COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[carl]

I am a huge fan of Galula myself - but my facts are straight and my point of understanding the context of his experience and the difference of his missions are critical ones.

Perhaps. But perhaps you are making too much of Mr. Galula's background limiting his ability to discern the essentials of small war.

Figure it this way. Mr. Clauswitz is held in very high regard by many people who are in a good position to know. Many of those people are Americans who are residents of what is principally a maritime power, one of the greatest in history. Clauswitz could be looked at as having been very limited by his experience. He barely mentioned navies and command of the sea and had no experience at all in with ships and sea fighting as far as I know. Yet he is of great value to many Americans, residents of a maritime power.

So I think Mr. Galula's limitations of experience didn't affect the value of his work to us.

[slapout9]

Perhaps. But perhaps you are making too much of Mr. Galula's background limiting his ability to discern the essentials of small war.

Figure it this way. Mr. Clauswitz is held in very high regard by many people who are in a good position to know. Many of those people are Americans who are residents of what is principally a maritime power, one of the greatest in history. Clauswitz could be looked at as having been very limited by his experience. He barely mentioned navies and command of the sea and had no experience at all in with ships and sea fighting as far as I know. Yet he is of great value to many Americans, residents of a maritime power.

So I think Mr. Galula's limitations of experience didn't affect the value of his work to us.

That's right carl. IMO his book on COIN theory is a more practical book than most field manuals. His limitations were minimal and had as much to do with the time period his ideas were being used in as anything else. I also have some doubts about just how much effort was really behind trying to implement his proposed "step"plan and adapting it to the actual current situation on the ground.

[Compost]

I suppose this is a good time to clarify. COIN – counterinsurgency – is a type of operation. Population-Centric COIN is a strategy. I believe it is because the political end-state (stable, legitimate government) is identical to the operational end-state (stable, legitimate government). The key is legitimacy. It is, by definition, the recognized right to govern. Take that out of COIN and all that is left is tactics and operational concepts.

US Army and USMC doctrine in para 1-4 of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated May 2014 starts with a short sentence: “ Counter-insurgency is not a substitute for strategy. ”

So now you want to split hairs and insist “ POP-centric COIN is a strategy “. But that doesn’t run fast enough to bypass history or escape common sense. The operational end-state of a completely successful strategy must be virtually identical to the sought-after political end-state. But that will not invariably - or frequently if ever - be “ stable, legitimate government “. It could be any form of junta, regime or government that can obtain the enthusiastic, reluctant or coerced acceptance of a sufficiently large proportion of the local, regional and/or international communities. That is real world legitimacy.

POP-centric COIN is not a strategy. Nor is evangelism.

[BrentWilliams]

US Army and USMC doctrine in para 1-4 of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 dated May 2014 starts with a short sentence: “ Counter-insurgency is not a substitute for strategy. ”

So now you want to split hairs and insist “ POP-centric COIN is a strategy “. But that doesn’t run fast enough to bypass history or escape common sense. The operational end-state of a completely successful strategy must be virtually identical to the sought-after political end-state. But that will not invariably - or frequently if ever - be “ stable, legitimate government “. It could be any form of junta, regime or government that can obtain the enthusiastic, reluctant or coerced acceptance of a sufficiently large proportion of the local, regional and/or international communities. That is real world legitimacy.

POP-centric COIN is not a strategy. Nor is evangelism.

I would note that the enemy centrist versus population centrist debate that was in the 2006 version is not in the 2014 version. Moreover, the FM directly says the population is not necessarily the center of gravity (see 7-21)

[TheCurmudgeon]

Compost,

Actually I think the manual makes my point well. The whole quote is:

Counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy. When counterinsurgents attempt to defeat an insurgency, they perform a range of diverse methods intended to counter an insurgency. Commanders must effectively arrange these diverse methods in time and space to accomplish strategic objectives. The U.S. can use a range of methods to aid a host nation or group in defeating an insurgency. The various combinations of these methods with different levels of resourcing provide the U.S. with a wide range of strategic options to defeat an insurgency. The strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to enable those ways. (See paragraphs 1-10 through 1-13 for more information on strategy.)

My emphasis.

Moving on to Para 1-10:

1-10. When and how the U.S. government provides assistance to other states to counter an insurgency is a question of policy and strategy. Commanders and staffs should understand that the U.S. can respond with a
range of measures, many of which do not directly involve U.S. forces securing the population or performing offensive operations, in a counterinsurgency. This manual provides the reader with information on how counterinsurgents may organize tactical tasks in time and space to reach an end state. It cannot and
should not be the only reference to conduct counterinsurgency operations for someone who wishes to fully understand the policy tools available to the U.S. to aid a host nation in fighting a counterinsurgency. (See JP 3-24, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.4, and the U.S. Government Guide to Counterinsurgency for more information on counterinsurgency policy tools.)

A military counterinsurgency effort it not a substitute for a complete strategy to reach the strategic goal. How much effort, and of what type, will depend on the unique strategic goal. We might care more about defeating the insurgents than helping the government because our interest are against the insurgents.

However, if you want a stable government that is supported by the people (or the people are at least not so pissed off that they will support an insurgency), then the goal is the population.

1-27. Legitimacy, the acceptance of an authority by a society, and control are the central issues in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. This is true however the U.S. enables a host nation to defeat an insurgency. The population of a particular society determines who has legitimacy to establish the rules and the government for that society. A population’s values and cultural norms will determine who that society perceives as a legitimate authority. Both the insurgency and the host nation attempt to control the population by some mixture of consent and coercion. Insurgents use all available tools, including political (diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, historical, national, class, political, tribal or ideological beliefs), and social, military, and economic tools to overthrow or undermine an existing authority. Likewise, the host nation will use all available tools to maintain acceptance of its authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. It may be a generally accepted social order. Control of a population, however, may not be the end state desired by an insurgent. A criminal enterprise might seek to undermine existing political power in order to enable it to continue its criminal activities or insurgents could seek political power in order to impose an ideological (or religious) system on an unwilling population. In counterinsurgencies, if the affected government wants to end the insurgency, it should use all instruments of its national power to prove its legitimacy, to defeat the insurgency, and to reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging.

Now, to be far, I am a bit of an evangelist when it comes to the idea of legitimacy. The problem I tend to run into is that most people assume that when I say something like legitimacy or rule of law I am talking about democracy. Nope. Legitimacy is in the eyes of the people. A tribal leader of the local Mullah may be who the people see as the legitimate leader.

Now, that does not square well with those of the liberal mindset that liberty is the same as equality. In reality that notion is the result of changes in the society having to do with prosperity and security. Equality is a "luxury" that is affordable by wealthy, stable societies. Inequality is a reality that is required to survive in less fortunate places.

I have also noted in several places that electoral democracy is a really bad idea in a factional society. A factional society is one where there are several different groups each with their own ideas about who is the legitimate leader (usually based on association with their ethnic group or religion). It creates instability. So, yes, I an evangelical against pushing for democratic elections too fast, ... a mistake we commonly make based on the assumption that liberty means equality.

I can rant more, but I won't. I have not finished the whole FM, but I think it has some good points. I also think that it probably grants Commander's too much leeway and not enough control or direction. But that is necessary. In the right hands it works. In the wrong, it leads to disaster.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is an interesting view. The Trailer for the new "Call of Duty:Advanced Warfare" Video Game. Kevin Spacey makes a great world dictator. But he has a lot to say about America's attempts at creating democracies around the world.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFu5qXMuaJU

A view that will now be part of the younger generations understanding of the world, since they won't read the news but will play the video game.

[slapout9]

Here is an interesting view. The Trailer for the new "Call of Duty:Advanced Warfare" Video Game. Kevin Spacey makes a great world dictator. But he has a lot to say about America's attempts at creating democracies around the world.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFu5qXMuaJU

A view that will now be part of the younger generations understanding of the world, since they won't read the news but will play the video game.

Curmudgy,
1-This view is already part of the younger generation and has been for some time. This video shows one of the strongest attractions of gangs but college boys and politicians just don't like simple answers because then they would actually have to do something that would show clear accountability. Clear,simple and accountable is not something Politicians like.

2-We are NOT a democracy! We are a Constitutional Republic that uses a limited Democratic process (elections). The whole point of having a Republic (rule of Law not rule by mass influence) was to prevent such things from happening as the video depicts. The more we push democracy the more the country will continue to fail.

3-All that a side......some pretty cool soldier outfits and equipment. When is this coming into inventory?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Curmudgy,
1-This view is already part of the younger generation and has been for some time. This video shows one of the strongest attractions of gangs but college boys and politicians just don't like simple answers because then they would actually have to do something that would show clear accountability. Clear,simple and accountable is not something Politicians like.

2-We are NOT a democracy! We are a Constitutional Republic that uses a limited Democratic process (elections). The whole point of having a Republic (rule of Law not rule by mass influence) was to prevent such things from happening as the video depicts. The more we push democracy the more the country will continue to fail.

3-All that a side......some pretty cool soldier outfits and equipment. When is this coming into inventory?

First, number 3. The game is set in 2054, so I am guessing it will be a while before you see any of that stuff ... other than on your TV when you play the game. I tried playing the "Army" game. In it you went through basic training. I couldn’t get through the obstacle course, so I am guessing I will die every time in this game too. Still, looks like fun.

Interestingly, your 1 and 2 conflict, showing the weakness of our “republic”. We certainly were a republic when founded. Direct elections were limited to the House with the Senate and the President elected by members of the House and others elected for their ability to make decisions for us. Those days are long gone (except for the remnants of the Electoral College). Today we are a representative democracy. Politicians are more worried about poll numbers (and political contributions) and public opinion than they are about leading. This may have been a republic, but I feel that the label really no longer really applies.

That said, I don’t believe that the important difference lies in the distinction between a democracy and a republic. Our system of government is founded on the principle that the individual is more important than the state. Communist democratic republics were founded on the principle that the state is more important than the individual. Terms like republic and democracy are largely meaningless. What matters and the foundational principles.

[slapout9]

That said, I don’t believe that the important difference lies in the distinction between a democracy and a republic. Our system of government is founded on the principle that the individual is more important than the state. Communist democratic republics were founded on the principle that the state is more important than the individual. Terms like republic and democracy are largely meaningless. What matters and the foundational principles.

It matters Curmudgy,

I pledge allegiance to a Republic not a Democracy.

We used to be about being an individual and about creating strong individuals but democracies are about creating victim/special interests groups that can form voting blocks and and as a reward they get more or special rights. As you mentiond once the so called "in" and "out" groups and then getting them to fight each other instead forming one group called citizens with the same rights for all under one law.

[slapout9]

Red Skelton expalins The Pledge Of Allgeince and also why it makes a differance!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZBTyTWOZCM

[TheCurmudgeon]

It matters Curmudgy,

I pledge allegiance to a Republic not a Democracy.

We used to be about being an individual and about creating strong individuals but democracies are about creating victim/special interests groups that can form voting blocks and and as a reward they get more or special rights. As you mentiond once the so called "in" and "out" groups and then getting them to fight each other instead forming one group called citizens with the same rights for all under one law.

I am not sure I would agree ..., no, I pretty much disagree with your assessment of the distinction between a democracy and a republic. I would also argue that the use of the two terms is so ubiquitous as to make them meaningless. For example, North Korea is the “Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” In most cases a country is a combination of the two, it is a representative democracy – the population votes (democracy) to select their representatives (republic).

The only pure democracy I ever lived in was when I lived in Lebanon, NH. Once a year we had a town meeting in the school gymnasium and everyone from the town that was eligible to vote came to the meeting. All items were discussed and debated, and all the people directly voted on every item. Everywhere else that claims to be a democracy, some form of representative system is used. It is considered a democracy because the representatives are elected rather than appointed.

This is an interesting area, and if you are so inclined you should start a thread over it.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think this thread has run its course. While I will probably find other issues with the new FM 3-24, the distinction between the strategic objective of political legitimacy and the other operational objectives (Centers of Gravity like external support for the insurgents/cross-border sanctuaries) is fairly clear early on.
Operational considerations …

1-13. An operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 3-0). The commander may use direct or indirect approaches to counter threats. Commanders may find their operational approach is mainly direct, indirect, or a mixture of both. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the center of gravity while avoiding the enemy strength. Commanders may use a single direct or indirect approach or, more likely, may employ a combination of approaches to counter an insurgency and its influence. Additionally, the emphasis on or combination of approaches may have to evolve as the security situation and insurgent networks evolve. The commander’s intent and the approach(es) the commander selects will drive the methods used by counterinsurgents. These methods may be direct or indirect. Approaches and methods must be nested and clearly linked, since they often involve support from diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts by non-military forces. (See chapter 9 for more information on direct methods and chapter 10 for more information on indirect methods. See JP 5-0 for more information on direct and indirect approaches.)

Versus strategic considerations …

STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

1-77. Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, several strategic principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in paragraphs 1-78 through 1-92 are relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to be exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.

LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE

1-78. Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to countering an insurgency. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a perceived condition by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people. (See paragraphs 1-27 through 1-33 for more information on legitimacy and control.)

I don’t believe there is much more to be said. While I personally don’t believe it matters if the government is effective (as in, it provides adequate services) as long as it is seen by enough of the population as legitimate. But that is a different issue.

[slapout9]

I am not sure I would agree ..., no, I pretty much disagree with your assessment of the distinction between a democracy and a republic. I would also argue that the use of the two terms is so ubiquitous as to make them meaningless. For example, North Korea is the “Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” In most cases a country is a combination of the two, it is a representative democracy – the population votes (democracy) to select their representatives (republic).

The only pure democracy I ever lived in was when I lived in Lebanon, NH. Once a year we had a town meeting in the school gymnasium and everyone from the town that was eligible to vote came to the meeting. All items were discussed and debated, and all the people directly voted on every item. Everywhere else that claims to be a democracy, some form of representative system is used. It is considered a democracy because the representatives are elected rather than appointed.

This is an interesting area, and if you are so inclined you should start a thread over it.

Might just do that

[slapout9]

I think this thread has run its course. While I will probably find other issues with the new FM 3-24, the distinction between the strategic objective of political legitimacy and the other operational objectives (Centers of Gravity like external support for the insurgents/cross-border sanctuaries) is fairly clear early on.
Operational considerations …


Versus strategic considerations …



I don’t believe there is much more to be said. While I personally don’t believe it matters if the government is effective (as in, it provides adequate services) as long as it is seen by enough of the population as legitimate. But that is a different issue.

I believe that is the main Political Objective, the desired Political End state but I don't think that is the Strategic Military Objective. The Military Objective needs to be the Motive of the Insurgency.

When I first came to SEC I was very conscious of how close COIN is to LE and I originally pushed the primary method of COG analysis of Motive, Means/Method and Opportunity. Traditional Military methods are just not going to work IMO. I now see that both the Army and Joint Publications on COIN included this concept for analyzing an insurgency, although one (the JP) appears to place it on a higher level of importance than the Army manual.

Which goes back to the concept of Linkage. Until the motive for the Insurgency is dealt with, establishing any kind a of legitimate government is just folly IMO. Which is why the main mission for the military should be to deal with motive of the insurgency and once that is done the political objective (winning the peace) of legitimacy can be done.

[Currahee23]

Just downloaded your thesis. I'm on a two week break from school right now, will see how much I can get through.

Congratulations, by the way!

[SWJ Blog]

Revisiting COIN Strategies in Vietnam

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[SWJ Blog]

Digging Our Own Grave? The Results of CT, COIN and Regime Change

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[SWJ Blog]

Don’t Hold Colombia Up as a COIN Model to Emulate

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[SWJ Blog]

Is COIN No Longer Relevant?

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[SWJ Blog]

COIN Is a Proven Failure

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