Well, let's say for argument's sake that U.S. " flips" policy on Israel in order to pursue its national interests. For a change of such a magnitude - I assume you would agree that it would be significant - what concrete benefits can the Arab governments then deliver in return beyond what we are already receiving now ?
I am not advocating a flip in policy. I do believe that an more centrist approach (or balanced approach) would bring greater benefits for both US and ultimately Israeli strategic goals. I would say that neither Walt nor Mearsheimer advocate a flip either. Our efforts as an "honest broker" in the process over the past several decades has been overcome by our declarations as Israel's ally. The greatest single result of that schism was the steady expansion of the settlements on the West Bank and Gaza. Those settlements cost us--the US--greatly in the region and now they are costing Israel in dismantling them, at least in Gaza.

Reagan was not the "leash" that pulled the IDF out of Beirut, though we did push for that. Sharon's leadership ultimately pulled him back after he made the unilateral decision to go in.

As I said earlier, the Israeli military is designed for its own playing field; that design goes deeper than just the units and the equipment. Issues of sustainablity, deployability, and the economy itself play a large role on Israeli strategic and operational design. The single time that the IDF got involved in combined operations with Western military forces was during the 1956 War; the Israeli "threat" against the Suez Canal gave the British and the French the coordinated pretext to seize the canal zone. It was the US under President Eisenhower who stood against that slight of hand operation.

Meanwhile, we did build the 1990 coalition with Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arab forces because incorporating those forces served ours and their interests.

best
Tom