Debate over The Generations of War.

[Cavguy]

Having now dissected EBO, Maneuver Warfare (MW), and Boyd, I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.

I first encountered "4GW" as a term when reading TX Hammes' "The Sling and The Stone" a few years ago, which is an excellent intro into the "flattening" of warfare.

Even then, I was uneasy in the breakdown of the 1/2/3/4th Generation of war, how they were defined, and utilized as a construct.

Looking back, the history dates to 1989 and this article.

At the most simplistic level, I acknowledge 4GW has become a useful 'catch all' for just about any non-conventional, non state based conflict environment. Part of that is that our current (some call 'hybrid') wars don't fit easily into traditional descripive boxes, and thus in many casual conversations people often talk about "4GW".

Having now read much more in the field, including this critique, I have come to view the whole "GW" construct with some measure of derision from a theoretical standpoint. It seems really the 2d/3d GW model was developed for the maneuver war theorists to justify the superiority of their theory rather than a rigorously developed time line of warfare. In fact, it kind of falls apart when you take it beyond the PowerPoint deep nature of the theory and start analyzing against history.

Quite simply, 4GW has been going on long before the proponents state (you can find biblical '4GW' conflicts). Also the idea that maneuver warfare is an evolution past attritional (2GW) warfare troubles me more after the above referenced threads.

I am now seeing "4GW" propped up as a term in more than a few papers and articles in leading journals, often as a throwaway. A large part of this is because the community, military, and academics can't decide what to call these asymmetric/hybrid/4GW/COIN/Stability conflicts.

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

* One final note, I sense another argument coming from the MW crew - that it was "justified" despite being a poorly devised construct to bring people to address MW and '4GW'. (the same argument was made about MW as a construct and the sainthood of Boyd) Did the ends justify the means if we accept it as a poor construct?

Let the discussion begin.

[selil]

Having now dissected EBO, Maneuver Warfare (MW), and Boyd, I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.

Even though when I wrote this article I was sure that there was something there (and the literature shows it) I am now thinking "generational" warfare is a misleading term. It isn't that the authors are not discovering different modes of war and applying techniques and tactics to those specific modes, but using generations to discuss them applies a time component that doesn't exist. As you said there are 4th generation conflicts in the biblical age. If it is simply technologies then you might have something, but even then technologies are only analogies/metaphors for other elements.

[Ken White]

Some people live for arcane terms; in some cases, the more arcane the better. Some people want such terminology, some actually need it -- for most it simply becomes a limiting device unless great care is taken.

While some use of terminolgy is necessary for discussion and instructional purposes, attempts to rigorously dictate a lexicon are counterproductive.

War is war, period. Warfare, however, is infinitely and subtly variable and examples of 'multi-generation' warfare throughout history abound -- one adopts limiting terminology at some risk of inducing a mind set or target fixation. In fighting, the only thing in mind should be alertness to what the opponent is doing and development of a counter to that with a goal of preempting him so that you are initiating the action that will remove him as a problem...

[Jedburgh]

See the discussion generated in this thread early last year in response to the posting of Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths.

[Ron Humphrey]

I would like to say that from the time I first started really looking into the various forms, levels, whatever one wants to call them it always struck me as somewhat odd. They are approached and discussed as totally different types of warfare while for the life of me I can't get out of my head that the real truth is each and every one of these approaches would be more akin to parallel dimensions of one another. Each has its points at which it is successful or at least makes sense but none can really stand on their own as a whole.

Perhaps if they are taken as pieces of the whole and then the linkages between them are established then discussions might actually be able to draw out the key differences be it key differences, strengths, or weaknesses?

[Cavguy]

See the discussion generated in this thread early last year in response to the posting of Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths.

Ahhh ... I committed the sin of not looking for old thread. Perused it and found this gem ...

We ignore the fact that Martin van Creveld and Bill Lind, the ideological fathers of the 4GW mafia and seemingly in competion to be known as the grumpiest military historian on the planet, have consistently been more correct than the pack in predicting how military events would unfold over the last 15 years. Wishing that they weren't just dosen't cut it, just as wishing that western forces with massive capability overmatch weren't strategically all at sea in the Middle East. The core point in the 4GW argument is that it is the collapse of the moral and legal construct of the state that gives the opponent their strength and that trying to put the state back together militarily won't work, the issues of info and lethality proliferation are second tier issues that support this anomaly.

Agree or not with the 4GW construct no one can argue that Armd Divisions, DDGX and F22 Wings, the ultimate evolutionary tools of western warfare, have much utility for the fight we face. Sure we can smash states but we are yet to prove we have the capability or will to build a state. The 4GW argument that it is our inability to conceptualise the issues rather than our military capabilities needs to be considered deeply rather than rejected because its advocates have the personaility of a wire brush.

My major beef isn't the construct so far, it's the linear progression of it - 2/3/4, that I don't buy. I especially don't buy the distinction between 2d and 3d GW. 1GW is also pretty irrelevant. Really all debate is centering around 3d/4th GW, although Bill Lind constantly calls the army a 2GW force.

[zenpundit]

I agree that that seeing "Generations" of warfare in strict linearity is very problematic. IMHO it's better as a simple taxonomy than a chronology.

OTOH, mainstream historians other than those associated with 4GW have also made the argument the the adoption of disciplined formations armed with smoothbore muskets (1GW) constituted a "military revolution" rooted in a particular time and place.

http://www.amazon.com/Military-Revol.../dp/0521479584

[Bill Moore]

Hey, does this mean you don't want to hear my theory on 5th Generation Wafare?

In all seriousness I agree, the terms then to create more confusion than clarity.

In general, there are a few broad categories of war (different doctrines, different equipment, different ways to get to the same objective). I hate all the terms, and still blame Clausewitz for the lack of evolutionary military thought. His writings were superb, but that shouldn't have equated to freezing the study of war in time. Instead we have some half baked ideas now like generational warfare, asymmetrical warfare, etc.

Some broad categories of war are:

Conventional Warfare:

Irregular Warfare/Low Intensity Warfare:

Nuclear Warfare:

Less than war: (Punitive missions such as our air strike on Libya, and our air strikes on Iraq in 98).

With the exception of the "less than war" category, we used all them simultaneously during WWII. We used conventional and irregular simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The bottom line is that anyone will fight the way that is advantageous to them. If you're really silly, you will get together with a much of like minded westerners in Genova and codify war, so everyone will have to fight the way you want them to fight, then assume that is the way that war will be fought. If they do something different, well that can't be war, it says so right here in this convention we signed. That must be that asymmetrical stuff.

[Cavguy]

Hey, does this mean you don't want to hear my theory on 5th Generation Warfare?

Actually, 5GW has been postulated in an article - the super-empowered individual waging conflict.

Kinda like the plot of the last "Die Hard" movie or "The Dark Knight".

Now '6 minute abs' er... 6GW ... then you'd be onto something.

[Tom Odom]

Having now dissected EBO, Maneuver Warfare (MW), and Boyd, I wanted to start the discussion on another question that I have been bouncing back and forth with.

I first encountered "4GW" as a term when reading TX Hammes' "The Sling and The Stone" a few years ago, which is an excellent intro into the "flattening" of warfare.

Even then, I was uneasy in the breakdown of the 1/2/3/4th Generation of war, how they were defined, and utilized as a construct.

Looking back, the history dates to 1989 and this article.

At the most simplistic level, I acknowledge 4GW has become a useful 'catch all' for just about any non-conventional, non state based conflict environment. Part of that is that our current (some call 'hybrid') wars don't fit easily into traditional descripive boxes, and thus in many casual conversations people often talk about "4GW".

Having now read much more in the field, including this critique, I have come to view the whole "GW" construct with some measure of derision from a theoretical standpoint. It seems really the 2d/3d GW model was developed for the maneuver war theorists to justify the superiority of their theory rather than a rigorously developed time line of warfare. In fact, it kind of falls apart when you take it beyond the PowerPoint deep nature of the theory and start analyzing against history.

Quite simply, 4GW has been going on long before the proponents state (you can find biblical '4GW' conflicts). Also the idea that maneuver warfare is an evolution past attritional (2GW) warfare troubles me more after the above referenced threads.

I am now seeing "4GW" propped up as a term in more than a few papers and articles in leading journals, often as a throwaway. A large part of this is because the community, military, and academics can't decide what to call these asymmetric/hybrid/4GW/COIN/Stability conflicts.

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

* One final note, I sense another argument coming from the MW crew - that it was "justified" despite being a poorly devised construct to bring people to address MW and '4GW'. (the same argument was made about MW as a construct and the sainthood of Boyd) Did the ends justify the means if we accept it as a poor construct?

Let the discussion begin.

Agree 100% and have for years.

Tom

[Bill Moore]

Again, these principles provide no answers in and of themselves. The solutions are found through study and the development of Clausewitz’ coup d’oiel. Who thinks wins![5]

These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value.

The issue of strategy is more than philosophy (which I think we confuse with principles in the case of Sun Tzu), it is the art of providing direction to accomplish objectives. All the Clausewitz and Sun Tzu quotes in the world won't help Officers conceive a strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and other irregular threats.

The so called theories of asymmetrical warafare, 4GW, etc., are an attempt to fill an identified gap in our doctrinal knowledge. They fall way short, but the fact remains there is a gap, and all the answers to today's problems are NOT in the classic texts.

[zenpundit]

It's aim is to get people to think - so just like Manoeuvre Warfare. The facts are irrelevant to the greater aim of getting people to think in a different way, and thus just like EBO.

All of these concepts are aimed at the altering of mindset, seemingly in preference to an approach that goes for empirically based education.

I can't really agree.

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise. I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists? We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

[Entropy]

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:

* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

[wm]

This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:

* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

Seems to me that both the 30 Years War and the 100 Years War meet all of the criteria above. anyone want to call them 4GW struggles?
Oh wait, I forgot, 4GW only became possible after the Peace of Westphalia introduced the conditions that made 3GW possible.

4GW reminds me of the Ptolemaic geocentric view of the universe. They both require wheels within wheels within wheels to explain the data. I also just love the claim that the 4GW construct is simply a "heuristic" to stimulate discussion. Being exposed to that kind of stimulus makes me want to shout, "Don't taz me bro!"

[William F. Owen]

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise.

Bill Lind makes so many points it's hard to keep track, but I submit that he is always trying to alter peoples ideas and opinions.

I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Concur. We now have more nation states, not fewer, and the vast majority of conflict is concerned about who lives where and with what systems of government.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists?

There is no evidence of what you suggest. My position is, that this is the area that holds the most promise for progressing military thought - and the one that most (not all) the "new concepts of war" folks seem to ignore.

We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

Above my pay grade. I don't get or even pretend to understand US Foreign Policy. - what is more, none of my business so I can't comment.

[max161]

These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value. These quotes in my opinion illustrate the problem with Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. They are philosophical comments, sometimes so obvious in their truth that they are of little value.

The issue of strategy is more than philosophy (which I think we confuse with principles in the case of Sun Tzu), it is the art of providing direction to accomplish objectives. All the Clausewitz and Sun Tzu quotes in the world won't help Officers conceive a strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and other irregular threats.

The so called theories of asymmetrical warafare, 4GW, etc., are an attempt to fill an identified gap in our doctrinal knowledge. They fall way short, but the fact remains there is a gap, and all the answers to today's problems are NOT in the classic texts. .

Actually Bill, I think you have described the problem perfectly. All most people do is look at the quotes and do not study the theory. As we talk about 4GW and asymmetric warfare and all the other buzzwords we are using today to try to describe the nature of warfare, we can find explanations for all of it in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz take study, not just regurgitating famous quotes and misapplying like, for example, the paradoxical trinity. Clausewitz did not only say the trinity was the people, the military, and the government like we so often hear (or as Summers said in his book On Strategy).

What Clausewitz really said was that:

"...war is a paradoxical trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are regarded as blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects concerns mainly the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope of which he play of tcourage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone."

I think that explanation of war cuts across the spectrum from insurgency to Major combat operations and is still relevant today.

But Bill, you are correct. Only looking at select quotes from the great masters does not bring understanding of war either historically or in today's world. It takes thorough study and that is what Clausewitz was trying to foster among his students and readers.

And lastly, Bill, as I argued in my paper, the answers are NOT found in the classic texts. They are found by studying them. Everyone wants to loko to a book to find the silver bullet or the holy grail. But there are no answers that can be pulled of books -0 not in FM 3-24, not in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, not in the Sling and the Stone, not in the Pentagon's New Map and not in On War or the Art of War. You have to read and study and figure out the answers for the situation in which you find yourself. The answers are inside us but the study of the classics and an understanding of the nature of war (from insurgency to major combat operations) is what it takes to develop strategy and practice operational art.

[Ski]

I'm up for a wargaming scenario with a 4GW lens. Will be enjoyable, especially if Herr Oberst Walters and Zen are on my side...

[Ski]

There is a trend here with Lind's work within the field of military theory.

The guy is brilliant, but he comes up with poor naming conventions for his theories. It happened with MW and now 4GW. I understand why he named them this, but only after hours of sitting down with him and eating copius amounts of food. That's the rub.

I disagree with Cavguy to an extent - I think 4GW can be used as a framework for prediction, and it starts with recogizing that the nation-state is failing. Just because there are more nations in the world doesn't mean anything if they are weak, illigitimate and broken.

I spoke to a Naval Academy history class in 06 about 4GW and Afghanistan as I had just returned from that Mecca of Central Asia culture. When doing some research for my brief, I found the Foreign Policy "Failed State" index. I then started scanning it, and looked at the countries we had troop committments to, and it reinforced my beliefs on 4GW.

Now I'm at CGSC, and we get to read theorists like Kaplan and Huntington, who describe a world very similar to what Lind and Co. wrote in 1989, 1994 and for the last 7 years. They have acceptable frameworks - even though Lind is quoted by Huntington, and Van Creveld (who wrote The Transformation of War in 91) is quoted throughout Kaplan's work.

To me, there is great overlap with 4GW. The 1989 article is the base for an intellectual discussion drawing in people such as Col Hammes (4/5GW), Frank Hoffman (Hybrid War), Kalev Sepp (Mosiac War), Echeverra (4GW doesn't exist), Barnett (Agrees with Lind but hates him because of hit piece Lind wrote), and many others trying to describe a condition/framework of warfare that is beyond simple counterinsurgency.

And on we go.