Note to self...
Reply With QuoteFirst, I'd like to mention that I doubt very much that it's a good decision to become engaged in a COIN campaign outside of your own nation.
It's usually a hint that you have your troops where they don't belong, probably as unjustified invaders now occupying a foreign country.
A puppet regime asking for your presence and protection is no excuse to me, even not if it's 'democratic'. It lacks sovereignty as long as you're there with your troops.
Anyway, I have some - let's say out-of-the-box - ideas for COIN that try to address common problems in COIN.
A)
Raising indigenous security forces - competent, quick. And to have a credible exit timetable.
My idea for this is to have recruits as 'shadows' of your own enlisted soldiers. For each soldiers there'll be an indigenous recruit who just passed a three-month basic training. He'll learn on the job.
The NCO's observe which shadows are promising enough for NCO jobs and take them as their shadows, recruits from basic training filling the gaps.
After about two years the first indigenous NCOs will be sent to an officer course and become shadows of lieutenants. Senior officers need to be produced somehow else. This would take about three to four years until line companies would have competent shadows. In the fourth year the shadows become the primary units and act independently, the occupying company only as backup. After four years, the occupying company leaves and the shadow company becomes fully operational.
The recruits should (if the country is divided by ethics and/or religion) be at most to one third of local origin, the rest being from different regions - to avoid some problems that are common in inhomogenous country's armies.
If anybody believes that four years isn't enough - compare it to the force buildup of the U.S. in 1941-1945. Three years is already enough if we refrain from over-ambitious requirements.
The language problem could be solved within a year - it's simple for evena dult people to learn about 2000 words of a foreign language in a year and communication by gesture helps a lot. The buddy relationship between soldier and shadow and direct responsibility for the competence of your shadow should encourage quick learning.
The shadow concept has in my opinion several advantages
- clear timeframe
- competence can be observed very well
- atrocities are less likely
- understanding of the civilian society is enhanced
- It's almost impossible that in such a relationship new forces supposedly loyal to the central government are in fact local militias not loyal to the government.
B)
Driving around. How to avoid IED's and other ambushes?
Think about it; what does the IED operator depend on the most? Identification. If he cannot tell which one of the 500 trucks per hour that pass his IED is an enemy, he becomes useless.
My idea is to use trucks acquired locally. A repair show repairs the dynamic components (without changing outer appearance or sound) and includes some more equipment. A driver in uniform but mostly looking like the local truck drivers steers the vehicle, sometimes but not always with another soldier looking the same next to him (let's say his shadow;-) ).
This truck leaves the base with a squad or half squad for patrol or whatever.
After leaving the base, the need to stop some times and set up ambushes to intercept possibly shadowing enemy forces.
If on patrol, they can easily live off these trucks for days before they return to the base, buying additional foot and drinking water from locals (surprisingly and therefore not poisoned).
If they run into a situation that requries reinforcements, they can wait till those reinforcements arrive and remain undetected.
In the famous "A Stryker approaches a compound unheard other than a tracked vehicle and the raid preserves the element of surprise." example, this truck would easily beat any million-$ vehicle. It could even have some armor plating to protect against rifle fire.
C)
Bases...
It's common practice to build a kind of defended fort in an occupied country and to tie up lots of troops with the services and defence of the camp.
At the same time, theorists claim that troops need to be in close contact with the local population and to cooperate, win hearts and minds and so on.
I have a different suggestion that eliminates a lot of the logistical footprint, alienation and other problems ... if it works.
My suggestion is to exploit the hospitality which is usually a very strong cultural element in rural areas - especially un less developed countries. Hospitality is often a matter of family honor.
My scenario is that when a company needs to be based in a small town the captain meets the town's elders together with his translator. He makes promises as well as asks whether they want his protection for the next four years. He wouldn't meddle with local politics but just care about the security situation and assist the local police in fighting common crime.
If they agree, he can ask for their hospitality and whether troops can sleep at night in the houses of the locals. The company could pay the community for this service.
This seems risky, of course. But think about it; hospitality forces the house owner to care for his guest. Any treason would ruin the family's honor in many regions. Treasoning a full company with a hundred dead would invariably lead to the utter destruction of the town, that needs to be clarified through informal channels.
The benefits of such an arrangement would be that community and company are closely tied together - it would be hard if not impossibly for non-local insurgent groups to turn this community into their base. The community would benefit commercially from the occupiers by the direct payment that finances communal personnel and investments and the purchasing power of the soldiers (food, drinks and other goods).
The single most serious problem that I see is the posibility that cultural incompatibility leads to conflits. This includes fraternisation with house owner's daughters. But a problem is just a challenge and without thinking and disciplined soldiers it would be hard to succeed in COIN anyway.
D)
First rule: You're at home when you do COIN. If you're U.S. American and patrol on a street, the children next to you are U.S.Americans of arab or whatever background. Treat them and all other local population as you would treat your own people. If you don't, you may be sent to prison just like you might if you did what you did at home.
You don't bump into the car in front of you with a Hummer to speed up your travel by forcing him to change the lane. You don't stop vehicles at checkpoints with machinegun fire. If you want to search a house, get your permission on paper first and ask first, wait and finally kick the door only if necessary.
You're at an unknown part of your own country and the different language shouldn't irritate you. Simple rule, should be understandable for everyone. Every soldier who's too dumb to learnt his rule quickly will do so in prison for violation of law or at least violation of a standing order.
The purpose is to discipline the soldiers and to minimize civilian unrest about the force. It's also a matter of justness.
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I'm waiting for constructive critique.
Originally Posted by TROUFION
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