Secretary Gates at National Defense University

[MSG Proctor]

Instead, Gates said, the Pentagon needs to be able to rapidly purchase and field more low-tech capabilities. "Our conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution in years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions -- the wars we are in -- require 75 percent solutions in months," he said.

This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now - and its still too slow and unresponsive.

Low-tech capabilities: READ: 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

[Tom Odom]

This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now - and its still too slow and unresponsive.

Low-tech capabilities: READ: 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

Come on. Look at weapons development, doctrine, and tactics changes in WWII. We literally developed fielded and won with new aircraft, ships, and weapons in a matter of 4 years and that includes the largest flash to bang in history so far at Hiroshima.

In contrast we have crept along like an old man since 9-11 when it comes to tactical changes and systems development. MRAP is just such a case. The realization that OIF was an insurgency took two years to sink in at the highest level.

Tom

[MSG Proctor]

Mr. Tom:
In WWII there was very little resistance for the mobilization of the entire US economy in support of the war effort. It was do-or-die. Today there is significant political resistance to our war efforts and an entrenched Cold War defense bureaucracy that had no corresponding model in the 1939 War Department.

While we agree on the pace of change (please review my post - I said the pace is still too slow), the depth of change required now seems more severe than in WWII. Our nation also fielded 12 million military uniformed servicemembers for WWII out of a population of 160 million while now our total defense build is 2 million out of a population of 320 million. As far as defense spending as a % of the GDP, during World War II, it was 38 percent of GDP; during Korea, 14 percent; Vietnam, 9.5 percent; during the Reagan buildup, 6.2 percent. The % being spent on the GWoT is about 4.4% of the GDP (2007 numbers).

In my estimation, the WWII War Department had to become bigger and better in a hurry, but it didn't have to become radically different from what it was in WWI aside from expanding the US Army Air Corps.

There is a culture of entrenched resistance in the Pentagon itself as Secretary Gates cites in his speech:

For example, this year's base budget request contains more than $180 billion in procurement, research and development, the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems. However, apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabilities to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict - and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts...

[Entropy]

IMO the reason's and differences between WWII and now are political. During WWII we had a nation at war, today we have a military at war and I think that makes all the difference.

The DoD and service procurement system is completely broken IMO, but I don't know how to fix it without the political support. Without that support, all these other factors throw a wrench into the works: Defense industry consolidation and lobbying where only a few companies can do a lot of this stuff; the legal problems where procurement gets delayed time and again because the loser ends up suing or whining to the GAO. And then there are certain members of our political class who seem to value the economic impact of procurement more than actually fielding new equipment.

I applaud Sec. Gates on this issue, but frankly I don't think that much will change as long as the military is the only organization on a war footing.

Edit: I agree with MSG Proctor - we posted on top of each other.

[MSG Proctor]

Well said, Entropy. Great points! While our military is at war, our country is at the mall. Also, excellent point linking development with political support.

[Tom Odom]

This is the new reality where doctrine is adapted on the fly and weapons systems and materiel solutions are developed in the shortest flash-to-bang time in history. I don't know that there is any precedent for the speed, depth, and breadth of change and adaptation occuring now

MSG Proctor

That is what I referred to. You are using absolute statements regarding history. Material solutions are NOT being developed in the shortest time in history. The changes that occurred then were far greater than anything that has happened in the past 7 years. We were far faster in WWII.

Are we too slow now? Yes, but you do not buttress the point by claiming we are making unpredented changes or setting speed records. To the contrary, you make the point by saying that we need such a political commitment if we are going to adjust as rapidly.

Entropy

Same statement. If your point is we need to change faster then I agree. The degree of commitment involved in WWII is the relevant variable.

As for the depth of change needed being greater today, maybe on the political side but I doubt it. The need is no greater; the will is lacking.

On the military side, fielding that 12 million force all happened in the space of 5 years --if you include the 1940's draft.

Frankly the degree and speed of change since 2001 has been a bad joke.

Tom

[MSG Proctor]

The degree and speed of change required is at an unprecedented level - regardless of the substandard deliverables. Maybe we can all agree on that.

I also stand by the need for 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with the TO&E of the 101st AASLT Division and 10th Mountain Division BCTs.

[Tom Odom]

The degree and speed of change required is at an unprecedented level - regardless of the substandard deliverables. Maybe we can all agree on that.

Nope. That is an open ended comparison that merely use hyperbole to make its point. The requirements to convert the US to world power status from 1940 to 1945 required as much speed and the degree of change was certainly no less than the changes you suggest today.

Is change needed? Yes. Is in needed soon? Yes. Is it needed at the highest level? Yes. We need to go back through nuts and bolts Key West circe 1948 process on roles and missions.

I also stand by the need for 12-20 more Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with the TO&E of the 101st AASLT Division and 10th Mountain Division BCTs.

Perhaps on the BCT numbers. As to their MTO&E not so sure. Agree we need greater troop strength where it counts most. I am very concerned that our developers are recreating at division and corps what modularity was to replace, the net result being that we have fewer boots where we need them most. I am not a fan of the current BCT M&TOE because it does the same thing: larger staffs and fewer shooters.

Tom

[jkm_101_fso]

I am not a fan of the current BCT M&TOE because it does the same thing: larger staffs and fewer shooters.

Booyah.
Exactly Right.
HHC BDE was almost as big (in numbers) as my entire BN.

[Entropy]

Tom, I think we are in violent agreement - it is the will that is lacking. My point was that there is no political will to grease the wheels, tell the miscreants to shut-up-and-color, and get things done quickly. Even if Gates manages to get the Pentagon out of its DC mindset, there is the Congress and other factors that will continue to impede our ability to adjust rapidly. The political costs of going for a 75% solution are, sadly, quite high as well - look at the body armor controversy a few years ago. No one wants to vote for or award a contract on something that isn't 99% because when the shortcomings are revealed the DC blame-game will commence in earnest. I don't know, maybe I'm being too cynical, but I don't think these problems can be solved without the overwhelming support of the citizenry putting pressure on Washington to make the changes.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, I think we are in violent agreement - it is the will that is lacking. My point was that there is no political will to grease the wheels, tell the miscreants to shut-up-and-color, and get things done quickly. Even if Gates manages to get the Pentagon out of its DC mindset, there is the Congress and other factors that will continue to impede our ability to adjust rapidly. The political costs of going for a 75% solution are, sadly, quite high as well - look at the body armor controversy a few years ago. No one wants to vote for or award a contract on something that isn't 99% because when the shortcomings are revealed the DC blame-game will commence in earnest. I don't know, maybe I'm being too cynical, but I don't think these problems can be solved without the overwhelming support of the citizenry putting pressure on Washington to make the changes.

Agree 110%. I find the speed of development, fielding, and innovation to be the litmus for commitment to winning versus commitment to extended processes and higher costs. When folks were applauding just how great the new MRAP looked I was embarrassed that we have been so inept and angered that it cost Soldiers lives. Arrogant comments about "going to war with the Army you have" did not help; especially when we had units and Soldiers getting in hot water over aggressive logistics to keep their folks alive.

If we had done this in 1940, we'd be speaking German or maybe Japanese. Or Russian.

Tom