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  1. #1
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    Default US Judicial Standard - Executive Branch Recognition

    As you will find from this Wiki article on diplomatic recognition, standards differ among nations once you get beyond the basic definition.

    Diplomatic recognition in international law is a unilateral political act, with domestic and international legal consequences, whereby a state acknowledges an act or status of another state or government. Recognition can be accorded either de facto or de jure, usually by a statement of the recognizing government. .....
    http://wapedia.mobi/en/Diplomatic_recognition

    In US courts, the vagaries of I Law do not come into play in determining whether a government is recognized or not. The courts are required to take judicial notice of the Executive's position on diplomatic recognition of a particular government. That rule is established by many cases - here are two:

    United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)

    Page 301 U. S. 330
    ....
    We take judicial notice of the fact that, coincident with the assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplomatic relations were established between that government and the Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from the commencement of its existence. The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment, and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty-making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate.
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/301/324/case.html

    United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)

    Page 315 U. S. 229

    .... The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States ....

    "What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political, rather than a judicial, question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government."

    Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 304 U. S. 137. That authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Objections to the underlying policy, as well as objections to recognition, are to be addressed to the political department, and not to the courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, p. 304 U. S. 138; 55 U. S. 50-51. ...
    .....
    Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional. 1 Moore, International Law Digest (1906), pp. 73-74; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940), pp. 192-195. Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals (Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 Ill.L.Rev. 365, 382-385) certainly is a modest implied power of the President, who is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, p. 299 U. S. 320. Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless

    Page 315 U. S. 230

    such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation unless the historic conception of the powers and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs (see Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol.Sci.Q. 385, 403-417) is to be drastically revised....
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/315/203/case.html

    A Federal court will want evidence of which (if any) government is or was recognized by the Executive branch - any other proof or argument is irrelevant.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-12-2008 at 03:54 AM.

  2. #2
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    Default US Judicial Standard Applied to Afghanistan

    In following posts, I will quote extensively from various websites (mostly government sites, where copyrights are not an issue) to present a statement of facts outlining the diplomatic history of the US and Afghanistan. Of course, in a judicial proceeding, those same facts would have to be established by expert testimony and certified documents.

    Here is a simple example of some evidence which would be presented.

    US Embassy - Kabul
    About the embassy
    History of the Embassy

    1) First U.S. Minister to Afghanistan
    Name: William H. Hornibrook
    Title: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
    Presentation of Credentials: May 4, 1935
    Note: Accredited also to Persia; resident at Tehran.

    2) Opening of Legation Kabul
    Legation Kabul was opened Jun 6, 1942 with Charles W. Thayer as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

    3) Elevation of Legation to Embassy Kabul
    Name: Ely E. Palmer
    Title: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
    Termination of Mission: Promoted to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Appointment: May 6, 1948 (Elevation from Legation to Embassy)

    4) Closing of Embassy Kabul
    Embassy Kabul was closed Jan 30, 1989.

    Note: The U.S. Liaison Office in Kabul reopened Dec 17, 2001. The United States recognized the Interim Authority in Afghanistan on Dec 22, 2001. Ryan Crocker was appointed Charge d'Affaires ad interim Jan 2, 2002.

    5) Robert Patrick John Finn
    Presentation of Credentials: April 3, 2002
    Termination of Mission: August 1, 2003

    6) Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad
    Presentation of Credential: November 24, 2003
    Termination of Mission: June 20, 2005
    http://kabul.usembassy.gov/about_the_embassy.html

    This little excerpt is, of course, incomplete for our purposes. We need to know much more about the period 1989-2001.

    -----------------------------------------------------------
    These following two sources will be quoted extensively in future posts. The urls are cited here, but will not be cited in future posts.

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
    Updated September 2, 2008
    Kenneth Katzman
    Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
    Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

    Embassy of Afghanistan (Washington D.C.)
    History
    About the Embassy
    http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/history.html

  3. #3
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1919-1992 - part 1

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

    (pp. 5-7)

    Background to Recent Developments

    Prior to the founding of a monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations linked to neighboring nations, not a distinct entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), and then by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.

    Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) is remembered fondly by many older Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that he could limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.

    Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when the diametrically opposed Communist Party and Islamic movements grew in strength. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship with strong state control over the economy. Communists overthrew Daoud in 1978, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was displaced a year later by Hafizullah Amin, leader of a rival faction. They tried to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bringing more women into government, sparking rebellion by Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the mujahedin (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal.

    Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in cooperation with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war.

    In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government.

    The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. On September 13, 1991, Moscow and Washington agreed to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

    The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding. [1] [1] For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377.

    With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders in northern Afghanistan, who joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and the mujahedin regime began April 18, 1992. [2] [2] After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.
    Despite the many changes in Afghan governments, US-Afghan diplomatic relations continued throughout the period, with direct Afghan representation at its Washington D.C. embassy from 1943 (next post).

  4. #4
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1919-1992 - part 2

    Embassy of Afghanistan
    History
    About the Embassy

    .... Shortly after Afghanistan regained her independence from Britain in 1919, King Amanullah, the reformist monarch of Afghanistan, dispatched General Wali Khan as the first Afghan envoy to Washington.

    Full diplomatic relations between the Afghanistan and the United States began in 1934. Shortly after the end of World War II, His Majesty King Zahir Shah dispatched Abdul Hussein Aziz as the first Afghan Ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Aziz leased a historic building from an outgoing Supreme Court Chief Justice (The building was later purchased by Ambassador Abdullah Malikyar). That building continues to house the Embassy more than half a century later. President Roosevelt appointed William Hornibrook as the first U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, on November 14, 1935. ....
    Afghan Representatives in Washington, D.C. (1943-1992)

    Abdul Hussain Aziz, Afghan Minister (1943-1948)
    Mohammed Naim Khan, Charge d'Affaires (1948-1950)
    Abdul Hamid Aziz, Charge d'Affaires (1950-1951)
    Mohammed Kabir Ludin, Ambassador (1953-1956)
    Dr. Najibullah Torwayana, Ambassador (1956-1958)
    Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador (1958-1963)
    Dr. Abdul Majid, Ambassador (1963-1967)
    Abdullah Malikyar, Ambassador (1967-1978)
    Dr. Abdul Waheed Karim, Ambassador (1978-80)
    Noor Ahmad Noor, Ambassador (1980-1981)
    Dr. Mohed Salem Spartak, charge d'affaires (1982-1984)
    Mohammad Haidar Rafiq, charge d'affaires (1984-1987)
    Mia Gul, charge d'affaires (1988-1990)
    Abdul Ghafoor Jawshan, charge d'affaires (1990-1992)
    American Ambassadors to Afghanistan (1935-1992)

    William H. Hornibrook (1935 - 1936) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1940 - 1942) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Cornelius Van Hemert Engert (1942 - 1945) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Ely E. Palmer (1945 - 1948) - Minister Plenipotentiary
    Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1949 - 1951) - First formal ambassador
    George Robert Merrell (1951 - 1952)
    Angus I. Ward (1952 - 1956)
    Sheldon T. Mills (1956 - 1959)
    Henry A. Byroade (1959 - 1962)
    John M. Steeves (1962 - 1966)
    Robert G. Neumann (1966 - 1973)
    Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (1973 - 1978)
    Adolph Dubs (1978 - 1979)

    From 1979 - 2001, the United States did not have an Ambassador posted in Afghanistan, although U.S. interests in Afghanistan were represented by a number of charge d'affaires. From 1981 [sic ?] to 2002, there was no official U.S. embassy in Kabul.
    Adolph Dubs was murdered in Kabul in 1979. Since the US embassy was not finally closed until 1989, there may be a typo ("1981") in the Afghan Embassy webpage.

    The continuation of US diplomatic relations with the various Afghan governments is established by the list of Afghan ambassadors and charges d'affaires during the period 1943-1992.

  5. #5
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1992-1996

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

    (pp. 7-8)

    The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban

    The fall of Najibullah exposed the differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties (Afghan National Liberation Front), Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, became president during April - May 1992. Under an agreement among the major parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992 with the understanding that he would serve until December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, saying that political authority would disintegrate without a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently shelled by other mujahedin factions, particularly that of nominal “prime minister” Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused Rabbani of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar’s radical Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) had received a large proportion of the U.S. aid during the anti-Soviet war. Four years of civil war (1992-1996) created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting.

    The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were practitioners of an orthodox Sunni Islam called “Wahhabism,” which is similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan who viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for civil war. With the help of defections, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994; by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.

    Immediately thereafter, Taliban gunmen entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides sheltered there, and subsequently hanged them.
    So much for Taliban respect for I Law and the GCs in September 1996 - Najibullah (who was a "bad guy") et al. had no trial - it was a good old fashioned lynching (mutilation and hanging - covered BTW by Soldier of Fortune back in that day - photos, etc.).

    -------------------------------------------
    Embassy of Afghanistan
    History
    About the Embassy

    Afghan Representatives in Washington, D.C. (1992-1996)
    ......
    Abdul Rahim, charge d'affaires (1992-1994)
    Yar Mohammad Mohabat, charge d'affaires (1994-1995)

    [JMM Note: Mohabat continued as charge d'affaires in Washington through 1996 and into 1997. See next part 1996-2001.]

    American Ambassadors to Afghanistan (1992-1996)
    .....
    From 1979 - 2001, the United States did not have an Ambassador posted in Afghanistan, although U.S. interests in Afghanistan were represented by a number of charge d'affaires. From 1981 [sic ?] to 2002, there was no official U.S. embassy in Kabul.
    Despite the turmoil in Afghanistan, diplomatic relations continued with the Rabbani government from June 1992 until well into 1997.

  6. #6
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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1996-2001 - part 1

    CRS Report for Congress
    Order Code RL30588
    Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

    All quotes below are from pp. 8-10.

    Taliban Rule

    The Taliban regime was led by Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet war while fighting under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and “Commander of the Faithful,” but he mostly remained in the Taliban power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and refused U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar is about 60 years old.

    The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, on the grounds that they represented un-Islamic idolatry.

    The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.

    The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998. [3] [3] For more information on Al Qaeda, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman.

    In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban on bin Laden, imposing U.S. sanctions and achieving adoption of some U.N. sanctions against the Taliban.

    On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, but bin Laden was not at any of the camps at the time. Some observers assert that the Administration, for varying reasons, missed other purported opportunities to strike bin Laden. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power with U.S. military force because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values.
    The 1998 missile strike raises interesting I Law issues (not resolved today) about use of armed force within a nation that has no recognized government, or at least no governance in the affected territory. Let us not digress there.

    The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban

    The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Among them were the Uzbek, Hazara Shiite, and Pashtun Islamist factions below (see also Table 10 on “Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan”).

    Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major Alliance faction was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam, although Dostam had earlier contributed to efforts to force Rabbani from power. During the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, Dostam reportedly impressed U.S. military commanders by leading horse-mounted forces against fixed Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, leading to the fall of that city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse.

    Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic factions. During the various Afghan wars, the main Hazara Shiite grouping was Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups).

    Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who is now a parliament committee chairman, headed a Pashtun-dominated mujahedin faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance.
    Since under US law, neither the Taliban nor the Northern Alliance was the recognized Afghan government, neither of them represented a High Contacting Party under GC III, Art. 2., under US law. But, both of them were Powers under that article. The evidence (yet to be examined) seems to prove that, leaving aside formal acceptances of the GCs, neither of those Powers applied them to prisoners.

    Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001

    Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy toward the Taliban differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure short of military while retaining dialogue with the Taliban. The Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report said that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report added that some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under consideration as well. [4] [4] Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002.

    In a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan, in part to persuade it to end support for the Taliban.

    In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York, although the Taliban representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received Taliban foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi to discuss bilateral issues.

    Fighting with some Iranian, Russian, and Indian support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country, including almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s charisma or undisputed authority.
    There is some controversy as to exactly what the Clinton administration was trying to accomplish in US-Afghan relations during the period 1996-2000. The Clinton policies carried over into Bush pre-9/11.

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    Default US & Afghan Positions 1996-2001 - part 2

    Embassy of Afghanistan
    History
    About the Embassy

    Sadly, the Embassy was not immune from the conflict that raged over the ocean within Afghanistan. After the Taliban seized control of Kabul, representatives from competing factions feuded over control of the Embassy building. Although the Taliban was not recognized by the United States, their representative in Washington occupied the Embassy building until the summer of 1997, whereupon the State Department officially closed the Embassy.
    The bottom line, recognized by both nations, was that stated in the CRS Report (above post):

    The Clinton Administration held talks with the Taliban before and after it took power, but relations quickly deteriorated. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997.
    The Clinton policy of non-recognition of any government in Afghanistan is affirmed in the 1997 CIA World Factbook's entry for Afghanistan.

    Constitution: none

    Legal system: a new legal system has not been adopted but all factions tacitly agree they will follow Islamic law (Shari'a)

    Suffrage: undetermined; previously males 15-50 years of age

    Executive branch: on 27 September 1996, the ruling members of the Afghan Government were displaced by members of the Islamic Taliban movement; the Islamic State of Afghanistan has no functioning government at this time, and the country remains divided among fighting factions

    note: the Taliban have declared themselves the legitimate government of Afghanistan; the UN has deferred a decision on credentials and the Organization of the Islamic Conference has left the Afghan seat vacant until the question of legitimacy can be resolved through negotiations among the warring factions; the country is essentially divided along ethnic lines; the Taliban controls the capital of Kabul and approximately two-thirds of the country including the predominately ethnic Pashtun areas in southern Afghanistan; opposing factions have their stonghold in the ethnically diverse north - General DOSTAM's National Islamic Movement controls several northcentral provinces and Commander MASOOD controls the ethnic Tajik majority areas of the northeast

    Legislative branch: non-functioning as of June 1993

    Judicial branch: non-functioning as of March 1995, although there are local Shari'a (Islamic law) courts throughout the country
    ......
    Diplomatic representation in the US:
    chief of mission : Ambassador (vacant); Charge d'Affaires Yar Mohammed MOHABBAT
    chancery: 2341 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
    telephone: [1] (202) 234-3770, 3771
    FAX: [1] (202) 328-3516
    consulate(s) general : New York
    consulate(s): Washington, DC

    Diplomatic representation from the US: the US embassy in Kabul has been closed since January 1989 due to security concerns
    .....
    Disputes - international: some support from RABBANI and MASOOD to anti-government Islamic fighters in Tajikistan's civil war; support to Islamic militants worldwide by some factions; question over which group should hold Afghanistan's seat at the UN
    A vignette in the story involved the Washington D.C. Afghan embassy.

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