Reply With QuoteNo, COIN is Not a Proven Failure
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Economics in COIN
Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation: Economics in Counterinsurgency Operations
Absence of a common operating framework, vague and conflicting guidance, and a lack of an integrated and cohesive effort among U.S. government agencies in the employment of economics in COIN operations is apparent. While clearly uncomfortable with COIN campaigns as an institution, the U.S. military and the U.S. government as a whole must remain prepared for future operations of a similar nature. A failure to develop a sound strategy for the employment of economics would inevitably lead to a repeat of the same ad hoc methods and structures used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worse, the same inefficiencies, waste, and abuse would likely be repeated as well, an issue clearly exacerbated by the immense fiscal pressures presently facing the U.S. military and the nation as a whole. This paper seeks to identify the fundamental cornerstones of sound economic strategy in previous COIN operations in the hope of contributing to a more unified and efficient effort in the future.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 03-07-2016 at 03:32 PM. Reason: This was a stand-alone thread with 10k views.
No, COIN is Not a Proven Failure
No, COIN is Not a Proven Failure
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COIN & the Capitalists: Private Sector Development and the Endgame in Afghanistan
COIN & the Capitalists: Private Sector Development and the Endgame in Afghanistan
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CNAS: Don’t Forget COIN, Because COIN Threat’s Getting Worse
CNAS: Don’t Forget COIN, Because COIN Threat’s Getting Worse
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Rethinking Western COIN: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflicts
Rethinking Western COIN: Lessons from Post-Colonial Conflicts
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COIN Logistics: Let’s Do Camels
COIN Logistics: Let’s Do Camels
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COIN Scorecard Update
COIN Scorecard Update
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On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN
On Winning Hearts and Minds: Key Conditions for Population-Centric COIN
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COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)
Event: Lessons for Africa from Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency Experience
The events two hour podcast is now available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AY2T...ature=youtu.be
Uncertain COIN: a review
COIN or counter-insurgency features in many threads and this article is worthy of a new thread. The author Dr Geraint Hughes, UK Staff College, mainly covers Anglo-US practices, but refers to others and asks many questions about our assumptions.
Hat tip to the blog Defence-in-Depth again.
He concludes:Link:http://defenceindepth.co/2016/03/07/uncertain-coinage/As Clausewitz put it, ‘[everything] is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult’. It would be highly dangerous for governments and their armed forces to be seduced into the logic of ‘clear, hold, build’, and to assume that they can fight a ‘pure’ and binary (government v insurgents) campaign that does not account for the possibility of proxy warfare, internecine conflicts involving multiple actors, state failure, and the potential for either escalation or metastasised violence across borders. Indeed, the characteristics of current conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere suggest that the terminological distinctions between COIN, PSO, ‘stabilisation’, and ‘major combat operations’ are potentially becoming increasingly less relevant.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-13-2017 at 02:28 PM. Reason: 15,550v before merging
davidbfpo
No COIN Left In Afghanistan – Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking Abou
No COIN Left In Afghanistan – Or The Elephant In The Room That No One Is Talking About
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Guard Should Specialize In COIN: War College Study
Guard Should Specialize In COIN: War College Study
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How COIN Theory Explains Organizational Change
How COIN Theory Explains Organizational Change
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The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power
The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power
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Where Are the Women? The Unfortunate Omission in the Army’s COIN Doctrine
Where Are the Women? The Unfortunate Omission in the Army’s COIN Doctrine
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Moderator at work
Nine threads merged in, a few were one post with high views.
There are over a hundred threads, in various arenas which have COIN in their title so searching is needed still.
davidbfpo
Insurgent Justice: Why and how do rebels make law?
Citing David Betz @ Kings War Studies acclaim for this new book:The publishers, Hurst & Co (London) intro says:Insurgencies win by out-governing the status quo power and the primary thrust of their strategy is nearly always the provision of alternative justice to populations hungry for better law. Frank Ledwidge’s brilliant book plugs the gap in the literature commendably. It is indispensable reading.Link:http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=...0&e=80d42c7c0aThis indispensable book explains how courts are now part of the broader battlefield, deployed by both insurgents and state forces in a world convulsed by unconventional warfare.
In most societies, courts are where the rubber of government meets the road of the people. If a state cannot settle disputes and enforce its decisions, to all intents and purposes it is no longer in charge. This is why successful rebels put courts and justice at the top of their agendas. Rebel Law explores this key weapon in the arsenal of insurgent groups, from the IRA’s ‘Republican Tribunals’ of the 1920s to Islamic State’s ‘Caliphate of Law’, via the ALN in Algeria of the ‘50s and 60s and the Afghan Taliban of recent years.
Frank Ledwidge delineates the battle in such ungoverned spaces between counterinsurgents seeking to retain the initiative and the insurgent courts undermining them. Contrasting colonial judicial strategy with the chaos of stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he offers compelling lessons for today’s conflicts.
The author has an interesting bio indicated here:http://www.port.ac.uk/strategy-enter...-ledwidge.html
Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-13-2017 at 02:52 PM. Reason: 301,571v
davidbfpo
Reassessing Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice
This was a 2012 conference, held in Austin, Texas, with Kings College London, University of Queensland and the hosts The Robert Strauss Center. There is a list of articles by the speakers and on a quick check the links do work. Some names are familiar, others not and SWJ does appear.
There is a strong British emphasis, so a couple of Northern Ireland articles will appear on that thread.
Link:https://reassessingcounterinsurgency....com/articles/
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-26-2017 at 11:38 AM. Reason: 330,369v 29k up since last post!
davidbfpo
A major hole in COIN scholarship
Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary cum book review of Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations in Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017):Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/ho...ency-campaign/The King’s College London professor takes direct aim at FM 3-24, and the West’s thinking on counterinsurgency, specifically its naiveté that the patron and client will share common political goals if the patron is doling out large sums of cash to the client.
(Later) Ladwig shines a bright light on some of the deficiencies in counterinsurgency literature and the United States’ naiveté about its relationship with its clients. His goal is to improve the West’s performance in future counterinsurgency battles.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-22-2018 at 08:04 PM. Reason: Copied from Setting up effective, local security forces thread
davidbfpo
British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN
British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN
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