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Thread: COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

  1. #601
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    Default We have to be careful to stick with the facts,

    and the exact era in which those facts existed. That applies to Vietnam, but also to all other Small Wars we attempt to analyze. We do well to realize that the Lessons Learned are learned from the distinct component parts of each Small War. E.g., Small War 1 might have been in the end a disaster for the incumbant, but may have tucked away a jewel of a program - which just might be the winning difference in Small War 2.

    Others may disagree, and this is solely my personal opinion; but I suggest that generalties only provide a starting point for the tough work which is implementation of those generalities. Implementation is made tougher by the nasty habit of armed conflicts to morph over time.

    Vietnam 1956 was not Vietnam 1966; and definitely not Vietnam 1976 (at which time, they had a big celebration in Ho Chi Minh City for the US Declaration of Independence, some of whose ringing phrases were included in original DRV Constitution). OK, I lied about the celebration; but inclusion of the phrases is no lie. As the re-education camps opened in the South, the fine phrases became hollow indeed.

    Let's go back to 1956 and Vietnam. At that time, we'd find the newly-founded American Friends of Vietnam (a review by Edwin Moise, whose webpages I cited, of Joseph G. Morgan, The Vietnam Lobby: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975).

    These American Friends were organized to support Diem; and they included such rabid right-wing reactionaries as Senators Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Mike Mansfield; Justice William O. Douglas and oft-times Socialist candidate Norman Thomas. The last might be thought a surprise, until one reads the obit of AFV's founder, Joseph A. Buttinger, Nazi Fighter And Vietnam Scholar, Dies at 85, whose opinions (like those of Norman Thomas) also morphed in time (snip from obit):

    Working with refugees in Vietnam in the 1950's, he became immersed in the history, culture and politics of that nation. He formed an organization, American Friends of Vietnam, and became a friend and supporter of the ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem. Later, disillusioned with Diem's dictatorial ways, Mr. Buttinger renounced him.

    Despite having no formal education beyond the sixth grade, he became a respected historian and analyst of current events in Vietnam. As the United States went to war with Vietnam, his scholarship was in demand. His evolving view was that American policy was historically and morally misguided and doomed to fail.
    Of course, that was more Vietnam 1966 than Vietnam 1956.

    One of those 1956 members (yup, JFK) delivered remarks at the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon in the Hotel Willard, Washington, D.C., June 1, 1956.

    Let us briefly consider exactly what is "America's Stake in Vietnam":

    (1) First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. In the past, our policy-makers have sometimes issued contradictory statements on this point - but the long history of Chinese invasions of Southeast Asia being stopped by Vietnamese warriors should have removed all doubt on this subject.

    Moreover, the independence of a Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essential to the economy of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia - and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.

    (2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment - it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.

    (3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring - we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence - Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest - then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

    (4) Fourth and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one - for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of war in Indo-china - a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat to such war is not now altogether removed form the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem. And the key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble.
    and to the point of "What Is To Be Done":

    But the responsibility of the United States for Vietnam does not conclude, obviously, with a review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs to be done; much more, in fact, than we have been doing up to now. Military alliances in Southeast Asia are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Communism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As Ambassador Chuong has recently said: "People cannot be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their freedom from foreign domination as well ass freedom from misery, oppression, corruption."

    I shall not attempt to set forth the details of the type of aid program this nation should offer the Vietnamese - for it is not the details of that program that are as important as the spirit with which it is offered and the objectives it seeks to accomplish. We should not attempt to buy the friendship of the Vietnamese. Nor can we win their hearts by making them dependent upon our handouts. What we must offer them is a revolution - a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer - far more peaceful, far more democratic and far more locally controlled. Such a Revolution will require much from the United States and much from Vietnam. We must supply capital to replace that drained by the centuries of colonial exploitation; technicians to train those handicapped by deliberate policies of illiteracy; guidance to assist a nation taking those first feeble steps toward the complexities of a republican form of government. We must assist the inspiring growth of Vietnamese democracy and economy, including the complete integration of those refugees who gave up their homes and their belongings to seek freedom. We must provide military assistance to rebuild the new Vietnamese Army, which every day faces the growing peril of Vietminh Armies across the border.

    And finally, in the councils of the world, we must never permit any diplomatic action adverse to this, one of the youngest members of the family of nations - and I include in that injunction a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free Vietnam was a party to that agreement - and neither the United States nor Free Vietnam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the Agreement they now seek to enforce.
    So, where did the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, "American Friends of Vietnam", drop the ball ?

    Regards

    Mike

  2. #602
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    The invention of nukes screwed up everything. Before they came along military campaigns could be followed through to a satisfactory conclusion, but from 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union the fear of triggering off a world-wide conflict has prevented us from doing things that might upset the applecart.

    MacArthur deserved to be relieved of command -- don't get me wrong on that -- but he had a point when he said, "There is no substitute for victory." I was born in 1952 but as far as I know no U.S. president during my lifetime committing troops to combat has ever told the Pentagon: "Win this war in three years or else. Design a plan for winning and tell me what you need. I'll mobilize the country and get the State Department and all of the other parts of the Government on board."

    In the absence of that kind of committment we fight these small wars one combat tour at a time with no end in sight, "Mowing the grass" as it were.
    Last edited by Pete; 08-13-2010 at 11:38 PM.

  3. #603
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    Mike,

    The key to studying history in order to help with current and future problems is, IMO, not to memorize all of the "facts" (true facts are elusive in history, and as you have pointed out, material facts are even more elusive and rarer still), and not to dwell in "generalities" either; but rather to search for commonalities that are also material to understanding the nature of the problem, and there by shedding insights on why certain approaches to it were either successful or failed in producing desired results.

    There is no money in re-fighting Vietnam. There were many great programs applied there, and tremendous efforts by hundreds of thousands of US personnel. Yet it all added up to a loss. Why? Many reasons, of course, but as I look at that war in the context of hundreds of other similar conflicts the most essential material commonality that I draw is this issue of Legitimacy of government as perceived by the relevant populace.

    If one backs a leader perceived as legitimate at home (his, not ours), one will likely prevail. If one backs a leader perceived as illegitimate at home, one will likely fail, regardless of how hard or how smart one approaches the problem.

    We still confuse "official" government as equating to "legitimate" government; and put far too much emphasis on who's legitimacy WE recognize over that that is recognized by the relevant populace.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default We can put Vietnam on the shelf (at least for a bit)

    Hi Bob,

    Moving away from that topic, and sticking more to areas of less specific "COIN" contents and discontents, how do Tim Lomperis' constucts of "legitimacy" fit (or not) with your own ideas on "legitimacy".

    He has been pushing his ideas on "legitimacy" since the 1980s, with first the issues of Domestic Legitimacy:

    Domestic Legitimacy.jpg

    and also the related issues with External Legitimacy:

    External Legitimacy.jpg

    His constructs are most fully developed in his 1996, From People's War to People's Rule, in the context of case studies of various "insurgencies" (he touches on several dozen, but looks to Vietnam I and II, China, Greece, Philippires-Huk, Malaya, Cambodia and Laos as the key core cases).

    You and Lomperis appear to be woofing at the same tree; but you may be finding different commonalities.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-15-2010 at 05:53 PM.

  5. #605
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Mike,

    Nice pull. I am not familiar with his work, but I will look at this with interest. Thanks for posting this.

    Bob
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Tim Lomperis was a MI officer ...

    in Vietnam (525 MI Group in Saigon in 1972-73) - see CV.

    His latest writings are from 2004 and 2005. They dealt primarily with valid and invalid comparisons of Iraq and Vietnam ("commonalities" and "differences"); and less so with his "legitimacy" constructs.

    Aid and Comfort to Our Enemies

    Iraq: The Vietnam War We Cannot Afford to Lose

    To a Baghdad Victory Via Saigon

    The last article is in a nutty page by page format (unformatted text at top; picture below; I couldn't find a normal pdf or html page); but it does deal with "legitimacy" (e.g., p.9):

    As the first president of an independent South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, at first, seemed to represent a legitimate Vietnamese nationalist leader. He had many American admirers in a Friends of Vietnam organization, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson called him “the George Washington of Asia.” But he grew autocratic and isolated, and was overthrown in a coup in November 1963. After some stability was achieved in 1965 by a military regime under General Nguyen Van Thieu, nationally elected delegates drew up a constitution in 1966. Presidential Elections were held in 1967 that put Theiu into the presidency democratically. Elections were held for the National Assembly, as were a second round of presidential elections in 1971 (even though all challengers to President Thieu had backed out by the actual balloting). Even though Allan Goodman has laid out several ways in which something of a civil society along democratic lines was emerging in local village politics and in constituent services provided by National Assembly legislators, [21] these politics did not go the full distance in nation building. The communists, and even political neutralists, were shut out of all these elections. The failure to incorporate the communists into the political process precluded the type of competitive politics that would have fostered the growth of real national political parties that would have engendered some checks and balances to a political system that left President Thieu with too many autocratic powers.

    [21] Allan E. Goodman, “Conflict and Accommodation Within Legislative Elites in South Vietnam, Pacific Affairs 44, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 211-228
    I agree with most of that, except for the concept of communist inclusion. That strikes me as pure Pollyanna given the history of North Vietnam. Of course, since they ended up with the South anyway, why not have brought them into the government before that.

    The more salient point to the quoted passage (IMO) is that "legitimacy" has a tendency to morph with events and with how leaders morph.

    Lomperis is hard to peg re: the political spectrum - a bit eclectic and revisionist at times, perhaps ?

    Anyway, he has some definite and long-winded ideas on "legitimacy".

    Regards

    Mike

  7. #607
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Hi Bob,

    Moving away from that topic, and sticking more to areas of less specific "COIN" contents and discontents, how do Tim Lomperis' constucts of "legitimacy" fit (or not) with your own ideas on "legitimacy".

    He has been pushing his ideas on "legitimacy" since the 1980s, with first the issues of Domestic Legitimacy:

    Domestic Legitimacy.jpg

    and also the related issues with External Legitimacy:

    External Legitimacy.jpg

    His constructs are most fully developed in his 1996, From People's War to People's Rule, in the context of case studies of various "insurgencies" (he touches on several dozen, but looks to Vietnam I and II, China, Greece, Philippires-Huk, Malaya, Cambodia and Laos as the key core cases).

    You and Lomperis appear to be woofing at the same tree; but you may be finding different commonalities.

    Regards

    Mike
    The second drawing looks like Karpman's triangle only with countries instead of people.

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    Default Not quite Karpman's Triangle,

    as presented by Tim Lomperis, since there is no explicit third party in his diagram.

    However, Slap, your instincts are correct and Karpman's Drama Triangle certainly looks applicable to an insurgency - incumbant (Victim), insurgent (Persecutor) and intervenor (Rescuer):



    and the intervenor in an insugency certainly has some of the problems faced by a Rescuer in a domestic relations situation, for example.

    This may well be another good catch on your part where concepts well known to LE and the justice system can be helpful in "COIN". Perhaps, COL Jones as a former prosecutor agrees ?

    On a related note, does anyone reading this know Tim Lomperis; and who could ask him to join the discussion ? IMHO: he would be a good addition to SWC.

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-16-2010 at 12:43 AM.

  9. #609
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Question is who do you cast in the role of "victim" and who in the role of "persecutor"?

    Governments faced with insurgency, or the US faced with broader ME terrorism, tend to cast themselves in the role of victim. Blame is heaped upon the insurgent, upon his ideology, upon those who "radicalize" him, etc.

    I would argue that in true insurgency the victim is the populace. That it is governments that fail the people, and not the people who fail the government. Not that the entire populace will act out in insurgency, they won't. But those who do act out have a much broader base of support than the counterinsurgent is typically willing to admit.

    As to the models, without reading his work yet, it appears to me that he is blending what I call "officialness" with what I see as "legitimacy" under an umbrella of what he calls simply Legitimacy. My take is that no outside party can bestow legitimacy. The best an outsider can do is recognize officialness. Legitimacy comes from the governed. It is a recognition of the right of those who govern to do so. No amount of outside recognition can overcome a perception of illegitimacy from the governed populace.

    Just my first perception as I try to decode his charts. I need to read his words to see where he is truly going with this.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Looks to me like you could have ....

    multiple Karpman's Drama Triangles, particularly where you have more than one intervenor (Rescuer).

    1. Viewpoint slanted toward incumbant (Victim; e.g., GVN), as seen by its intervenor (Rescuer; e.g., US) against the insurgent (Persecutor; e.g., Viet Cong & its Rescuer, the DRV).

    2. Viewpoint slanted toward insurgent (Victim; e.g., Viet Cong), as seen by its intervenor (Rescuer; e.g., DRV) against the incumbant (Persecutor; e.g., GVN & its Rescuer, the US).

    3. Viewpoint slanted toward civilian population (Victim), as seen by its intervenors (Rescuers; e.g., ICRC, NGOs, etc.) against both the incumbant and insurgent (both Persecutors & also their Rescuers).

    Keep in mind that Karpman's Drama Triangle is a transactional analysis game where the avowed motives are not the real motives, apparent "good guys" rapidly shift to "bad guys", etc.

    Bob, probably the book is your best bet to understand Lomperis (the articles online only give some taste); although I've been slogging at his theories on and off for the last two years without becoming a convert. But then, I'm not a convert to your "legitimacy" theories either. Well, we can agree to disagree.

    Cheers

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 08-16-2010 at 03:26 AM.

  11. #611
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    Keep in mind that Karpman's Drama Triangle is a transactional analysis game where the avowed motives are not the real motives, apparent "good guys" rapidly shift to "bad guys", etc.
    Yep, makes it all the more applicable IMO.

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    Default transactional theory applied to small wars...

    I tend to be like Mike: not agreeing 100% with the transactional theory but it does help to determine how you are perceived.

    Basically, the problem is that it is not just what you are but also how you want the others to perceive you and how each position allows you to influence others. The victim does enjoy the victimisation and basically is calling to the persecutor to persecute her and the rescuer to save her. It is a position of power and not a real state of distress.
    The victim will act in order to be harassed and then be saved. So rather than the population, I would place the host nation government in the role of the victim.
    The insurgents could feet in, like during liberation wars of the 70th, but in the case of Afghanistan it does not translate the reality of their actions and propaganda.

    The persecutor will then be either the loyalist external forces (ISAF and US) or the insurgents (Taliban), depending on what would allow the victim to enjoy her position. In fact in that diagram, when applied to politic, the most powerful position is the victim one. That’s mainly why it is not really satisfactory to analyse a situation.

    The second position of power is the rescuer. The rescuer is the one who enjoys external recognition and takes direct advantage of his acts. But the rescuer needs a victim to justify his role. That is why, IMO, the rescuer cannot be the host nation government.
    As example, the NGO will always try to place themselves as rescuer but also victim. Rescuer because they save the world, Victim because they are not armed and therefore exposed or by endorsing the role of population voice.
    Applied to insurgency, you can come with the insurgents as rescuer or the loyalist external force. Actually, the legitimacy battle will basically be on who is the rescuer as both agree that protecting the population is their aim.

    The persecutor is a quite passive position. Basically both victim and rescuer cannot exist without him. And he cannot exist without them while the victim and the rescuer can always justify their existence by the designation/creation of a persecutor. He is not the bad guy but the tool of the victim to be rescued and the tool of the rescuer to legitimate his position.
    Groups like LRA, or the lightening path in Peru, tried to reverse that hierarchy through atrocities on the civilian population. The idea is that if the victim does fear the persecutor enough, he will become the rescuer by stopping his persecutions. The victim cannot therefore enjoy her position of being aggressed to be rescued but will enjoy her position of victim by being protected from being rescued by the persecutor. (Do not know if that is clear). Basically more the victim calls for rescue more she is persecuted and less she calls for rescue and less she is persecuted. It is the base of ruling by terror.
    But I do not see that case being applicable to Afghanistan.

    What is important to understand is that this is a dynamic diagram in which each position is dependant of the existence/creation of the others. And that no one is a passive actor, especially the victim.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Question is who do you cast in the role of "victim" and who in the role of "persecutor"?... I would argue that in true insurgency the victim is the populace.
    I'd be curious to know what constitutes "true insurgency".

    I agree that the populace is generally the victim. Often, though, the Government, the insurgent, and outside intervenors are all proclaiming themselves saviours - and generally pursuing their own interests - while acting as persecutors.

    I'm not convinced that it's possible to generate a really universal theory of insurgency.... the differences between cases are too dramatic. In many ways trying to come up with a theoretical framework obstructs understanding, as it tends to create assumptions that may not be appropriate to any specific insurgency. Each needs to be examined and understood on its own terms.

    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    (he touches on several dozen, but looks to Vietnam I and II, China, Greece, Philippires-Huk, Malaya, Cambodia and Laos as the key core cases).
    I should look at that. I confess that I get extremely cranky when people treat the Huk insurgency as a separate phenomenon, rather than a subset of the continuing insurgency later fought (and still being fought) as the New People's Army. The Huk insurgency was not, realistically, defeated: it was suppressed for a while and subsequently re-emerged under a new name.

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    I too recognize that every insurgency is unique. These differences are indeed dramatic. Equally dramatic, and far more helpful for drawing lessons that help to prevent or cure these unique events, are the similarities.

    I see no downside to looking for universal factors when the COIN community has already developed universal solutions. How many times must I listen to some senior leader parrot "Development-Governance-Security"? Not to be argumentative but within those three broad lanes lies the cause of insurgency as well as the cure, so how and where then must one apply their energy for the desired effect? Too often we do as much harm as good, and often the good is as much the result of good luck as it is good planning. We can do better. We must do better.

    Study of the human terrain, etc are all efforts to smarten up this engagement, but even if I understand the human terrain like a native, and I know the insurgent as well as he knows himself, I still am apt to F the whole thing up if I don't really understand what causes insurgency in the first place.

    The afore mentioned "victim mentality" of governments faced with insurgency; and a COIN doctrine that presumes success in the preservation of the current government combine to steer engagement away from where it really needs to be within these broad lanes for a positive effect and tends to drive it toward engagement that is either ineffective or counterproductive. Thus why most COIN efforts are such long, drawn-out affairs.

    When the intervening force sees itself also as the COIN force it exacerbates all of the above.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    The afore mentioned "victim mentality" of governments faced with insurgency; and a COIN doctrine that presumes success in the preservation of the current government combine to steer engagement away from where it really needs to be within these broad lanes for a positive effect and tends to drive it toward engagement that is either ineffective or counterproductive. Thus why most COIN efforts are such long, drawn-out affairs.

    Bob,

    I believe also that in the case of Afghanistan, the fact that the government is differenciated from the external powers plays a great role in its capacity to play the victime.
    More you want to give him its independance more you face the possibility that they will play the victim of an insurgency which is not the result of their faults but the result of the presence of an occupying power.
    Unlike situation as Algeria this gives even more room for the host government to enjoy and abuse of the victim position.

    If you add the fact that you place your self in the confortable place of the rescuer (by calling yourself the COIN force) this tend to exacerbate the possibilities for the host government to abuse of his even more confortable position of victim. Just because criticising victims makes of you quite automatically a persecutor... (Which is not always the case.)

    In cases like Algeria, the combat to be the persecutor or the recuser between the 2 armed parties is much easier to identify and the population is "automatically" the victim. In Afghanistan, you find yourself with a middle man (the host government) who can claim to play the role of the population. in fine the victim/population has no voice in that game.
    Last edited by M-A Lagrange; 08-16-2010 at 10:48 AM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    even if I understand the human terrain like a native, and I know the insurgent as well as he knows himself, I still am apt to F the whole thing up if I don't really understand what causes insurgency in the first place.
    True enough... but if we try to reach conclusions about what causes "insurgency", generically, there is always a temptation to impose those conclusions on a specific insurgency where they may not fit. Similarities are not universalities, and when people become invested in certain generic conclusions they are often very reluctant to set them aside, even when understanding demands it. This can be a dangerous thing.

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    Default Hey Steve,

    from Dayuhan
    I should look at that. I confess that I get extremely cranky when people treat the Huk insurgency as a separate phenomenon, rather than a subset of the continuing insurgency later fought (and still being fought) as the New People's Army. The Huk insurgency was not, realistically, defeated: it was suppressed for a while and subsequently re-emerged under a new name.
    You'd have to read the book and then give your opinion on how well Lomperis covered the situation. He goes back in time well before the Huks and also briefly covers NPA.

    You have the viewpoint of someone who is neither government nor insurgent; and therefore closer to an NGO. Nothing wrong with that considering where you live; I'd probably do the same under the same circumstances - I don't have a big trust of governments or mining companies.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jmm99 View Post
    You have the viewpoint of someone who is neither government nor insurgent; and therefore closer to an NGO.
    Hello Mike,

    What do you call an NGO point of view?
    I had several colleagues who would admite without any problem that they are closer to insurgents than any occupying power what ever insurgents may do. Just a question of principle.
    Also, I know a lot of NGO which are closer to their funding master than you can imagine.

    In Goma, NGO were crying for the FARDC to go and kill some insurgents (CNNDP, FDLR, LRA). But where also begging for MONUC to protect them. In terms of advocacy, they were all on the FARDC back and very little critic on the insurgents (CNDP or FDLR).

    And when I tried to use the transactional sheme to criticise the NGO positions, former NGO staff students and prof in Paris were just shocked that I could even imagine that "rescuer" may not be just a good guy but actually depended on victims to exist.

    Colonialement

    M-A

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    And when I tried to use the transactional sheme to criticise the NGO positions, former NGO staff students and prof in Paris were just shocked that I could even imagine that "rescuer" may not be just a good guy but actually depended on victims to exist.
    M-A

    I applaud the fact that you even brought that point to light in front such an obviously pure-of-heart audience. Goma in my day was perhaps one of the most startling example of that phenomenon, albeit one in which the UNHCR was especially culpable.

    I chuckled at the thought of asking the FARDC to "rescue" the NGOs by killing insurgents. I never could see the FAZ as willing to go after anyone who might actually be armed.

    Tom

    Tom

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    Council Member M-A Lagrange's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    I chuckled at the thought of asking the FARDC to "rescue" the NGOs by killing insurgents. I never could see the FAZ as willing to go after anyone who might actually be armed.
    Well FARDC have slightly changed from FAZ (But not so much, I reassure you). But the most interresting point is that NGO were putting themselfs as the victims (they did have objective reasons for that) and were pushing the adgenda of the NGO being the victims rather than pushing the adgenda of the population being the victim.
    The idea was to push MONUC to have a more active role into supporting FARDC in conducting the operation. (And a more robust Chap 7 mandate).
    This happened after some UK based NGO did not managed to have France and the Belgium sending troops to conduct a Artemis like operation in Goma.
    Which was also the Kabila adgenda. (Not that they did not try, even the congolese catholic church went on a tour in europ to pleade the cause of the silent genocide of Bantu by the Nilotic...)

    I believe that it illustrate quite beautifully how from persecutor/rescuer (Kabila/NGO) you can try to picture yourself as the "Victim" calling for a third part to come and rescue you.

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