How well do you LOO?

[Cavguy]

-We need one common narrative as our theme, and an Iraqi visited or stopped by our partnered forces in one portion of the AO should hear the same theme that he did if he was stopped on the other side, several dozens of kms away
-We need to have an IO campaign as much as we need a tactical plan that involves kinetics. Our Marines down to the private need to understand the basic tenets of it, and it needs to be supervised closely.

From my recent article

8. Understand perceptions matter far more than truth. Counterinsurgency is political conflict for power, and control of the population is the primary means to gain that power. History is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning the tactical battles while losing the strategic campaign for the support of the host and home nations . We have learned that operations will be assessed through the lens of information effects. Information engagement is not a staff section’s responsibility or an operations order annex, but a commander’s program through which all efforts, lethal and non-lethal, must be viewed. Counterinsurgents must constantly ask, “What are the various audiences, and how will this action be perceived by each one? Then, ask what can we do to shape that perception to our advantage?” A successful counterinsurgent is proactive in shaping the information message of his actions. When reacting to events in the current media environment, speed and accuracy are key. To increase tempo, media engagement authority must be decentralized as much as possible out of theater and corps headquarters down to battalions and companies.8 Creating credible perceptions of increasing success and momentum are critical to re-establishing legitimacy and restoring the population’s confidence and trust in the host government.9

It has been attributed to Admiral Mullen, but I haven't been able to find it in print -

"[For COIN] we need an information order with an operations annex, not an operations order with an information annex."

I don't literally agree, but he makes a great point. Every patrol/operation sends a message, is it the one you intended to send?

[Tom Odom]

8. Understand perceptions matter far more than truth. Counterinsurgency is political conflict for power, and control of the population is the primary means to gain that power. History is replete with examples of counterinsurgents winning the tactical battles while losing the strategic campaign for the support of the host and home nations . We have learned that operations will be assessed through the lens of information effects. Information engagement is not a staff section’s responsibility or an operations order annex, but a commander’s program through which all efforts, lethal and non-lethal, must be viewed. Counterinsurgents must constantly ask, “What are the various audiences, and how will this action be perceived by each one? Then, ask what can we do to shape that perception to our advantage?” A successful counterinsurgent is proactive in shaping the information message of his actions. When reacting to events in the current media environment, speed and accuracy are key. To increase tempo, media engagement authority must be decentralized as much as possible out of theater and corps headquarters down to battalions and companies.8 Creating credible perceptions of increasing success and momentum are critical to re-establishing legitimacy and restoring the population’s confidence and trust in the host government.9

Agreed 110%: see:

6. Information warfare as a political struggle is about perceptions not facts. That means that a counter insurgent force or an insurgent force must first identify its own weaknesses because such weaknesses fuel perceptions. In the case of the RPF, its greatest weakness was its largely Tutsi-exile composition. The hardliners use of that weakness fueled their information campaign that culminated in the genocide.

From the Guerillas From the Mist article here on SWJ

Tom

[sullygoarmy]

Congrats on entering the world of Lines of Operation! There are few FMs, texbooks and pamphlets that made the cut to come with me from Fort Leavenworth. This one by Jr. Jack Kem, however, is right here on my desk beside me: Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.. Dr. Kem has a great chapter (chapter 5) on logical lines of operation which may be worth your time.


One note from the old O/C in me...be wary of IO fratricide. Having a coordinated IO plan with dedicated LOOs helps. But when everyone from the Psyops team to your squad leader up through the Battalion Commander visits the local Sheik over a few days, you've hit IO fratricide. That will be your job to deconflice IO "fires" and ensure you are targeting the proper resources against the correct targets. Happy hunting!

[jcustis]

IO fratricide avoidance makes sense, and yes, the second and third order effects of too many voice was kicked around. Now that you reinforced my slight concerns, we'll be certain to discuss that aspect.