COIN Counterinsurgency (merged thread)

[Mark O'Neill]

But, I hope everyone is having (or had, for those of you on the other side of the date line) a happy Friday!

Is there such a thing as a bad friday? After all, it is not Monday!

Will have good saturday too if the Wallabies put away the All Blacks in the Bledisloe Cup test match in Melbourne tomorrow night.

Of course, if we lose...

Sorry, getting way off thread.

[Rob Thornton]

Clauswitz made a good point when he proposed that the longer a war continues the greater role chance plays (paraphrased).

War expectations have allot to do with this.

Until you can get the public to accept that chance is going to play an increasing role in long term conflicts where political solutions weigh heavily, its going to be a hard sell. That is not to say it can't be done, just that politicians must articulate the threat as so it is self evident. That does not mean they should mis-represent the threat, to do that is to erode trust, once trust is gone its not easily recovered. In today's info age, there are many wiki-ists who will go out of their way to find the truth.

[RJO]

Many thanks for the thoughtful commentary, Dominique.

[MaxL]

I wonder what the large number of non-christian Americans would think about this as a justification for national policy or strategic planning? You wouldn't last 10 seconds in Australia trying it.

Thankfully, I have never seen anyone successfully argue a conops in our Army or security policy establishment on the basis that "Jesus would want me to do it". Our mob tend to be a bit secular and stick to the more mundane, rather than the divine... you know, good old fashion simple things like sound military strategic planning principles.

Fair enough. To clarify, I was discussing garnering public support for a policy, and operating on the assumption that combining a moral argument with 'sound military strategic planning principles' would be a way to do that. In hindsight the Jesus thing was a bit much.

Essentially, I was trying to say what Rob said, much more concisely than I managed, in his most recent post in this thread.

[kaur]

Here is part of the Freedman's book, that describes narratives.

http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=4184174

[RJO]

Many thanks, kaur. I will read that with interest. I've done some work in the past on narrative in the sciences, and am trying to see how that work might fit in with the issues discussed here.

Bob

[VinceC]

One thing to think about: We are comfortable with the role of narrative in Western civilization -- it embodies the idea of starting at a beginning and taking actions that cause reactions, until you reach a logical outcome. This includes the concept, deeply rooted in our culture, of overall strategic progress toward better conditions of existence, despite short-term setbacks and complications. We live in a cause-and-effect culture.

Communicating with other cultures might require different techniques and strategies. For example, the Jewish and Christian Bibles are organized with a strong narrative dimension. The Quran is organized by chapter lengths, starting with the longest chaperter first. It does contain sub-narratives, but its overriding element is that the Quran was not created but is the truthful word of G-d that has always existed, and which was revealed -- first at once, then in comprehensible portions -- to the Prophet (peace be upon him).

If you consider some of the most enduring art of the Muslim world ... calligraphy, architecture, weaving and carpets ... these are not narrative works but are based instead on elegance, harmony, and intricate presentation.

[Brian Gellman]

Many COIN theorists discuss how the guerilla or insurgent has time on their side, and that often they only need to survive to win. However, in Iraq, time (or lack there of) has always been a concern of key leaders of the Iraqi insurgency. There have been many incidents where insurgent leaders demanded an insurgent "surge" such as during elections and other milestone events. The insurgents do not want to just sit around and wait for the government to collapse, they feel pressure to increase instability before the government does have an effective counter-insurgent force, and before the people truly grow tired of insurgent presence. This is what I believe happened in al Anbar (specifically Ar Ramadhi). The Iraqi people just got tired of the AQ types, joined up and kicked them out. AQI moved elsewhere. Eventually AQI will be forced out of that province as well. It is a matter of time. But how long?

I posit that time is not solely in favor of the insurgent, as much COIN study suggests, and the counterinsurgent can use time to his advantage after proper analysis. Everyone is worried about time. Everyone wants to see change. A counter argument might be that the insurgent, a soccer fan, may see a stalemate against a stronger opponent, similar to a tie, as a victory. But eventually people want to see real gains and real wins. Just as we ask how much time the US has before our strategic CoG, the will of the American people, is broken, we should give serious thought and discussion to just how long AQI and other Iraqi insurgents have until their popular support recedes due to a lack of any tangible gains.

Recommendations for analysis:

1. Determine an estimate of how long insurgent organizations can sustain the fight. How long will the population tolerate them, how long will their local and foreign support last in a particular region? We can use these estimates to help determine time frames for troop levels and goals for security force training. We can focus efforts where we feel insurgents have the least amount of time remaining.

2. What are the “deal breakers” with the population that might end passive or active support for the insurgents? What events might influence foreign entities to cut ties to the insurgents? We can use “deal breaker” events to decrease the time insurgents have left before losing popular support. (Many of the deal breakers would be actions taken by the insurgent, however, if we know what they are, when they happen we can be better prepared to exploit them).

3. Perhaps we should demand a timetable for AQI's withdrawal. When they refuse to give one as we have refused, it may have an effect on their local support, just as our refusal to submit a time table affects our support. We have to stop thinking of the insurgent guerilla as this mythical entity that cannot be beaten and use their own strategies against them.

[SteveMetz]

Many COIN theorists discuss how the guerilla or insurgent has time on their side, and that often they only need to survive to win. However, in Iraq, time (or lack there of) has always been a concern of key leaders of the Iraqi insurgency. There have been many incidents where insurgent leaders demanded an insurgent "surge" such as during elections and other milestone events. The insurgents do not want to just sit around and wait for the government to collapse, they feel pressure to increase instability before the government does have an effective counter-insurgent force, and before the people truly grow tired of insurgent presence. This is what I believe happened in al Anbar (specifically Ar Ramadhi). The Iraqi people just got tired of the AQ types, joined up and kicked them out. AQI moved elsewhere. Eventually AQI will be forced out of that province as well. It is a matter of time. But how long?

I posit that time is not solely in favor of the insurgent, as much COIN study suggests, and the counterinsurgent can use time to his advantage after proper analysis. Everyone is worried about time. Everyone wants to see change. A counter argument might be that the insurgent, a soccer fan, may see a stalemate against a stronger opponent, similar to a tie, as a victory. But eventually people want to see real gains and real wins. Just as we ask how much time the US has before our strategic CoG, the will of the American people, is broken, we should give serious thought and discussion to just how long AQI and other Iraqi insurgents have until their popular support recedes due to a lack of any tangible gains.

Recommendations for analysis:

1. Determine an estimate of how long insurgent organizations can sustain the fight. How long will the population tolerate them, how long will their local and foreign support last in a particular region? We can use these estimates to help determine time frames for troop levels and goals for security force training. We can focus efforts where we feel insurgents have the least amount of time remaining.

2. What are the “deal breakers” with the population that might end passive or active support for the insurgents? What events might influence foreign entities to cut ties to the insurgents? We can use “deal breaker” events to decrease the time insurgents have left before losing popular support. (Many of the deal breakers would be actions taken by the insurgent, however, if we know what they are, when they happen we can be better prepared to exploit them).

3. Perhaps we should demand a timetable for AQI's withdrawal. When they refuse to give one as we have refused, it may have an effect on their local support, just as our refusal to submit a time table affects our support. We have to stop thinking of the insurgent guerilla as this mythical entity that cannot be beaten and use their own strategies against them.

I'd agree with you that it makes no sense to draw the general conclusion that time is on the side of insurgents. There are many historical instances of the opposite--an insurgency often catches a government by surprise and poorly prepared for it. Sometimes, if governments avoid early defeat, they learn and adjust. Since government nearly always have access to more resources than an insurgency, if they can learn, adjust, and sustain their morale, the balance often shifts in their favor.

I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist. Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict. (One would assume that insurgents and an indigenous government both have an equal stake in a conflict).

In terms of Iraq specifically, though, I'm not sure I agree with your analysis. You are approaching it from a rational decisionmaking perspective, assuming that various participants are weighing costs and benefits. But many analysts have pointed out that conflicts like insurgencies often reach the point of irrationality--where participants make decisions based on something other than a cold analysis of costs and benefits. Americans have a particularly hard time understanding this, particularly when primal identities (ethnicity, sect, confessionalism, tribe) and cultural elements like the obligation for revenge and a hyperdeveloped sense of personal honor are involved.

To take a specific example, why would "foreign entities" end their support to "jihadists" in Iraq? Much of that support, at least that we know of, is unofficial (Iran may be the exception). How could we, for instance, pressure the Saudis to stop the flow of money from their citizens to Iraq (assuming they could do so) when those providing the funds see it as "defending Islam"?

I'm not sure what effect giving AQI a withdrawal ultimatum would have. AQ has long said they are involved in a hundred year struggle. They know that support involvement in Iraq is eroding quickly in the United States. I can't imagine how we could convince them that if they don't withdraw, we will make things worse for them.

[tequila]

A problem with your thesis. You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership.

This goes even more for the groups that Malcolm Nance and others have identified as the main force of the Sunni insurgency - the native nationalist groups, whether originally spun off from the Ba'athist security forces, the army and RG/SRG formations, the Saddam Fedayeen, etc. as well as native Iraqi jihadist groups that have sprung up since, i.e. the Islamic Army in Iraq and its allies in the Reform and Jihad Front.

Basically, most of the insurgents are Iraqi Sunnis who live in Iraq. They have that basic advantage over Americans, who will one day go home. The issue has passed on from whether the Americans will leave (they will) to when will they leave, and who will hold what kind of power after they are gone.

A simple reading of insurgent rhetoric shows that Iraqi Sunni insurgents have not yet let go of some basic conceptions (1) they are the founders and the guardians of modern Iraqi nationalism (2) Iraq is occupied by both Americans and Persian "Safawis" - i.e. religious Shias are not really Iraqis but rather Iranians, a trued-and-true bias played on by Saddam from the old days (3) a truly free Iraq is one that is free from both American and Persian dominance - i.e. one that is run by Sunni Iraqis.

Lack of military progress is largely moot. As Sunnis feel more besieged, they will not turn on the insurgency which they see as the only legitimate defense against Shia supremacy. Insurgents may turn on each other to protect their own standing and place in the community, as in Anbar, but that is not a guarantee that they will not turn their guns on the Americans or the Iraqi government once the greater threat of AQI or other Sunni insurgents has passed.

[Brian Gellman]

Steve and tequila,

Thanks for the very quick and well thought out replies. Here is a quick response, I hope to have more time later.

"I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist."

Ok, I agree with this statement, however, time is relative and it has different meanings to different people. Even the most dedicated protagonist can be forced to act prematurely and overcommit themselves if they feel time is not on their side.

I should add another recommended analysis: What is the insurgent's perception of time? Does the insurgent believe that time is on their side, and why does the insurgent believe that? How can we exploit this perception in order to force the insurgent to change their strategy (or at the very least, their tactics)?

"Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict."

Agreed, and this leads to the "outsider" counterinsurgent's perception of time, or lack there of. This is also important to the perception of the insurgent and probably one of the primary reasons why an insurgent might choose a prolonged strategy and trade space for time.

"You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership."

AQI itself is a foreign element, as are its ideas. And to the majority of the population, they are not welcome ideas. Some suggest that if the US left Iraq, that AQ could not survive in Iraq. If true, this suggests that many see AQI as simply a means to an end, one that is merely a convenient relationship intended to be discarded when no longer needed. If this is true, or even if only the perception exists, that would mean that AQI and their native Iraqi followers must have some sense of an end of their time in Iraq.

The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).

[tequila]

The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).

Hi Brian,

Just FYI, I greatly enjoyed your posts at Intel Dump and it is good to see you posting here, assuming you are the same guy of course.

W/regards to AQI, hasn't its declaration of the ISI already made any departure plans moot in that it has given its own declaration to stay permanently? The backlash can already be seen in Anbar province and with the formation of the RJF. However, this has not ended in AQI's liquidation since, I would argue, the main drivers of AQI's continued support in the extremist Sunni community still exist --- the presence of the Americans and (most importantly) increasing violence between Sunni and Shia.

[SteveMetz]

Steve and tequila,

Thanks for the very quick and well thought out replies. Here is a quick response, I hope to have more time later.

"I would say that time is on the side of the more dedicated protagonist."

Ok, I agree with this statement, however, time is relative and it has different meanings to different people. Even the most dedicated protagonist can be forced to act prematurely and overcommit themselves if they feel time is not on their side.

I should add another recommended analysis: What is the insurgent's perception of time? Does the insurgent believe that time is on their side, and why does the insurgent believe that? How can we exploit this perception in order to force the insurgent to change their strategy (or at the very least, their tactics)?

"Thus advantage tends to accrue to insurgents when they are facing an outsider who has less of a stake in the conflict."

Agreed, and this leads to the "outsider" counterinsurgent's perception of time, or lack there of. This is also important to the perception of the insurgent and probably one of the primary reasons why an insurgent might choose a prolonged strategy and trade space for time.

"You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership."

AQI itself is a foreign element, as are its ideas. And to the majority of the population, they are not welcome ideas. Some suggest that if the US left Iraq, that AQ could not survive in Iraq. If true, this suggests that many see AQI as simply a means to an end, one that is merely a convenient relationship intended to be discarded when no longer needed. If this is true, or even if only the perception exists, that would mean that AQI and their native Iraqi followers must have some sense of an end of their time in Iraq.

The reason I suggest demanding a withdrawal timetable from AQI is because we know that AQI will not give one. This will reinforce the perception of many Iraqis that AQI does not intend to leave Iraq either. This may affect popular support of AQI by those Iraqis who are offering support only with the short term goal of removing Western occupiers. Perhaps this can alter AQI's perception of time, and force them to act prematurely or even desperately (either way, make them REACTIVE).

In my Rethinking Insurgency monograph, I argued that many insurgencies persist for reasons other than the dream of strategic success. They become a way of life for the insurgents. Insurgent leaders and footsoldiers realize that if the conflict ends, so does their access to resources, their prestige, their very psychological raison d'etre. If true, this means that simply altering the strategic equation may not be enough to end the conflict.


I agree with you that AQ is largely a foreign element. But, as tequila pointed out, it is also true that it has put down roots in Iraqi society. There now are Iraqis who fully subscribe to the AQ ideology. That suggests that even if all the foreign fighters left tomorrow. there would still be an AQI of some type.

Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

[Abu Buckwheat]

A problem with your thesis. You posit that AQI represents a foreign element in Iraqi society. While it is undoubtedly true that it began that way and maintains a strong foreign contingent, it has nonetheless assimilated into the Iraqi Sunni context and has a sizable number of native Iraqis in its membership.

You are absolutely right that the Sunnis will not turn on the insurgency but as I wrote in my entry, they won't turn on them specifically because they are Iraqi and not foreigners.

I have lived in Iraq for quite a while and I believe that for all of AQI’s efforts to assist their Iraqi brothers they are still considered a foreign force by the community (both Sunni and non-Sunni). The Iraqi insurgents under arms who follow their Salafist philosophy may number in the low hundreds as opposed to the Iraqi rejectionist religious extremists or the neo-Baathist nationalists. They see themselves as the true Iraqi resistance. This is why the Islamic State of Iraq suffered so much and why the

The efforts of AQI are just complimentary to the entire "eject the occupiers" mission of the entire Sunni Resistance. They operate a specific mission with specific goals that just happen to be complimentary to the over all mission of each group, including stoking sectarian violence. What happens there after the occupation is entirely up to each groups' own long-term strategy but I doubt there will be grateful Iraqis willing to give AQI a mini-Afghanistan in the Sunni Triangle. They will be sidelined. Their real threat comes from their ability to keep professionalizing and acquiring weapons. What I was saying was that AQI's ultimate goal and end state for Iraq is not what the other two wings of the insurgency desire. I illustrated the singularity of the short-term strategy with the clear differences of the long term in this chart from The Terrorist of Iraq:



I do not fear for an AQI run or influenced community because extremely few are Salafist Takfiris. What I fear is that the status quo will remain after we withdraw. Tequila also wrote:

Lack of military progress is largely moot. As Sunnis feel more besieged, they will not turn on the insurgency which they see as the only legitimate defense against Shia supremacy. Insurgents may turn on each other to protect their own standing and place in the community, as in Anbar, but that is not a guarantee that they will not turn their guns on the Americans or the Iraqi government once the greater threat of AQI or other Sunni insurgents has passed.

Classic and to the point. AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

[Tom Odom]

Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

Such a far cry from the "bring it on" in 2004. Agree, Steve. But you are proving your own post as below:

But many analysts have pointed out that conflicts like insurgencies often reach the point of irrationality--where participants make decisions based on something other than a cold analysis of costs and benefits.

Tom

[tequila]

AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

A great point. Also they provide a certain deniability to Sunni groups who realize that one day they may have to negotiate with Shias and Kurds. They can always say, "No, it wasn't us setting off all those car bombs in markets, it was those awful sectarian takfiris from the ISI."

For example:

A front of Iraqi armed groups, which declared opposition to the foreign presence in Iraq, denounced on Monday the suicide bombing attack that targeted a market in Tuz Khurmato district in northern Iraq.

The Jihad and Reform front, including six major Iraqi armed groups, said in a statement on the internet that "the front denounces the bombing attack in Tuz Khurmato area where hundreds were killed and injured."

"While we denounce these attacks, we call upon all Jihadist groups to refer to the Holy Quran and the Prophetic tradition in acts concerning the people's souls, wealth and honor," the statement added.

[Brian Gellman]

"Insurgent leaders and footsoldiers realize that if the conflict ends, so does their access to resources, their prestige, their very psychological raison d'etre. If true, this means that simply altering the strategic equation may not be enough to end the conflict."

Steve, I will take some time this weekend to read your article, I find the statement above very interesting and can easily believe it based on my experience. Again, thanks for your responses, as a relatively new student of COIN, I truly appreciate and respect your time.

In my understanding of COIN, you can target three things:

1. The insurgent themselves
2. The population who supports the insurgent (thus indirectly attacking the insurgent by destroying its logistical base).
3. Target the cause of the insurgency, the ideas that feed it.

In my experiences in Iraq I constantly found myself focusing on #1, hunt down an insurgent, one after another. I never saw any real positive effects in this strategy because we did not address #2 and #3 which set the conditions for the replenishment of insurgents we removed. There is no doubt that the insurgents will not change their minds, that many times the insurgents enjoy their status and want to prolong the fight for multiple reasons such as you suggest. Due to political realities, #3, removing the cause of the insurgency, US withdrawal, may not be a viable option, therefore I am biased towards option #2.

My post is suggesting a strategy that focuses on #2. We find the ties that bind the insurgents to the population, the "deal breakers", effectively poisoning the see in which they swim. This is why I suggest an approach that is not focused on the insurgent, whoever the insurgent is, with an desired endstate of getting the insurgent to change his mind or die. I want to find the "deal breakers" between the insurgent and their support base, and exploit it.

I believe there are always deal breakers in every relationship. If AQI planted roots in Iraq, what do the Iraqi people get out of it? Surely they don't accept the philosophy simply on its merit, there must be an arrangement.

Even foreign support of the insurgency has deal breakers. Once such deal breaker may be secrecy of support. Another may be how the money is used. I suggest that these are very important questions that can be answered and not simply discounted.

[Brian Gellman]

Tequila, yep, that is me, same guy. Glad you enjoyed the post, Phil let's me play from time to time. Good to see a familiar face.

However, this has not ended in AQI's liquidation since, I would argue, the main drivers of AQI's continued support in the extremist Sunni community still exist ---the presence of the Americans and (most importantly) increasing violence between Sunni and Shia.

Question: I am confused about this statement. Are you arguing that Sunni and Shia violence increasing is good or bad for AQI and their continued presence in Iraq?

I would argue that sectarian violence, which is primarily blamed on AQI (whether they did it or not), is one of the "deal breakers" for the average Sunni Iraqi who simply wants to resist occupation, not kill their fellow Iraqis for being apostates. I believe it is the indiscriminate sectarian attacks that separate the average AQI guy from their local support. It is because of AQI tactics such as sectarian attacks on Iraqis that I believe time does not favor AQI, they (and their ideas) are foreigners that will one day wear out their welcome. The question is when and how can we catalyze it?

[Brian Gellman]

AQI has become a critical punishment tool (like Thor's Hammer, Mjolnir) of the other insurgents and they will not put that tool down until the right amount of money is on the table.

Abu B, what might be the "deal breaker" that would convince Iraqis to put that tool down? How do we separate the link between the people and AQI? Is US withdrawal the answer? Sounds like basic economics, if there is a need (remove the occupiers), it will be filled (AQI). If the need disappears, will AQI be out of a job and force to move on?

[Dr Jack]

I agree with you that AQ is largely a foreign element. But, as tequila pointed out, it is also true that it has put down roots in Iraqi society. There now are Iraqis who fully subscribe to the AQ ideology. That suggests that even if all the foreign fighters left tomorrow. there would still be an AQI of some type.

Here's another interesting point: President Bush is now justifying involvement in Iraq almost solely on the threat of AQ "taking over." I believe that is so inconceivable that it is a political losing hand.

This reminds me of the baseball expression "play for a tie at home, play for a win on the road." If the struggle in Iraq is between AQI and the US, then the US is the team on the road... and President Bush wants to play for a win -- but AQI know it still has the bottom of the 9th in their "100 year struggle," so a tie works for now.