in what to AQ is "enemy territory".

That's my best shot (doctrinal and legal) at explaining the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare. I expect that COL Jones can expound, expand and explain his concept in his own terms.

Regards

Mike

PS - to Da Mods. Should this discussion re: the proposition that AQ wages Special Operations Warfare aka Unconventional Warfare, be in a separate thread ? It starts with Bob's World post #63 (interspersed after that with unrelated posts).

[slapout9]

I wasn't making the argument that Rostow and Lindsay used the same terminology - and wasn't focusing on the differences or not in usage of "counterinsurgency" vice "unconventional warfare".


Mike

jmm99,I was focusing on that, because I think there was a difference of opinion just can't prove it. Lindsay means UW will always involve a 3rd outside party or maybe more, I don't believe the other two necessarily meant that....but like I say that is my opinion.

Your other connections are revealing to say the least but I can't say I was surprised to find a former Wall Street Banker in the bunch.

[jmm99]

but after reading through both of them (Rostow & Lindsay) again, I think they may have been just dealing with different aspects of the same big problem they saw - communist revolutions in developing countries. But, it's fuzzy in places.

What Rostow was very clear about was the centrality to the Kennedy administration of economics in this process. Here is a snip:

Rostow ICA 1962.jpg

This is a remarkable statement when you consider exactly what the US then or now would be biting off by following it to the letter. Ir is akin to a few parts of President Kennedy's inaguration speech.

Ken White has suggested that economics was the key to Kennedy-Johnson involvement in Vietnam. I'd like to see the full presentation of the proposition, which would be consistent with initiation of a lot of wars (done for economic reasons).

Regards

Mike

[Ken White]

Not ignorance, stupidity. That foolishness still guides too much US Foreign policy. Bob's World has frequently mentioned that the 'cold war' mentality needs to go -- he is for some reason reluctant to acknowledge its origin, perhaps because to many in SF Kennedy is a Saint because he gave 'em the Green Beret. Having been there at the time, I can truthfully say most of us thought it no big deal -- but the showboats sure loved it.

The cold war mentality does still exist and should be retired but so to does that "America has a responsibility..." charade need to go...

Rostow and others of the Kennedy Admin did a tremendous amount of damage to the US and it has been particularly pernicious and long lasting. Kennedy has a lot to answer for. Almost as much as Johnson.

[William F. Owen]

Soldiers that can speak the language, understand the culture, know the terrain and climate and thereby negate the advantage the Taliban currently have.

Why? None of those things will actually negate any advantage. All of those things are why you have military intelligence.
What area(size) of ground do you think anyone actually knows "well enough" to negate a military advantage? 100 sq Km? 1,000?

I advocate it is of value and often needed to bring in locals into such units as interpreters and trackers and the like. Perhaps over time these units can be indigenised, say over five or more years.

So indigenous support groups? Far more sensible - as the UK has often historically done. Even in Ulster a lot of good info came from UDR guys who had grown up in the boarder areas.

I have a deep concern over these supposed PTSD rates. PTSD must surely come in degrees, yes?

Why deep concerns? Sure, PTSD comes in degrees. So what? Some folks who have it, don't know it.

So if it seems to be inevitable than why spread it around the whole army? Why not concentrate it among a smaller group who can be followed up, treated (with X), etc etc.

So have an Army and then only use a very small part of it? Why? Any unit that fights in any war or conducts any combat operations will suffer from PTSD casualties. One of the worst cases of PTSD I have ever personally encountered was a former member of RLI.

Now why did this PTSD seem to only blossom at current rates after around 1980? In the case of the UK we may be seeing a new angle on the theme of benefit scam.

I grew up with a whole bunch of men with sever PTSD from WW2. The issue is that it really only became "talked about," in the 1980's. Anyone who had ever spent time in or around the military knew it existed.
Yes a very small percentage of dishonest men might try and commit fraud, but a couple of meetings with a doctor experienced in treating PTSD should uncover that very quickly.

I am by no means an expert, but as explained to me, PTSD is a "wound." Identified and treated the negative effects can be greatly mitigated. Keep "wounding" someone - prolonged and continuous exposure to operations- and you prejudice the chances of their making a full recovery or being "wounded again."
I would also reference the advice from a member of this board, who pointed out that there is a huge difference between actual PTSD and merely the social problems of "re-adjusting" to being "back in the world."

[Bob's World]

First, I think it is critical not to get mired in debates over ever-morphing definitions that have been applied to a large family of missions and operations generally associated with the condition of insurgency and the employment of Special Operations Forces or irregular/guerrilla forces to shape political outcomes, so I will keep to larger concepts that may overlap or ignore some historic or even current uses of terminology.

(In fact, one would almost wonder if there was an AQ deception campaign designed specifically to create confusion and resultant inaction or inappropriate action going on with our chasing of an elusive answer to how best to describe and thereby shape our response to what we face. They aren't that crafty, but I'm sure a couple of them have taken credit on their OER support forms...)

So, the US was dragged into a "War on Terrorism" after being the target of a series of terrorist attacks. Though not fully satisfying, we set out in response to these attacks with a broad "Counterterrorism" campaign. Tactics met with Tactics.

Over time, we came to realize that such a narrow approach really wasn't appropriate, and as our disruption of Iraq governance and occupation of that long oppressed country was resulting in a wide range of organizations rising up in a mix of separatist, revolutionary, and resistance insurgencies; in addition to AQ riding to the sounds of our guns there and expanding their UW operations to Iraq proper, as well as imploring nationalist insurgent groups they were already engaging with around the Muslim community to send fighters there to further engage the Western governments that are widely perceived as supporting the governments they were in insurgency against back home; we shifted to a more comprehensive approach and called it "Counterinsurgency." (Phew...a whole book in one sentence, sorry)

Insurgency and COIN are much more operations than the tactics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism are, but we co-opted and shaped a new family of COIN doctrine that was (logically) heavily influenced by our experience in Iraq, and also by our continuing challenge of dealing with AQ on a global level. This led to mindsets of a need to sustain the status quo of governance in those countries where AQ was conducting UW operations to motivate and facilitate insurgent movements to challenge the same. In so doing, we morphed to a perspective that successful operations for the US were ones that "defeated" the insurgency, as measured by sustaining the current government. We picked a side. If AQ was for change of governance, we were for the sustaining of governance. This is the slippery slope. Insurgencies do not happen unless the conditions for insurgency exist first. "Ideology" and "Radicalization" do not cause insurgency, they are just tools of insurgent leaders and UW leaders to get things going in the direction they want them to go. We were so focused on the sizzle that we ignored the steak.

So, then seeing ourselves as the COIN force in the foreign insurgencies (both the full blown ones in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines; and the lower level ones like Yemen, Somalia, etc) we came to measure our own success by how well we sustained the current governments. This led to expansion of programs designed to build capacity of forces designed specifically to go after these insurgent forces, and also development programs to attempt to bolster populaces to support the government rather than the insurgency, and was loosely supported with a very Western-centric ideological campaign aimed at these failing governments promoting specific forms of governance used in the West currently ("Democracy") and current values held in the West ("universal values") as cure-alls that these cultures must adopt.

We lost sight of the big picture as we dove deeper into tactical perspectives that we were in turn morphing as we went.

The big picture is that we were attacked and needed to clearly and decisively avenge that attack and punish those who attacked us (CT is very good for this, regime change not so much); and that we had a broad and diverse family of nationalist resistance movements going on in the regions of the world where Islam is the prevalent religion, and not coincidentally, where there are still the greatest degree of residual colonial/western influence and residual effects (borders, forms of government, manning of government, etc) in place being engaged by this same actor, AQ, in a savvy UW campaign to encourage people rise up at home to throw this external burden off. The first pissed us off, the latter threatened to disrupt relationships that we saw as essential to sustaining critical national interests for energy, freedom of movement and security and commerce. Those nations were all too happy to blame their problems with internal security matters on outside influencers as well, resulting in an Intel-driven bundling of distinct nationalist movements under the flag of the AQ UW force and a concerted effort to preserve these threatened governments through a broad program of development, security and governance under a new broad banner of "COIN" that presumed success in the sustainment of the status quo.

Isn't the real goal still revenge against and punishment of AQ; coupled with a reestablishment of stability in regions where critical interests are currently at risk?

COIN sucked us into the role of defeating insurgency and preserving government. That is the role for a government faced with insurgency, not for a government helping another with their insurgency. We got too mired in the problem and lost perspective.

Countering AQ's UW campaign allows us to back up and take a more holistic and yes, Ms Flournoy, "pragmatic" approach. It allows us to:

1. Design and execute a "silent but deadly" CT program at AQ proper (not those who are actually nationalists just wearing AQ T-shirts currently), going after critical nodes of their network around the globe. This is a supporting effort that will not solve the problem (others will replace them in time if the problems that gave rise to them are not addressed), but will send others a clear message, make our own populaces feel better, and disrupt the current UW operations.

2. Drop the COIN mantra. The nations where these subversive movements and insurgencies are growing need to conduct COIN, but our role is to seek a stability that supports our long-term national interests. Picking sides is risky, and these governments need to clearly understand that we are on the side of stability, and not on the side of any particular government. This is also more genuine, as the side we are then clearly on is our own. This facilitates our ability to sit-down with and discuss the challenges to stability with all of the parties involved. Insurgencies happen for a reason, we should be focused on the efforts to get after those reasons, not the efforts to get after those who rise up because of those reasons.

3. Freed from the idea that sustaining the status quo is success, we can look for more creative answers achieving a success defined by stability and national interests. In some places it may well be entirely appropriate to those new ends to supplant AQ as the champion of the people. This does not immediately mean dive into the business of using UW to drive violent insurgency, but to rather take advantage of our position within the law to seek other options to drive change. Not being clearly on the side of the existing government allows more flexibility in seeking options. It also takes away the security blanket that many leaders have clung to to act with impunity toward their own people.

4. Such an approach would allow us to stop demanding that our allies subjugate their own national interests in favor of US national interests. This is an approach that is wearing thin, and the current tact rooted in preserving some questionable governments around the globe is quite naturally creating residual instability in many of the diasporah populaces in these same allied nations. While this is highlighting that some of these allies need to do a better job of COIN at home in ensuring that their entire populace feels included in good governance, current approaches are putting unneccessary pressures on fragile systems. By allowing our allies to engage in manners that THEY see as best promoting stability in pursuit of THEIR national interests we could relieve these pressures and bundle such operations under a comprehensive counterUW campaign

4. Oh, and not least, such an approach would allow us to stop calling Iraq and Afghanistan "wars." Wars come with huge burdens for major powers, and a major change of strategic perspective allows us to drop a term that never should have been applied to begin with. These are merely two of dozens of AORs where we are conducting a wide and diverse program of tailored operations in the pursuit of stability, all under an umbrella of countering the UW campaign of AQ.

[Bob's World]

As an aside, from wiki on "Pragmatism" (highlights added by me):

"The primacy of practice
The pragmatist proceeds from the basic premise that the human capability of theorizing is integral to intelligent practice. Theory and practice are not separate spheres; rather, theories and distinctions are tools or maps for finding our way in the world. As John Dewey put it, there is no question of theory versus practice but rather of intelligent practice versus uninformed, stupid practice and noted in a conversation with William Pepperell Montague that "[h]is effort had not been to practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice". (Quoted in Eldridge 1998, p. 5) Theory is an abstraction from direct experience and ultimately must return to inform experience in turn. Thus an organism navigating his or her environment is the grounds for pragmatist inquiry."

Our current practice is lacking in a certain intellectual rigor regarding the nature of insurgency in general, as well as the nature of AQ and their operations. A UW lens helps to clarify that nature in a way that the Terrorist lens does not.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Sounds like you have properly described COIN as one of the many tools in a civilian policeman's tool belt---a radio, Mace, a billy club, a gun, a pad and pencil, etc...

On some calls, you use on, on some calls, another, and others, none. Sometimes the best weapon is presence, some times its talking, sometimes its throwing the bad guy into the back of the squad car, and in very, very rare instances, it is drawing your weapon.

None of that sounds like WAR.

In the background, though, are specialized actors like DEA, SWAT Teams, FBI anti-terrorist teams, etc... that, to an extent, help to shape the environment by providing specialized tools and tactics for specialized problems not consistent with the routine beat cop's tools.

In another link, Entropy was explaining the ratio of 30,000 Afghan villages to the deployed troops available for "presence" patrolling.

Reminded me of the years I spent in and around the Hof Gap watching Russian radio trucks cruising through East German villages to make sure their TV antennas were pointed East, and not West.

If Talib gunmen are the TV signals invading the local village space, it is pretty hard to believe that a handful of unarmed old guys in a small village are really going to be able to fend off the signal, and the US "radio" truck (the infrequent "presence patrols" wandering through are not adequate to shape or alter the environment.

Sometimes, all the militareze can confuse the reality of the entire problem, when the practical problems are somewhere else.

Funny juxtaposition in this thread of the relationship between personal PTSD, and our national response to 9/11.

Anybody familiar with PTSD knows it is a very real and serious "wound," or injury, and is not just battle related. So, how much did our civilian leadership's response reflect, perhaps, their own personal PTSD in response to 9/11. And this whole "military" response (GWOT) got tangled up in that?

What's the best therapy, and how do we intellectualize the practical problems ?

[Bob's World]

"None of that sounds like WAR."

America is a nation at peace. Just look outside your window. Yes, our military is certainly in harm's way, and will continue to be so, but describing such engagements as "war" creates unneeded strategic risks for our nation; and approaches that are much less "warlike" on their face may well be more appropriate for promoting long-term success as well.

But first we must be able to step back and reframe the problem. (This is actually what Operational Design is supposed to do for you).

[Red Rat]

First, I think it is critical not to get mired in debates over ever-morphing definitions that have been applied to a large family of missions and operations generally associated with the condition of insurgency and the employment of Special Operations Forces or irregular/guerrilla forces to shape political outcomes, so I will keep to larger concepts that may overlap or ignore some historic or even current uses of terminology.

(In fact, one would almost wonder if there was an AQ deception campaign designed specifically to create confusion and resultant inaction or inappropriate action going on with our chasing of an elusive answer to how best to describe and thereby shape our response to what we face. They aren't that crafty, but I'm sure a couple of them have taken credit on their OER support forms...)

'debates over ever-morphing definitions' are wont to lead to violent agreements, disagreements and confusion. There could be a whole thread here as we try and come up with common terms and definitions so that we can communicate with each other more accurately. Some disagreements over terminology are a symptom of fundamental differences in philosophy and perception of a problem, most are a symptom of lack of thought and analysis.

So, the US was dragged into a "War on Terrorism" after being the target of a series of terrorist attacks. Though not fully satisfying, we set out in response to these attacks with a broad "Counterterrorism" campaign. Tactics met with Tactics.

Disagree. AQ's strategy was to try and provoke a general conflict between the West and the Umma through an attack that was so provocotive that it would have to be responded to. In responding we would energise and radicalise the Umma. We (the West) responded with a strategy that sought to destroy AQ safe havens (Afghanistan) and then (in invading Iraq) we thought we could install an arc of western liberal democracies in the Middle East (Iraq, then Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran). We would defeat radical Islam by enabling Islamic countries to adopt a western liberal style of Islam. We met strategy with strategy. Both strategies were inherently flawed in that both overestimated the strength of belief in their cause. AQ expected more people to turn against the West more violently, the West expected the Middle East to want to become liberal western democracies. The flaw was brought about because both sides saw their perspective as the 'right' perspective and discounted that there are a number of equally valid perpectives. The AQ analysis was probably more right then ours in that it did provoke the west (more so in the invasion of Iraq then it expected) and it did provoke a rise in jihadist fervour and action - but not as wide as it had hoped for.

Over time, we came to realize that such a narrow approach really wasn't appropriate, and as our disruption of Iraq governance and occupation of that long oppressed country was resulting in a wide range of organizations rising up in a mix of separatist, revolutionary, and resistance insurgencies; in addition to AQ riding to the sounds of our guns there and expanding their UW operations to Iraq proper, as well as imploring nationalist insurgent groups they were already engaging with around the Muslim community to send fighters there to further engage the Western governments that are widely perceived as supporting the governments they were in insurgency against back home; we shifted to a more comprehensive approach and called it "Counterinsurgency." (Phew...a whole book in one sentence, sorry)

Insurgency and COIN are much more operations than the tactics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism are, but we co-opted and shaped a new family of COIN doctrine that was (logically) heavily influenced by our experience in Iraq, and also by our continuing challenge of dealing with AQ on a global level. This led to mindsets of a need to sustain the status quo of governance in those countries where AQ was conducting UW operations to motivate and facilitate insurgent movements to challenge the same. In so doing, we morphed to a perspective that successful operations for the US were ones that "defeated" the insurgency, as measured by sustaining the current government. We picked a side. If AQ was for change of governance, we were for the sustaining of governance. This is the slippery slope. Insurgencies do not happen unless the conditions for insurgency exist first. "Ideology" and "Radicalization" do not cause insurgency, they are just tools of insurgent leaders and UW leaders to get things going in the direction they want them to go. We were so focused on the sizzle that we ignored the steak.

The 'enemy of my enemy is my friend', except sometimes we do not want to get involved in the argument and sometimes the 'enemy of my enemy' is wrong.

So, then seeing ourselves as the COIN force in the foreign insurgencies (both the full blown ones in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines; and the lower level ones like Yemen, Somalia, etc) we came to measure our own success by how well we sustained the current governments. This led to expansion of programs designed to build capacity of forces designed specifically to go after these insurgent forces, and also development programs to attempt to bolster populaces to support the government rather than the insurgency, and was loosely supported with a very Western-centric ideological campaign aimed at these failing governments promoting specific forms of governance used in the West currently ("Democracy") and current values held in the West ("universal values") as cure-alls that these cultures must adopt.

Agree.

We lost sight of the big picture as we dove deeper into tactical perspectives that we were in turn morphing as we went.

I think we fundamentally misappreciated the threat. We tried to whip it up as an existentialist threat to our way of life. In terms of analysing the threat from AQ and co they had Intent, Capability and Opportunity to attack us, but never the capability or opportunity to provide an existential threat.

The big picture is that we were attacked and needed to clearly and decisively avenge that attack and punish those who attacked us (CT is very good for this, regime change not so much); and that we had a broad and diverse family of nationalist resistance movements going on in the regions of the world where Islam is the prevalent religion, and not coincidentally, where there are still the greatest degree of residual colonial/western influence and residual effects (borders, forms of government, manning of government, etc) in place being engaged by this same actor, AQ, in a savvy UW campaign to encourage people rise up at home to throw this external burden off. The first pissed us off, the latter threatened to disrupt relationships that we saw as essential to sustaining critical national interests for energy, freedom of movement and security and commerce. Those nations were all too happy to blame their problems with internal security matters on outside influencers as well, resulting in an Intel-driven bundling of distinct nationalist movements under the flag of the AQ UW force and a concerted effort to preserve these threatened governments through a broad program of development, security and governance under a new broad banner of "COIN" that presumed success in the sustainment of the status quo.

Isn't the real goal still revenge against and punishment of AQ; coupled with a reestablishment of stability in regions where critical interests are currently at risk?

Quite possibly, but it ignores the factor that domestic politics and attitudes play. We also have to be seen to be improving things, preferably in a western liberal vein.

COIN sucked us into the role of defeating insurgency and preserving government. That is the role for a government faced with insurgency, not for a government helping another with their insurgency. We got too mired in the problem and lost perspective.

Countering AQ's UW campaign allows us to back up and take a more holistic and yes, Ms Flournoy, "pragmatic" approach. It allows us to:

1. Design and execute a "silent but deadly" CT program at AQ proper (not those who are actually nationalists just wearing AQ T-shirts currently), going after critical nodes of their network around the globe.

2. Drop the COIN mantra. The nations where these subversive movements and insurgencies are growing need to conduct COIN, but our role is to seek a stability that supports our long-term national interests.

3. Freed from the idea that sustaining the status quo is success, we can look for more creative answers achieving a success defined by stability and national interests.

4. Such an approach would allow us to stop demanding that our allies subjugate their own national interests in favor of US national interests.

5. Oh, and not least, such an approach would allow us to stop calling Iraq and Afghanistan "wars."

Agree to all your 5 points raised. But I suspect that in the times we are living and the need for international consensus these would prove difficult to implement. The nature of conflict reflects the nature of the society waging it and in the western case we now seem to be less hard nosed, more idealistic and the rights of all individuals appear equal, which makes it difficult to carry out your first 4 points if they are seen to be inimicable to individual rights.

[Steve the Planner]

Rat: Love the term: Misappreciated (Touche!)

Bob: Since November 2009, I was very concerned that we were throwing the wrong tool at the problem.

The problem is the government and its leaders. Corruption, corruption and corruption, as Gen. Petreaus is now focusing on like a laser, are the three main problems.

The weak spot, and what drives the corruption, is a failed and failing civilian strategy and toolkit. Not to discredit the civs in the field enduring a lot to TRY to do something, but the big picture, structure and organization is broken---and must be fixed to get started.

I was very sad to read the following from a recent Christian Science Monitor Report about US AID failures. Didn't we know this a while ago? Why hasn;t it been fixed?

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-...arts-and-minds

Steve

[Dayuhan]

Off to go paddling in a few minutes, so I'll spare the dissertation and focus on one point...

In some places it may well be entirely appropriate to those new ends to supplant AQ as the champion of the people. This does not immediately mean dive into the business of using UW to drive violent insurgency, but to rather take advantage of our position within the law to seek other options to drive change.

Is there a place in the world where AQ is "the champuion of the people"? I don't know of one. Thee are a lot of people in the Muslim world who are absolutely delighted to see AQ fighting the invading infidel someplace far away, but I don't see any particular enthusiasm in most places for an AQ-style power change at home.

I'd also question whether it's realistically possible for the US to don the mantle of popular champion anywhere in the Muslim world. The US is not widely trusted thereabouts, and conspiracy theories are often taken for granted. No matter what we say or do, any US involvement is going to be perceived as an underhanded attempt to seize control. It's not an environment where populaces want us to play an active role.

Criticizing governments in the ME does not win us points with the populace. Even people who despise their own governments will defend them against US criticism: it's not seen as "standing up for the people", it's seen as disrespect for the nation and the culture.

Realistically, what options "within the law" do we have to mess with the domestic policies of other states? Are those waters we really want to be diving into?

For Steve, re this...

The problem is the government and its leaders. Corruption, corruption and corruption, as Gen. Petreaus is now focusing on like a laser, are the three main problems.

The weak spot, and what drives the corruption, is a failed and failing civilian strategy and toolkit. Not to discredit the civs in the field enduring a lot to TRY to do something, but the big picture, structure and organization is broken---and must be fixed to get started.

Again, we're coming up against the limits of our capacity to direct and influence governance in another country. We cannot clone ourselves, nor can we reasonably expect governments we install to simply function as we would like. We cannot "fixx" Afghanistan; we can't govern the place ourselves and any government we install will govern their way, not ours.

[JMA]

Why deep concerns? Sure, PTSD comes in degrees. So what? Some folks who have it, don't know it.

By degrees I mean whether to the extent of it being debilitating. Minor effects of PTSD can be managed personally, or through the family without the need for any medical care. Then we see the totally debilitating condition which is what my grandfathers generation used to call being "shell shocked". So there we have a 1 and a 10 on the scale. So what about all the 2s to the 9s?

So when I read that 30% of Vietnam veterans suffered from PTSD I ask to what degree.

So if they don't know that they have it do they really have a problem?

So have an Army and then only use a very small part of it? Why? Any unit that fights in any war or conducts any combat operations will suffer from PTSD casualties. One of the worst cases of PTSD I have ever personally encountered was a former member of RLI.

Use only enough of the army who are specialised in that form of warfare to do the job. Leave the mechanised forces out of it to prepare for the next war where their skills will be required.

If this is such a big thing then why not consider raising the equivalent of the French Foreign Legion to do the "dirty work"?

I learn that PTSD can be triggered by one single incident. Who develops it seems to vary from one individual to the next.

The RLI (my regiment) is an interesting case study in this matter.

We understood the build up of combat anxiety which we interpreted as knowing that one would be in combat tomorrow and the next day and the day after that. That creates a fear of the unknown and is probably IMHO more difficult to handle. This opposed to dealing with something that happened in the past. Be it an hour ago, a day ago, a week ago or a month ago.

No doubt some RLI veterans will have some issues. We constantly ask ourselves whether some people had drink and drug problems before they joined the army and whether some had behavioural problems before they joined the army and was there some history of domestic violence before they joined the army. And why is the prevalence of alcoholism not being considered as the rates in the US are reported to be around 8-9% for the age group 18-44?

I have seen nothing in the PTSD stats that differentiates between professional soldiers and conscripts and reservists. I believe we need to establish if there is a difference.

Further I would like to see a study follow the 3 Para guys trapped in that Beau Geste fort in Helmand (in 2006/7?) and in constant combat for 50 odd days and see what develops there.

I grew up with a whole bunch of men with sever PTSD from WW2. The issue is that it really only became "talked about," in the 1980's. Anyone who had ever spent time in or around the military knew it existed.
Yes a very small percentage of dishonest men might try and commit fraud, but a couple of meetings with a doctor experienced in treating PTSD should uncover that very quickly.

Existed yes. Shell shocked people were known and sympathised with... but at a rate of 30% of all combatants?

I am by no means an expert, but as explained to me, PTSD is a "wound." Identified and treated the negative effects can be greatly mitigated. Keep "wounding" someone - prolonged and continuous exposure to operations- and you prejudice the chances of their making a full recovery or being "wounded again."

The way to deal with this then is to establish who are most susceptible to PTSD (and alcoholism and anti social behaviour) and screen them out of combat jobs. Then introduce some psychological preparation before these soldiers get into combat situations to allow them to handle the situations they find themselves in psychologically. In other words be professional and be proactive.

I would also reference the advice from a member of this board, who pointed out that there is a huge difference between actual PTSD and merely the social problems of "re-adjusting" to being "back in the world."

Yes I agree... and let the two not be confused.

[JMA]

Why? None of those things will actually negate any advantage. All of those things are why you have military intelligence.
What area(size) of ground do you think anyone actually knows "well enough" to negate a military advantage? 100 sq Km? 1,000?

So indigenous support groups? Far more sensible - as the UK has often historically done. Even in Ulster a lot of good info came from UDR guys who had grown up in the boarder areas.

Look William you have decided that you are not going to agree so there is little point in continuing this conversation.

If you are dealing with an enemy that has grown up in the area of operations he is in a 1,000 times more advantageous position than a kid out of New York City or London.

As a city boy I can remember back to the school holidays when we visited relations on their farm. Our cousins knew every nook and cranny of their farm. Where to swim, where to find ducks on which dam, where to find and catch a snake, where the wild fruit grew etc etc. This while we "townies" stumbled along in awe. Now whether you or I like it or not that is the situation in Afghanistan. The ISAF "townies" are absolutely lost. But what do we do? We compare ours in-theatre knowledge not with the locals but with other newer units and laugh at their hopeless lack of knowledge while elevating our own even though we are merely proving that in the land of the blind the man with one eye is king (among ISAF forces that is).

Perhaps one should consider the criminal negligence of continuing to pump hopelessly unacclimatised troops into harms way in a far off land of which they have no effective knowledge? I mean there was a Brit battalion that was sent out to Kenya for a month to prepare for Afghanistan? Who makes this kind of weird and bizarre and criminal decision?

I am talking about the best way to utilise foreign troops in Afghanistan where they are needed because the locals don't have it (at present or if they ever will). Yes, no matter how well the troops learn the language there will still a need to be interpreters and interrogators and yes some locals can be fed into the system to slowly build up local content.

Had something like this been introduced around 2006/7 the standard and effectiveness of the British military contribution would have been many times more efficient... but no they just keep feeding raw troops into the fray and wonder why things are not going so well. As the man said, the Brits are slow learners.