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  1. #1
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    Default Constitutional History of Afghanistan

    This is a boring slog, since all of these documents are much the same. However, they prove how Afghanistan looked at itself as a nation (state).

    They also prove that Afghanistan was a state from 1923 to the present - the relevant period in Afghan constitutional history which encompasses the 1949 GCs, to which Afghanistan was and is a "High Contracting Party".

    Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
    State Parties Afghanistan
    Signature 08.12.1949
    Ratification / Accession 26.09.1956
    Reservation / Declaration - None
    http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?...rm&id=375&ps=P

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1923)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan April 9, 1923
    ....
    Article 1
    Afghanistan Is Completely Free and Independent in the Administration of its Domestic and Foreign Affairs. All Parts and Areas of the Country Are under the Authority of His Majesty the King and Are to Be Treated as a Single Unit Without Discrimination Between Different Parts of the Country.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1964)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1964
    .....
    Title One
    The State
    Article 1
    Afghanistan Is a Constitutional Monarchy; an Independent, Unitary and Indivisible State. Sovereignty in Afghanistan Belongs to the Nation. The Afghan Nation Is Composed of All Those Individuals Who Possess the Citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in Accordance with the Provisions of the Law. The Word Afghan Shall Apply to Each Such Individual.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1964.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1976)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1976
    ....
    Chapter Three
    The State
    Article Twenty: Afghanistan Is a Republican, Democratic, Independent, Unitary and Indivisible State.
    Article Twenty One: National Sovereignty in Afghanistan Belongs to the People. The Nation of Afghanistan Consists of All Those Individuals Who Hold the Citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in Accordance with the Provisions of the Law. The Word Afghan Shall Apply to Each and Every Individual of the Nation of Afghanistan.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1976.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1987)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1987
    ....
    Chapter One
    Foundations of the Political System
    Article One:
    The Republic of Afghanistan Is an Independent Unitary and Indivisible State Having Sovereignty over the Whole of its Territory. The National Sovereignty in the Republic of Afghanistan Rests with the People. The People Exercise National Sovereignty Through Loya Jirga, National Assembly and Local Councils.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1987.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1990)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1990
    .....
    Chapter One
    Foundations of the Political System
    Article One:
    The Republic of Afghanistan Is an Independent, Unitary and Indivisible and Islamic State, Having Sovereignty over the Whole of its Territory. National Sovereignty in the Republic of Afghanistan Belongs to the People. The People Exercise National Sovereignty Through Loya Jirga and National Assembly.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1990.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (2004)

    The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
    (Ratified) January 26, 2004
    ....
    Chapter One: State
    Article One
    Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state.
    Article Two
    The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Followers of other faiths shall be free within the bounds of law in the exercise and performance of their religious rituals.
    Article Three
    No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.
    Article Four
    National sovereignty in Afghanistan shall belong to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives. The nation of Afghanistan is composed of all individuals who possess the citizenship of Afghanistan. The nation of Afghanistan shall be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes. The word Afghan shall apply to every citizen of Afghanistan. No individual of the nation of Afghanistan shall be deprived of citizenship. The citizenship and asylum related matters shall be regulated by law.
    OK, all of that proves that Afghanistan has been a nation (state) at all times relevant to this discussion. The next issue is the successive governments of Afghanistan - in short, who had authority to speak for the "High Contracting Party" under the 1949 GCs.

  2. #2
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    Default Governments in Afghanistan

    Presidents

    Nur Muhammad Taraki - 30 April 1978 – 16 September 1979
    Hafizullah Amin - 16 September 1979 – 27 December 1979
    Babrak Karmal - 27 December 1979 – 24 November 1986
    Haji Mohammad Chamkani - 24 November 1986 – 30 September 1987
    Mohammad Najibullah - 30 September 1987 – 16 April 1992
    Abdul Rahim Hatef - 16 April 1992 – 28 April 1992
    Sibghatullah Mojaddedi - 27 April 1992 – 28 June 1992
    Burhanuddin Rabbani - 28 June 1992 – 27 September 1996, 27 September 1996 – 13 November 2001 (President of the Northern Alliance), 13 November 2001 – 22 December 2001
    Hamid Karzai - 22 December 2001 (acting until 7 December 2004 - under 2004 Constitution)

    wiki bios start at:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nur_Muhammad_Taraki

    You can just follow along via the links at the bottom of the page.

    Chronological History of Afghanistan

    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/chron/index4.html

    United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance)

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_...of_Afghanistan

    Note: these Wiki articles are not cited as evidence - but merely as a quick entry into the timeline and characters.

    ------------------------------------------
    Taliban

    Head of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan
    Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
    Mohammed Omar - 27 September 1996 – 13 November 2001

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Omar

    Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [1] was the name given to the nation of Afghanistan by the Taliban during their rule, from 1996 to 2001. At the peak of their influence the Taliban never controlled the entire area of Afghanistan, as about 10% of the country in the northeast was held by the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. [simple map shows area of Taliban control].
    .....
    Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates ever recognized the Taliban government. Turkmenistan also de facto recognized the Taliban government, as it had official meetings and agreements with Taliban government ministers.

    One reason for this lack of international recognition was the Taliban's disregard for international law. One of the first acts of the Islamic Emirate was the killing of the former President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah. Before the Taliban had even taken control of Afghanistan's capital they sent out a squad to arrest, torture, mutilate and kill Najibullah, leaving his body hanging from a street lamp outside the presidential palace for two days. As Najibullah was staying in the United Nations compound in Kabul, this was a violation of international law.[4] The Taliban regime was also heavily criticised for the murder of Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan[4] [5] in 1998.
    ....
    [1] Directorate of Intelligence (2001). "CIA -- The World Factbook -- Afghanistan
    [4] Mullah Omar : WarlordsofAfghanistan.com [This link adds absolutely nothing of present value]
    [5] [15 Sep 1998] SC/6573 : SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS MURDER OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS IN AFGHANISTAN
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic...of_Afghanistan

    15 September 1998
    Press Release
    SC/6573
    SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS MURDER OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS IN AFGHANISTAN
    19980915
    http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/19...15.sc6573.html

    These facts cut against the Taliban's having authority to speak for the nation of Afghanistan, as a "High Contracting Party" under the 1949 GCs.

    The below facts, if true, could lead to another legal theory concerning the Taliban:

    Governance

    The Taliban did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:

    "The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years. " [32]

    Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from "Bay'ah" or oath of allegiance in imitation of the Prophet and early Muslims. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had the "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed," taken from its shrine "for the first time in 60 years." Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted "Amir al-Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a de facto pledge of support.

    Also in keeping with the governance of early Muslims was a lack of state institutions or "a methodology for command and control" standard today internationally even among non-Westernized states. The Taliban didn't issue "press releases, policy statements or hold regular press conferences," and of course the outside world and most Afghans didn't even know what they looked like, since photography was banned.[33] Their regular army resembled "a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force" with only 25,000 to 30,000 men, these being added to as the need arose. Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrassa education." Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts to fight when needed. If and when military reverses trapped them behind lines or led to their deaths, this created "even greater chaos" in the national administration.[34] In the Ministry of Finance there was no budget or "qualified economist or banker." Cash to finance Taliban war effort was collected and dispersed by Mullah Omar without book-keeping.

    [32] March 1996 interview in Kandahar with Mullah Wakil, an aide to Omar by Ahmed Rashid, from Rashid's book Taliban (2000), p.43
    [33] Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.5
    [34] Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.100
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban

    Note: I am not citing Wiki as an "expert witness" - the links are simply a quick way for someone to get the general drift of the situation (s) over the years.

    Here are the two legal theories which might fit the Taliban 1996-2001:

    1. The Taliban was a "Power" in the Afghan conflict - not the recognized government of Afghanistan. Hence, it would have had to accept the GCs and apply them in order to enjoy their benefits under Art. 2.

    2. The Taliban, in fact, created a new nation in that large portion of Afghanistan which they controlled. Given the vast divergence of what seems to have been their "organic law" from the norms of the written Afghan constitutons, that is a plausible argument. It does not help them under the GCs since they would then be a non-contracting party. So, we would be back to the requirements of Art. 2 - a "Power" in the armed conflict, who would have had to accept the GCs and apply them in order to enjoy their benefits.
    We are back to my four questions, concerning acceptance and application of the GCs by the Taliban and AQ-Ansar.

    I am no factual expert on Afghanistan. There should be a zillion people here with factual expertise on the key factual issues. Like to hear from you.

  3. #3
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    Default Where We Are - Where We Are Going

    Before going on with what could become a very long-winded series, we might re-capitulate - where have we been and where we are going. In short, what is the end goal here ?

    The purpose is to refute (my present view), or to confirm (less likely IMO), the heart of Bryan William's basic argument (post #1 refs): (1) that the Taliban was a nation (state), or alternatively the government of a recognized nation (state; i.e., Afghanistan); (2) that, as a nation or government, the Taliban had armed forces which included AQ's Ansar "brigade" as a constituent part; and (3) that, as such, the "troops" of the Taliban and AQ's Ansar "brigade" were protected persons via GC III, Arts. 2 and 4. The key to the discussion is the correct interpretation of those articles.

    GC III, Art. 2 (posts ## 14-16) is primarily based on the concept of a High Contracting Party (a nation which has formally accepted the GCs), introduced in Art. 1, which is bound to abide by the GCs (whether it does so or not is a separate issue). Thus, the terms "party" or "parties" in Art. 2 initially refer to a High Contracting Party (more on Art. 2, para 3, below). Post #17 establishes that Afghanistan, as a recognized nation, was and is a "High Contracting Party" to the GCs.

    Art. 2 also recognizes that other groups (not High Contracting Parties) may be involved in an "armed conflict". Thus, all organized groups involved in an armed conflict may fall within the definition of Powers involved in that conflict. For example, the Taliban was clearly a Power in the Afghan conflict (1994-2001), under Art. 2, para 3, (post # 16); and an Occupying Power (once it occupied much of Afghanistan, a High Contracting Party), under Art. 2, para 2 (post # 15).

    GC III, Art. 2, para 3 (post # 16), establishes a procedure whereby a Power (not a High Contracting Party) can become a Party (for purposes of Art. 4 and the rest of the POW articles) by accepting and applying the GCs (thus my four questions, post # 10).

    Of course, if a Power is or becomes the recognized government of the High Contracting Party (here, Afghanistan), that Power is the representative of a High Contracting Party; it is bound by and entitled to the protections of the GCs; and we proceed directly to GC III, Art. 4.

    If a Power does not meet the requirements of Art. 2, para 3, we then have to consider application of common Art. 3 (included in all four GCs).

    The recognized governments of Afghanistan have been cut and dried (from the standpoint of US diplomatic recognition) over much of its history. However, the situation during the period 1996-2001 was not so cut and dried (see, post # 18, for the conflicting "governments" in 1996-2001). We will address that period - and those before and after it - in subsequent posts.

    As to the Taliban (and AQ's Ansar "brigade", assuming it was part of the Taliban's armed forces), we have the following flowchart:

    1. Taliban was the recognized government of Afghanistan - go directly to GC III, Art. 4 (POW status for its armed forces as defined in Art. 4); or

    2. Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, but accepted and applied the GCs (as defined in GC III, Art. 2, para 3, post # 16) - go directly to GC III, Art. 4 (POW status for its armed forces as defined in Art. 4)[*]; or

    3. Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, and did not accept or apply the GCs - do not go to GC III, Art. 4 (which cannot then apply), but consider the application of GC III, Art. 3. That has been the stance of the US government; albeit not always well-expressed.
    The first step is determination of what group (if any) was the recognized government of Afghanistan during the relevant period (1996-2001). We are dealing with that issue in the context of the US judicial system (Article III Federal courts and US Military Commissions). Thus, we have to abide by the US judicial standard for diplomatic recognition of a government.

    Anyone may argue (here or elsewhere) that this or that government was (is) or should have been (should be) the "recognized government" of Afghanistan - whether de facto or de jure, efficient or legitimate, and so on - and even put together a "mock trial" to "adjudicate" the question. However, that argument will fail in a Federal court (see next post).

    It is entirely conceivable that a court in another nation could reach a different determination. For example, a Pakistani court (if it followed the same basic rule) would be compelled to hold that the Taliban was the recognized government of Afghanistan during the period 1997-2001 - since that was the position of the Pakistani government.

    [*] fn - "new nation". The same requirements and result would apply if it is argued that the Taliban's "state" was a new nation (since, as that nation, it would not be a High Contracting Party to the GCs). Since the US government (Executive branch) never recognized the Taliban "state" as a new nation, that argument would be rejected out of hand by any Federal court following established precedents.

    The HAMDAN SYMPOSIUM (Terraplexic) has now closed, without substantial discussion of GC III, Arts. 2, 3 & 4. The Hamdan case is also pretty much history. However, the issues discussed in this long series of posts will return in the forthcoming MCA trials. So, I am proceeding with this as a reference for others and for me as those cases develop.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-12-2008 at 03:53 AM.

  4. #4
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    Default US Judicial Standard - Executive Branch Recognition

    As you will find from this Wiki article on diplomatic recognition, standards differ among nations once you get beyond the basic definition.

    Diplomatic recognition in international law is a unilateral political act, with domestic and international legal consequences, whereby a state acknowledges an act or status of another state or government. Recognition can be accorded either de facto or de jure, usually by a statement of the recognizing government. .....
    http://wapedia.mobi/en/Diplomatic_recognition

    In US courts, the vagaries of I Law do not come into play in determining whether a government is recognized or not. The courts are required to take judicial notice of the Executive's position on diplomatic recognition of a particular government. That rule is established by many cases - here are two:

    United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)

    Page 301 U. S. 330
    ....
    We take judicial notice of the fact that, coincident with the assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplomatic relations were established between that government and the Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from the commencement of its existence. The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment, and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty-making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate.
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/301/324/case.html

    United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)

    Page 315 U. S. 229

    .... The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States ....

    "What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political, rather than a judicial, question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government."

    Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 304 U. S. 137. That authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Objections to the underlying policy, as well as objections to recognition, are to be addressed to the political department, and not to the courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, p. 304 U. S. 138; 55 U. S. 50-51. ...
    .....
    Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional. 1 Moore, International Law Digest (1906), pp. 73-74; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940), pp. 192-195. Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals (Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 Ill.L.Rev. 365, 382-385) certainly is a modest implied power of the President, who is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, p. 299 U. S. 320. Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless

    Page 315 U. S. 230

    such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation unless the historic conception of the powers and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs (see Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol.Sci.Q. 385, 403-417) is to be drastically revised....
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/315/203/case.html

    A Federal court will want evidence of which (if any) government is or was recognized by the Executive branch - any other proof or argument is irrelevant.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-12-2008 at 03:54 AM.

  5. #5
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    Default US Judicial Standard Applied to Afghanistan

    In following posts, I will quote extensively from various websites (mostly government sites, where copyrights are not an issue) to present a statement of facts outlining the diplomatic history of the US and Afghanistan. Of course, in a judicial proceeding, those same facts would have to be established by expert testimony and certified documents.

    Here is a simple example of some evidence which would be presented.

    US Embassy - Kabul
    About the embassy
    History of the Embassy

    1) First U.S. Minister to Afghanistan
    Name: William H. Hornibrook
    Title: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
    Presentation of Credentials: May 4, 1935
    Note: Accredited also to Persia; resident at Tehran.

    2) Opening of Legation Kabul
    Legation Kabul was opened Jun 6, 1942 with Charles W. Thayer as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

    3) Elevation of Legation to Embassy Kabul
    Name: Ely E. Palmer
    Title: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
    Termination of Mission: Promoted to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Appointment: May 6, 1948 (Elevation from Legation to Embassy)

    4) Closing of Embassy Kabul
    Embassy Kabul was closed Jan 30, 1989.

    Note: The U.S. Liaison Office in Kabul reopened Dec 17, 2001. The United States recognized the Interim Authority in Afghanistan on Dec 22, 2001. Ryan Crocker was appointed Charge d'Affaires ad interim Jan 2, 2002.

    5) Robert Patrick John Finn
    Presentation of Credentials: April 3, 2002
    Termination of Mission: August 1, 2003

    6) Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad
    Presentation of Credential: November 24, 2003
    Termination of Mission: June 20, 2005
    http://kabul.usembassy.gov/about_the_embassy.html

    This little excerpt is, of course, incomplete for our purposes. We need to know much more about the period 1989-2001.

    -----------------------------------------------------------
    These following two sources will be quoted extensively in future posts. The urls are cited here, but will not be cited in future posts.

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
    Updated September 2, 2008
    Kenneth Katzman
    Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
    Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

    Embassy of Afghanistan (Washington D.C.)
    History
    About the Embassy
    http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/history.html

  6. #6
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1919-1992 - part 1

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

    (pp. 5-7)

    Background to Recent Developments

    Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.

    Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.

    Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.

    Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war.

    In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government.

    The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

    The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding. [1] [1] For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.

    With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992. [2] [2] After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
    Despite the many changes in Afghan governments, US-Afghan diplomatic relations continued throughout the period, with direct Afghan representation at its Washington D.C. embassy from 1943 (next post).

  7. #7
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1919-1992 - part 2

    Embassy of Afghanistan
    History
    About the Embassy

    .... Shortly after Afghanistan regained her independence from Britain in 1919, King Amanullah, the reformist monarch of Afghanistan, dispatched General Wali Khan as the first Afghan envoy to Washington.

    Full diplomatic relations between the Afghanistan and the United States began in 1934. Shortly after the end of World War II, His Majesty King Zahir Shah dispatched Abdul Hussein Aziz as the first Afghan Ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Aziz leased a historic building from an outgoing Supreme Court Chief Justice (The building was later purchased by Ambassador Abdullah Malikyar). That building continues to house the Embassy more than half a century later. President Roosevelt appointed William Hornibrook as the first U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, on November 14, 1935. ....
    Afghan Representatives in Washington, D.C. (1943-1992)

    Abdul Hussain Aziz, Afghan Minister (1943-1948)
    Mohammed Naim Khan, Charge d'Affaires (1948-1950)
    Abdul Hamid Aziz, Charge d'Affaires (1950-1951)
    Mohammed Kabir Ludin, Ambassador (1953-1956)
    Dr. Najibullah Torwayana, Ambassador (1956-1958)
    Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador (1958-1963)
    Dr. Abdul Majid, Ambassador (1963-1967)
    Abdullah Malikyar, Ambassador (1967-1978)
    Dr. Abdul Waheed Karim, Ambassador (1978-80)
    Noor Ahmad Noor, Ambassador (1980-1981)
    Dr. Mohed Salem Spartak, charge d'affaires (1982-1984)
    Mohammad Haidar Rafiq, charge d'affaires (1984-1987)
    Mia Gul, charge d'affaires (1988-1990)
    Abdul Ghafoor Jawshan, charge d'affaires (1990-1992)
    American Ambassadors to Afghanistan (1935-1992)

    William H. Hornibrook (1935 - 1936) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1940 - 1942) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Cornelius Van Hemert Engert (1942 - 1945) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Ely E. Palmer (1945 - 1948) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1949 - 1951) - First formal ambassador
    George Robert Merrell (1951 - 1952)
    Angus I. Ward (1952 - 1956)
    Sheldon T. Mills (1956 - 1959)
    Henry A. Byroade (1959 - 1962)
    John M. Steeves (1962 - 1966)
    Robert G. Neumann (1966 - 1973)
    Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (1973 - 1978)
    Adolph Dubs (1978 - 1979)

    From 1979 - 2001, the United States did not have an Ambassador posted in Afghanistan, although U.S. interests in Afghanistan were represented by a number of charge d'affaires. From 1981 [sic ?] to 2002, there was no official U.S. embassy in Kabul.
    Adolph Dubs was murdered in Kabul in 1979. Since the US embassy was not finally closed until 1989, there may be a typo ("1981") in the Afghan Embassy webpage.

    The continuation of US diplomatic relations with the various Afghan governments is established by the list of Afghan ambassadors and charges d'affaires during the period 1943-1992.

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