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  1. #1
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    Default 1949 GC III - Art. 2 - Para 1

    Text

    Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
    Commentary

    PARAGRAPH 1. -- ARMED CONFLICTS INVOLVING
    THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

    By its general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for the recognition of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries [p.23] to the application of the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.

    It remains to ascertain what is meant by "armed conflict". The substitution of this much more general expression for the word "war" was deliberate. It is possible to argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of "war". A State which uses arms to commit a hostile act against another State can always maintain that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police action, or acting in legitimate self-defence.

    The expression "armed conflict" makes such arguments less easy. Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces (8) is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 , even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one Power to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4 . Even if there has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is sufficient for its application. The number of persons captured in such circumstances is, of course, immaterial.

    The Convention provides only for the case of one of the Parties denying the existence of a state of war. What would the position be, it may be wondered, if both the Parties to an armed conflict were to deny the existence of a state of war? Even in that event it would not appear that they could, by tacit agreement, prevent the Conventions from applying. It must not be forgotten that the Conventions have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve State interests. Even if the existence of a state of war is disputed, Article 3 can be applied.

    (8) [(1) p.33] This was the Special Committee of the Joint Committee. The provision in question was discussed, first as Article 2, paragraph 4 (i.e. with the numbering it had in the Stockholm draft), and later as Article 2A. See ' Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, ' Vol. II-B, pp. 40-48, 75-79, 82-84, 90, 93-95, 97-102;
    This is self-explanatory - the key is that a "declared war" is not a material factor.

  2. #2
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    Default 1949 GC III - Art. 2 - Para 2

    Text

    Art 2. ...
    .... The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
    Commentary

    PARAGRAPH 2. -- OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

    This new provision is particularly pertinent for the protection of civilian persons under the Fourth Convention, but its inclusion is none the less appropriate in regard to prisoners of war, since, even in the absence of resistance, the Occupying Power might be tempted to intern all or part of the armed forces of the adversary in the interests of its future security. For that reason it was necessary to ensure that such internees would be treated as prisoners of war throughout their detention.
    While not expressly mentioned in the Commentary, Art. 2, para 2 has obvious application to a situation where two factions (each claiming to be the legitimate government of a "High Contracting Party", assuming the nation in question previously adopted the Convention) are fighting over that nation's territory. In that case, only one of them can be the legitimate government (and representative of the "High Contracting Party") of the nation. The other faction would be covered as a "Power" to the conflict by Art. 2, para 3.

    The situation would be altered factually (and somewhat legally) if one of the factions claimed that it was forming a new nation (state). In that case, the other faction would continue as representative of the "High Contracting Party", and the "new nation" faction would still be covered as a "Power" to the conflict by Art. 2, para 3.

    Afghanistan 9-10-2001 involved either situation 1 or 2. Post 9-11-2001, a number of "High Contracting Parties" entered the picture. Which of them, and for what time frame, was an "Occupying Power" is a mixed question of law and fact.

  3. #3
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    Default 1949 GC III - Art. 2 - Para 3

    Text

    Art 2. ...
    .... Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
    Commentary

    [p.24] PARAGRAPH 3. -- CONFLICTS IN WHICH THE BELLIGERENTS
    ARE NOT ALL PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION

    1. ' Relations between belligerents party to the Convention '

    This provision appears to state an elementary truth; but that was not always the case. The Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1906 all contained a ' clausula si omnes ' (9), and that provision was in force when the First World War broke out in 1914. But despite the fact that the application of the Convention might have been suspended on the ground that one of the belligerents -- Montenegro -- was not a party to it, all the Contracting States in general honoured their signature (10).

    It was essential, however, to clarify the position and to prevent any future recurrence of a situation similar to that of 1914. It should be noted that this problem of relations between opposing Powers is quite distinct from that of the relations between allied Powers fighting under a unified command. The latter case, which is also very important, is considered later in this volume, in connection with Article 12 .

    2. ' Relations between Contracting and non-Contracting Parties '

    The second sentence, added by the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, has certainly the characteristics of a compromise, for it does not come to a decision between the suspensive and resolutive conditions. At first sight it appears to incline towards the Belgian amendment. But whereas the latter only made the Convention applicable as from the time of its formal acceptance by the non-Contracting Power, the sentence adopted by the Diplomatic Conference drops all reference to an invitation to be made to the non-Contracting Power, and substitutes for the words "as from the latter Power's acceptance" the words "if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof".

    What, then, is the position in the interval between the launching of hostilities and the non-contracting belligerent's acceptance?

    [p.25] The First Report by the Special Committee of the joint Committee, to which reference has already been made, states: "according to the spirit of the four Conventions, the Contracting States shall apply them, in so far as possible, as being the codification of rules which are generally recognized" (11). This passage shows how this not very clear provision should be interpreted.

    The spirit and character of the Conventions lead perforce to the conclusion that the Contracting Power must at least apply their provisions from the moment hostilities break out until such time as the adverse Party has had the time and an opportunity to state his intentions. That may not be a strictly legal interpretation; it does not altogether follow from the text itself; but it is in our opinion the only reasonable solution. It follows from the spirit of the Conventions, and is in accordance with their character. It is also in accordance with the moral interest of the Contracting Power, inasmuch as it invites the latter to honour a signature given before the world. It is finally to its advantage from a more practical point of view, because the fact of its beginning itself to apply the Convention will encourage the non-Contracting Party to declare its acceptance, whereas any postponement of the application of the Convention by the Contracting Party would give the non-Contracting Party a pretext for nonacceptance.

    There are two conditions to be fulfilled under this part of the paragraph -- (a) acceptance and (b) de facto application of the Convention. What happens if the non-Contracting Party makes no declaration, but in actual fact applies the Convention? Before answering this question, it must be seen what is meant by "accepting" the provisions of the Convention (11).

    Is a formal and explicit declaration by a non-Contracting State indispensable? The Rapporteur of the Special Committee seems to say that it is. "A declaration" he wrote "was necessary, contrary to the Canadian amendment, according to which an attitude on the part of the non-Contracting State in conformity with the Convention would have sufficed to make it applicable". He added, it is true, that it was not possible to lay down any uniform procedure in the matter, and that "the Convention would be applicable as soon as the declaration was made. It would cease to be applicable as soon as the declaration was clearly disavowed by the attitude of the non-contracting belligerent" (12).

    [p.26] Does it follow from this that, if the second condition -- namely the application of the Convention de facto -- is alone fulfilled, the Contracting Party is released from its obligations?

    Closely as that may seem to follow from the letter of the text, it does not appear possible to maintain such an interpretation. It would make the application of the Convention dependent on a suspensive condition even more rigid than that of the Belgian proposal, which was itself regarded as being too strict. It would bring about a paradoxical -- not to say, a monstrous -- situation. It would entitle a Power to disregard rules solemnly proclaimed by itself, while its adversary, though not legally bound to those rules, was scrupulously applying them; and all this only because of the omission of the latter to make a declaration, or because of delay in the transmission of such a declaration.

    ' Summum jus summa injuria. ' The saying may often be true; but it should never be cited in reference to a humanitarian Convention. The Third Convention, like its three sister Conventions, rightly condemns reprisals against persons in the most categorical terms. But would it not be worse than any reprisals to ill-treat prisoners even before one's adversary had done so, merely because it was inferred from his silence that he was intending to do so?

    The two conditions laid down for the non-Contracting Power are that it should ' accept ' and ' apply ' the provisions of the Convention. In the absence of any further indication, there is no reason to assume that "acceptance" necessarily implies an explicit declaration. It can equally well be tacit. It may be implicit in de facto application. These considerations do not in any way minimize the importance of an explicit declaration by the non-Contracting Power. It is, on the contrary, most desirable that the latter should make such a declaration, and with the least possible delay. The International Committee of the Red Cross for its part, when offering its services at the beginning of a conflict, never fails to ask Parties to the conflict which are not legally bound by the Convention to declare their intention of applying it or of observing at least its principles, as the case may be.

    In practice, any Contracting Power in conflict with a non-Contracting Power will begin by complying with the provisions of the Convention pending the adverse Party's declaration. It will take into account facts above all.

    Furthermore, although the Convention, as a concession to legal form, provides that in certain circumstances a Contracting Power may legally be released from its obligations, its spirit encourages the Power [p.27] in question to persevere in applying humanitarian principles, whatever the attitude of the adverse Party may be. (13)

    (9) [(1) p.24] See above, p. 21;

    (10) [(2) p.24] As stated in the Commentary on the 1929 Geneva Convention, "the facts backed by the signatures of the signatories and by the humanitarian interests of all, outweighed the law." Paul DES GOUTTES, ' Commentaire de la Convention de Genθve du 17 juillet 1929, ' Geneva, 1930, ad Article 25, p. 188;

    (11) [(1) p.25] See ' Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, ' Vol. II-B, p. 108;

    (12) [(2) p.25] Ibid., p. 109;

    (13) [(1) p.27] This paragraph of Article 2 was applied during the Suez conflict in the autumn of 1956, when the opposing Parties were Egypt, on the one hand, and France, Israel and the United Kingdom, on the other. Of these, only the United Kingdom was not bound by the Conventions, which it had not yet ratified. Nevertheless, in reply to a telegram from the International Committee of the Red Cross the
    British Prime Minister stated that, pending their formal ratification, the United Kingdom Government accepted the Conventions and fully intended to apply their provisions, should the occasion arise. The ICRC informed the other States Party to the conflict of this statement, and none of the belligerents contested the applicability of the Conventions.
    The provisions of GC III, Art. 3 are roughly twice as long as the above parts. Those of GC III, Art. 4 are roughly twice as long as those of GC III, Art. 3. I suggest resolving issues under GC III, Art. 2 before attacking the other parts.

  4. #4
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    Default Constitutional History of Afghanistan

    This is a boring slog, since all of these documents are much the same. However, they prove how Afghanistan looked at itself as a nation (state).

    They also prove that Afghanistan was a state from 1923 to the present - the relevant period in Afghan constitutional history which encompasses the 1949 GCs, to which Afghanistan was and is a "High Contracting Party".

    Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
    State Parties Afghanistan
    Signature 08.12.1949
    Ratification / Accession 26.09.1956
    Reservation / Declaration - None
    http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?...rm&id=375&ps=P

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1923)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan April 9, 1923
    ....
    Article 1
    Afghanistan Is Completely Free and Independent in the Administration of its Domestic and Foreign Affairs. All Parts and Areas of the Country Are under the Authority of His Majesty the King and Are to Be Treated as a Single Unit Without Discrimination Between Different Parts of the Country.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1923.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1964)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1964
    .....
    Title One
    The State
    Article 1
    Afghanistan Is a Constitutional Monarchy; an Independent, Unitary and Indivisible State. Sovereignty in Afghanistan Belongs to the Nation. The Afghan Nation Is Composed of All Those Individuals Who Possess the Citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in Accordance with the Provisions of the Law. The Word Afghan Shall Apply to Each Such Individual.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1964.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1976)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1976
    ....
    Chapter Three
    The State
    Article Twenty: Afghanistan Is a Republican, Democratic, Independent, Unitary and Indivisible State.
    Article Twenty One: National Sovereignty in Afghanistan Belongs to the People. The Nation of Afghanistan Consists of All Those Individuals Who Hold the Citizenship of the State of Afghanistan in Accordance with the Provisions of the Law. The Word Afghan Shall Apply to Each and Every Individual of the Nation of Afghanistan.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1976.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1987)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1987
    ....
    Chapter One
    Foundations of the Political System
    Article One:
    The Republic of Afghanistan Is an Independent Unitary and Indivisible State Having Sovereignty over the Whole of its Territory. The National Sovereignty in the Republic of Afghanistan Rests with the People. The People Exercise National Sovereignty Through Loya Jirga, National Assembly and Local Councils.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1987.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (1990)

    The Constitution of Afghanistan 1990
    .....
    Chapter One
    Foundations of the Political System
    Article One:
    The Republic of Afghanistan Is an Independent, Unitary and Indivisible and Islamic State, Having Sovereignty over the Whole of its Territory. National Sovereignty in the Republic of Afghanistan Belongs to the People. The People Exercise National Sovereignty Through Loya Jirga and National Assembly.
    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1990.html

    Constitution of Afghanistan (2004)

    The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
    (Ratified) January 26, 2004
    ....
    Chapter One: State
    Article One
    Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state.
    Article Two
    The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Followers of other faiths shall be free within the bounds of law in the exercise and performance of their religious rituals.
    Article Three
    No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.
    Article Four
    National sovereignty in Afghanistan shall belong to the nation, manifested directly and through its elected representatives. The nation of Afghanistan is composed of all individuals who possess the citizenship of Afghanistan. The nation of Afghanistan shall be comprised of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui and other tribes. The word Afghan shall apply to every citizen of Afghanistan. No individual of the nation of Afghanistan shall be deprived of citizenship. The citizenship and asylum related matters shall be regulated by law.
    OK, all of that proves that Afghanistan has been a nation (state) at all times relevant to this discussion. The next issue is the successive governments of Afghanistan - in short, who had authority to speak for the "High Contracting Party" under the 1949 GCs.

  5. #5
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    Default Governments in Afghanistan

    Presidents

    Nur Muhammad Taraki - 30 April 1978 – 16 September 1979
    Hafizullah Amin - 16 September 1979 – 27 December 1979
    Babrak Karmal - 27 December 1979 – 24 November 1986
    Haji Mohammad Chamkani - 24 November 1986 – 30 September 1987
    Mohammad Najibullah - 30 September 1987 – 16 April 1992
    Abdul Rahim Hatef - 16 April 1992 – 28 April 1992
    Sibghatullah Mojaddedi - 27 April 1992 – 28 June 1992
    Burhanuddin Rabbani - 28 June 1992 – 27 September 1996, 27 September 1996 – 13 November 2001 (President of the Northern Alliance), 13 November 2001 – 22 December 2001
    Hamid Karzai - 22 December 2001 (acting until 7 December 2004 - under 2004 Constitution)

    wiki bios start at:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nur_Muhammad_Taraki

    You can just follow along via the links at the bottom of the page.

    Chronological History of Afghanistan

    http://www.afghan-web.com/history/chron/index4.html

    United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance)

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_...of_Afghanistan

    Note: these Wiki articles are not cited as evidence - but merely as a quick entry into the timeline and characters.

    ------------------------------------------
    Taliban

    Head of the Supreme Council of Afghanistan
    Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
    Mohammed Omar - 27 September 1996 – 13 November 2001

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Omar

    Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [1] was the name given to the nation of Afghanistan by the Taliban during their rule, from 1996 to 2001. At the peak of their influence the Taliban never controlled the entire area of Afghanistan, as about 10% of the country in the northeast was held by the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. [simple map shows area of Taliban control].
    .....
    Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates ever recognized the Taliban government. Turkmenistan also de facto recognized the Taliban government, as it had official meetings and agreements with Taliban government ministers.

    One reason for this lack of international recognition was the Taliban's disregard for international law. One of the first acts of the Islamic Emirate was the killing of the former President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah. Before the Taliban had even taken control of Afghanistan's capital they sent out a squad to arrest, torture, mutilate and kill Najibullah, leaving his body hanging from a street lamp outside the presidential palace for two days. As Najibullah was staying in the United Nations compound in Kabul, this was a violation of international law.[4] The Taliban regime was also heavily criticised for the murder of Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan[4] [5] in 1998.
    ....
    [1] Directorate of Intelligence (2001). "CIA -- The World Factbook -- Afghanistan
    [4] Mullah Omar : WarlordsofAfghanistan.com [This link adds absolutely nothing of present value]
    [5] [15 Sep 1998] SC/6573 : SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS MURDER OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS IN AFGHANISTAN
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic...of_Afghanistan

    15 September 1998
    Press Release
    SC/6573
    SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS MURDER OF IRANIAN DIPLOMATS IN AFGHANISTAN
    19980915
    http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/19...15.sc6573.html

    These facts cut against the Taliban's having authority to speak for the nation of Afghanistan, as a "High Contracting Party" under the 1949 GCs.

    The below facts, if true, could lead to another legal theory concerning the Taliban:

    Governance

    The Taliban did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:

    "The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years. " [32]

    Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from "Bay'ah" or oath of allegiance in imitation of the Prophet and early Muslims. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had the "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed," taken from its shrine "for the first time in 60 years." Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted "Amir al-Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a de facto pledge of support.

    Also in keeping with the governance of early Muslims was a lack of state institutions or "a methodology for command and control" standard today internationally even among non-Westernized states. The Taliban didn't issue "press releases, policy statements or hold regular press conferences," and of course the outside world and most Afghans didn't even know what they looked like, since photography was banned.[33] Their regular army resembled "a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force" with only 25,000 to 30,000 men, these being added to as the need arose. Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrassa education." Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts to fight when needed. If and when military reverses trapped them behind lines or led to their deaths, this created "even greater chaos" in the national administration.[34] In the Ministry of Finance there was no budget or "qualified economist or banker." Cash to finance Taliban war effort was collected and dispersed by Mullah Omar without book-keeping.

    [32] March 1996 interview in Kandahar with Mullah Wakil, an aide to Omar by Ahmed Rashid, from Rashid's book Taliban (2000), p.43
    [33] Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.5
    [34] Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.100
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban

    Note: I am not citing Wiki as an "expert witness" - the links are simply a quick way for someone to get the general drift of the situation (s) over the years.

    Here are the two legal theories which might fit the Taliban 1996-2001:

    1. The Taliban was a "Power" in the Afghan conflict - not the recognized government of Afghanistan. Hence, it would have had to accept the GCs and apply them in order to enjoy their benefits under Art. 2.

    2. The Taliban, in fact, created a new nation in that large portion of Afghanistan which they controlled. Given the vast divergence of what seems to have been their "organic law" from the norms of the written Afghan constitutons, that is a plausible argument. It does not help them under the GCs since they would then be a non-contracting party. So, we would be back to the requirements of Art. 2 - a "Power" in the armed conflict, who would have had to accept the GCs and apply them in order to enjoy their benefits.
    We are back to my four questions, concerning acceptance and application of the GCs by the Taliban and AQ-Ansar.

    I am no factual expert on Afghanistan. There should be a zillion people here with factual expertise on the key factual issues. Like to hear from you.

  6. #6
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    Default Where We Are - Where We Are Going

    Before going on with what could become a very long-winded series, we might re-capitulate - where have we been and where we are going. In short, what is the end goal here ?

    The purpose is to refute (my present view), or to confirm (less likely IMO), the heart of Bryan William's basic argument (post #1 refs): (1) that the Taliban was a nation (state), or alternatively the government of a recognized nation (state; i.e., Afghanistan); (2) that, as a nation or government, the Taliban had armed forces which included AQ's Ansar "brigade" as a constituent part; and (3) that, as such, the "troops" of the Taliban and AQ's Ansar "brigade" were protected persons via GC III, Arts. 2 and 4. The key to the discussion is the correct interpretation of those articles.

    GC III, Art. 2 (posts ## 14-16) is primarily based on the concept of a High Contracting Party (a nation which has formally accepted the GCs), introduced in Art. 1, which is bound to abide by the GCs (whether it does so or not is a separate issue). Thus, the terms "party" or "parties" in Art. 2 initially refer to a High Contracting Party (more on Art. 2, para 3, below). Post #17 establishes that Afghanistan, as a recognized nation, was and is a "High Contracting Party" to the GCs.

    Art. 2 also recognizes that other groups (not High Contracting Parties) may be involved in an "armed conflict". Thus, all organized groups involved in an armed conflict may fall within the definition of Powers involved in that conflict. For example, the Taliban was clearly a Power in the Afghan conflict (1994-2001), under Art. 2, para 3, (post # 16); and an Occupying Power (once it occupied much of Afghanistan, a High Contracting Party), under Art. 2, para 2 (post # 15).

    GC III, Art. 2, para 3 (post # 16), establishes a procedure whereby a Power (not a High Contracting Party) can become a Party (for purposes of Art. 4 and the rest of the POW articles) by accepting and applying the GCs (thus my four questions, post # 10).

    Of course, if a Power is or becomes the recognized government of the High Contracting Party (here, Afghanistan), that Power is the representative of a High Contracting Party; it is bound by and entitled to the protections of the GCs; and we proceed directly to GC III, Art. 4.

    If a Power does not meet the requirements of Art. 2, para 3, we then have to consider application of common Art. 3 (included in all four GCs).

    The recognized governments of Afghanistan have been cut and dried (from the standpoint of US diplomatic recognition) over much of its history. However, the situation during the period 1996-2001 was not so cut and dried (see, post # 18, for the conflicting "governments" in 1996-2001). We will address that period - and those before and after it - in subsequent posts.

    As to the Taliban (and AQ's Ansar "brigade", assuming it was part of the Taliban's armed forces), we have the following flowchart:

    1. Taliban was the recognized government of Afghanistan - go directly to GC III, Art. 4 (POW status for its armed forces as defined in Art. 4); or

    2. Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, but accepted and applied the GCs (as defined in GC III, Art. 2, para 3, post # 16) - go directly to GC III, Art. 4 (POW status for its armed forces as defined in Art. 4)[*]; or

    3. Taliban was not the recognized government of Afghanistan, and did not accept or apply the GCs - do not go to GC III, Art. 4 (which cannot then apply), but consider the application of GC III, Art. 3. That has been the stance of the US government; albeit not always well-expressed.
    The first step is determination of what group (if any) was the recognized government of Afghanistan during the relevant period (1996-2001). We are dealing with that issue in the context of the US judicial system (Article III Federal courts and US Military Commissions). Thus, we have to abide by the US judicial standard for diplomatic recognition of a government.

    Anyone may argue (here or elsewhere) that this or that government was (is) or should have been (should be) the "recognized government" of Afghanistan - whether de facto or de jure, efficient or legitimate, and so on - and even put together a "mock trial" to "adjudicate" the question. However, that argument will fail in a Federal court (see next post).

    It is entirely conceivable that a court in another nation could reach a different determination. For example, a Pakistani court (if it followed the same basic rule) would be compelled to hold that the Taliban was the recognized government of Afghanistan during the period 1997-2001 - since that was the position of the Pakistani government.

    [*] fn - "new nation". The same requirements and result would apply if it is argued that the Taliban's "state" was a new nation (since, as that nation, it would not be a High Contracting Party to the GCs). Since the US government (Executive branch) never recognized the Taliban "state" as a new nation, that argument would be rejected out of hand by any Federal court following established precedents.

    The HAMDAN SYMPOSIUM (Terraplexic) has now closed, without substantial discussion of GC III, Arts. 2, 3 & 4. The Hamdan case is also pretty much history. However, the issues discussed in this long series of posts will return in the forthcoming MCA trials. So, I am proceeding with this as a reference for others and for me as those cases develop.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-12-2008 at 03:53 AM.

  7. #7
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    Default US Judicial Standard - Executive Branch Recognition

    As you will find from this Wiki article on diplomatic recognition, standards differ among nations once you get beyond the basic definition.

    Diplomatic recognition in international law is a unilateral political act, with domestic and international legal consequences, whereby a state acknowledges an act or status of another state or government. Recognition can be accorded either de facto or de jure, usually by a statement of the recognizing government. .....
    http://wapedia.mobi/en/Diplomatic_recognition

    In US courts, the vagaries of I Law do not come into play in determining whether a government is recognized or not. The courts are required to take judicial notice of the Executive's position on diplomatic recognition of a particular government. That rule is established by many cases - here are two:

    United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)

    Page 301 U. S. 330
    ....
    We take judicial notice of the fact that, coincident with the assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplomatic relations were established between that government and the Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from the commencement of its existence. The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment, and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty-making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate.
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/301/324/case.html

    United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)

    Page 315 U. S. 229

    .... The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United States ....

    "What government is to be regarded here as representative of a foreign sovereign state is a political, rather than a judicial, question, and is to be determined by the political department of the government."

    Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, 304 U.S. at p. 304 U. S. 137. That authority is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Objections to the underlying policy, as well as objections to recognition, are to be addressed to the political department, and not to the courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, p. 304 U. S. 138; 55 U. S. 50-51. ...
    .....
    Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional. 1 Moore, International Law Digest (1906), pp. 73-74; 1 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1940), pp. 192-195. Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals (Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 Ill.L.Rev. 365, 382-385) certainly is a modest implied power of the President, who is the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, p. 299 U. S. 320. Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of foreign relations requires no less. Unless

    Page 315 U. S. 230

    such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation unless the historic conception of the powers and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs (see Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol.Sci.Q. 385, 403-417) is to be drastically revised....
    http://supreme.justia.com/us/315/203/case.html

    A Federal court will want evidence of which (if any) government is or was recognized by the Executive branch - any other proof or argument is irrelevant.
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-12-2008 at 03:54 AM.

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